


CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO CHITRAL, 1895

EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

CORRESPONDENCE


RELATING TO

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CHITRAL.

Presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:


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Correspondence relating to Chitral.



No. 1.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 17 of June 11, 1877.

WE have to submit, for your Lordship's approval, an account of the action we have taken for securing an object of importance in the general scheme for the protection of the north-west frontier; that is to say, an efficient control over the passes of the Hindu Kush between the eastern confines of Afghanistan and the north-western frontier of Cashmere.

It appeared to us imperative to take an early opportunity of encouraging our loyal feudatory, the Maharaja of Cashmere, to obtain an effective, but peaceful, control over the countries lying between those passes and the Cashmere frontier, namely, Chitral, Mastuj, Yassin, and their dependencies.

A favourable opportunity for commencing negotiations on this subject presented itself in the arrival at Srinagar, in the middle of 1876, of one Jafar Ali, the bearer of communications from the Chitral Chief to His Highness the Maharaja of Cashmere. Later in the year, in response to a friendly answer from His Highness, another messenger arrived with an important letter. The Chief of Chitral formally tendered his allegiance to the Ruler of Cashmere, adding that his relative, the Chief of Dir, was with him, and that Raja Pahlwan, the Ruler of Yassin and Mastuj, was his dependent, and would likewise accept the suzerainty of the Maharaja.

The offer of the Chitral Chief having been reported to the Viceroy, the subject was reserved by his Excellency for discussion with the Maharaja on the occasion of his interview with His Highness at Madhopore on the 17th and 18th November 1876. What passed on that occasion will be found in the record of our proceedings. It will suffice here to state that, while the Maharaja undertook to endeavour by peaceful negotiation to obtain political control over Chitral and Yassin, his Excellency promised to aid the negotiations by all the means in his power, and assured His Highness that, in the event of his action involving him unexpectedly in military operations, the British Government would, if necessary, afford him countenance and material aid. It was further agreed that an English officer should be appointed to reside permanently in Gilgit for the purpose of obtaining information as to the progress of events beyond the Cashmere frontier; also that a line of telegraph should be constructed by the Maharaja, connecting Gilgit, Srinagar, and Jammu with the British telegraph system; and, lastly, that the agents from Chitral and Yassin, then in the camp of the Maharaja, should accompany that Chief to Delhi, in order to be present at the Imperial assemblage. They did so, and at an interview at Delhi with the Foreign Secretary, in the presence of the Maharaja's Minister, emphatically confirmed the representations previously made as to the anxiety of the Chitral Chief to become the vassal of Cashmere.

After the close of the Imperial assemblage, Bairam Shah, one of the Chitral agents, proceeded on his return journey to Chitral by the Peshawar route, accompanied by two representatives from the Maharaja, for the purpose of continuing the friendly negotiations which had been commenced under such good auspices. Meanwhile another letter from Aman-ul-Mulk reached His Highness by the Gilgit route, reporting the unexpected defection of the Chief of Dir to Cabul, but reiterating his tender of allegiance to Cashmere, and promising in the early spring to send his son Nizam-ul-Mulk with Raja Pahlwan to Gilgit to consummate arrangements. Thus matters remained until the 28th of March, when a telegram was received from Major Henderson, the officer on special duty with the Maharaja, reporting receipt by His Highness of another letter from Aman-ul-Mulk to the effect that all the neighbouring Chiefs were submitting to the Amir of Cabul, that he was left isolated and too weak to resist without assistance the pressure he expected from a Cabul agent then on his way to Chitral.

In reply to the above, his Excellency in Council authorised the Maharaja to instruct the Chitral Chief to resist the claims of Cabul, and to furnish him with the means of doing so, relying, if necessary, on the support of the British Government. At the same time, under instructions from his Excellency in Council, a letter was addressed by the

Commissioner of Peshawar to the Amir of Cabul, warning him against any endeavour to assume sovereignty over Bajaor, Swat, Dir, or Chitral; and reminding His Highness that, as the British Government had never recognised his claim to allegiance from those States, to enforce it without the assent of that Government would be regarded as an unfriendly act.

What may be the practical result of the above negotiations between the Maharaja of Cashmere and the Chitral Chief it is of course impossible to predict with confidence; but there can be but little doubt that the people of Dardistan, who differ wholly in race, language, and traditions from the Pathans of the west, regard with deep concern the advancing pressure from Afghanistan, and are in sore need of a friendly protector. Thus there is a fair prospect of the Cashmere Ruler, supported as he is by the power and prestige of the British Government, being able to acquire such influence and control in the above-mentioned States as will enable us, in course of time, to make such political and military arrangements as will effectually command the passes of the Hindu Kush.

We venture to hope that our proceedings may receive the approval of Her Majesty's Government, which will learn, we feel sure, with much satisfaction, that the Maharaja of Cashmere has displayed the greatest loyalty and earnestness in support of our policy in this important matter, and is at this moment hastening the construction of a line connecting Gilgit, Srinagar, and Jammu, with our telegraphic system.

No. 2.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 49, of February 28, 1879.

MY LORD,

IN our letter No. 17 of 1877, dated 11th June, we submitted an account of the action we had taken with the object of securing efficient control over the passes of the Hindu Kush between the eastern confines of Afghanistan and the north-western frontier of Kashmir.

The diaries and other papers that have been forwarded from time to time will have kept your Lordship informed of the general tenor of our correspondence and proceedings, subsequent to the date of that letter, in furtherance of the views therein explained. The appointment of an officer to Gilgit has much aided the extension of our knowledge of the physical features of the adjacent country, and of the different tribes which inhabit it. And we propose to take this opportunity of stating more definitely the policy which, with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, we propose gradually to follow out upon that section of our extreme north-western frontier.

The greater part of the territory between Wakhan and the border of India proper is well within the reach of our effective influence. There can be no doubt that the movement of events in this quarter, though at present indeterminate and complicated, is so far significant that it should place us on our guard. The petty Chiefs who own the wild country below Sarikol and around Kashmir are evidently in much perplexity. They have been recently tendering, more or less surreptitiously, their allegiance alternately to Kabul, Kashmir, and China—the Chief of Hunza (for example), though disavowing political disloyalty to Kashmir, has undeniably made overtures to Tashkurgan; and the Chief of Chitral endeavours to trim between Kabul and Kashmir. They are all, in fact, doubting to which quarter they should look for the safest barter of their allegiance in return for protection by some paramount power. Meanwhile, to these Chiefs belong the southern openings of the only passes which give direct passage through the mountain ranges up to Sarikol on the Pamir steppes—the district which the dilapidation of the Kashgar dynasty has left politically masterless. And we have to remember that the remarkable depression or break in the great mountain barrier of the Hindu Kush, where it is crossed by the Iskamun and Baroghil passes, occurs just where a section of our frontier with Central Asia is held by a Native Indian State.

All these facts and tendencies, reviewed collectively, have confirmed our impressions of the importance of making out, as definitely as the nature of the country and our knowledge of its condition will permit, the territorial limits up to which we should extend our indirect authority, and within which the encroachments of foreign influence should be anticipated. Throughout the zone of quasi-independent territory which this limit would include, it may be sufficient for a long time to come that our political supremacy shall be tacitly accepted, to the exclusion of other similar claims or assertions. We may thus succeed in adjourning, upon the border of India beyond Kashmir, that contact between

the recognised territories of England and Russia in Asia to which some may look forward as ultimately inevitable, but which it is not our concern in India to facilitate or expedite. It is true that upon this section of the Hindu Kush range the whole country is so difficult, remote, and ill-populated, that there is little to attract advance or occupation from the northern side of the mountains, either on political or on military grounds. Nevertheless all our experience in Asia points to the inconvenience of an undefined frontier, and to the expediency of laying down some general political demarcation where debatable border lands interpose between the necessarily converging forces of two powerful States. The line which we may at first adopt as defining the sphere of our political influence should coincide generally with the geographical outline of the position which, if need be, we may be ready to maintain actively. If we are enabled deliberately and at leisure to examine and select our ground, and by degrees to accustom the people to a political connexion with India, we shall the more certainly avoid committing ourselves to the occupation of any position, military or political, from which we might afterwards find ourselves obliged to withdraw.

Upon these general principles we have examined carefully the strategical features as well as the political aspect of our frontier beyond Kashmir, with the object of settling this line of political demarcation. In this direction the natural boundary of India is formed by the convergence of the great mountain ranges of the Himalayas and of the Hindu Kush which here extend northward up to their junction. The Mustagh range, running up from south-eastward to the Baroghil Pass, marks the water-parting between the Tagdunbush Pamir and Sarikol on the north, and the Upper Indus Valleys southward. From the Baroghil Pass south-west the Hindu Kush divides the watershed of the Oxus and the Indus. Within the angle thus formed lie the territories of Chitral, Darel, Yassin, Hunza, and other petty dependencies. From Hunza, on the slopes of the Mustagh, westward to Chitral under the Hindu Kush, these States occupy the valleys which run up to the skirts of the ranges, and are drained by the uppermost tributaries of the Indus river system. And the only passes through these ranges from the Pamir are, as we have said, in the hands of these semi-independent Chiefs. If, we extend, and by degrees consolidate, our influence over this country, and if we resolve that no foreign interference can be permitted on this side of the mountains, or within the drainage system of the Indus, we shall have laid down a natural line of frontier which is distinct, intelligible, and likely to be respected.

We purpose, therefore, to follow out consistently the policy of which the first steps were reported and explained by our letter of 11th June 1877. Our object, as there stated, is to acquire, through the Ruler of Kashmir, the power of making such political and military arrangements as will effectually command the passes of the Hindu Kush. With this object, we shall take every opportunity of strengthening our control over the country lying south of the mountain slopes; and of attaching the Chiefs, through Kashmir, to British interests. Major Biddulph has recently visited Yassin and Chitral from Gilgit, and his explorations have added much to our knowledge of the country, and of its people. Our officers in Kashmir will be instructed to discourage and counteract all tendencies of the Kunjod Chiefs towards acknowledgement of any superior authority other than that of the Kashmir Ruler; and the Chitral engagement with Kashmir (which has been concluded and is forwarded herewith) will be drawn as close as possible. We may thus succeed in retaining and settling down within our political system all the country which falls inside our geographical frontier. And although we desire to realise our plans gradually, by pacific means, we shall nevertheless consider it from the first incumbent upon the Government of India to prevent, at any cost, the establishment within this outlying country of the political preponderance of any other power. Nor do we anticipate that any such interference with our legitimate supremacy will be attempted in earnest; so soon as it shall have become known that we have marked out a clear and consistent frontier, and that we intend to maintain it.

No. 3.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 241, of December 22, 1880.

WE have the honour to submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of papers regarding the late disturbances in the neighbourhood of Gilgit.

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For some time before the occurrence of the outbreak, which was reported to your Lordship by telegram, disquieting rumours had reached us regarding the attitude of some of the Chiefs on the northern frontiers of Kashmir. The garrison of Chaprot had been strengthened by the Maharaja in accordance with the advice of the Officer on Special Duty at Gilgit, and it was hoped that there was no immediate cause for alarm, but Major Biddulph was not free from anxiety as to the intentions of the neighbouring tribes, and there was some reason to apprehend that a general feeling of disaffection existed among them.

The first intimation of any actual trouble reached us on the 6th November, when we received telegraphic news from Srinagar to the effect that the fort of Sher, to the west of Gilgit, had been attacked by the Yassinees.

It seems, from such information as has yet reached us, that, on the 28th October, a force of about 750 men, led by Pehlwan Bahadur, the Chief of Yassin, surprised the frontier fort of Gakuch and marched upon Gilgit. The Kashmir fort at Sher was invested and attacked, and Major Biddulph was informed that more than one of the neighbouring Chiefs only awaited its fall to join the insurgents. He advanced to its relief with his own escort of twenty Native infantry and some Kashmir troops, but the attempt failed, and for a time there was a prospect of his being himself besieged. On the 19th November, however, we received news that Pehlwan Bahadur had broken up the investment of Sher and withdrawn; and it appears from later intelligence that, attacked or threatened in rear by the Chitral Chief, he has been abandoned by his men, and has fled almost alone towards Wakhan. The rising has therefore for the present completely collapsed, and there is reason to hope that no further disturbances may take place.

The causes and objects of the rising are as yet obscure, and a report has been called for on the subject. In the meanwhile, we have sent Major Biddulph instructions to avoid any steps likely to involve him in fresh complications upon the Gilgit border, and we have directed him to come himself to head-quarters as soon as the weather permits, in order that the situation may, if possible, be fully explained. Colonel Tanner, who has a thorough knowledge of the surrounding country, was deputed at the beginning of the affair to accompany the reinforcements sent up by His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, and he will remain temporarily in Gilgit after Major Biddulph's departure.

On receipt of complete information we shall again address your Lordship upon the subject. At present we would only add that the Maharaja of Kashmir seems to have spared no exertions to push forward an effective force for Major Biddulph's relief, and that His Highness has endeavoured in every way to meet our wishes in the matter.

No. 4.

COPY of a DESPATCH from HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 5, dated January 28, 1881.

MY LORD MARQUESS,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of Letter, No. 241, of the 22nd December last, from your Excellency's Government regarding the late disturbances in the neighbourhood of Gilgit.

2. I shall reserve any detailed expression of my views on this subject until I am in possession of the complete information promised by your Excellency in Council, but in the meantime I desire to convey my full approval to the instructions you have issued to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir directing Major Biddulph to repair to the head-quarters of your Government, when able to do so, that the situation may be fully explained, and causing that officer to be warned in clear and definite terms against taking or encouraging during the winter any steps likely to involve him directly or indirectly in fresh complications upon the Gilgit border.

HARTINGTON.

No. 5.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 103, of July 15, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 5 of the 28th January 1881, regarding affairs in Gilgit.

In our letter No. 241 of December 1880, we submitted such information as we then possessed regarding the causes and progress of the rising by which Gilgit was endangered

towards the close of last year. We proposed again to address your Lordship on receipt of complete information; and it was added that in the meanwhile Major Biddulph had been warned to avoid any steps likely to involve him in fresh complications, and had been directed to come to head-quarters as soon as the weather permitted, in order that the situation might be fully explained. Your Lordship approved of these instructions, but reserved any detailed expression of your views upon the subject generally until the complete information promised should have been received.

We have now the honour to forward a copy of further correspondence showing the reports received and the action taken upon them by the Government of India. Your Lordship will see that it has been decided to withdraw the Gilgit Agency, and that the Maharaja of Kashmir has been so informed. The reasons for this step are various; but it may be briefly stated that neither the Government of India, nor, apparently, the Maharaja of Kashmir, is at present in a position to answer for the safety of a British officer at Gilgit in the event of a sudden attack upon the place by the independent and unruly tribes of the neighbourhood; while, on the other hand, the expectations formed from the establishment of the Agency have not been fulfilled. Major Biddulph was deputed to Gilgit in 1877 with the object, first, of obtaining trustworthy information in regard to occurrences beyond the border; and, secondly, of gaining influence among the neighbouring tribes. There can be no doubt that Major Biddulph, who is an active and enterprising officer, has during his residence at Gilgit added much to our knowledge of the country round, and of the tribes inhabiting it; the intelligence which he has from time to time obtained of the course of events in Chitral and Badakshan has not been unimportant, and he was well placed for observing, during our recent occupation of Kabul, the general state and tendency of affairs in the countries bordering on North-East Afghanistan. On the other hand, his position in the remote corner of a foreign State obliged him to deal chiefly with these tribes through the medium, not always trustworthy or favourable, of the local officials. Any attempts to exercise direct influence would have been met by suspicion and jealousy; while he was continually hampered by the double-dealing, intrigues, and feuds of the petty Chiefs over whom he had no real control. The late rising of the Yassin Chief, who had previously been friendly, and whose conduct is still unexplained, shows that the Political Agent had failed, probably through the inevitable difficulties of his situation, to secure any solid or durable influence over the petty Chiefships with whom he has had dealings for three years past. Under these circumstances, it appeared to us that the British Agency at Gilgit could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassment and anxieties altogether disproportionate to the advantages which could be expected to result from its maintenance. We therefore decided to withdraw it, and to leave altogether in the hands of the Kashmir Durbar the local management of affairs upon the northern frontiers of the State.

The Maharaja has not been given to understand that the withdrawal of the Agency is final. On the contrary, the Government of India have reserved full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit if this should hereafter seem desirable. His Highness has further been informed that the relations of the Kashmir State with the Chiefships adjoining its northern frontier cannot be otherwise than a matter of permanent concern to the British Government; that the Durbar will be expected to supply early and accurate information of the course of events throughout that region; and that the British Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir should be consulted on matters affecting the relations of Kashmir with any of the neighbouring States. But Colonel Tanner, who is now carrying on the duties of the Gilgit Agency, has been directed to march down before the end of the summer, with his office establishment, and to inform the Chiefs and others with whom he has relations that the Agency will not remain during the coming winter. He will avoid all appearance of haste, and will conclude any current business or correspondence; but it is expected that he will have left Gilgit by the end of the present month.

It will be seen from the correspondence enclosed that Aman-ul-Mulk, the Ruler of Chitral, by whose action the late invasion of Gilgit territory from Yassin was frustrated, has applied to be admitted into direct political relations with the British Government, and has put in a claim to a substantial reward for his services. His agent has been to Simla, and has presented a letter from his master setting forth certain definite requests. As Aman-ul-Mulk has, with the approval of the Government of India, contracted engagements by which he entered into a condition of subordinate alliance with the Kashmir State, his application to be admitted to direct political relations cannot be entertained. He has, however, been reassured in regard to his expressed apprehensions of encroachment or interference from the direction of Afghanistan, and the Maharaja's attention has been directed to his claims.

It will be observed that the Maharaja proposes to increase the Chitral subsidy, declining the offer that a share of the expense should be borne by the British Government, and that His Highness also agrees, conditionally, to the partition of the Yassin territories desired by Aman-ul-Mulk. We see no reason for demurring to the views of the Maharaja, who is principally interested in these arrangements; and we have instructed Mr. Henvey accordingly. But as there appears to be no advantage in dealing with the Chief of Dir through Kashmir, or in encouraging the Kashmir State to attempt to extend its influence in that quarter, we have instructed Mr. Henvey that the Maharaja's suggestion upon this point need not be further entertained.

No. 6.

