If we look at the map of the country we shall see that the frontier at this point is crossed by three main passes, all leading into the Swat Valley. These passes, in order from east to west, are the Mora Pass^ the Shahkot Pass, and the Malakand Pass. All were reported equally difficult and each about 3,500 feet high, with a rough footpath, possible for laden animals, leading over each. From reasons of policy it was decided not to use the Mora Pass, with the idea of not disturbing unnecessarily possibly hostile tribes on that flank. There remained the Shahkot and Malakand Passes. A proclamation was sent on in advance to the people of Swat, saying that the British Government had no hostile intentions against them, but merely asked for right of way through their territory ; such a concession being liberally paid for. Had the people of Swat elected to accept these pacific terms a simultaneous advance would have been made by both passes ; but intelligence was received that all the passes were strongly held,. and especially so the Shahkot Pass. Sir Robert Low therefore decided to merely threaten the Shahkot and Mora Passes, whilst his real attack was made on the Malakand Pass. With this plan in view the ist Brigade bivouacked at Lundkwar in full sight of, and directly threatening, the Shahkot Pass ; whilst a strong cavalry reconnaissance was made towards the Mora Pass to stir up dust and to distract the enemy's attention from the true point of attack. The passes are, roughly speaking, about seven miles apart, and as soon as it was found that the enemy was irrevocably committed to defend all those passes, Sir Robert Low issued orders to concentrate on his left, and with his whole force stormed the Malakand Pass.

The battle took place on April 3rd, on the very day that Colonel Kelly's column crossed the Shandur Pass far away to the north, the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Waterfield leading, supported by the I St Brigade under Brigadier-General Kinloch, whilst the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Gatacre was held in reserve. The enemy's position extended along the crest of the pass, holding the heights on either flank, whilst a series of breastworks built of stone, each commanding the one below, were pushed down the main spurs. The : position was of extraordinary strength, and one which in the hands of an organised enemy would have taken a week to capture. The enemy's numbers were afterwards found to be about 12,000, about half of whom were armed, whilst the remainder were occupied in carrying off the killed and wounded, fetching water, and bowling down huge rocks on the assaulting columns. The extent of the position may be put down at one and a half miles. The regiments chiefly engaged were the King s Own Scottish Borderers, the Gordon Highlanders, the Guides, and the 4th Sikhs, all of the 2nd Brigade ; and the Bedfordshire Regiment, the 60th Rifles, the 15th Sikhs, and the 37th Dogras composing the 1st Brigade. Three mountain batteries massed under Major Dacres Cunningham also took a conspicuous part in the fight, whilst three Maxim guns also did their share towards defeating the enemy.

The plan of attack was as follows. The Guides, supported later by the 4th Sikhs, were to scale the precipitous height on the extreme right of the enemy s position, then turning inwards the two regiments were to sweep along the crest, taking the enemy in flank whilst the frontal attack was pushed home. It was calculated that the Guides would take three hours to reach the crest, but so stern was the resistance, and so jagged and perpendicular the ascent, that it took these practised mountaineers five hours before they had captured the last sangar and crowned the heights. Meanwhile as the day was drawing on it was considered inadvisable to delay longer the frontal attack, for the enemy had been now under a most searching and accurate shell fire from three batteries for the space of upwards of three hours and were naturally much shaken by it, whilst the action of the Guides had made itself well felt on his right flank ; orders were therefore given for the Kings Own Scottish Borderers and the Gordon Highlanders to advance to the attack, each being directed up a separate spur.

It was a fine and stirring sight to see the splendid dash with which the two Scotch regiments took the hill. From valley to crest at this point the height varies from i,ooo to i,500 feet and the slope looks for the most part almost perpendicular. It was this very steepness which partly accounted for the comparatively small loss suffered from the enemy's fire and the showers of huge boulders which were hurled upon the assailants ; but the chief reason for this happy immunity was the wonderfully spirited manner in which the men rushed breastwork after breastwork, and arrived just beneath the final ridge before the enemy had time to realise that the assaulting columns were at their very feet.

When the whole of the 2nd Brigade had thus got well under way orders were given for the ist Brigade to support them, the 60th Rifles, followed by the 1 5th Sikhs, being sent up a re-entrant, which intervened between the Kings Own Scottish Borderers and the Guides, whilst the Bedfordshire Regiment and 37th Dogras, heading on up the valley passed across the front of the enemy's position, and, circling round the rear of the Gordon Highlanders, attacked the enemy s extreme left. overlapping it considerably. The 60th Rifles after ascending some way suddenly came across an old Buddhist road, and turning sharp to their right along this soon found themselves level with the leading companies of the Kings Own Scottish Borderers. The whole line now took a moment s breathing time, to collect the men still struggling up in small groups, and to get into wind for the final rush. As soon as all was ready bayonets were fixed, the bugle s cheery call to advance was sounded, and with a great shout the position which from below appears almost impregnable was carried at the point of the bayonet ; the three British regi- ments reaching the crest at almost the same moment. Meanwhile the Guides and 4th Sikhs had stormed the lofty peak away on our left, and were ready to move inwards if such support had been necessary ; whilst the Bedfordshire Regiment and 37th Dogras scaling the heights before them dashed down the far valley in hot pursuit of the enemy, only halting when they reached the large walled village of Khar on the Swat River.

Thus brilliantly was an exceptionally strong position carried, and the first obstacle which lay in the path of the Southern column of the Relief Force brushed away. The action lasted five hours, and it is difficult to praise too highly the dash and determination with which the pass was carried. Nor is it possible to forget the sterling bravery of the enemy, who for five hours withstood a most searching and splendidly-directed shell fire from three batteries, ajid yet were still firm enough to stand up to a bayonet charge at the end of it. Their loss was computed by themselves at 500 killed, and the general average of battles would make their wounded probably reach a total of 1,000, or, say, a total loss of from 1,250 to 1,500. The British loss was under seventy killed and wounded.

Several curious cases of the vitality of the wounded was furnished by both sides. A man of the Guides, hit in the region of the stomach, climbed down to the foot -of the pass, and walked five miles back to the Field Hospital, supported by a comrade. One of the enemy on the other hand, with no less than six bullets through him, walked all the way to Chakdara, nine miles off, and was afterwards treated by our surgeons, and, strange to say, made a rapid recovery. There is no doubt that Asiatics can stand wounds inflicted by sword or bullet infinitely better than Europeans can. Wounds that would kill a European, or at any rate lay him up for months, affect these hardy and abstemious mountaineers in a very much less severe manner. Imagine, for instance, having the whole lock of an exploded gun blown into one's shoulder, and going about as if nothing in particular had happened ! Yet such a lock was cut out of a man s shoulder months after the occurrence by one of our surgeons. Marvellous cases of recovery, without number, might be told, but perhaps the case of quite a young boy is as typical as any. Like boys in any other part of the world, hearing that a fight was going to take place hard by, he naturally determined to go and look on. •Whilst he was thoroughly enjoying himself in all the excitement of the fight, and probably throwing stones vigorously, a stray bullet hit him in the arm, passing through it in several places and splintering it badly. When the pass was taken he was found lying wounded, and his wound was examined. The doctors decided that he must have his arm cut off, or mortification would certainly set in, and they gave the boy the choice between death or the amputation of his arm. He chose the former, but in a few days instead of being dead he was better, and in a few days more was out and about again.

Concealed amongst the rocks, boulders, and bushes, the enemy formed a most difficult mark to hit ; whilst the same causes, combined with the steepness of the ground, saved our troops from severer loss. The admirable control under which our infantry fire was kept may be gauged by the fact that the average expenditure of ammunition was under seven rounds per man throughout the day.