COPY of a DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 36, dated September 16, 1881.

MY LORD MARQUESS,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 103, dated the 15th July last, reporting your decision to withdraw the British Agency from Gilgit, and your orders upon various points affecting the relations between the Maharajah of Kashmir and the Chiefs of Chitral and Dir.

2 The result of the careful consideration which your Excellency in Council has given to the question, consequent on the attack on Gilgit which was made by Pahlwan Khan of Yassin in the autumn of last year, has led you to the conclusion that the Agency there could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassments and anxieties disproportionate to the advantages that might be expected from its maintenance. The Officiating Agent has accordingly been directed to withdraw with his establishment before the end of the summer, and the decision to this effect has been communicated to the Maharajah of Kashmir, although in terms which reserve to Government full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit, should such a measure hereafter appear desirable.

3. Under all the circumstances of the case, I approve of the decision at which you have arrived. The appointment of an Agent at Gilgit appears from the first to have been distasteful to the Maharajah of Kashmir, and, from whatever cause, has failed to realise the expectations with which it was made in 1877. The position in which Major Biddulph was placed by the outbreak of last year, if not one of serious danger, was certainly humiliating, and only some very clear advantage would justify the permanent retention of an officer in a post so isolated, exposed to such attacks. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that the effect of the withdrawal of the Agent may possibly be practically to close a valuable channel of information as to the course of events in the countries between Kashmir and Russian Turkestan, at a moment when such information is likely to be of particular interest, as well as to diminish in some degree your knowledge of the intrigues to which that part of the frontier is specially exposed. How far this result may follow must to a very great extent depend upon the good faith of the Maharajah of Kashmir, in which your Excellency in Council is no doubt justified in confiding. In the event, which I should be sorry to anticipate, of that confidence proving to be misplaced, and of the Maharajah failing to keep you fully informed of what is passing on his borders and those of his feudatory, the Mir of Chitral, it might be necessary to reconsider the expediency of deputing an officer to Gilgit, at all events during the summer months.

4. As regards the relations between the Maharajah of Kashmir and the Chiefs of Chitral and Dir, I approve of the orders which you have issued. It is desirable that the dependence of Aman-ul-Mulk on His Highness, which has been recognised by Treaty between the two rulers, should be maintained and confirmed, especially as the result of recent events has been to place the Chief of Chitral in possession of Yassin, which is on the Gilgit side of the watershed. On the other hand, it is not obvious that any advantage would be gained by the extension of Kashmir influence over the contiguous State of Dir, and the views which the Maharajah appears to entertain on that head have properly been discouraged.

HARTINGTON.

EXTRACT from LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 58, dated May 6, 1889.

WE have the honour to submit proposals for the re-establishment of a British Agency in Gilgit.

It is unnecessary for us to dwell upon the importance of the country lying to the north and north-west of Kashmir. This has long been recognised, and during the Viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, as your Lordship is aware, an English officer was sent to Gilgit with the object of establishing our influence among the neighbouring Chiefships, and obtaining information from the districts lying beyond the Kashmir frontier. The attempt was not successful, and in 1881 the Agency was withdrawn. Since then circumstances have greatly changed, and we are convinced that there is now good reason for reverting, with some modifications, to the arrangement made by Lord Lytton, and there are no sufficient grounds for anticipating a second failure. The advance of Russia up to the frontiers of Afghanistan, and the great recent development of her military resources in Asia, have admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening our line of defence, and among the points requiring special attention are the northern passes of the Hindu Kush, which afford a difficult but not impracticable route for a force large enough to cause much excitement, if nothing worse, in Kashmir and among the tribes of Bajour, and perhaps at Jalalabad and on the Punjab frontier. We cannot afford to disregard this risk. Further we cannot afford to permit any foreign Power to establish in time of peace its influence in the country. Fortunately the opportunity is a very favourable one. During the past few years we have thoroughly explored the country in question, and have entered into closer relations with the most important of its Chiefs. The Ruler of Chitral, who has established his authority over Yassin also, has more than once received with much cordiality English officers within his State, and his sons have been received as guests in India. A Native Agent of this Government is now residing in Chitral itself. The Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar, recently in revolt against Kashmir, whose country was visited last summer by a Russian officer, and is claimed as feudatory by the Chinese, have of their own accord asked for a visit from an English officer. In the meantime the state of affairs in Kashmir itself has completely changed. The Kashmir army is being reorganised, and we hope before long to have within the State a force of about 4,000 well-disciplined and well-armed troops. Altogether there are many good reasons for making a fresh effort to secure this portion of our strategical frontier, and many circumstances which seem to assure us that we may with reasonable certainty count upon a favourable result.

Having very fully considered the matter, we decided in the autumn of 1887 that some measures ought to be taken to effect our object without much further delay. Colonel Lockhart, who visited the country in 1885, had submitted in 1886 proposals for holding it, but these proposals seemed to us to involve unnecessarily large expenditure. We therefore sent up an officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department, Captain Durand, with orders to work out a plan on a more moderate scale. The idea was to establish in Gilgit an English Agency backed by a sufficient number of the reorganised troops which Kashmir would furnish under the scheme for the utilisation of the Native armies. The number of English officers was to be as small as possible, and the expenditure to be cut down to the lowest limit. The objects in view were the watching and control of the country lying to the south of the Hindu Kush and the organisation of a force which would be able in time of trouble to prevent any *coup de main* by a small body of troops acting across the passes.

Captain Durand spent the summer in visiting Chitral and other points of interest, and was very well received. His proposals are briefly that the British Agency at Gilgit should consist of four officers, namely, the officer in charge, two junior officers of infantry and artillery, and a doctor. The force would consist of 1,200 regular infantry, 100 garrison artillery, a battery of screw guns, and 500 irregular troops. This force would be under the control of the English officer in charge, not of the Kashmiri Governor. The telegraph line would be completed to Gilgit and roads opened up. Certain increased subsidies would be granted to the neighbouring Chiefs; the Mehtar of Chitral would be presented with a battery of guns and 1,000 Sniders; and in course of time a considerable force of Chitralis would be organised and armed.

After considering Captain Durand's report, we think that his proposals may be accepted with certain modifications. We would give the Chitral Chief an allowance of Rs. 6,000 instead of Rs. 12,000. The cost of the non-commissioned officers and men employed in training the Kashmir troops at Gilgit should be borne by the Darbar, and

so in our opinion should the cost of the two junior officers attached to the Agency. They will hardly be in the same position as other officers employed in organising the troops of Native States, because in the present case the troops which they will drill and supervise will be employed in the actual watch and ward of the frontier of Kashmir and the control of her feudatories. The pay of the officer in charge may we consider be fixed at Rs. 1,200 per mensem with a fixed travelling allowance of Rs. 300.

Connected with this scheme is a project for the opening up of a direct road to Chitral from the Peshawar frontier through Dir. When Captain Durand was in Chitral, Aman-ul-Mulk offered to send him back to India by this route, and it is evident that the advantage of having such a short and direct road open to us in the same manner as the Khyber is open would be very great. It is not easy to overcome the fears and prejudices of the people of Swat and Bajaur with regard to this point; but we have some reason to hope that in course of time we may succeed in doing so. The Khans of Dir and Jandol, who command the greater part of the road, both seem likely in the end to prove tractable, and even now a regular postal road could be established. For the opening up of the new line of communication a further expenditure of some Rs. 15,000 a year would probably be necessary.

Altogether we desire to expend a total sum of a little more than half a lakh of rupees a year in strengthening our position in this quarter, and we trust that our proposals may be sanctioned. If so we shall have the Upper Hindu Kush well watched, and the countries to the south of it closed against interference, and we shall get some useful information from the districts beyond. We shall be protected against any *coup de main* from the northward. We shall have provided for a really important part of our scheme of frontier defence, and at small cost to ourselves.

The exact position of the officer in charge at Gilgit may require to be further considered hereafter. For the present, we propose merely to stipulate that the Kashmiri Governor of Gilgit will take no important step in dealing with the Kashmir feudatories except by his advice, and that with regard to the organisation and movements of the troops his instructions must be followed. There must apparently be a Kashmiri Native Commandant of the troops as well as a Governor, and the junior English officers must act as adjutants. We propose to call the officer in charge the Officer on Special Duty at Gilgit, or perhaps Joint Commissioner at Gilgit, and not to bring him upon our graded political list, his duties being as much military as political.

There are some minor points in Captain Durand's proposals about which we are not yet in a position to offer a confident opinion. For example, we are not altogether certain of the expediency of giving guns and a large number of breech-loading arms to Aman-ul-Mulk. The value of the Chitralis as fighting men seems very doubtful; and there are other reasons for caution in this respect. Such points as these may, however, be left for settlement hereafter.

With these remarks we submit the matter for your Lordship's orders. In the meantime we have sent Captain Durand back to Kashmir. When your Lordship's orders are received he will, if they are in favour of the scheme we have proposed, proceed to Chitral and set the new arrangements on foot. The Amir is reported to be turning his attention to Chitral affairs, and it is desirable that Aman-ul-Mulk should be reassured as soon as possible and brought into close and permanent relations with us.

No. 8.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 22, dated June 28, 1889.

I HAVE given my earnest attention to the proposals submitted with the letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 58, dated 6th May 1889, relative to the re-establishment of a British Agency at Gilgit. The grounds on which you solicit the sanction of Her Majesty's Government to this measure are that the advance of Russia up to the frontiers of Afghanistan, and the great recent development of her military power in Asia, have admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening every point in the line of defence of the north-west frontier of India, and among the points requiring special attention are the northern passes of the Hindu Kush. Further, your Government remark that you could not afford to permit any foreign Power to establish in time of peace its influence in the country lying to the north and north-west of Kashmir. The present position of affairs is also favourable to the adoption of steps calculated to exclude these adverse foreign influences. Friendly relations have been entered into with the Ruler of Chitral, and the

Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar have voluntarily asked to be visited by a British officer. The altered condition of the Kashmir State and the reorganisation of its military resources supply additional reasons, in the opinion of your Government, for making fresh efforts to secure this portion of the strategical frontier, and you anticipate a successful result.

The proposals which your Government submit for the acceptance of Her Majesty's Government are based upon a report drawn up by Captain A. Durand, S.C., of the Quartermaster-General's Department, who was deputed to Gilgit and Chitral in 1888 to study the existing military position, and to elaborate a scheme for holding the country without the aid of British troops.

Your recommendations are :—

- (1.) That a British Agency shall be established at Gilgit, to consist of four officers, viz., the officer in charge, two junior officers of infantry and artillery, and a medical officer.
- (2.) That a brigade of Kashmir troops shall be stationed at Gilgit, to consist of—
 - 1,200 regular infantry,
 - 100 garrison artillery,
 - 1 battery of screw guns,
 - 500 irregular troops,

and be under the control of the British officer in charge. His pay to be fixed at Rs. 1,200 per mensem, with a travelling allowance of Rs. 300. The cost of the non-commissioned officers and men required to train the troops to be borne by the Kashmir Durbar, as also the pay of the two junior officers, the total cost of the Agency being estimated at about Rs. 40,000.

I notice that for the present it is intended to stipulate that the Kashmir Governor of Gilgit shall take no important step in dealing with the Kashmir feudatories except by the advice of the British Agent, and that with regard to the organisation and movements of the troops his instructions must be followed.

- (3.) The telegraph line to be extended to Gilgit, and roads to be opened up. The Kashmir State to be called upon to pay for road-making in its territory, and to expend some Rs. 23,000 a year on the British medical officer and his subordinates.
- (4.) An allowance of Rs. 6,000 a year to be made to the Ruler of Chitral, and subsidies to neighbouring Chiefs.

The considerations which your Excellency's Government have urged in support of these recommendations appear to me to be sound and well founded, and your proposals, which seem judicious and adequate to the initiation of these defensive measures, have the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

The projected opening of a direct road to Chitral from the Peshawur frontier through Dir is an important feature in connexion with the scheme, and I trust that the tribes whose countries will be traversed by this route will be induced to co-operate in the execution of this work.

No. 9.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 165, dated December 3, 1889.

WE have the honour to forward papers, regarding the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency and the proceedings of Captain Durand, the British Agent, in connexion therewith.

While our Despatch No. 58, of the 6th of May 1889, was under your Lordship's consideration, we received from the Resident in Kashmir, who had confidentially informed the Darbar of the arrangements contemplated, the intelligence that the Kashmir State Council had unanimously accepted the scheme in its entirety, and had moreover expressed a wish to be permitted to bear the entire cost of the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency. As your Lordship was informed, we directed Colonel Nisbet to thank the Council for their loyal offer, but we declined to allow the Darbar to bear the whole cost, preferring that expenditure on account of the British Agent and his office establishment, the increased subsidies, and a few other heads, should be borne by the Government of India.

On receipt, in July last, of your Lordship's sanction to our proposals, Captain Durand, who was already in Kashmir, was directed to proceed to Gilgit.

Enclosure No 1 in No. 9.

EXTRACT FROM PROCEEDINGS of a MEETING of the KASHMIR STATE COUNCIL held on June 1, 1889.

READ Resident Kashmir's letter of 29th May 1889, on the subject of the re-establishment of the Agency at Gilgit, the expenses of which it is proposed should be borne partly by the Government of India, and partly by the Kashmir State, the share of the latter, including the pay of the medical officer and his native subordinates and contingencies, and also the pay of two junior military officers (at it is believed Rs. 700 each), besides an outfit allowance of Rs. 1,000 each to the medical officer and the junior military officers, the Council being asked at the present to sanction in addition to the pay of the medical officer (1) the salary at present of one of the junior military officers (viz., Lieutenant Manners-Smith) on Rs. 700 per mensem; (2) the medical officer's outfit allowance; and (3) to report what funds it can allot in the Budget of the present year towards the improvement of the frontier communications, such as the road to Gilgit, &c.

RESOLVED unanimously, that the proposals contained in Resident's letter be accepted and the Resident be informed accordingly.

Resolved further, that the State Council consider it their paramount duty, in view of the importance of defending the northern frontier of Kashmir, to relieve the Government of India of the charge of the Gilgit Agency; and they accordingly offer to defray the entire cost which the scheme proposed by Government is likely to entail, and express a hope that their offer will be accepted.

Resolved further, that the Resident be informed that General de Bourbel has allotted Rs. 30,000 in the current year's Public Works Budget for improvement of the frontier communications, and the Council will be glad to place that amount at his disposal.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

FROM SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the
RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated August 5, 1889.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to forward, for your information, copy of the Despatches* cited in the margin on the subject of the re-establishment of a British Agency at Gilgit.

*To Her Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 58, dated 6th May 1889.

From Her Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 22, dated 28th June 1889.

Captain A. Durand, the officer selected for the post of British Agent, has, as you are aware, already started for Gilgit, in anticipation of the sanction of Her Majesty's Secretary of State. He is accompanied by Dr. Robertson and Lieutenant Manners-Smith, whose services have been placed at the disposal of the Kashmir State for employment in connexion with this scheme. The services of an artillery officer will also be placed hereafter at the disposal of the Darbar.

The sanction of Her Majesty's Government having now been received, I am directed to send the following instructions for your guidance and for communication to Captain Durand, who will be styled the British Agent at Gilgit, and will have charge of the Kashmir troops posted there.

The general lines upon which the British Agent should proceed are laid down in the Despatches herewith forwarded, and it is unnecessary to re-state them in this letter. He should go to Chitral, and there set on foot the proposed new arrangements in that direction. He should inform the Mehtar that the Government of India has decided to give him an annual subsidy of Rs. 6,000; and he should inquire in what way the amount can most conveniently be paid. With regard to the proposed gift of a battery of guns and B.L. rifles to Aman-ul-Mulk, instructions will be sent to you hereafter.

The arrangements to be made with the Punyal Rajas are matters of less importance, and Captain Durand can enter upon these arrangements and other subsidiary matters when he finds an opportunity of doing so.

As you are aware, the proposed opening up of a direct road between Peshawar and Chitral is for the present in abeyance, owing to the attitude of the Khan of Jandol. A postal line is about to be introduced as a preliminary measure, and it is hoped that in time the original intention of opening up the road will be carried out. Captain Durand should bear the importance of this in mind and lose no opportunity of pressing it upon the Mehtar and any other of the Chiefs concerned, with whom he may come in contact.

As to the improvement of the road to Gilgit from Kashmir, and the completion of the telegraph, you require no instructions. You are aware of the importance of these measures.

A Native hospital assistant with a compounder, dresser, and a supply of medical requirements, is now on his way to Gilgit to report himself to Captain Durand for employment in Chitral. Captain Durand should arrange to inform the Mehtar and the British news-writer of this, and he should, if possible, take the party with him to Chitral, where he will be able with Dr. Robertson's help to settle details regarding the position and duties of the hospital assistant. It is very desirable that the hospital assistant should not clash with Jamadar Rab Nawaz Khan. He should be instructed to send through the Agency Surgeon a monthly return of patients treated, and reports on any other subjects which he may consider of interest, and which fall within the legitimate sphere of his duties.

The British Agent in Gilgit will be immediately under your orders, and he will address all official communications to you. In the event, however, of his being in Chitral or other places from which he can communicate more quickly with India *via* Dir or by other routes, there will be no objection to his addressing the Government of India direct on urgent matters and sending copy of his letters to you. For example, he asked last autumn for permission to return to India by way of Peshawar. His letter and the answer were sent by the direct route.

In conclusion, I am to take this opportunity of requesting you to convey to the President of the Council in appropriate terms his Excellency the Viceroy's acknowledgments of the loyal support afforded to this scheme by the Kashmir State.

No. 10.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 43, dated April 28, 1890.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a report by Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Durand on the work done since the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency in 1889.

Enclosure in No. 10.

EXTRACT, GILGIT AGENCY REPORT, 1889.

FROM Hunza the British Agent and party returned to Gilgit. The Mehtar's reception was most cordial, and throughout the stay of the party in Chitral every endeavour was made by him and his sons to ingratiate themselves with the British officers.

The Mehtar readily agreed to the Government conditions dependent on the receipt of the increased subsidy, namely, his assistance in opening up the Peshawar-Chitral road, the improvements of the main paths in his country to tracks passable by laden mules, and the fortification of certain selected positions to be afterwards pointed out to him.