Of the enemy's bravery it is difficult to speak too highly, and individual cases were conspicuous. One leader, carrying a large red and white banner, called on his men to charge the Scottish Borderers when they were half way up the hill. The charge was made, but all his followers gradually fell, till the leader alone was left. Nothing daunted he held Steadily on, now and again falling, heavily hit, but up and on again without a moment s delay, till at last he was shot dead close to the line. More desperate courage than this is difficult to imagine. Again, one of the enemy's drummers, not content with taking his fair share of risks, persisted in mounting on to the roof of a hut, where he showed up clear and conspicuous against the sky line, and thence cheered on his comrades. Every now and again a bullet would find him out, and he would drop to dress his wounds, and then again mounting recommenced beating his drum. At last a bullet got him through the heart, and he fell headlong a hundred yards down the cliff, and there lay stark dead, but with his drum round his neck, and his arms ready raised to strike it. No doubt the great Mahomed will find a place for him in the ranks of the Mussulman Paradise.

On the night after the battle, the crest of the pass was held by the 1st Brigade, with two regiments pushed down as far as Khar, whilst the 2nd Brigade bivouacked at the south entrance of the pass. On the following morning commenced the stupendous task of pushing over the pass the ammunition baggage and supplies of the advanced brigades. The only available path was a single track very steep and much encumbered with boulders, which had been hastily improved by working parties of Sappers and Pioneers. Up this, from dawn to dusk, toiled batch after batch of laden mules, and yet at the end of the day small progress had been made. At this highly opportune moment it was discovered that the old Buddhist road, hit off by the 60th Rifles during the assault, led down by a good gradient to the plains. Every available man was immediately employed in improving this relic of a civilisation 2,000 years old, with the result that in another twenty-four hours the brigades were ready to move. Had it not been for this Buddhist road, the very existence of which appeared to have been forgotten by the present inhabitants, it would have taken many days to get the division across the Malakand Pass.

Whilst the work on the pass was going on, the ist Brigade moved down into the Swat Valley, and was fiercely assailed by several thousand of the enemy, who, finding the Shahkot and Mora Passes turned, came streaming westward, determined on a fight. These large bodies of men appeared on the spurs which flanked the advance of the 1st Brigade, and it became necessary to hold them in check till the brigade with its baggage could get clear into the open valley. This duty was successfully performed by the 37th Dogras, who crowned a neighbouring spur, as well as by the Mountain Artillery, which kept the enemy s crest well swept. Towards evening, however, the enemy, mistaking the defensive attitude of our troops, who were merely covering the advance of the remainder, were reported to be boldly issuing into the plain to the number of 2,000, making as if to sweep round the foot of the spur where it meets the plain, with a view to charging on to the head and flank of the advancing column. Receiving warning of this movement, orders were immediately given for the mere handful of cavalry which had been able so far to struggle over the pass to trot round the spur, and to watch for a chance of falling on the enemy in the open. This small body consisted of fifty sabres of the Guides Cavalry under Captain Adams, who, on reconnoitring round the spur, found the enemy in the open, but, like all mountaineers, hugging the foothills. Seeing his chance. Captain Adams, with great promptness and boldness, charged, doing great execution, and driving the whole mass of the enemy headlong into the hills. Not only was the charge brilliant and effective, but the moral effect was enormous. The enemy had not the remotest notion that any cavalry had crossed the pass, and like all nations unaccustomed to horses, they had exaggerated notions of the power of cavalry. When, therefore, they saw their worst fears more than realised, and fifty sabres without a ^ moment's hesitation charging a couple of thousand foot soldiers and completely altering the aspect of the fight, the ascendency of the cavalry arm was established for the campaign. Even Fowler and Edwardes, in their far-off captivity, heard nothing reiterated so much as this dread of cavalry. The immediate result was that the enemy began to melt away even from the hill tops, and by next morning not a vestige of them was to be seen. Our losses on this day were slight, including seven or eight in the cavalry, whilst the enemy suffered severely, at least 250 being killed.

On the 5th and 6th of April, reconnaissances under the Chief Staff Officer, General Blood, were pushed up the valley to search for fords across the Swat River, and to keep in touch with the enemy, who could be seen in considerable force beyond Thana. Suitable points of passage having been found, the duty of forcing the passage was entrusted to General Waterfield and the 2nd Brigade. The enemy now left Thana and crossing the river were reinforced by a body of riflemen sent down by Umra Khan under the command of his brother. In all about 4,500 men were posted in a naturally strong position to oppose the passage of the British force. On the enemy's bank small rocky hills at the water s edge, completely commanded the perfectly level and open southern bank, from which the attack had to be delivered. Naturally a frontal attack would have been very costly, but General Waterfield's smart tactical instinct showed him the way to gain his end with but slight loss. Engaging the enemy heavily at long ranges with his artillery and the main body of his Infantry, he sent the Guides Cavalry and nth Bengal Lancers up the river with orders to cross by a little-known ford, and to fall briskly on the flank and rear of the enemy. To support the cavalry he sent the 15th Sikh Infantry. The effect was instantaneous ; the defenders of the passage the moment they saw the dread Lancers, half swimming, half wading, across the river, a mile or so up stream, than they began to lose heart ; and what at first was a retirement gradually degenerated into a flight, headed by Umra Khan's brother and the body of horsemen escorting him. But the Lancers and Guides were not to be denied, and falling on the demoralised foe, left the green crops strewn with their dead. The enemy's total loss was about 400 killed, of whom about one hundred fell to the cavalry. Holding the north bank with two battalions, fords were rapidly marked out, and the infantry, aided by inflated skins, and the skilled watermen of the country impressed for the service, struggled across with only two or three casualties from drowning. The work was an anxious one, for armpit deep in the rushing torrent a man washed off his legs was lost for ever.

During the cavalry pursuit one of the squadrons of the nth Bengal Lancers narrowly missed captur- ing Umra Khan s brother, which at the time would have been a great coup. For it must be remembered that two British officers, Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, were all this time prisoners in Umra Khan s hands, and entirely at his mercy. It may be said that the halter was round their necks, and every blow our forces struck served but to tighten the knot. With Umra Khan's brother in our hands the situ- ation would have been reciprocated, and we could then have afforded to treat on equal terms for an exchange. During this same pursuit a curious inci- dent occurred. One or two of the enemy made a stand close to a tree in the plain ; at them charged a trooper, lance well down, as hard as he could gallop ; whether he hit his man or not history does not relate, but the next second he found himself and his horse at the bottom of a well, which without side walls stood behind the tree. His horse was killed, but he himself escaped with a bad shaking. If one may hark so far back a similar accident met an uncle of the author's. Lieutenant George Younghusband, of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, in the Mutiny. He was charging with his squadron with Greathead s column, on their march to the relief of Agra, when he came across a blind well, down which he fell, with his mounted orderly on top of him. His orderly and the two horses were killed, and he only came out alive, but alas ! only to be killed in another charge shortly afterwards.

In the village of Chakdara, which lies near the main ford on the north bank, many arms were found, and amongst others a straight officer s sword, cavalry pattern, by Wilkinson, of London. As the number was on the sword, application was made to Messrs. Wilkinson to find out from their books the name of the original owner of the sword. It turned out to be an officer of the name of Bellew. This is very probably Bellew of the loth Hussars, who served in Afghanistan in 1878-79, and is still in that regiment, having changed his name to Bryan. We had here evidence of the immense strength of the class of stone fort built by Umra Khan. The fort is called Ra- mora, and lay east of Chakdara, being Umra Khan's advanced fort, with which he practically domin- ated the entire Swat Valley. This was captured after a short resistance, and sentenced to be blown up by the Sappers. But sentence was one thing, and execution another. A heavy charge was placed at the foot of one of the towers, the train lighted, and the spectators stood afar off, expecting to see the whole structure lifted sky high. There was a very loud report indeed, but that was all, for the tower stood perfectly unmoved. On further examination it was found that the base of each tower was perfectly solid masonry from the foundation to fifteen feet above ground line, whilst the walls above were of immense thickness. All the forts built by Umra Khan were of the same pattern, that is, four-cornered, with one of these strong towers at each corner, and with high walls of great thickness and carefully loopholed forming the four sides. Our artillery could make no impression on these forts. The sites chosen in the open valleys are very good ; but in the narrow valleys they are perforce much com- manded by the neighbouring precipitous hills. On the Swat River, the enemy's position, with the fort of Ramora on one flank, rocky hills well prepared for defence on the other, the village of Chakdara in the centre, with much swampy ground restricting the advance of an enemy even after the passage of the river to a few well-defined paths, combined to make the position if scientifically held a remarkably- strong one.