As to the first stipulation it is more than doubtful if he is sincere in his professions. He has undoubtedly written to the Chiefs whose territories lie between our borders and those of Chitral, urging them to comply with the wishes of Government, but at the same time he has sent verbal messages, advising them to object to the road being open to the passage of troops. This is mainly due to his naturally suspicious character; but once the Peshawar authorities succeed in coming to terms with the Chiefs concerned, he will most likely acquiesce in the arrangement. Still he must be carefully watched, for he is a master of intrigue.

The second point, the improvement of the so-called roads in his country to good mule-tracks, there is not much difficulty about. By next year almost the whole road from his border to Chitral will be fit for mule traffic. At certain points blasting will be necessary, and assistance has been promised him. The only danger is that in mistaken zeal to carry out our wishes, the Mehtar and his sons may make themselves and us extremely unpopular. The rule of the Mehtar and his sons is probably not very popular, but it is acquiesced in, and no attempt to upset it seems likely to have

a chance of success. Internally there is no one to lead a rising; externally the knowledge that we are behind the Mehtar will deter any aspirant from making the attempt, which would have little or no support from the leading men who are mostly bound to the Mehtar by all sorts of family ties as well as by other interests. Still this is a point which must be considered, and steps have to be taken to minimise the discontent.

As to the third point, the Mehtar was extremely anxious to commence fortifying the positions at once, under the guidance of the British officers, as a visible sign to all his enemies, the Amir included, of his close alliance with the British Government. But the lateness of the season prevented a careful visit of inspection to the points selected, and the matter was allowed to stand over. It is however extremely important that the subject should have early consideration, and it is for Government to decide whether the suggestion made in a letter to the Resident in Kashmir from the British Agent as to the despatch of an engineer officer to Chitral next year should not be adopted.

Although the sanction of Government had been received to the presentation of 1,000 Snider carbines to the Mehtar, it seemed best, seeing that, according to information received before reaching Chitral, the Mehtar did not in the least expect that his wishes on this point would be gratified, to limit the gift to 500, more especially as there appeared to be a growing inclination on his part to engage in hostilities with Umra Khan in favour of the Khan of Dir, to attack Tangir and possibly Darel, and finally to raid on the Kafirs on a larger scale than usual.

Five hundred carbines were accordingly promised much to the Mehtar's gratification. Fifty will be presented this year, and the remainder will be forwarded next spring. The grant is quite sufficient to strengthen him very materially, and to give him a better chance of holding his own against Umra Khan should they quarrel, and it has been received in Chitral, and doubtless in the surrounding States, as the most effectual guarantee of our trust and friendship. At the same time the possession of an extra 500 rifles is not enough to encourage him to enter heedlessly into hostilities either against Umra Khan or the people of Tangir, or to make him too independent. Steps have been taken to impress upon him that Government would view with disfavour any attempt on Tangir, and that no interference with Darel will for a moment be allowed, also to dissuade him from mixing himself up actively with the Dir-Bajaur quarrels, and from making any move against the Kafirs.

While the party was in Chitral, Dr. Robertson saw to the establishment of the Chitral Dispensary which promises to be of great use in the country and extremely popular. The Native doctor in charge, Hospital Assistant Shekh Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, reported at the end of November that patients at the rate of 100 a day were now coming in.

It had been proposed that Captain Durand should visit the Khans of Dir and Jandol, and after consulting them as to the opening of the Peshawar-Chitral road should proceed, if possible, to India by this route. This scheme had to be abandoned with great regret owing to the fact that the British Agent had not received instructions as to what terms could be offered to the Chiefs, and that Umra Khan of Jandol, though expressing his desire for a meeting did not invite it, unless he could be given definite pledges from Government. As the negotiations relating to the opening of the road are now in the hands of the Peshawar authorities, it is useless to enter here into a discussion of the steps to be taken to ensure the success of the Government project. It is enough to state that Umra Khan is the most important man between Chitral and Peshawar, that he wishes to be treated with direct, without intermediaries, and that a meeting between him and a British officer deputed by Government and able to offer definite terms would probably lead to useful results.

No. 11.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 170, dated October 14, 1891.

WE have the honour to submit, for your Lordship's information, a copy of correspondence regarding the action which we have taken to strengthen the Mehtar of Chitral, and to improve our already friendly relations with him.

Your Lordship will observe that we have increased the subsidy which the Mehtar receives from us by Rs. 6,000 per annum; we have granted small annual allowances to

three of his sons ; and we are sending four non-commissioned Muhammadan officers to Chitral for the instruction of the Mehtar's irregular forces.

The conditions upon which we have made these allowances are set out in the letter to the Resident in Kashmir, dated 1st October 1891 ; and we trust that our proceedings will meet with your Lordship's approval.

Enclosure in No. 11.

FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the
RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated October 1, 1891.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters regarding an application from the Mehtar of Chitral for an increase to his subsidy, to allow of his keeping up a standing force of 2,000 men.

Neither the British Agent at Gilgit nor yourself were prepared to support this application ; and you were of opinion that it would suffice to present to Aman-ul-Mulk 100 more Snider carbines, and to depute four Muhammadan non-commissioned officers to instruct the men already carrying Sniders in the Mehtar's service.

The Government of India have had an opportunity of personally discussing the situation with Lieutenant-Colonel Durand, and it has been decided—

- (1) to raise the subsidy granted to the Mehtar by the Government of India from Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 12,000 per annum ;
- (2) to give to Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk an annual present of Rs. 1,500 each ;
- (3) to give to Shah-i-Mulk Rs. 1,000 a year.

These allowances will each be made contingent on good behaviour, and on the condition that the Mehtar and his sons accept the advice of the British Agent or his deputy on all matters. It should also be a condition of the grant to the Mehtar that he will agree to the extension of the telegraph line to Chitral next year, or as soon as may be convenient, and that he should consent to the permanent residence of a British officer in his country.

It has been decided to depute four non-commissioned Muhammadan officers to Chitral for the instruction of the Mehtar's irregular forces, and they will, it is hoped, shortly report themselves to you at Srinagar. They will receive an allowance of 50 per cent. on their ordinary pay, and will be subordinate to Jemadar Rab Nawaz Khan, while at the outset, at all events, they will have the advantage of supervision by Lieutenant Manners-Smith, who, as you are aware, will shortly go to Chitral for the winter months.

The proposal to grant the Mehtar 100 more Snider carbines is approved, and the time for making the presentation will be left to the discretion of the British Agent at Gilgit.

I am to request that this decision may be communicated to the Mehtar of Chitral by the British Agent at Gilgit, in the name of the Government of India, in such terms as he may deem appropriate.

No. 12.

COPY OF DESPACH from SECRETARY OF STATE to the GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA, No. 40, dated November 13, 1891.

MY LORD MARQUESS,

FROM your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department No. 170, dated the 14th October 1891, I learn that, in consequence of recent Russian movements on the Pamirs, your Government has decided to strengthen the position of the Mehtar of Chitral ; and, in view to the improvement of our relations with him, to increase his

subsidy to Rs. 12,000 a year, and to grant allowances to his sons on conditions which are specified in your Deputy Secretary's letter to the Resident in Kashmir, dated the 1st October 1891.

2. You have also resolved to depute four non-commissioned Muhammadan officers to Chitral for the instruction of the Mehtar's irregular forces, and to issue to him 100 additional Snider carbines.

'These several measures have my approval.

I have, &c.
CROSS.

No. 13.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 192, of October 19, 1892.

MY LORD,

We have the honour to submit a copy of papers, regarding measures proposed for establishing our position in Gilgit and the surrounding States.

Her Majesty's Government have been fully informed by our Despatches of the progress of events in Gilgit, and the Chiefships of Chitral, Hunza, and Nagar, and of the general aspects of affairs on this part of our frontier. In the first of these Despatches we gave our reasons for re-establishing the British Agency at Gilgit. The staff was fixed at four English officers; and a small brigade of Kashmir troops, under the control of the British Agent, was to be stationed at Gilgit. Our share of the cost of the scheme was estimated at something less than half a lakh of rupees a year; but the plan was on the most moderate scale; the number of English officers was as small as possible, and the expenditure had been cut down to the lowest limit. The considerations which we urged

* Despatch from Her Majesty's Secretary of State No. 22, dated the 28th June 1889.

in support of these recommendations appeared* to Her Majesty's Government to be sound and well founded, and our proposals were approved as adequate to the initiation of the defensive measures in question.

We have lately had occasion to consider further the question of our future policy in Gilgit and the surrounding States, and the strength at which it would be necessary to maintain the British Agency, in order to carry out that policy effectively. The proposals of Colonel Durand and the Resident in Kashmir on these points have been before us for some months, and we have had the advantage of discussing them with Colonel Durand. The conclusion to which we have come is that it will not be necessary to make any increase in the numbers of troops in the Gilgit Agency, either British or Kashmir. We have relieved the 200 Gurkhas by 205 Sikhs, and we have sent up a small detachment of sappers, but on the other hand we have withdrawn the mountain guns sent up last year.

In a letter addressed by us in the Foreign Department to the Resident on the 26th May last we explained to the Resident that the force to be maintained in the neighbourhood of Gilgit was intended for a two-fold purpose, namely, as an obstacle in the way of an advance against Gilgit through the passes of the Hindu Kush, and to watch the tribesmen of Hunza and Nagar and the adjoining States. In reference to the first of these objects we were of opinion that the scarcity of supplies and the great difficulties which would be encountered by a force advancing against Gilgit from Alai rendered it unnecessary that the garrison should be more than sufficient to hold in check a very small and lightly equipped body of troops emerging from the passes. As regards the second object, it was hoped that the successful operations against Hunza and Nagar would for some time to come have a deterrent effect upon the surrounding tribes. The great difficulty of transporting supplies across the passes dividing Gilgit from Kashmir is in itself a reason for not retaining too large a force at Gilgit. Nevertheless,

| | | |
|--|---|-----|
| * British Indian escort | - | 200 |
| Kashmir infantry | - | 625 |
| British Indian sappers | - | 20 |
| Kashmir artillery, 1 battery of 4 guns | - | 150 |

the garrison could not at present be safely reduced below about 1,000 men,* exclusive of the troops stationed along the line between Bunji and Astor, which consist of two battalions (each 625 strong) of Kashmir Imperial service troops. It may eventually be found possible to hold Gilgit with a force comprised mainly of local levies, raised from among the neighbouring tribes, and entirely dependent upon local supplies.

The decision to keep down the Gilgit garrison to the lowest strength in numbers and to retain within the Agency no more regular troops than will suffice for the escort of the British Agent involves the necessity of rendering the Kashmir Imperial service troops more efficient and trustworthy than they now are. This result cannot be secured without the aid of a competent staff of British officers; and in our opinion it should be at least as strong as that now employed in the Agency.

The establishment of officers fixed in 1889 consisted of the British Agent paid † 1 British Agent. from our political Budget, and three assistants, including a surgeon, paid by the Kashmir Darbar. In 1891, this staff was temporarily augmented by 13 military officers, whose salaries have been met from our military Budget, and their places in their regiments have not been filled up. The number of officers which we now propose to have with the Agency is stated in the margin. Under the arrangements which we now recommend, the charge for all officers at present paid from the military Budget, except the Royal Engineer officers, will be transferred to the political Budget, and the vacancies left by the officers in their regiments will be filled up. In view of the importance of the Agency to Imperial interests, we have determined, as before, not to throw any portion of the extra cost upon the Kashmir State.

1 Political Assistant, 1st Class.
1 " " 2nd Class.
1 " " paid by the Kashmir State
1 Military Assistant (Captain).
1 Surgeon, paid by the Kashmir State.

R.E. Officers:—
1 Captain.
1 Subaltern.

R.A. Officers:—
1 Captain.
1 Subaltern.

Staff Corps Officers:—
1 Major.
3 Captains.
8 Subalterns.
1 Commissariat Officer.

We trust that your Lordship will agree to these arrangements, which we feel convinced are as economical as they can be under the circumstances. Although they only involve the addition of two political and four military officers to the number already employed in the Agency, they have the appearance of a large increase over the original proposals of 1889. But it will be evident to your Lordship that the situation upon this part of the frontier of the Indian Empire has greatly changed in the last three years, and that the necessity for placing the Gilgit Agency in a condition of thorough efficiency is no longer open to question.

We believe that it has become more than ever necessary for us to exercise constant vigilance in this quarter, and that our position should be one which will enable us to obtain timely information of all events of importance on, or near, the border; to afford a reasonable amount of support to Kashmir and its dependencies, including Gilgit and Chitral; to convince the adjoining tribes that it is for their advantage to depend upon us rather than upon Russia or China; and to resist successfully a *coup de main*.

The difficulty of giving effect to such a policy is exceptionally great, in consequence of the extent of the country with which the Gilgit Agency is concerned. In illustration of our meaning we may mention that the distance between Gilgit itself and Astor, which is included in the military charge, is about 70 miles. The further distances from Gilgit to the outposts at Hunza and Gakuch on the Yasin frontier are over 50 and 40 miles respectively.

The small force in the Gilgit Agency has in fact to guard a long line of communication and to occupy points at a distance of over 100 miles from its base; and it may be called upon at any moment to send out detachments to a much greater distance. The country is, moreover, as your Lordship is aware, one presenting very great physical difficulties, while the attitude of the tribesmen is necessarily uncertain. There have lately been disquieting rumours as to the prevalence of excitement amongst the Chilasi tribes, and in other parts of the Agency. The presence of the Afghan Commander-in-Chief in the Kunar valley, within a short distance of the frontier of Chitral, has naturally had a disturbing effect upon the surrounding country, and has greatly increased the difficulties of the position. We may refer to the state of things

| † Establishment fixed in 1889. | Establishment now proposed. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------------------|---|------------------------|---|-----------------------|---|------------|---|---|-------------------------|---|----------------------|
| 1 British Agent. | 1 British Agent. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 Political Assistant. | 3 Political Assistants. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 Military Assistant. | 1 Surgeon. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 Surgeon. | 18 Military Officers. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Temporarily added in 1891.</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13 Military Officers. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total existing Staff. | Proposed increase over existing staff, permanent and temporary. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <table border="0" style="margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em;">}</td> <td>1 British Agent.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em;">}</td> <td>1 Political Assistant.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em;">}</td> <td>14 Military Officers.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em;">}</td> <td>1 Surgeon.</td> </tr> </table> | } | 1 British Agent. | } | 1 Political Assistant. | } | 14 Military Officers. | } | 1 Surgeon. | <table border="0" style="margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em;">}</td> <td>2 Political Assistants.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em;">}</td> <td>4 Military Officers.</td> </tr> </table> | } | 2 Political Assistants. | } | 4 Military Officers. |
| } | 1 British Agent. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| } | 1 Political Assistant. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| } | 14 Military Officers. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| } | 1 Surgeon. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| } | 2 Political Assistants. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| } | 4 Military Officers. | | | | | | | | | | | | |

which arose in Chitral immediately after the death of the late Mehtar, which occurred while our present proposals were still under discussion. It affords an illustration of the kind of trouble which may at any moment arise within the limits of the Agency. The Mehtar's two sons, one of whom had possessed himself of Chitral, while the other held Yasin, seemed to be on the point of commencing a struggle for the succession,—a struggle which threatened to extend beyond the limits of Chitral itself, and to involve the minor Dard States by which Gilgit is surrounded. These consequences were only averted by the voluntary decision of the elder son, Nizam-ul-Mulk, to place himself in the hands of the British Agent.

As to the political officers, two more are asked for; so that one may be placed in Hunza or Nagar, and the other in Chitral. We may mention that the new Mehtar has within the last few days asked us to send him a British officer. This may not be a permanent arrangement; but, until we have thoroughly established our influence in those States, it will not be safe to leave them to their own devices. We shall address your Lordship separately with regard to our relations with Chitral.

It is, in our opinion, our duty to avoid, as far as possible, entangling ourselves in any local disputes arising in the States of the Agency. We have already issued instructions to the Resident in Kashmir in the letter of 26th May, impressing upon him that it is the desire of the Government of India that the officers at Gilgit should carefully avoid any action which might have the effect of bringing about hostilities, and we have told him that the efforts of those officers should, on the contrary, be directed to endeavouring, by means of conciliatory measures, to establish the most amicable relations with the tribes. In a subsequent communication of the 27th September, we have informed the Resident that the altered condition of things in Chitral, which has arisen in consequence of the death of the late Mehtar, does not call for any departure from the policy thus indicated. We desire to invite your Lordship's attention specially to these considerations, because we are anxious that you should be under no misapprehension as to the purpose for which it is proposed to add slightly to the number of officers who are at present employed in the Gilgit Agency. The work of the staff will be closely watched, and should we hereafter find it possible to reduce the number of the officers attached to it, we shall take the first opportunity of doing so.

The season being so far advanced, we have been compelled to order the officers up to Gilgit in anticipation of your Lordship's approval.

Enclosure in No. 13.

FROM SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the RESIDENT
IN KASHMIR, dated May 26, 1892.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to address you on the subject of our future policy in Gilgit, and the surrounding States.

You were informed that the Government of India had no intention of pushing the project for the construction of a road through the territory occupied by the Indus Valley tribes.

It was also pointed out to you that no action should be taken likely to lead to a collision with the Chilasi tribes, and that their headmen should be treated in a conciliatory manner. It will be your duty to inform the British Agent in Gilgit of the instructions which you have thus received, and to impress upon him, and the officers of the Agency, the necessity of acting strictly in accordance with them.

The Government of India have now had under their consideration the strength of the force which should be maintained for the future in the neighbourhood of Gilgit. The force in question is obviously intended for a two-fold purpose. It is intended in the first place as an obstacle in the way of a Russian advance against Gilgit through the passes of the Hindu Kush; and, in the second, to watch the tribesmen of Hunza and Nagar, and the adjoining States.

In regard to the second object, it is to be hoped that the effect produced upon the surrounding tribes by the successful operations against Hunza and Nagar will, for some time to come, render them unlikely to cause trouble. I am to impress upon you strongly that it is the desire of the Government of India that the officers of the Agency should carefully avoid any action which might have the effect of bringing about hostilities.

Their efforts should, on the contrary, be directed to endeavouring, by means of conciliatory measures, to establish the most amicable relations with the tribes.