The river is now spanned by three bridges — a fine suspension bridge, a pontoon bridge and a trestle and pier bridge, the latter two being liable to be washed away in flood time.

Directly the passage of the Swat River had been effected the Sappers were set to work to construct the trestle and pier bridge, whilst strong recon- naissances were sent forward to keep in touch with the enemy. These found the Katgola Pass over the Laram Range unoccupied, and the cavalry push- ing on descended on to the Panjkora River, some twenty miles ahead. Here was found the most formidable obstacle which the force had yet en- countered. On April 9th, the river was fordable for horses and, with difficulty, also for infantry ; on the nth, it was barely fordable for horses, and not at all for Infantry ; but from that time onwards it became a mighty torrent totally unfordable, im- practicable also for cavalry swimming, though the Indian trooper and his horse are like ducks in the water. It became necessary therefore to build a bridge.

The only materials immediately at hand were the heavy logs of wood, parts of great trees which are annually floated down from these parts to India, for sale. With these, and using telegraph wire to anchor the piers, a rough footbridge was with great difficulty and danger constructed, and floated into position. On the night of April 12 th, the Guides were pushed across, and strongly entrenched, so as to cover the bridge head. The night passed quietly, but towards morning a freshet came down bearing great logs and washed the bridge away, leaving the Guides on the far side. The position was undoubtedly an awkward one, for cavalry recon- naissances had reported that the enemy in some strength, calculated at 9,000 by the local people, lay only about seven miles westward, and the news of the bridge breaking would immediately be reported by their outlooks. However it never does in fighting these people to hesitate or appear to be in the least discomposed, happen what may. Colonel Battye, who was commanding the Guides on this occasion, therefore adhered to the orders received overnight, when the bridge was intact. These orders were to turn the enemy's sharpshooters out of the positions from which they had been annoying our working parties, and to burn such villages near at hand as had been furnishing armed parties to fire across the river by night and day. The bold offensive thus taken by the Guides undoubtedly had a good effect. They started early in the morning and making a wide sweep drove out all parties of the enemy concealed amongst the rocks, and burnt such villages as were actively hostile. All this was easy work for troops highly skilled in hill warfare, though the climbing was very stiff ; but the really stern trial came when the hour arrived to retire to the bridge head. It requires the very best and steadiest of troops to carry out a retirement in the face of great odds, and it requires still greater nerve to do so in the presence of a brave and fanatical foe who count life as nothing, who with matchless courage charge right up to the muzzle of a breechloader, and who give no quarter and ask for none.

In retiring before such an enemy an almost exaggerated deliberation is required, for the least appearance of hurry, much more so of confusion, will open the sluice gates and let in such a stormy torrent of warriors, that science must perforce give way to weight of numbers.

The story of the day's fighting may thus be briefly told. The Guides had completed their mission on which they had been despatched, and were now retiring down the spurs of a lofty hill which forms the angle where the Jandul River flows into the Panjkora River. This hill is to the south of the Jandul River, whilst the bridge head was to the north of it. Thus, to reach their entrenched position the Guides had to retire down the mountain they were on and to cross the Jandul River. At about twelve noon two dense columns of the enemy were seen coming down the Jandul Valley, one column keeping to the right bank, and the other to the left bank of the Jandul River. The first column, breasting the mountain out of range of the Guides and mostly hidden from them by an intervening spur, reached the summit and attacked the regiment Strongly as it retired. The second column sweeping down the valley prepared to assail the Guides in flank and rear, hoping to completely cut off their retreat. Foot by foot — to the spectators it seemed almost inch by inch — the different companies retired alternately down the ridges they occupied, fiercely assailed on all hands yet coolly firing volley after volley, relinquishing quietly and almost imperceptibly one strong position only to take up another a few yards back, the splendidly directed fire of the Derajat Mountain Battery doing invaluable service ; so good indeed was the fire discipline of the troops engaged under these trying circumstances that not a shot was fired except by word of command. Mean- while two companies of the regiment, which had been left to hold the bridge head, moved out to check* the advance of the enemy's second column, which, making a detour, was moving with determination into the flank and rear of the retreating force. The whole of the 2nd Brigade, a battery of artillery, and a Maxim gun, were now ordered out and placed in a strong position on the east bank of the Panjkora (the Guides being on the west bank), whence in the later stages of the retirement their fire could be of material assistance. Owing to the very broken nature of the mountain sides, and the excellent cover afforded to skilled skirmishers, our loss was exceedingly small till the foot of the hill was reached. Here the regiment had to cross several hundred yards of level ground, on which the green barley was standing waist high, and theil cross the Jandul River, here about three feet deep, to make its way through more fields to the bridge head. Unhappily, just as the regiment left the last spur, the commanding officer, Lieutenant- Colonel F. D. Battye was mortally wounded, dying, as he would perhaps most wish to, at the head of his regiment, after a quarter of a century of distinguished service with it.

It was in crossing this open ground that the extraordinary bravery of the enemy became more brilliantly evident. Standard-bearers with reckless gallantry could be seen rushing to certain destruction, falling perhaps within ten yards of the invincible line of the Guides. Nay, sometimes men, devoid of all fear, and having used up the whole of their ammunition, rushed forward with, large rocks and hurled these at the soldiers, courting instant death. They were like hounds on their prey. Nothing could damp their ardour or check the fury of their assaults. Even after the Guides had crossed the Jandul stream, and the enemy were under a severe flank fire from the Gordon Highlanders and the Kings Own Scottish Borderers, they dashed into the stream, where each one stood out as clear as a bulls eye on a target, and attempted to close again. But not a man got across, so steady and well directed was the flank fire of the British regiments. The fight was now practically over for the day; fire slackened all round, and the entrenched position was rapidly occupied, and strengthened where necessary. During the day the enemy, who numbered 5,000, lost from 500 to 600 men ; the Guides' total loss was only about twenty, a result due to the skilful manner in which the retirement was effected, as well as to the fine cover afforded by the broken ground on the mountain side.

It was now evening, and preparations had to be made to meet a night attack, for the enemy, several thousand strong, were still close round hidden be- hind the low hills. As a reinforcement a couple of companies of the 4th Sikhs and some spare officers were sent -across in rafts, with a Maxim gun ; whilst the near bank, which commanded the bridge head entrenchment at 800 yards' range, was occupied by a mountain battery, and the troops of the 2nd Brigade. The position of the enemy being such as it was,. the night was one of some .anxiety, for a determined rush might be expected at any moment. Such an attack was planned and on the eve of being executed, when the unexpected, and as it seemed to the enemy, magical, appearance of a star shell completely dumfounded the hitherto dauntless foe, and the attack was not delivered. From the information of spies it appeared afterwards that 2,000 chosen warriors, sword in hand, lay concealed in the standing corn just outside the picquets, merely awaiting the signal for assault, when this happy contrivance of civilisation staved off a fight, which could only have been attended with enormous loss on both sides. Before the enemy finally drew off however, the force sustained a serious loss in the death of Captain Peebles, in charge of the Maxim gun. This officer's services had proved invaluable from his intimate knowledge of the working of the Maxim, a gun which in inexpert hands is apt, like other pieces of mechanism, to get out of order. The working of Captain Peebles's gun had been the admiration of the whole force throughout the campaign.

It had become sufficiently apparent now that no floating bridge could hope to stand the current in the Panjkora River, and it was therefore decided to throw across a suspension bridge at a point some- what lower down. Curiously enough at this point, where the rocky hills shut in the river till it is like a mill race only 100 feet or so across, were found bridging materials collected by Umra Khan, who had evidently ordered a cantilever bridge to be built here. The work was entrusted to Major Aylmer, V.C., R.E., who had had much experience in this branch of his art up in the Gilgit direction. The available materials were telegraph wire and beams from dismantled houses. With these, within forty- eight hours, Major Aylmer constructed a suspension bridge of l00 feet span, capable of bearing even loaded camels, cavalry, and mountain artillery.