Apart from the political objections, which the Government of India entertain, to a policy which might have the effect of involving us in further military operations on this part of the frontier, numerous proofs have lately been afforded of the costliness of maintaining a large force in the neighbourhood of Gilgit. It will, moreover, be obvious to you that, upon general grounds, there are serious objections to keeping considerable portions of the Native Army in so distant and isolated a position.

Under these circumstances, and assuming that the policy which has thus been laid down will be rigidly adhered to, the Government of India see no occasion for adding to the strength of the Gilgit garrison. Considering the great difficulty of transporting supplies across the passes by which Gilgit is divided from Kashmir, there would be obviously great advantages in fixing the strength of the garrison at a number which the country itself would be able to support. That number would, it is understood, not exceed about 1,600 men. Upon this point and upon the distribution of the troops in the neighbourhood of Gilgit, and throughout the line of communication, no decision will be come to until Colonel Durand's arrival in Simla.

The Governor-General in Council gathers from your telegram of the 18th instant that you and Colonel Durand are both of opinion that the garrison of Gilgit itself might be safely reduced to the strength of one regiment and a battery, the remainder of the Imperial Service troops being stationed along the line between Bunji and Astor. I may observe that the Government of India, while admitting that it will always be necessary to maintain a small body of British troops as an escort to the Resident, are not without hope that it may eventually be found possible to hold Gilgit with a force consisting mainly of local levies raised from amongst the neighbouring tribes, and entirely dependent upon local supplies. In this view it is desirable that the utmost encouragement should be given to the spread of cultivation in the neighbourhood.

The Government of India are satisfied that the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency was undoubtedly necessary, and that the operations against Hunza and Nagar were inevitable. Now that these have been brought to a successful conclusion, it is hoped that it may, in the future, be found possible to secure the passes and to maintain peace in the Dard States without adding materially to the burdens of the Empire.

No. 14.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT FOR INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 193, of October 19, 1892.

WE have the honour to forward papers regarding the death on the 30th of August of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, Ruler of Chitral, and the succession to the *masnad* of his son, Afzal-ul-Mulk.

Aman-ul-Mulk had several sons by different wives, but only five of them appear to have been regarded as of any importance. These are Nizam-ul-Mulk, Afzal-ul-Mulk, Shah-i-Mulk, Bahram, and Murid Dastgir. The first two are full-brothers by a daughter of a late Khan of Dir, and have been generally considered the principal sons. Nizam-ul-Mulk, as the elder, was his father's acknowledged heir, but it was always believed that, on Aman-ul-Mulk's death, Nizam's succession would be contested by at least two of the brothers, Afzal-ul-Mulk and Shah-i-Mulk. Fortune favoured Afzal-ul-Mulk, who, at the moment of his father's death, happened to be present at Chitral, while Nizam-ul-Mulk was absent in Yasin. Afzal-ul-Mulk, who is said to be a man of courage and determination, promptly assumed the reins of government and wrote to the Viceroy announcing his succession, which he described as having taken place "with the unanimous consent of his brothers" and of the "leading men and all the people" of the country. We may add that, according to reports received both in Gilgit and in India, three of the brothers, Shah-i-Mulk, Bahram, and Wazir-ul-Mulk were put to death by Afzal-ul-Mulk.

The question of our future policy in regard to Chitral, the political control of which was one of the original objects of the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency, is under consideration, and a further Despatch will be addressed to your Lordship on the subject in due course. Meanwhile we have acknowledged Afzal-ul-Mulk as Mehtar of Chitral, and have congratulated him on his succession. Nizam-ul-Mulk, finding himself

too weak to hold his own, has come in to Gilgit, where he will be detained for the present, pending the receipt of the proposals of the local officers on the whole situation.

We regard the unopposed succession of Afzal-ul-Mulk as very satisfactory. It puts an end to the probability of a struggle between the two brothers, which might have disturbed the whole Agency; and, moreover, Afzal-ul-Mulk has always shown the strongest goodwill towards the British Government and its officers. His first act now on establishing his authority has been to invite us to send a British officer to Chitral, and we hope that we may find in him a friendly and trustworthy ruler. If so, the position of the Gilgit Agency will be greatly strengthened.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

FROM SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated September 27, 1892.

(EXTRACT.)

THE Government of India has had under consideration the action which should be taken in consequence of the death of the Mehtar of Chitral, an occurrence which has materially altered the condition of affairs in that country.

Communications have been received from Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk, the two sons of the Mehtar, who both have claims to the succession. Afzal-ul-Mulk has addressed letters to his Excellency the Viceroy and to the Foreign Secretary, announcing the death of his father, and his own accession to the *masnad*, with the consent of the people and of his brothers. Nizam-ul-Mulk has sent a letter by the hand of his foster-brother to the British Agent at Gilgit, begging that a British officer may be sent to Chitral to divide the country between the brothers, and stop the fighting which must otherwise inevitably ensue. A reply is being sent direct *via* Peshawar to Afzal-ul-Mulk, expressing regret at the Mehtar's death, and congratulating Afzal-ul-Mulk on his accession, with the consent of the people and of his brothers.

With regard to the communication made by Nizam-ul-Mulk, the British Agent at Gilgit should acknowledge its receipt, and add that he will be prepared to listen to anything that Nizam-ul-Mulk may have to say, with a view to the establishment of an amicable understanding between the two brothers. Should Mr. Robertson have occasion to pass through Yasin on his way to Chitral, he might take the opportunity of giving good advice to Nizam-ul-Mulk.

The general lines, upon which the policy of government in Chitral and its neighbourhood should be based, have been laid down in my letter, dated the 26th of May last, and the Government of India does not consider that the death of the late Mehtar renders necessary any departure from the policy then indicated. It should be our endeavour to avoid, as far as possible, entangling ourselves in disputes which may arise between Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk, or in any tribal quarrels occasioned by them. The main object should be to provide adequately for the safety of the Gilgit Agency, and to adopt such measures as may be indispensable for that purpose. The substance of this letter should be communicated to Colonel Durand for his information and guidance, and for that of the officers under his command. You have already been requested to submit proposals as to the action to be taken consequent on Aman-ul-Mulk's death, and I am to request that you will furnish them, as early as possible, bearing in mind the foregoing observations.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated October 5, 1892, from the RESIDENT IN KASHMIR to the FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

(EXTRACT.)

Following from Robertson, dated the 30th September :—Rab Nawaz Khan reports that 300 men of Umra Khan's have seized Narsat Fort. Afzal has written to Umra Khan protesting against his action, but Umra Khan will never give up the fort, the Jemadar believes. The Afghan Commander-in-Chief from Asmar has sent to Bailam some men under Jalad Khan to order Umra Khan to evacuate the fort instantly.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated October 7, 1892, from the COMMISSIONER, Peshawar, to the FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

(EXTRACT.)

A letter, dated 29th September, from an agent of Umra Khan's has been received to-day. It states that on 17th idem Umra Khan received a communication from Afzal-ul-Mulk, regretting that Umra Khan had occupied Narsat from which Afzal-ul-Mulk had withdrawn his levies temporarily only to strengthen himself at Chitral, in the expectation that Umra Khan would not interfere with that country, and desiring that Jandol levies may now be recalled. Umra Khan's relation with Afzal-ul-Mulk are strained on account of this communication. On 23rd September Umra Khan received a letter from Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk, seeking his friendship, desiring him to send Jandol levies to Ashrit or Drosh, and promising to reward him suitably if Nizam-ul-Mulk succeeds to the rulership of Chitral. Umra Khan has sent assurances of his friendship to Nizam-ul-Mulk.

No. 15.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 45, dated December 2, 1892.

I HAVE considered with great care the letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 192, dated the 19th October, together with its enclosures, relating to the affairs of the Political Agency at Gilgit, and asking for sanction to an increase in the political and military establishment attached to it.

Your letter is addressed primarily to the question of the number of officers to be permanently attached to the Agency, but incidentally it covers the whole ground of the policy by which your Agent at Gilgit should in future be guided, and of the duties expected of him and his staff.

The outline of this policy is laid down in Sir Mortimer Durand's letter, dated 26th May, addressed to the Resident in Kashmir. In that letter you repudiate any intention of pushing the project for the construction of a road through territory occupied by the Indus valley tribes, and you direct that no action should be taken likely to lead to a collision with the Chilasi tribes, but that their headmen should be treated in a conciliatory manner. You point out that the primary duties of the force at Gilgit are to check any small bodies of troops advancing from the north over the passes in the north-east corner of the Hindoo Koosh range, and to watch the tribesmen of Hunza and Nagar and the adjoining States. You assume that this policy will be rigidly adhered to, and conclude that for these purposes the present garrison is sufficient; indeed you express a hope that it may hereafter be reduced and replaced to a great extent by local levies dependent on local supplies. Your instructions contained in that letter have my full approval, and I have no doubt your Excellency will exercise due vigilance to prevent their being exceeded. In your letter under reply, however, you further develop your views of the duties which the garrison and the officers of the Agency respectively have to perform, and you argue that the decision to retain the garrison at as low a figure as possible involves an increase in the number of British officers, in order to render the Kashmir troops more efficient and trustworthy than they are at present. You point out that, on the one hand, recent events on the Pamirs, and, on the other hand, the advance of the Amir's troops up the Kunar Valley (influencing, as it must do, the condition both of Chitral and the Bajaur group of States), have largely increased the necessity for constant vigilance, and for obtaining timely information of events on or near the border, as well as for securing the friendship of the adjoining tribes. At the same time you show that the Gilgit garrison has to occupy posts along a line of over 100 miles in length, and to guard the whole length of communication in a country of great physical difficulties and among tribes of an uncertain attitude.

Therefore, while maintaining emphatically the duty of avoiding any entanglement in the tribal disputes of the neighbouring States, and any action which might bring about hostilities, and while recognising that it should be the constant endeavour of your officers by means of conciliatory measures to establish the most amicable relations with the tribes, you have decided that it is none the less necessary to increase the Agency staff to the extent proposed by the Political Agent.

I observe that the sanctioned establishment as fixed in 1889 consists, besides the Agent and his Political Assistant, of one Military Assistant and one Surgeon. To these were temporarily added, in consequence of the complication with Hunza in 1891, 13 military officers, and to this combined staff (permanent and temporary) you now propose to add two Political Assistants and two Military Officers, so that the whole staff will now stand as shown in the margin,* and the whole annual expenditure, which was given in 1889 as about Rs. 50,000, will now stand at about Rs. 200,000. You add that the season being so far advanced you have been compelled to order the officers up to Gilgit in anticipation of my sanction.

It must be distinctly understood that my assent is given to these arrangements only upon your Excellency's assurances that they are as economical as they can be under the circumstances; that I do not wish their cost or scale to be augmented, and that I shall be glad if any change in the situation enables your Excellency to reduce them.

* 1 British Agent.
 1 Political Assistant, 1st Class.
 1 " " 2nd Class.
 1 " " paid by the Kashmir State.
 1 Military Assistant (Captain).
 1 Surgeon paid by the Kashmir State.

R.E. Officers :—
 1 Captain.
 1 Subaltern.

R.A. Officers :—
 1 Captain.
 1 Subaltern.

Staff Corps Officers :—
 1 Major.
 3 Captains.
 8 Subalterns.

1 Commissariat Officer.

I do not demur to the arguments and evidence adduced in your letter to prove that the responsibilities and difficulties of the Agent and his staff have been materially increased by recent events in adjoining territories, and that the policy which your Excellency's Government have laid down can only be carried out efficiently by a stronger staff than has hitherto been at the Agent's command. Nevertheless, looking to the rapid expansion, since the Agency was restored in July 1889, of the sphere of our operations around Gilgit, to the difficulty, so constantly proved by experience on our Indian frontiers, of restraining the tendency to multiply political relations and responsibilities, and remembering that our movements may have a disturbing as well as a pacifying effect among the independent tribes and Chiefships of this remote borderland, I attach great importance to the close supervision by your Excellency of the conduct of political affairs in that quarter. I have, indeed, every confidence that your Excellency will strictly confine the action of the Agency within the limits of the policy explained in May 1892 by your Foreign Secretary's letter to the Resident in Kashmir, and that you will prevent any attempts at undue interference with or control of the tribes.

I should have been glad if you had found the temporary addition to the staff, which you sanctioned in view of the Hunza disturbances of 1891, sufficient, but I hesitate to criticise the details of the increase you now recommend.

The allowances which you suggest seem to me generally suitable; I have only to observe that the staff pay should be given in addition, not to regimental, but to Staff Corps pay, though there is no objection to officers of the Royal Engineers drawing regimental pay and pay proper under the rules in the Public Works Department.

No. 16.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 233, dated December 28, 1892.

OUR Despatch No. 193, of the 19th of October 1892, informed your Lordship of the death of Aman-ul-Mulk of Chitral, the succession of his son, Afzal-ul-Mulk, and the flight of Nizam-ul-Mulk to Gilgit. We now have the honour to report upon the more recent progress of events in Chitral.

Up to the beginning of November it seemed that affairs were settling down. Afzal-ul-Mulk appeared to be rapidly establishing his rule throughout the country; and we were considering the desirability of despatching a British Mission to Chitral in accordance with the expressed wishes of the new Mehtar, in order to consolidate our relations with him. Nizam-ul-Mulk was still in Gilgit, and the only source of anxiety was to be found in the proceedings of the Jandol Chief, who, taking advantage of the prevailing confusion, had seized Narsat at the southern end of the Chitral Valley, a place regarding which disputes had for some time existed between him and the late Mehtar. An attempt to bring about an amicable settlement between Umra Khan and the Chitral ruler would have been one of the first aims of the British Mission.

About the middle of November, however, news was received that Sher Afzal, a brother of Aman-ul-Mulk, who had been for many years a refugee in Badakhshan, and was in receipt of a large allowance from the Amir, had suddenly descended upon Chitral. Accompanied by a small party of horsemen, he crossed by the Dorah Pass; he first seized the Latku Fort, and killed Murid Dastgir, one of Aman-ul-Mulk's numerous sons, and having been joined by the people of Latku, attacked and occupied Shogot. On the night of the 6th November, he surprised the fort of Chitral and killed Afzal-ul-Mulk. The people at once submitted to him, and Afzal-ul-Mulk's principal adherents fled to Dir.

On learning of the change in the state of affairs, Nizam-ul-Mulk wrote to the British Agent that, should he become Mehtar, he would agree to British officers being stationed in Chitral, and to the establishment of a telegraph line, and would carry out all orders of Government. The Sardar also signified his intention of moving against Sher Afzal. Nizam-ul-Mulk having come to Gilgit of his own accord, and being there as our guest, and not under detention, Colonel Durand was unable to refuse him permission to leave Gilgit. He accordingly allowed the Sardar to go, and despatched 250 rifles, two guns, and a hundred levies to Gupis, opposite the mouth of the Yasin Valley, and a few miles beyond the frontier of the Gilgit district, in order to strengthen his own position in the event of its becoming necessary to treat with Sher Afzal, and to preserve order in the western part of the district and in Yasin.

In taking this measure without the sanction of Government, Colonel Durand acted from a conviction that immediate and decided action in anticipation of orders could alone avert a serious crisis. The course of events justified his decision; a collision was avoided, the danger to which the British news agent and other servants of Government in Chitral were exposed was to some extent diminished, and a general rising among the border tribes was probably averted. The troops were afterwards withdrawn, and the most recent reports show that the condition of the border is much more satisfactory. We have informed the Resident in Kashmir that Colonel Durand's conduct under very trying circumstances has our full approval.

Nizam-ul-Mulk, on crossing the frontier, was joined by the people of Turikho and Murikho, and 1,200 men sent by Sher Afzal to oppose his advance also went over to him. He immediately marched on Mastuj, which he occupied without difficulty. Drasan fell into his hands on the 1st of December, and shortly afterwards Sher Afzal fled to the Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Asmar.

For some time prior to the flight of Sher Afzal, Umra Khan continued to play an active part in the southern part of Chitral. Ghulam, a son of Aman-ul-Mulk, having taken refuge with him, and sought his assistance, he despatched a force into Chitral territory, excusing himself in a letter to the Government of India on the ground that the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk's sons were his friends, and friends of the British Government, while Sher Afzal was a protégé of the Amir's, and unfriendly to the British Government. His troops arrived before Darosh, but were unable to take the fort, and, after slight skirmishes, were withdrawn to Dir territory, where they engaged in conflict with tribes inhabiting the Kohistan of Dir. Umra Khan has been told that the Government of India never approved of his interference in Chitral affairs, and that his sending a force into the country before the Government of India had received information as to the state of affairs might have very embarrassing results.

Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk has earnestly requested that a British officer may be sent to him, and Colonel Durand has pressed upon us the advisability of acceding to the Sardar's request. There appears to be no doubt that Nizam-ul-Mulk has established himself as Ruler of Chitral, and Colonel Durand has proposed that Captain Younghusband should go to him at once with a small escort, and that troops should again be posted at Gupis to keep Yasin quiet. Your Lordship having sanctioned these proposals on the understanding that Nizam-ul-Mulk is actually in possession of Chitral, we have, on this understanding, directed them to be carried out at once. The question of the mission under Surgeon-Major Robertson will be decided as soon as he returns from Chilas.

No. 17.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 142, dated July 11, 1893.

WE have the honour to address your Lordship on the subject of recent affairs in Chitral.

In our Despatch, No. 233, of the 28th of December 1892, we informed your Lordship of the flight of Sher Afzal, of the assumption of the Mehtarship by Nizam-ul-Mulk, of his earnest request that a British officer might be sent to him, and of our decision, with your Lordship's concurrence, to depute Surgeon-Major Robertson on this mission, on the understanding that Nizam-ul-Mulk was actually in possession of Chitral. Dr. Robertson was cautioned not to commit us further than necessary, and we instructed him to avoid formally installing Nizam-ul-Mulk as Mehtar, but to congratulate him on his accession, and to act generally upon the instructions which your Lordship had previously approved in regard to Dr. Robertson's proposed mission to Sardar Afzal-ul-Mulk. These instructions authorised him to promise, on suitable conditions, the same subsidy and support as were given to the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk; and to lay down, if Chitral and Jandol agreed, the boundary between Bajaur and Chitral; and they included a special caution against taking any action likely to impair the position of Kashmir as the suzerain of Chitral. On the 7th of January, Dr. Robertson, accompanied by Captain F. E. Younghusband and Lieutenant the Hon. C. G. Bruce, with an escort of 50 men of the 15th Sikhs under Lieutenant Gordon, left Gakuch for Chitral *via* the Shandur Pass. At the same time 150 rifles were moved up to a position near Gupis to preserve order in Yasin. In spite of severe weather, the mission reached Chitral without mishap on the 25th of January. Its arrival was generally popular with the common people, but Dr. Robertson's reports made it clear that, mainly owing to the personal unpopularity of Nizam-ul-Mulk with the Adamzadas or principal men, it was regarded with considerable suspicion by the upper classes. Nizam-ul-Mulk was profuse in his professions of loyalty, and was evidently convinced that he depended upon our support for his retention of power. At the end of March Dr. Robertson reported that the position of affairs was unsatisfactory; and there were rumours of a threatened combination to attack the English after the Ramzan fast; and that a conspiracy existed against the life of Nizam-ul-Mulk, who appeared at that time to be making no advance in popularity. One of the chief difficulties of the situation was the attitude in Yasin of Muhammad Wali Khan, the representative of the former ruling family. He refused to have any dealings with Nizam-ul-Mulk, and was intriguing for his own hand. He, however, eventually went in to Gilgit, where he still remains; and Nizam-ul-Mulk sent his brother, Ghulam Dastgir, with a strong force, to assume the governorship of Yasin. Muhammad Wali's partisans offered no opposition, and though the situation in Yasin is not altogether free from elements of possible trouble, Ghulam Dastgir is gradually establishing himself there. The success of Ghulam Dastgir and the public recognition of Nizam-ul-Mulk as successor to the Mehtarship, brought about some improvement in the position of affairs at Chitral. Nevertheless, a feeling of unrest prevailed; the people declined to believe that Sher Afzal and his son were under surveillance at Kabul, and many of the leading men expected his early return.

The position was further complicated by the attitude of Umra Khan of Jandol, who was threatening to attack Darosh, nominally in the interests of Amir-ul-Mulk, one of the sons of the late Aman-ul-Mulk, but in reality with a view to seizing that part of the Chitral Valley for himself. On the 3rd of April, Dr. Robertson wrote:—

“ We seem to be on a volcano here. . . . Matters are no longer improving; the atmosphere of Chitral is one of conspiracy and intrigue. The Baba Sahib (a notorious Mulla in Dir) is feeding 1,800 men daily, we hear—an immensely large number for that furious fanatic to entertain. He prays daily for the utter destruction of the infidels, and declares there is more merit in fighting against the Chitralis than against anyone else, for they have brought the English into their country. . . . Umra Khan has well thrashed Muhammad Sharif (ex-Khan of Dir), and is said to be making peace with Sa'dar Khan of Nawagai. I hear he is furiously angry with Nizam-ul-Mulk, and tells his friends that Nizam, on fleeing to Gilgit, and subsequently through Waffadar Khan, promised him all the valley below Ghiriat if he would help him against Afzul-ul-Mulk. He swears he will take Chitral as far as Mastuj for Amir-ul-Mulk, whom he now forcibly prevents from returning to Chitral.”

It had never been in our contemplation that Dr. Robertson's deputation to Chitral should be more than temporary, and we considered that, after he had in compliance with our instructions recognised Nizam-ul-Mulk as the *de facto* Ruler of the State, it was undesirable that he should remain any longer in Chitral. We accordingly sent instructions on the 21st April for the withdrawal of the mission, authorising Dr. Robertson to endeavour to meet Umra Khan before starting, if he saw any prospect of being able to do so, and leaving it to his discretion to decide whether a British officer and small escort should remain behind at Chitral. Dr. Robertson was unable to bring about a meeting with Umra Khan. He believed that there would be no unreasonable risk in leaving the two officers behind; and accordingly, on the 26th of May, he started for Gilgit, leaving Captain Younghusband and Lieutenant Gordon at Chitral with the whole of the escort, which he considered it imprudent to reduce.

We have come to the conclusion that recent events do not call for any departure from the policy which has hitherto been adopted with regard to Chitral. We believe that it is essential that it should continue to be under the suzerainty of Kashmir and under British influence, and we consider that, in order to secure this end, it is indispensable that a British officer should for some time to come remain in the State. There is no doubt that this course involves some risk. Nizam-ul-Mulk is not a strong ruler, and so long as the Afghan troops remain close to his border, above Asmar, and Sher Afzal is believed by the Chitralis to have the support of the Amir, his position cannot be free from difficulty. But we have never concealed from ourselves that there was risk in sending British officers to Chitral, and it does not seem to us that the risk is now any greater than it was when Dr. Robertson's mission started. The latest reports tend, indeed, to show that Nizam-ul-Mulk is beginning to establish his authority, and that his prospects are more hopeful at this moment than they were at the beginning of the year. Writing on the 12th of May, Dr. Robertson reported that the condition of affairs had of late very greatly improved, and was still improving; but that more time was required, and that to withdraw now altogether from the country would be most inexpedient. On the 18th of May, he reported that there was a profound quiet everywhere. Finally, in his report written on his return to Gilgit on the 6th June, Dr. Robertson writes:—

“ There is now no reasonable risk in officers living in Chitral if properly protected; any sudden withdrawal of the whole of my party would create such a general feeling of insecurity throughout the country that it would be probably impossible for the Mehtar to maintain his authority, even if it did not impel him to leave Chitral altogether. . . . An Englishman now may travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort, unless Mr. Bruce's four Gurkhas may be so denominated. There were no sentries at night. No suspicion of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five months' work in the country.”

It had, moreover, always been in our contemplation that one of the additional officers sanctioned for the Gilgit Agency should be posted in Chitral for the purpose of watching events on that part of the frontier, and this arrangement has received your Lordship's specific sanction. We consider that after the encouragement which has been given to Nizam-ul-Mulk by the advent of the mission, it would be unjust to him, as well as detrimental to our own interests, to withdraw suddenly and entirely from Chitral at the present moment. We have carefully considered whether a Native Agent would be sufficient for the purposes which we have in view. It may be found possible hereafter to replace Captain Younghusband by a Native official, but we have come to the conclusion that, for the present, such an arrangement would fail to give the Mehtar the necessary support and to secure the adequate protection of our interests. It is, in fact, the arrangement which was in force until the despatch of Dr. Robertson's mission, and we doubt whether it has worked altogether well. We have therefore decided that Captain Younghusband shall remain in the State for the present, though not necessarily at the capital itself. Colonel Durand has proposed that he should take up his head-quarters at Mastuj; which, though within 63 miles of Chitral, which on an emergency Captain Younghusband could reach in a day, would be only 45 miles from our proposed frontier post at Ghizr. We shall make it clearly understood that Captain Younghusband is not expected to coerce the Mehtar in any way, or to interfere with the internal affairs of the State; but that he is deputed merely for the purpose of supplying us with trustworthy information as to events on that part of the frontier, and of giving to the Mehtar that amount of encouragement which the presence of a British officer within Chitral limits will not fail to afford.

We recommend that of the 200 rifles of the 16th Sikhs, 100 should form the escort of the British Agent at Gilgit. The remaining 100 would, until further orders, serve as escort to the Assistant British Agent for Chitral. We may explain, in reference to the latter proposal, that it was our intention to replace the Sikh escort now with Captain Younghusband by an escort of Kashmir troops. Colonel Durand and Surgeon-Major Robertson have, however, both born strong testimony to the valuable effects produced upon the minds of the Chitralis by the presence of a small body of Sikh troops, and have expressed their opinion that it would be unadvisable to withdraw the Sikh escort immediately. We propose, therefore, that it should remain for the present, and we believe that the retention of the Sikhs is not likely to be regarded with alarm by the Chitralis. Any apprehension on this account would, we believe, be to a great extent removed if our recommendation that the Assistant British Agent should have his headquarters at Mastuj, instead of at Chitral itself, is accepted. We shall be better able to form an opinion upon this point after a somewhat longer experience.

No. 18.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 188, of August 29, 1893.

MY LORD,

IN our Despatch No. 142, dated the 11th July 1893, reference is made to Surgeon-Major Robertson's final report on Chitral affairs, and an extract is quoted from it. We have now the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the report, together with our reply approving of Dr. Robertson's proceedings and conveying instructions with regard to the future conduct of our relations with Chitral.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

FROM OFFICIATING RESIDENT IN KASHMIR to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, dated June 28, 1893.

(EXTRACT.)

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a letter, dated 17th June 1893, from Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I., being his final report on Chitral affairs, together with a copy of the instructions issued by him for the guidance of Captain Younghusband.

I would submit my opinion that Surgeon-Major Robertson has conducted the duties entrusted to him by the Government of India with much tact and discretion; that the object of the mission to Chitral has been fulfilled; and that it is evident that Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk is largely indebted to the support and assistance he received from Surgeon-Major Robertson's mission for the measure of success attained by him in establishing himself as the Ruler of Chitral.

I consider that the instructions framed by Surgeon-Major Robertson for the guidance of Captain Younghusband, who remains as political officer in Chitral, are full and sufficient, and that they have been drawn up with the care, skill, and foresight which have marked all Surgeon-Major Robertson's actions; and with the knowledge and experience of men and measures in Chitral which he possesses to so rare a degree.

I trust that the services of Surgeon-Major Robertson and of the officers* whom he so strongly commends for their cordial assistance will be brought to the favourable notice of the Government of India; and I venture to draw particular attention to the terms in which Surgeon-Major Robertson refers to the excellent work done for the mission by Khan Sahib Abdul Hakim.

*Captain F. E. Younghusband.
Lieutenant the Hon. C. G. Bruce.
Lieutenant T. L. R. Gordon.

From Surgeon-Major G. S. ROBERTSON, C.S.I., to the RESIDENT IN KASHMIR.

(EXTRACT.)

Gilgit, June 17, 1893.

I HAVE already officially informed you of the return of the Chitral mission to Gilgit, and of its work being now ended. I now forward, for subsequent transmission to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, a final report on Chitral affairs, together with a copy of instructions left behind for the general guidance of Captain Younghusband; also the mission accounts.

A translation of a letter addressed to me by Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk is likewise enclosed. It was handed to me just before my departure from Chitral by the Mehtar himself, who took the opportunity of presenting it to renew his professions of entire devotion to the Government of India, his earnest desire to place himself and the resources of his country at the disposal of the power which had not only seated him on his father's throne, but was still maintaining him there with equal generosity and magnanimity.

Nizam-ul-Mulk does not pretend that all his actions during his father's lifetime gave him an absolute right to expect our whole-hearted support. He rather accepts the position that, in spite of certain doubtful proceedings on his part, justifiable only on the ground that he was acting under the orders of his father and King, he has nevertheless been treated with the utmost kindness by the Government of India.

He fluently proclaims his gratitude for what has been already done for him, while he earnestly confesses his inability at the present time to continue the struggle against his numerous enemies, unless he is still sustained by the same strong hand which has so powerfully aided him in the past. He founds an argument why he should be accorded further help in the future on the broad ground that it is necessary for a great government to be consistent in its policy. It is this conviction which is found underlying all his utterances, although it is usually somewhat obscured by that habitual indirectness of speech which is common to all Orientals.

You are aware that the Government of India left it to me to decide whether Captain Younghusband should remain in Chitral with a small escort, or whether he should return with the mission to Gilgit. I decided that he should stay behind in Chitral, and that the whole of the detachment of the 15th Sikhs, with Lieutenant Gordon of the same regiment, should be left with him also as a personal guard. I formed this determination on the grounds that there is now no unreasonable risk in officers living in Chitral if properly protected; that any sudden withdrawal of the whole of my party would create such a general feeling of insecurity throughout the country that it would be probably impossible for the Mehtar to maintain his authority even if it did not impel him to leave Chitral altogether. Finally, I considered that, although 50 Sikhs under a trustworthy commander were sufficient to guard the residence and stores of the political officer, yet it would be an act of imprudence to diminish that number. In short, I read my telegraphic instructions about leaving Captain Younghusband at Chitral with a "small escort" as meaning a "sufficient escort," and acted on this assumption.

In now adverting to the work actually accomplished by the Chitral Mission, I think it may be considered good on the whole. My previous report will have shown the nature of many of the difficulties the mission had to contend against. Most of these difficulties were, however, successfully overcome, and consequently they need not be referred to again at any length.

As a means of closely connecting Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk himself with the Kashmir Darbar and with the Government of India, there never was any doubt about the assured success of the mission. But it was quickly discovered that a much wider field of operations lay before the political officers than was contemplated when the mission originally started. The country was in a distracted condition, torn by factions; the Mehtar was highly unpopular; the English were looked upon with suspicion and dislike by the influential classes.

For its own safety, therefore, no less than with the view of maintaining English influence and English prestige, the mission was compelled to actively and energetically support Nizam-ul-Mulk in his government, yet without ever appearing to interfere in the internal affairs of the State.

Instead of finding ourselves in the position of envoys sent to congratulate and form an alliance with a young prince flushed with recent triumphs over rebellious subjects and powerful outside foes, we found ourselves called upon to firmly establish on his throne, and infuse with hope and virile energy, an unnerved terror-stricken Chief who was conscious that he ruled on the merest sufferance a thoroughly disaffected people, whose abstention from further outbreaks of violence was entirely due to a doubt and fear lest

the Government of India might have the will and also the power to avenge any injury to its nominee.

That under such peculiar circumstances any permanence can be expected for the work already successfully accomplished would be unreasonable, unless the same plans which have worked so well in the immediate past be steadily persevered with in the immediate future.

Military force other than that which the Mehtar himself can organise and direct, it would be impolitic to use in Chitral, even if it were possible to employ it at such an enormous distance from its base of reinforcements and supplies in Kashmir or India.

The upper classes have to be won over and conciliated by friendly overtures, apparently emanating from men absolutely secure and confident in their strength and position, while at the same time the imagination of the Adamzadas must be acted upon by the spectacle of their ruler being securely protected from all outside enemies, and gradually making himself feared and respected by the firmness, combined with justice, of his rule, and by the display of the wealth and resources he possesses as the subsidised ally of his acknowledged suzerain, His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir.

That there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a line of policy it would be idle to deny, but there are also two factors, the value of which cannot be over-estimated, as favouring influences in any attempts we may make to mould the Chitralis to our interest, especially if these favouring influences be employed discreetly and with dexterity. They are, first, the absence of any real fanatical feeling in Chitral, and, secondly, the extreme impressionability of the people.

The absence of all sentiments of religious intolerance in Chitral amounts to a national peculiarity. It is especially indicated by the strenuous but futile efforts of one or two of the chief men, notably by one of the Mehtar's uncles, to gain a reputation for fanaticism. But the pretended bigotries displayed are so obviously a threadbare cloak for hiding simple designs for increasing individual self-importance that no one is deceived by so palpable a sham. One man, a cousin of the Mehtar's, at first very friendly in his relations with the mission, went on a visit to the "Baba Sahib" at Dir. On his return it was discovered he had become fanatical. He kept aloof from all communication with the British officers, but yet maintained this uncompromising attitude with so much difficulty, so much doubt and self-consciousness, that it was impossible to feel any resentment at such embarrassed shamefaced proceedings. Another individual, who had been promised a small present, remembered on the day the "khilats" were distributed that, as a "Sofi," he could not possibly attend to receive his gift. He nevertheless came to the garden door of my house and openly before all his followers begged that his reward might be sent him there by the hand of his friend.

The impressionability of Chitralis again is something extraordinary. It undoubtedly makes them terribly fickle. But fickleness tells both ways. If you cannot rely upon unswerving supporters in changeable people, you can at least be happy in the thought that they can rarely become inveterate opponents. When great impressionability is combined with extreme cupidity, for which Chitralis are also remarkable, the power of influencing them lies with the man of most tactful speech, especially if he also possesses the longest purse. Polite attentions, complimentary speeches, have a great, if ephemeral, effect on most Chitralis. When accompanied by a small douceur, they not unfrequently have the effect of starting the recipient to his feet with his eyes dimmed by grateful tears, his mouth full of fervid protestations of devotion. It is true his gratitude rapidly cools, but it can be excited again as often as is desirable by a re-employment of the means described.

It follows, therefore, that a political officer in Chitral has a wonderful power always at hand of influencing for a time all those brought into direct contact with him. All manner of apparently determined enemies of the Mehtar, Adamzadas, Moghli Pirs, Sayads, as well as intriguers of other classes, succumbed at once to the not very subtle influences employed against them, while as soon as it became generally known that I preferred expressions of loyalty to their Mehtar to hearing speeches of personal devotion to myself, the alteration I desired was made almost invariably.

Having now indicated what strong support can be afforded the Mehtar by British officers in Chitral in the way of winning over to his cause the influential classes—the villagers and poorer people will always look at the English with favourable eyes—and having in my former report, already referred to, shown how the position of the political agent at Chitral can be easily rendered practically safe against those who from fanaticism or other motives are hostile to the continued residence of British soldiers so

close to their frontiers, it is still necessary to revert to the present weakness of the Mehtar and his absolute dependence on the Government of India.

Nizam-ul-Mulk's lack of popularity can be overcome by time. His miserable poverty will be relieved by the Kashmir and Government of India subsidies he will receive. But the strongest influence against him at present is the doubt in his subjects' minds whether the Government of India really intends to continue its full support to Nizam-ul-Mulk, or whether it will after a time withdraw its officers and leave the country to be scrambled for again by Sher Afzal, Umra Khan, and the Khushwakt Princes.

Intriguers declare, and their words spread like wildfire throughout the land, that Sher Afzal is only biding his time until he has come to terms with the Government of India and with the Amir; also that the fact of Muhammad Wali being treated as a princely guest at Gilgit is significant that Government has not made up its mind what to do. They point their arguments by showing that Sher Afzal is in active correspondence with his supporters in Chitral, and by truly stating that numbers of Yasinis, in response to Muhammad Wali's intrigues, are continually running away to Gilgit.

The people, in fact, are waiting for a sign in which they may place some confidence. They fear to do or leave undone anything which may bring down upon them the vengeance of Sher Afzal or Muhammad Wali, if either of those Princes are in the end triumphant in Chitral or in Yasin. They know the capacity of both Katur and Khushwaktias for wreaking vengeance on those they bear enmity to.

For this state of things there is a simple and effective remedy. It is for the Government of India to at once assume, and let the fact be widely known that it does assume the protection of both Chitral and Yasin. Foreign enemies will be warned off. The people will be given peace.