During the construction a very prompt and plucky act on Major Aylmer s part saved the life of a soldier. About a mile up stream, where the first floating bridge had been constructed, a flying bridge and rafts were still working | backwards and for- wards, to supply the Guides with their wants on the other bank. One of these rafts, on which were two men of the Devonshire Regiment Maxim Gun Detachment, got accidentally overturned, and the boat- men and oars were washed away. The two soldiers managed to climb on to the raft and were carried down stream at a great pace. General Gatacre, seeing the accident, immediately galloped down to the site of the new bridge to give warning, in the hopes of saving the men. Meanwhile one man had made an attempt to jump on shore, and had been swept away and drowned, and the survivor on the raft came flying down the torrent. With the greatest presence of mind and pluck Major Aylmer immediately slipped down a slack wire that was across the river, and just managed to grab the soldier as he shot past. The raft was immediately after dashed to pieces on the rocks below. With considerable difficulty the soldier and his preserver were hauled on shore, and it was then found that the Major was badly bruised and cut by the wire. The Royal Humane Society's medal has been given for many a less distinguished act of bravery, yet I do not think that in the stir of passing events it actually occurred to any of the spectators to send the recommendation home.

Certain news came in about now that Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, the two officers who had fallen into Umra Khan s hands, were at Barwa, a small fort only about eighteen miles distant, on the other side of the Panjkora. This rather complicated matters, for according to all precedent and our former experiences of Pathan warfare these officers' lives were not worth an hour s purchase in any case, and their murder in cold blood might be calculated on as a moral certainty if we were to attack. The follow- ing note was received from the officers, written from Barwa: — Fowler R.E, and Edwardes 2nd Bombay Grenadiers are shut in Barwa can you get us out. Give bearers Rs.ioo. 7.4.94 (stc) P.S. Shall we try and bolt people here panic." A hasty scrawl written on the leaf of a note-book.

The title " Political " officer is one of ill omen in the Indian Army, but in Major Deane the force had a guide, philosopher, and friend whose services throughout were simply invaluable. Added to an intimate knowledge of the country, its people, and language, he added a shrewd knowledge of how to deal with them. To Major Deane's diplomatic skill Lieu- tenants Fowler and Edwardes in all human probability owe their lives, and their release freed the General's arm to strike, unhampered by the thought that his action might sound the death-knell of the two young* officers. In meeting Major Deane half way in these diplomatic overtures Umra Khan displayed an enlightened and civilised advancement which is far ahead of his surroundings. Without demanding any quid pro guOy he, when they were asked for, returned the prisoners in all honour, having treated them thoroughly well throughout.

Whilst the Sappers are busy building their bridge over the Panjkora this would be a not altogether unfavourable moment to epitomise the campaign in so far as it had conduced to the relief of the beleaguered garrison up to this date. Every effort had failed to get news from the besieged, nor had it been found possible by any device — for many were tried — to throw news of the. coming succour into the fort. But so far great results had been gained ; the commander-in-chief, the soul and body of the siege, Umra Khan himself, with one thousand of his picked men, mostly armed with breech-loaders, had been compelled to abandon the siege, and to hasten back southwards and to organise, resistance to and raise the tribes against our advance. On this same date, April 13th, Colonel Kelly and his handful of men were at Mastuj, having accomplished his celebrated passage of the Shandur Pass. His advance so far had been but slightly opposed. From reliable information it was supposed that the garrison of Chitral had supplies to last them only up to April 22nd. A week therefore only remained, and before the Southern force lay Umra Khan with 9,000 men and two mighty ranges of mountains, whilst the Northern force, under Colonel Kelly, though within sixty miles of Chitral, had before it a narrow and difficult route, at any point in which the enemy might be found strongly posted.