The majority of the inhabitants of Chitral would gladly welcome the change. The Adamzadas would soon be brought to acquiesce in it. All but a small minority in Yasin are clamouring to become subjects of the Government of India. At the present moment there are deputations of Tui men in Gilgit, braving Muhammad Wali's resentment, who have come to implore that they may not again be handed over to the cruel oppression of either Khushkwakt or Katur. On the road to Gilgit the same petition was continually made to me secretly by those who fear to openly declare their sentiments.

The English were never so popular in Chitral as they are at present. It was discernible everywhere on the return march in the ready smile, the willing service of the men we met. Some Adamzadas at Mustuj, friends of Nizam-ul-Mulk, came to me to pray that Government would not now withhold water from the tree it had planted with its own hand, and so leave it to wither and die—the poorer classes everywhere re-echo the same wish in simpler but equally sincere phrases.

An Englishman now may travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort unless Mr. Bruce's four Gurkhas may be so denominated. There were no sentries at night. No suspicion of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five months' work in the country.

With all their weaknesses, foibles, and vices, of which they have their proportionate share, it is impossible not to like Chitralis. I personally should view with sad regret any retrograde step on the part of Government, which would inevitably be followed by a return to confusion and bloodshed in the pleasant country, and in a relapse into sorrow and misery of the happy-faced picturesque people.

I think I have now, in this and in my former report, gone over all the ground of which it seemed necessary or desirable that you should have my opinion. There only remains for me now the grateful task of acknowledging the valuable services and the happy selection of the officers appointed to accompany and assist me.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from MEHTAR NIZAM-UL-MULK, of Chitral, to Surgeon-Major G. S. ROBERTSON, C.S.I., in charge Chitral Mission, dated May 26, 1893.

After compliments.—As I, the sincere well-wisher of Government, suffering from misfortunes of the times, went and appealed to the great Government of India, and by God's grace from there having received royal kindness with the patronage and support

of Government, took possession of my father's country, and again by the coming of your mission with other officers to Chitral I acquired perfect strength and stability, I am consequently extremely pleased (literally, happy, contented) with you and your companions, and extremely thankful to Government for its favours and kindness, and to the limits of possibility with all sincerity and truthfulness both with my life and heart, I shall continue to act sedulously in the performance of services to Government, and I consider that the country under me is just like the countries within the possession of the great Government. Accordingly, since I have great hope of support from Government, my country being identical with countries belonging to Government, and since with truthfulness I have girded up the loins of sincerity. I request that two or three officers of Government, with 100 or more or less number of sepoy compatible with the means and resources of this country, should permanently remain in Chitral, and whichever place in the land of Chitral they select for a cantonment they may make buildings there. And without making a telegraph line, the acquiring of news and information is difficult, and delays may be caused in royal affairs; the telegraph line should be extended from Gilgit to Chitral, so that to all countries and powers it may become known and evident that the country of Chitral is inside the limits of the British Empire, and any other object of Government that there may be in this country I have no objection to offer against it. At the same time I am hopeful that some of my wishes also may be accepted, the advantages of them in reality do not accrue to me especially, but their adoption is advisable for the governance (literally, keeping the country) of the country, the carrying out of the wishes of Government, and the acquiring of peace and prosperity.

1st. The amount of yearly subsidy, which was fixed by the Kashmir Darbar and Gilgit for my father, should as before be continued to me, even I should be entitled to an increase of it since I have been placed (on the throne) by Government in this country, and my father's wealth has all been plundered, and consequently I am in very great straits for want of funds to reward people and to meet the necessary expenditure.

2nd. As my country belongs to Government, anyhow the parganah (district) of Narsat, which from the time of my ancestors having belonged to us, is my hereditary property, should be taken out of the usurping possession of the Khan of Jandol and handed over to me, so that the bad name and blemish on our reputation may get wiped off.

3rd. As through favour of Government all the country possessed by my father has been granted to me, a sanad also should be granted to me, saying that all the countries possessed by the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk are granted to his son, Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk, by the Government of India, so that my head may be raised and my position exalted before all high and low people.

4th. As the stay of Sher Afzal in Badakhshan, and also that of the son of Mir Wali in Gilgit, causes refractoriness and wandering amongst the people of Chitral and Warshagam, and as it is quite likely that Mir Wali's son by talking intriguingly with the people of Yaghistan may delude them, it is advisable, even necessary, that Sher Afzal should always be kept at Kabul or Kandahar, and that Mir Wali's son should be sent down to Kashmir.

I trust, my friend, you would pay your attention to the points contained in this letter.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the
RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated Simla, July 31, 1893.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of the correspondence ending with your letter of the 28th of June, on the subject of Surgeon-Major Robertson's mission to Chitral.

2. The enclosures of the letter cited contain a connected account of Dr. Robertson's proceedings from the time of his leaving Gilgit in January last to the date of his return on the 6th of June. They also furnish his recommendations for the future conduct of our relations with Chitral. These papers have been considered by the Government of India with great interest, and I am to convey the following orders and observations of the Governor-General in Council upon them.

I am in the first place to say that you are authorised by the Government of India to convey to Dr. Robertson their general approval of his proceedings. He has had an exceedingly difficult task to perform, and although he may in a few instances have interfered in the internal affairs of the Chitral State to an extent not contemplated by the Government of India, it would probably have been difficult or impossible for him to do otherwise. The weakness of his position was due to the fact that Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk has apparently little strength except what he owes to our countenance, and is, or certainly was at first, far from popular with some of the most influential of his subjects. Dr. Robertson appears to have been remarkably successful, under these unpromising conditions, in enabling Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk to establish himself as ruler, and in bringing about a better understanding between the rival factions. It is satisfactory to observe that he is able to report that "an Englishman may now travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear," and that "a district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet." I am to request you to inform Dr. Robertson that his services are highly appreciated by the Government of India, and that they concur in his commendations of the officers* and men associated with him in his difficult task.

* Captain F. E. Younghusband.
Lieutenant the Hon. C. G. Bruce.
" T. L. R. Gordon.
Khan Sahib Abdul Hakim.

3. Dr. Robertson's proposals for the firm establishment of our authority in Chitral are briefly as follows:—

- (i.) The posting of a British officer in Chitral with a guard of 120 men, and the occupation of Yasin.
- (ii.) The consequent strengthening of the Gilgit garrison.
- (iii.) The posting of a British political officer in Yasin, practically controlling the Governor as in Hunza and Nagar.
- (iv.) The raising of a local levy in Yasin.
- (v.) The immediate occupation of Ghizr and Gupis.
- (vi.) The recognition of the *de facto* Mehtar, if he acknowledges the suzerainty of Kashmir; no guarantee of succession being given.
- (vii.) The formal installation of the Mehtar.
- (viii.) The construction of a road and telegraph line to Chitral.
- (ix.) The public assumption by the Government of India of the protection of Chitral and Yasin.

These suggestions are concurred in by Colonel Durand.

4. It has always been in the contemplation of the Government of India that one of the additional officers sanctioned for the Gilgit Agency should be posted in Chitral, though not necessarily at the capital, for the purpose of watching events on this part of the frontier, and my telegram has already conveyed to you the decision that Captain Younghusband should remain, making his head-quarters at Mastuj, whither he should remove as soon as possible. The instructions given by Dr. Robertson to Captain Younghusband for his guidance are approved. It cannot be too clearly laid down that Captain Younghusband is not expected to coerce the Mehtar in any way, or to interfere with the internal affairs of the State; but that he is deputed merely for the purpose of obtaining trustworthy information as to events on that part of the frontier, and of giving to the Mehtar that amount of encouragement which the presence of a British officer within Chitral limits will not fail to afford.

5. The Government of India have decided, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, to strengthen and redistribute the force within the Gilgit Agency, and to occupy Gupis and Ghizr; but on this subject a separate communication will be sent to you.

6. The Government of India have come to the conclusion that recent events do not call for any departure from the policy which has hitherto been adopted with regard to Chitral. It is essential that the State should continue to be under the suzerainty of Kashmir and under British influence; and sanction has been given to the payment to Nizam-ul-Mulk of the subsidy for the year 1892. Dr. Robertson may promise the Mehtar that this annual payment will continue so long as he conducts himself properly. While, however, the Government of India are prepared to recognise Nizam-ul-Mulk as the *de facto* Ruler of Chitral, and to afford him their countenance as such, care should be taken not to give him a guarantee or a promise of protection against rivals, and his formal installation should be avoided as tending to imply that we have undertaken to keep him in power. A letter may be sent to Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk, conveying an assurance of the kind indicated above without bestowing a formal sanad of appointment, as in the case of Hunza and Nagar.

No. 19.

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 34, of September 1, 1893.

YOUR Excellency's important letter in the Foreign Department, No. 142, dated 11th July 1893, dealing with the affairs of the Gilgit Agency, has received my most careful consideration.

With regard to Chitral, you forward Dr. Robertson's full and instructive report on his mission to the Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk, the effect of which mission has been to obtain a very useful insight into the affairs of Chitral, and to give Nizam-ul-Mulk an opportunity of strengthening his position and acquiring the goodwill of his subjects. Now that the mission has, in accordance with your original instructions, been withdrawn, you propose to leave an assistant of the Gilgit Agency, with an escort of 100 bayonets, at Mastuj or some other place in Chitral, with instructions not to coerce the Mehtar in any way, nor to interfere with the internal affairs of the State; but to supply you with trustworthy information as to the affairs of that part of the frontier, and to give the Mehtar "that amount of encouragement which the presence of a British officer within Chitral limits will not fail to afford."

In my Despatch of 2nd December last, I remarked on the difficulty, so constantly proved by experience on our Indian frontiers, of restraining the tendency to multiply political relations and responsibilities, and I observed that our movements may have a disturbing, as well as a pacifying effect among the independent tribes and chiefships of this remote borderland. From this point of view, I urged on your Excellency a strict adherence to the limits of the policy, explained in your Foreign Secretary's letter of 26th May 1892 to the Resident in Kashmir, and strongly deprecated any undue interference with or control of the tribes, such as might lead to hostilities or to the further extension of our responsibilities.

In regard to Chitral, it has been the consistent policy of the Government of India to exclude from that country, not merely the control, but even the influence, so far as possible, of the Amir of Afghanistan. But apart from the evils which might result from Chitral falling under Afghan influence or domination, it is obvious that the near prospect of the Russian occupation extending to the north bank of the Panja, which is less than a day's march from the Chitral frontier, render it a matter of importance to us to be able to control the external affairs of Chitral.

I cannot agree that it would be a wise policy to give to the Amir suzerainty over Chitral. It would be unjustifiable to deprive Kashmir of her acknowledged right of suzerainty over that State in order to hand it over to an Afghan ruler.

I observe that, in your opinion, the maintenance of an English officer as Political Agent in Chitral, renders necessary the retention of strong posts along the line of the Gilgit and Ghizr rivers, and it is partly on this account and partly to paralyse any hostile action of the tribes having relations with the Gilgit Agency, that your Excellency's Government desires the permanent addition of a Bengal infantry battalion to the garrison of the Gilgit Agency. But, in determining our future policy towards Chitral, a wider view must be taken, and the question must be looked at with reference to the general aspect of affairs in that region, which may in a short time be considerably changed. It seems to me, therefore, in existing circumstances, premature to decide now on permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier. In the meantime I can only sanction the retention of Captain Younghusband in that State as a temporary measure. I quite approve of the line of action which you lay down for him, but in regard to the subsidiary measures which you propose for safe-guarding the line of communication by the maintenance of posts at Gakuch, Gupis, and Ghizr, I think that they should be reduced to what is absolutely necessary for securing the present safety of the British Agent, and keeping open his communications with Gilgit.

No. 20.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 207, of September 20, 1893.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 188, dated the 29th August 1893, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further papers regarding affairs in Chitral.

Your Lordship will observe that His Highness the Amir has undertaken to detain Sher Afzal in the Ghazni district, and to prevent him from intriguing in Chitral; and that in consequence of Narsat now being in the hands of the Khan of Jandol, Dr. Robertson has suggested that Nizam-ul-Mulk should not be recognised as "Mehtar of Chitral,

“ including all the countries possessed by the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk,” but simply as “ Ruler of the whole of Chitral and Yasin.”

In compliance with Dr. Robertson's suggestion, we have instructed the Resident in Kashmir to make the necessary alterations in the two last paragraphs of the draft letter to the Mehtar. A copy of the draft as altered is enclosed.

Enclosure in No. 20.

From the BRITISH AGENT AT GILGIT to MEHTAR NIZAM-UL-MULK.

I SENT to the Resident in Kashmir, for submission to the Government of India, your letter of the 26th May 1893, and I have now received the orders of the Viceroy with regard to it. His Excellency desires me to say in the first place that he fully appreciates the sentiments of loyalty and goodwill to which you have given expression, and that he takes the greatest interest in your welfare and that of the Chitral State. With regard to your proposals that some British officers should remain in Chitral, and that the telegraph line should be carried on to Chitral from Gilgit, I am to inform you that his Excellency has decided to leave Captain Younghusband as political officer in Chitral. He will reside at some spot sufficiently near your capital to be of service to you whenever you may wish to consult him. His Excellency has also decided to station a British officer with some troops in Yasin, so as to render that district safe from attack. Telegraph line may possibly be extended hereafter, but at present this seems hardly necessary.

You have made four other requests, and the Viceroy has considered them:—

First, he has authorised me to tell you that, so long as you show goodwill towards the Government of India and the Maharaja of Kashmir, you will continue to receive the subsidy granted to Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk,

Secondly, his Excellency wishes me to say that the Khan of Jandol has been warned not to commit aggressions against Chitral.

Thirdly, his Excellency desires me to inform you that the Government of India recognise you as Ruler of the whole of Chitral and Yasin.

Fourthly, I am to let you know that the Amir has given a written assurance that he will keep Sher Afzal under surveillance within Afghanistan, and that he will not be able again to disturb the peace of Chitral; and I am to assure you that Mir Wali's son will not be allowed to disturb your authority in Yasin.

This answer to your letter will no doubt be very satisfactory to you, and will convince you of the goodwill of the Government of India.

No. 21.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 99, of June 12, 1894.

LORD KIMBERLEY stated in his Despatch No. 34, dated the 1st September 1893, regarding the affairs of the Gilgit Agency, that he could only sanction the retention of Captain Younghusband in Chitral as a temporary measure, and drew attention to certain considerations likely to materially affect the permanent political and military arrangements on that frontier.

The Resident in Kashmir was duly informed of the views entertained by your predecessor; and in January last, when it appeared not improbable that the negotiations with Russia might shortly be brought to a successful issue, his Excellency Lord Lansdowne caused Colonel Barr to be instructed that, if no new complications arose, the Political Officer in Chitral should be withdrawn after the winter was over. The Resident was at the same time desired to give his best attention to the possibility of affecting any reductions in the political staff of the Gilgit Agency.

We have since received several reports giving the views of the local officers on matters connected with our policy in and on the borders of Chitral, and the whole question has been again considered. The recommendations of the Officiating British Agent, Colonel Bruce, show that the local officers advocate a policy of activity which we are not prepared to support. It is unnecessary under the circumstances to enter on any examination of the points advanced by Colonel Bruce, but the consideration to which in our opinion much weight must at present be attached is that, as noted by Captain Younghusband, immediate withdrawal from Chitral would deprive us of the best means we possess of watching events on the Hindu Kush frontier. The negotiations with Russia still continue. On the southern frontier of Chitral complications have arisen owing to the action of Umra Khan of Jandol, who has attacked certain Kafirs over whom Chitral claims control, and has threatened Chitral territory. The

attitude of Umra Khan need not be regarded as a matter of the first importance, and we are not without hopes that an understanding may be arrived at with him in the course of the Afghan frontier delimitation; but we are convinced that to withdraw our political officer from Chitral, while the Pamir question is still unsettled, would be premature and unwise. We have accordingly decided that our position as regards Chitral must for another year remain on the present footing. The detailed instructions which we have given to the Resident will be found in our Foreign Secretary's letter, dated the 2nd June 1894, and we trust that our proceedings will meet with your approval.

As regards the regiment of Bengal infantry (pioneers), at present in the Gilgit Agency, our view is that it should not be withdrawn without being relieved, at least until an agreement has been concluded with Russia on the Pamir question.

The papers now forwarded include certain proposals as to the training of Chitral levies. During a recent short visit to the Mehtar's capital, Captain Younghusband made temporary arrangements for giving instruction in musketry to selected bodies of Chitralis. To this we have raised no objection, but we are not at present prepared to go further.

Enclosure in No. 21.

From the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the
RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated June 2, 1894.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to address you in respect to the policy to be observed in Chitral in the near future.

When a review of the position on this frontier was placed before the Secretary of State for India nearly a year ago, Lord Kimberley sanctioned the retention of Captain Younghusband in Chitral as a temporary measure only, and pointed to three possible contingencies which would materially affect the general aspect of affairs in that region. Those contingencies were—

- (i) the abandonment by the Amir of all idea of bringing Chitral under his control;
- (ii) the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Russia for the determination of boundaries in the Pamir tract; and
- (iii) the mitigation, through the mediation of our frontier officers, of the irritation and suspicion of the frontier tribes.

At the close of 1893, the first of the above conditions had been attained by the agreement concluded between the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand; there were indications that a Pamir settlement might before long be arrived at; and the attitude of the tribes was fairly satisfactory. In these circumstances you were informed that, if no new complications arose, the political officer in Chitral should be withdrawn when the winter was over. In sanctioning the temporary retention of Captain Younghusband in Chitral, the Secretary of State had expressed the opinion that the subsidiary measures undertaken should be limited to what was absolutely necessary for the safety of the political officer, and for keeping open his communication with Gilgit. In view of these instructions the abandonment of the posts at Gakuch, Gupis, and Ghizr would have been the corollary of the withdrawal of the political officer.

The course of events since my letter of January last was written has not however tended to facilitate the execution of the policy then projected. The actual demarcation of the Afghan frontier, in accordance with the agreement with the Amir, has yet to be carried out; the settlement of the relations of the tribes on that line is a matter requiring delicate management, and the situation on the southern border of Chitral is complicated by the claims and aspirations of Umra Khan of Jandol, whose recent conduct constitutes a disturbing element. Finally, the Pamir negotiations have not reached a conclusion.

To this last point much weight is attached by the Governor-General in Council. In his opinion the moment is inopportune for taking a step which would not improbably be regarded as a definite withdrawal, and which would deprive us of our look-out post for affairs beyond the Hindu Kush. The decision, therefore, of the Government of India is that, for another year, our position in and towards Chitral must remain upon the

present footing. It appears that Colonel Bruce and Captain Youngbusband advocate a policy of activity and extension which is not in accord with the views of the Government of India. You are aware that the Government of India consider that there should be a limit to the period of driving Nizam-ul-Mulk in leading strings, and that he should be taught, as soon as possible, to rely on and act for himself. I am to request that this policy may be impressed on the British Agent, and that he may be clearly informed that it is not intended to maintain permanently a resident officer in Chitral. It will suffice to retain the unquestioned right of sending a political officer into Chitral at all times; and, hereafter, when the resident officer has been withdrawn, it will probably be advisable to make a practice of sending a political officer from time to time into the northern part of the State to watch the progress of affairs in the country, and in the direction of the Hindu Kush Passes.

In accordance with the policy laid down in the preceding paragraph, the Governor-General in Council is unable to accept the suggestion that the head-quarters of the political officer in Chitral should be transferred to the Mehtar's capital, and it should be made generally known that the head-quarters will remain at Mastuj. At the same time it is not intended to discourage occasional visits by the political officer to the Mehtar, for such visits may be useful as paving the way towards the permanent arrangements under which it is probable that no resident officer in Chitral will be maintained.

As regards the deputation of musketry instructors to train selected bodies of Chitralis, I am to say that the Government of India are not at present prepared to sanction the formal deputation of selected non-commissioned officers to Chitral for long periods, but will take no exception to temporary measures of the kind introduced by Captain Younghusband during his recent visit to Chitral, provided it is understood that instruction is only given to such levies as the Mehtar already has, and that no scheme of military organisation, such as that sketched by Captain Younghusband, is attempted.

The attitude of Umra Khan and the complications to which it may lead cannot at present be conveniently discussed. It is in contemplation that, in the course of the demarcation of the Afghan frontier in the Chitral and Bajaur neighbourhood, a meeting should, if possible, be arranged between Umra Khan and the British Joint Commissioner. If this meeting actually takes place, it will probably be easier to judge on what general lines Umra Khan should be dealt with, and in the meantime the Governor-General in Council, as at present advised, considers that no action can with advantage be taken.

No. 22.

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 34, of August 3, 1894.

MY LORD,

I HAVE given my careful consideration to the letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, No. 99, Secret, dated the 12th June 1894, forwarding recent correspondence on Chitral affairs and enclosing the instructions which you addressed to the Resident in Kashmir on 2nd June 1894, regarding the policy to be pursued by your Agent in that country.

The perusal of Captain Younghusband's interesting reports has satisfied me that the policy adopted last year, under Lord Kimberley's instructions, has so far been successful. The despatch of the mission and the retention of Captain Younghusband as political agent in Chitral have had the effect of ameliorating the conditions of government in that country, and of giving increased stability and popularity to the rule of the Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk, and at the same time have strengthened the ties by which he is bound to the British Government.

The reasons, however, which induced Lord Kimberley to declare that it would be "premature to decide now on the permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier" are still of weight. It is true that the Amir of Afghanistan no longer advances any claims to exercise control in the affairs of Chitral, but the settlement of the frontier on the south-west and south of Chitral may still lead to troublesome complications; while on the north the question of the line delimitating the Russian boundary in the

regions of the Upper Oxus is still unsettled. It was perhaps premature in these circumstances to raise the question of withdrawing Captain Younghusband from Chitral, and I fully concur in your decision that the moment for effecting what would certainly be regarded as a final withdrawal is inopportune, and, while adhering to Lord Kimberley's view that the present arrangements can only be regarded as temporary, I am no more prepared than Lord Kimberley was last year to formulate a definite policy (whether of abandoning or of continuing those arrangements) within a fixed period such as is indicated in Mr. Cuninghame's letter to the Resident in Kashmir.

I approve also of your decided rejection of the proposals for establishing a political officer and an escort in Yasin and for opening up the road between Peshawar and Chitral, but Captain Younghusband's more moderate suggestions for transferring his own headquarters from Mastuj to Chitral, and for removing to Mastuj the detachment now posted at Ghizr, seems to me to be supported by weighty reasons and to deserve consideration. I leave the decision of the matter, however, entirely in the hands of your Excellency's Government.

On the question of local levies, I see no objection to the policy of encouraging and even assisting the Mehtar to give some training on the lines already started by Captain Younghusband to a limited number of his hill levies. It is better that his 400 rifles should be in the hands of men who know something of their use than in those of untrained men who could not prevent their becoming the prey of Pathan raiders, and the value to be attached to our controlling the foreign relations of Chitral seems to depend to a considerable extent on the efficiency of the Mehtar's local levies.

I concur in the retention for the present of the regiment of Bengal Infantry (Pioneers) in the Gilgit Agency.

No. 23.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, March 8, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

If the force available at Robertson's disposal is not sufficient to ensure his safety, the only route by which we can attack Umra Khan is from the Peshawur border. We are making preparations preliminary to arrangements for doing this if it should be necessary, but it is evidently an undertaking of great magnitude.

No. 24.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, March 8, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Military authorities state that one month would be required for collection of transport before a relief expedition could start. Looking to the whole situation in Chitral, we think it essential to be prepared to make a diversion into Bajaur. We have, therefore, authorised immediate orders to issue to commence hiring camels up to 6,000; all other points in connexion with the organisation of expedition to be dependent upon your sanction.

No. 25.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, March 8, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

I am prepared to approve such action for securing safety of Robertson and party as you may deem necessary.

No. 26.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, March 15, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Orders have been issued for mobilization of the 1st division of the field army.

No. 27.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, March 15, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Please let me know, why so large a force is considered necessary for securing safety of Robertson and party.

No. 28.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, March 18, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Large force is required on account of necessity for holding line of communication in great force, and to meet possible hostility of both Mohmands and Swatis and other frontier tribes.

No. 29.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, March 30, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

As soon as present trouble is over, policy with regard to Chitral and neighbourhood will have to be fully and carefully re-considered in light of recent events. Meantime, our hands should be kept perfectly free. I hope therefore that you will take care that nothing is said or done to commit Government either way with regard to making new roads or retention of posts now occupied, or occupation of new posts.

No. 30.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 66, April 17, 1895.

We have the honour to report, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, upon the progress of affairs in Chitral since the murder of Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk in January last, and to give a narrative of events which have led up to the present situation, and the despatch of a force for the relief of Mr. Robertson and the rest of the British officers and troops in the Chitral Fort.

Her Majesty's Government are aware of the circumstances attending the succession of Nizam-ul-Mulk to the Chitral Mehtarship. We had misgivings as to his proving to be a strong ruler, but, during the two years of his rule in the country, he had succeeded in fairly holding his own and had obtained a certain degree of popularity. There were, indeed, no other dangerous opponents left in the field. Sher Afzal, after his sudden descent on Chitral in November 1892, and his flight before Nizam-ul-Mulk in the following month, had been interned in Kabul, and the Amir wrote to our Agent there that he would not again create disturbances in Chitral. Most of the sons of the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk had either been murdered or had fled the country. Of the latter, one was Amir-ul-Mulk, a youth of from 18 to 20 years of age, who, on the accession of Nizam-ul-Mulk, had fled to Bajaur, and taken refuge with Umra Khan.

In May 1894, Amir-ul-Mulk returned to Chitral professing to have escaped from Umra Khan's hands, and was kindly received by Nizam-ul-Mulk. On the 1st January 1895, while the brothers were out hawking at Broz, a few miles from Chitral, Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot by a follower of Amir-ul-Mulk. His death was almost instantaneous. None of the Mehtar's party made any attempt to avenge their ruler's murder, and Amir-ul-Mulk promptly seized the Chitral Fort, and proclaimed himself Mehtar. Two of Nizam-ul-Mulk's leading officials and some of his partisans were murdered at the same time, and others taken prisoners.

The news was quickly brought into Gupis by refugees, and on the 5th of January it was confirmed by Ghulam Dastgir, a half-brother (by a slave-mother) of the murdered Mehtar, who fled to the camp of Mr. Udny, our Commissioner for demarcation in the Kunar Valley. Lieutenant Gurdon, Assistant Political Officer, was in Chitral when the murder took place, with an escort of eight Sikhs. The rest of his escort of 100 men were posted at Mastuj, 63 miles north-east of Chitral. Amir-ul-Mulk sent a deputation to him asking to be recognised as Mehtar, but was told that the orders of Government must be awaited. Fifty Sikhs from the escort at Mastuj were at once sent to Chitral, upon Lieutenant Gurdon's requisition, and Mastuj was reinforced by 100 men. Ghizr was held by Captain Townshend with 200 men, and Mr. Robertson, the British Agent at Gilgit, started about the middle of January for Chitral to report on the situation. We cautioned Mr. Robertson not to commit the Government of India to any change of policy in regard to Chitral, and not to recognise any candidate to the Mehtarship, or conclude any permanent arrangement, without reference to the Government of India.

Until Mr. Robertson arrived, Mr. Gurdon remained in Chitral, acting with admirable coolness and judgment; he occupied a house in an excellent position for defence, if necessary, and commenced quietly laying in supplies. Amir-ul-Mulk sent more than one deputation to him, asking to be recognised as Mehtar, but Lieutenant Gurdon declined to commit himself to any other statement than that the orders of Government must be awaited. He continued to adopt this attitude on all subsequent occasions, when Amir-ul-Mulk personally visited him, and preferred the same request.

Various reports were received by the Government of India regarding the origin of the murder, but there can be little doubt now that it was the result of a conspiracy of the Sher Afzal party and Umra Khan of Jandol, the latter seeing an opportunity for his own aggrandisement in the disturbance which must necessarily follow in Chitral. Umra Khan's relations with Nizam-ul-Mulk had for some time previously been very strained, and at the time of his murder Nizam-ul-Mulk was planning some means of retaliating on Umra Khan for seizing his property on the way up from India, and for closing the road to Chitral against traders from India. Amir-ul-Mulk disclaimed all connexion with Umra Khan, but he was probably acting in collusion with him at the time he was projecting Nizam-ul-Mulk's murder, but afterwards soon realised the danger of Umra Khan's presence and became anxious to get rid of him. Be this as it may, immediately after the murder, Umra Khan advanced into the southern end of the Chitral Valley with a large force. He sent a letter to the Governor of Darosh, in which he announced his intention of starting at the head of a jehad to punish the Kafirs, and requested that Amir-ul-Mulk would come to Ashreth to receive him. Amir-ul-Mulk not falling in with his wishes, Umra Khan's force occupied Ashreth, and proceeded to advance on Kila Darosh.

Mr. Robertson, while *en route* to Chitral, heard of Umra Khan's invasion of Chitral territory. In his opinion this effected a complete change in the situation. Mr. Robertson was then at Mastuj, 158 miles from a line of telegraph, and necessarily acted on his own judgment. He informed us that Lieutenant Gurdon could not withdraw from Chitral without help; and that he had determined to push on to his assistance, but that, if Umra Khan advanced rapidly and in force, he would be unable to return to Mastuj, "the road is so terribly bad." At the same time he wrote to the Khan of Jandol on the 26th of January, demanding an explanation of the presence of his forces in Chitrali territory, and requesting him to at once retire, and so save himself from the consequences of the displeasure of Government. Under our instructions Mr. Udny and Mr. Robertson further addressed Umra Khan early in February, demanding an explanation of his proceedings. Umra Khan replied to Mr. Udny on the 10th February that he came to assist and strengthen Amir-ul-Mulk and to combine with him for an attack on the Kafirs. Amir-ul-Mulk had opposed his friendship and acted in a hostile manner, and no alternative was left him but to do the same. He added that he would leave Amir-ul-Mulk alone if he was willing to make peace, and that he hoped his friendship with the British Government would remain unbroken. He replied to Mr. Robertson in similar terms.

Notwithstanding these professions of friendship, Umra Khan's agents at Sao and other places in the Kunar Valley were doing their utmost to prevent communications passing between Mr. Udny's camp and the British officers in Chitral. A sharp look-out was kept for messengers, and one was killed a few hundred yards north of Chanduk, it is believed, by one of Umra Khan's picquets, though the Bajauris declare that the man was murdered under the orders of the Sipah Salar to bring discredit upon Umra Khan.

Mr. Robertson arrived in Chitral on the 1st February, and took up his position in the fort. He had with him 290 men, and sufficient supplies to the end of April had been collected. Besides these there were 200 at Mastuj, and 100 Sikhs of the British Agent's escort had been despatched from Gilgit to Mastuj and 100 Kashmir troops to Ghizr. Mr. Robertson reported that he found the Chitralis of Chitral proper less well affected towards us than they were two years ago. He considered them so hopelessly treacherous and divided and impotent for fighting that he recommended the Sipah Salar should be allowed to occupy all the country he had claimed in his boundary negotiations with Mr. Uday, including the district of Narsat.

The Bajauris, whose force was estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 men, remained throughout February in the southern part of the Chitral Valley. The Chitrali force opposing Umra Khan numbered about 3,000 men. On the 25th January the Chitralis were driven from the position which they were holding before Kila Darosh with some loss on both sides; they continued, however, to hold Kila Darosh itself until the 9th February, when it was surrendered to Umra Khan by arrangement, under which the lives of the defenders were spared, and many breech-loading rifles and matchlocks were given up to him.

After the surrender of Kila Darosh, the Chitralis concentrated at Ghairat under Amir-ul-Mulk. In order to stop a general stampede of the inhabitants from Chitral proper, and to neutralise the open revolt of the Kushwakhtis against Amir-ul-Mulk, Mr. Robertson took over the Kushwakht country as a temporary measure, and on his own responsibility, without pledging Government to anything, he promised protection to the Kushwakhti headmen, and appointed Khushwakht Governors to Mastuj and Laspur. At this time Amir-ul-Mulk was with Mr. Robertson in the Chitral Fort, and Mr. Robertson believed that, by showing that he and Amir-ul-Mulk were working in thorough accord, he was restoring confidence. He believed that if any rival claimant elected to fight with the help of Umra Khan, many Chitralis would join the British party, and that the Kushwakhtis would certainly stand firmly with us.

The situation in which Mr. Robertson was placed appeared to be one of considerable difficulty. He had, before Kila Darosh was surrendered, reported that efforts were being made by the Chitralis to get him into collision with Umra Khan. He had resisted these, but at the same time he said that the Chitralis had "no fight in them," that they undoubtedly called in Umra Khan, but desired to escape the consequences of their own acts; and that their attitude was so doubtful that if he were to move back one yard he would be mobbed by a crowd of refugees. The whole country would be open to Umra Khan and he would be harrassed or permitted to retire according to the humour of Umra Khan and his fanatical following. In these circumstances it was evident that any further success would render Umra Khan a serious danger to the British Representative, and accordingly we authorised Mr. Robertson, on the 19th February, to give the Chitralis such material and moral support in turning him out of Chitral territory as might be consistent with the safety of his own party, and to call up reinforcements from the Kashmir regiment on the Gilgit command, if necessary.

On the 21st February, Mr. Robertson reported that everything was satisfactory, supplies plentiful, the men healthy, and the Chitralis cheerful and helpful. But the situation now became seriously complicated by the arrival on the scene of the refugee Sher Afzal from Kabul. Mr. Robertson did not receive reliable information of his arrival in Chitral territory until the 24th February, when he at once entered into communication with him. On the 27th February, Mr. Robertson received from Sher Afzal, through a confidential messenger, a demand that he should go back to Mastuj at once. Sher Afzal promised to be friends with Government on the same terms as previous Mehtars of Chitral, but his promise was coupled with a threat that, if his terms were not accepted, Umra Khan would at once advance. Mr. Robertson replied that Kashmir was Chitral's suzerain, and neither Umra Khan nor anyone else could impose a Mehtar on Chitral without the permission of Government; he added that Sher Afzal's message was wanting in respect to the Government of India, that he was informing Government of Sher Afzal's demands and would communicate their instructions to him, and that, if in the meantime he attempted any overt acts of hostility, he must take the consequences on his own head.

At the end of February the Chitralis were still holding Ghairat, and Umra Khan was rapidly completing his preparations for the defence of Kila Darosh against an attack from the Chitralis which he believed to be imminent. A few Chitralis of the lower class had gone over to Sher Afzal, but the Adamzadas, though suspected of being partisans of

Sher Afzal, had not yet openly defected. Out of the 700 Sniders given to Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, it was estimated that only 200 remained in Chitral, most of the others having found their way into Umra Khan's possession.

The strength of the force with Umra Khan at this time is not known. It has been differently assessed at 3,000 and 8,000 men. The former is believed to have been the strength of the force with which he originally advanced into Southern Chitral, but on his circulating in Swat and elsewhere a call to jehad against the British, he is reported to have been joined by 5,000 more, among whom were included many Mullas from Dir and Bajaur.

A report was received at Gilgit, on the 6th March, that the position at Ghairat had been attacked by Sher Afzal and Umra Khan, and that the whole British party had retired into the Chitral Fort, which was being fired into; also that the road from Mastuj to Chitral had been closed and the fort of Drasan occupied by order of Sher Afzal. The Assistant British Agent was then sending forward at Mr. Robertson's request 150 Hunza, Nagar, and Punyal levies from Gilgit to reinforce Chitral; and when he heard the report of Mr. Robertson being forced back to Chitral, he called up 100 Kashmir troops from Chilas for duty in Gilgit, and warned the Officer Commanding the 32nd Pioneers to hold half his battalion in immediate readiness to march, if necessary; to Gilgit on receipt of intimation to do so.

The report as to the attack on Mr. Robertson was contradicted next day, and it was now reported that the closing of the road from Mastuj to Chitral was due to some malcontents having broken down a bridge. It appears from the communication which was then received in Gilgit that Mr. Robertson, who had gone out with Amir-ul-Mulk to the Chitrali position of Aiun, on the river between Chitral and Darosh, returned to Chitral on the 1st March with the whole of his escort. He sent a message to Gilgit that no anxiety need be felt if communication with him were interrupted. This is the last direct communication received from Chitral; it came from Lieutenant Gurdon and was dated the 1st March. Mr. Robertson was believed to have with him in Chitral a strong force and plenty of supplies, while Gupis, Ghizr, and Mastuj were also held by troops with British officers in each. Mr. Robertson wrote on the 13th February that he was holding Chitral Fort with 240 men, and expected an additional 50 men the same day; and on the 25th February he wrote that he had plenty of supplies for three months, owing to Lieutenant Gurdon's successful efforts. We had thus reason to believe that he had supplies for a garrison of 290 men up to the fourth week in May. It was clear, however, that his position, cut off from communication with Gilgit, was full of risk so long as Umra Khan was north of the Lowarai Pass.

The information described in the two preceding paragraphs was received by us on the 7th of March, and after carefully considering the situation, we decided that preliminary arrangements should be undertaken in order to be prepared, if necessary, to operate against Umra Khan from Peshawar. We believed that Mr. Robertson's garrison in Chitral Fort could resist attack from Umra Khan and Sher Afzal's forces, and hold out as long as his ammunition and supplies lasted, but his communications were on all sides interrupted, and his retreat cut off; and it appeared to us to be imperative that no effort should be spared to effect his relief by the end of April, if the investment was not otherwise removed before that date. The time estimated for the advance of a force from the Peshawar border to Chitral necessitated that a start should be made early in April, and there was not a day to spare if we were to be prepared to advance then. We subsequently heard that reinforcements had left Mastuj, numbering, as far as we could ascertain, 120 men; if these had reached Chitral they would, by increasing the number of mouths to feed, reduce the time for which Mr. Robertson had supplies from three months to about nine weeks, or till the end of April only.

On the 14th March, in order that Umra Khan might have distinct notice of the decision to which we had thus come, a final letter of warning, in the name of the Government of India, was ordered to be sent to him through Mr. Udny and the Commissioner of Peshawar, and an attempt was also ordered to be made to send a similar letter through the British officers in Chitral and Mastuj. The letter recounted the warnings given to Umra Khan against interfering with Chitral affairs, mentioned his various acts of aggression, directed him to at once quit Chitral territory, and told him that if by the 1st of April he had not withdrawn, the Government of India would compel him to do so; that they were making preparations to send forward their forces for that purpose, and he would only have himself to blame for any evil results that might fall

upon him. At the same time a Proclamation* was issued to the people of Swat and others on the Peshawar frontier, announcing the intention and object of Government, assuring them that we did not intend to permanently occupy any territory through which the force might pass or interfere with the independence of the tribes, and promising friendly treatment to all those who did not oppose the march of the troops. Instructions were also sent to Mr. Robertson to inform Sher Afzal that the Government of India could not deal with him so long as he remained in alliance with Umra Khan. These instructions never reached Mr. Robertson owing to Chitral Fort being invested by the enemy. The Amir of Afghanistan was informed of the intentions of the Government of India.

Orders were issued at the same time for the mobilisation of the 1st Division of the Field Army, under Major-General Sir Robert Low, with certain modifications in regard to the artillery and cavalry.

Major Deane, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, Lieutenant Rawlinson, Mr. F. B. Spencer, Mr. Waterfield, Commandant, Peshawar Border Police, and Mr. W. S. Davies were appointed political officers with the force, under the orders of Sir Robert Low, who was given supreme political authority, as well as military command. Major Deane at once commenced negotiations with the Swatis and other tribes concerned, and explained the situation to them. The Assistant British Agent at Gilgit having reported that all the men of Tangir and Darel had been recalled to their homes, which possibly indicated some excitement there, he was authorised to explain to the people the purport of the Proclamation issued to the Swatis and Bajauris. Native reports say that early in February Umra Khan had sent messengers to the Tangiris urging them to attack Chilas.

Interruption of communication beyond Mastuj continued, and on the 17th March the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, telegraphed that reports circulated by agents of Sher Afzal were causing considerable excitement among the people of the country, and that he was anxious about a small party of 100 Sikhs and 20 sappers with Captain Ross and Lieutenant Fowler, which had left Mastuj recently for Chitral, presumably under Mr. Robertson's orders. He reported that, under the circumstances, he had requested Colonel Kelly to bring up to Gilgit the half battalion of the 32nd Pioneers held in readiness in Chilas. Two hundred men of this regiment with Colonel Kelly arrived at Gilgit on the 20th March, and 200 more on the 22nd.

On the 21st March, news reached Gilgit from Captain Bretherton at Mastuj of a serious attack on some British Indian troops between Mastuj and Chitral. Complete details have not yet been received, but from the latest information it appears that about

* From the FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to the CHIEF SECRETARY, Punjab Government.

(Telegraphic.)

March 14, 1895.

THE Governor-General in Council has resolved that the following Proclamation be issued, and his Excellency in Council would like his Honour to give directions for having its purport generally communicated upon the border:—To all the people of Swat and the people in Bajaur who do not side with Umra Khan.

Be it known to you, and any other persons concerned, that—

Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, in spite of his often repeated assurances of friendship to the British Government, and regardless of frequent warnings to refrain from interfering with the affairs of Chitral, which is a protected state under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the Chitral valley and attacked the Chitrali people.

The Government of India have now given Umra Khan full warning that, unless he retires from Chitral by the 1st of April, corresponding with the 5th day of Shawal 1312 H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In order to carry out this purpose, they have arranged to assemble on the Peshawar border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance, and to march this force through Umra Khan's territory towards Chitral.

The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and prevent any future, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and as soon as this object has been attained, the force will be withdrawn.

The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes; and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. Supplies and transports will be paid for, and all persons are at liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations in perfect security.

the beginning of March, under instructions from Mr. Robertson, a Subadar started from Mastuj with 40 men and 60 boxes of ammunition for Chitral. He was compelled to halt at Buni, the road being broken, and wrote in to Mastuj that he expected to be attacked. On receipt of the Subadar's letter, Lieutenant Moberley, special officer with the Kashmir troops at Mastuj, asked Captain C. R. Ross, commanding the British Agent's escort of 14th Sikhs, to make a night march in support of the Subadar. Captain Ross and Lieutenant H. J. Jones, with a company of the 14th Sikhs, started on the evening of the 4th March. Lieutenants J. S. Fowler and S. M. Edwardes, with 20 sappers and miners, who had arrived at Mastuj on the 4th, followed next day, and all three parties appear to have been together at Buni. The ammunition escort and the sappers under Lieutenant Fowler went forward on the 6th March. Captain Ross, hearing, on the 8th, that Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes were in difficulties at Reshun, went with Lieutenant Jones and 60 Sikhs to their assistance. They reached the Karagh defile about noon, and found it held in strength by a large body of men estimated at 1,000, who fired on them; on their trying to return they found the road closed. As they had by this time lost 20 men they took cover, holding out in caves all the next day. On the 10th, at 2 a.m., they started to cut their way back to Buni, where, however, only Lieutenant Jones and 14 men arrived alive. Captain Ross, 46 fighting men, eight followers, and a hospital assistant were killed. Lieutenant Jones himself and some of the survivors were wounded. Lieutenant Moberley left Mastuj with 150 Kashmir troops and 53 Punyal levies on the 16th March, and reached Buni the next day. Hearing that the enemy were preparing to cut the bridge and hold the defile behind him, and recognising that any further attempt to advance would be uselessly sacrificing life, Lieutenant Moberley, after consultation with Lieutenant Jones, decided to retire at once to Mastuj. According to Lieutenant Jones' information, there were some of Umra Khan's men in Drasan at this time. The fate of the Subadar's party, of the sappers with Lieutenant Fowler and of Lieutenant Edwardes, remained uncertain up to the end of March, but news has since been received that the two British officers were made prisoners and handed over to Umra Khan, along with a Jemadar, eight Muhammadan sepoys, two Dogras, and a Sikh. The loss of the enemy in their attack on Captain Ross's party is said to have been heavy.

This intelligence materially altered the situation again. It was now known to us that, before we had taken the action described above, Umra Khan and Sher Afzal had actually waged war upon British Indian and Kashmir troops. The necessity for relieving Mr. Robertson's force in Chitral was more imminent than had been supposed, while the reason for giving Umra Khan a period of grace within which he might withdraw from Chitral had disappeared. Colonel Kelly, commanding the 32nd Pioneers, the senior military officer in the Gilgit district, was placed in command of operations in the Gilgit district. His orders permitted him to make such dispositions and movements as he might think best, provided he undertook no operations which did not offer reasonable prospects of success. It was, however, felt that the relief of Chitral from that side was probably impossible. Orders were therefore issued for the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force as soon as it could be made ready. Colonel Kelly with 200 Pioneers and four officers left Gilgit for Mastuj on the 23rd March, and reached Gupis on the 25th; 200 more, with two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, started for Ghizr on the 24th. Two hundred more Pioneers were called up to Gilgit from the Indus Valley, and the remainder proceeded to Chilas, relieving 150 Kashmir troops to strengthen the posts at Bunar and Ranghat bridge. Unfortunately, just at this time, heavy snow fell on the hills, and there was reported to be $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet on the Shandur Pass. This seriously impeded Colonel Kelly's advance, but he has nevertheless crossed the pass and taken two mountain guns with him. He arrived at Laspur with 200 Pioneers and two guns on the 5th April, and reconnoitred as far as Gasht, finding the enemy in position about three miles beyond. He advanced to Gasht on the 8th. Some idea of the severity of the climate may be gathered from the fact that there had been 30 cases of snow blindness and 26 cases of frost bite among his men.

General Sir Robert Low, with the Divisional Head-quarters and the second and third brigades of the Chitral Relief Force, arrived at Mardan on the 30th March. The first troops crossed the frontier on the 1st April.

Little news has been received of the actual condition of affairs at Chitral itself. The Sipah Salar informed Mr. Udny on the 24th of March that some Kafirs had told him that Umra Khan had started off most of his force from Kila Darosh to Chitral, retaining only 500 men at the former place; but he called up reinforcements from Bajaur, whither other reports say he himself went for the Muhammadan festival, which fell on the 28th

March. Mr. Udny says that, situated as he is, in a camp surrounded by Afghan pickets, it is almost impossible for him to obtain information independently of the Sipah Salar.

The Jemadar, who has been already mentioned as being one of the prisoners with Umra Khan, effected his escape and reached Peshawar on the 10th April, and made a statement to Mr. Cuningham, the Commissioner. It appears from this that Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes, after holding out gallantly for seven days, were seized by treachery. Muhammad Isa Khan, Sher Afzal's foster-brother, induced them to leave the shelter of the village, in which they had been defending themselves, by assuring them that peace had been restored. They were seized along with a few of their party, and sent to Chitral, the remainder of the party being killed. There they learned that an officer, whom the Jemadar believed was Lieutenant Gurdon, and apparently a number of the defenders of the fort, had lost their lives in an engagement outside the town. It would appear from this account that the fort was plentifully stocked with provisions, but Mr. Robertson's party seems to have been hard pressed, for the Jemadar says that a truce having been established, negotiations proceeded for about five days with the view of arranging for Mr. Robertson's retirement.

The parley apparently ended without any agreement being arrived at. Native reports say all was well at Chitral Fort up to the 1st April. But the Chitralis are in force within 5 miles of Mastuj, and have closed all communication between Mastuj and Ghizr.

Everything possible is being done to secure the goodwill of the tribes through whose country the Relief Force will march. Safdar Khan of Nawagai and Muhammad Sharif Khan, the ex-Khan of Dir, are both showing a friendly disposition. The Khan of Nawagai on receipt of the Government Proclamation openly declared himself a friend of Government, and his Agents, who had come in to British territory, produced a letter from the Khan in which he asks for permanent relations with the British Government, and not such unreliable relations as the Amir forms. They have been given a promise of an allowance and arms and ammunition for the Khan, conditional on the latter not being used against the Amir, and on good service, and they have been sent on ahead to arrange for grain and supplies. Safdar Khan is said to be keeping his people back from joining Umra Khan against us. Muhammad Sharif Khan has, it is reported, addressed the Afghan Sipah Salar asking for his consent to attack Umra Khan. He sent a similar communication to the Peshawar authorities. He accompanied our troops to the Swat river, and General Low reports that the Khan has now obtained possession of all the forts on the Panjkora river, and has promised to co-operate against Umra Khan. The attitude of the Mulla of Manki, the most influential Mulla on or within the Peshawar border, has been from the first uncertain. He possesses property within the Peshawar District, and has doubtless been subjected to contrary influences. He professed at first to intend to behave as a loyal subject, but he is reported to have advised the Swat jirga to oppose our force entering Swat. Since the defeat and submission of the Swatis, the Mulla has dismissed all deputations who attended on them with advice that they should not fight. He has declared that the present occasion is not one for a jihad. The Mulla of Adda tried in vain to raise the Mohmands, and the Buner Mullas were directly threatened by the headmen of their tribe with punishment if they did not withdraw from opposition. On the whole it may be said that Mulla influence succeeded in organising opposition to the entry of our troops into Swat, but failed to raise a general tribal gathering against us.

We have the pleasure to record that numerous offers of service have been received from the States which maintain Imperial Service troops, and from other States as well, besides offers made by Chiefs and private persons to render individual services. The Jaipur and Gwalior transport corps have been accepted, and they have already arrived on the frontier, having moved out of their States within 48 hours of receipt of notice—an excellent performance considering that all the carts had to be taken to pieces, and eleven trains were required for the conveyance of the corps. The three Kashmir infantry regiments at Jammu, which would in ordinary course go up to Gilgit in relief this year, were very anxious to join the Relief Force, and the Maharaja of Kashmir and Raja Ram Singh expressed their desire to accompany them. It did not appear to us that the occasion was one in which the Imperial Service troops other than transport corps should be employed. We did not desire to exaggerate the gravity of the occasion. We were mobilising one division only, a force which we deemed to be sufficient for the purpose. It therefore in our opinion was inexpedient to bring into the expedition troops, the intention of whose organisation is that they should be held in reserve for use in an emergency.

The utmost good and loyal feeling has been shown by the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar. They both volunteered to furnish more men for service, and on the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, inquiring through the political officer in Hunza if any more men were willing to enlist temporarily as levies in addition to the 90 now in Ghizr, the Mir of

Hunza, Muhammad Nazim Khan, and Raja Sikundar Khan, the heir of the Khan of Nagar, who owing to his father's age is actually the Ruler of the State, themselves immediately responded by arriving in Gilgit with some 900 men of all ranks, ready to serve Government in any way required. Each man brought a fortnight's supplies, in order to avoid giving trouble. Two hundred have been employed as levies, half to go on to Colonel Kelly to Ghizr, and the remainder to guard the Roshan nullah. Two hundred have gone to Gupis with supplies. Captain Stewart reports that the most enthusiastic spirit was displayed by all; and the effect on Darel and Tangir should be excellent.

Telegraphic communications have already informed Her Majesty's Government of the advance through Swat to the Panjkora river at Sado of the force under Sir Robert Low.

No. 31.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, April 18, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

WE have discussed Chitral policy with reference to your telegram of 30th March, with following conclusions:—

- (1.) Until we have ascertained what has happened in Chitral since Robertson was shut up we cannot arrive at a final conclusion as to policy; but
- (2.) We are agreed that the military occupation of Chitral, supported by a road (to the) Peshawur border, is a matter of first importance.
- (3.) If a road is not opened from Peshawur, we have not unanimously come to conclusion in regard to expediency of occupying Chitral; but
- (4.) We are unanimous in asking your permission to enter into negotiations with the tribes with the view to obtaining their consent to the opening up of this road when, in our opinion, the opportunity arises in connexion with General Low's advance, and in thinking it would be serious mistake to lose this opportunity.

No. 32.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, April 19, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram of 30th March. The policy accepted by Lord Kimberley in his Despatch of 1st September 1893, and by me in my Despatch of 3rd August 1894 was avowedly provisional. The agreement with Russia on Pamir question and demarcation with Amir of internal boundaries would have made an early decision as to future policy in any case desirable, but events in Chitral and the operations of General Low's forces render it expedient that the question should be taken into immediate consideration by your Government. Recent events show the peril of maintaining a British officer with escort in Chitral, so long as he can be supported only *via* Gilgit. To arrange for his support by the shorter line of the Peshawur-Dir route involves questions financial, political, and military, of serious difficulty and importance. I wish you to consider and advise me whether the strategical and political importance of Chitral is such in your opinion as to render desirable in the face of these difficulties the maintenance of the main objects of our past policy in Chitral, which as I understand, were, to control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our interests, to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes, and to watch what goes on beyond them. Also, whether you can suggest any method of securing these objects less costly and less hazardous than that lately in force. I should be glad to receive an outline of your views by telegram, if possible.

No. 33.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, April 20, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram of yesterday. Our views as to importance of Chitral are expressed in our telegram of 18th, but without entering into negotiations with tribes I cannot answer as to cost of road from Peshawur, or extent of political difficulties.

No. 34.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, April 25, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Chitral. Your telegrams of 18th and 20th April. I have no objection to your sounding the tribes as to the terms and conditions on which they would consent to opening up and maintaining Peshawur-Chitral road, should this road be hereafter decided on; but I do not wish to be committed to the policy of the military occupation of Chitral or maintaining a British officer there permanently, with or without support of this road, till Her Majesty's Government have had an opportunity of fully considering your detailed views and arguments on questions stated in my telegram of 19th April for your consideration.

No. 35.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, April 25, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Chitral. Narrative of events indicates withdrawal under present circumstances impossible, as it would leave country to complete anarchy and would render a settlement more difficult. In our opinion we must also keep open the road from Peshawur for some time, probably three or four months at least, whatever the ultimate decision may be.

No. 36.

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 15, April 26, 1895.

I HAVE recently had under my careful consideration the various questions connected with the past and future policy of your Government in regard to the Gilgit Agency, and especially in regard to its dealings with Chitral.

On this subject my predecessor, the Earl of Kimberley, when sanctioning the appointment of a British officer as political Agent in Chitral, wrote, in his Despatch No. 34, Secret, of 1st September 1893, as follows:—

“I observe that, in your opinion, the maintenance of an English officer as political agent in Chitral renders necessary the retention of strong posts along the line of the Gilgit and Ghizr rivers, and it is partly on this account, and partly to paralyse any hostile action of the tribes having relations with the Gilgit Agency, that your Excellency's Government desires the permanent addition of a Bengal infantry battalion to the garrison of the Gilgit Agency. But, in determining our future policy towards Chitral, a wider view must be taken, and the question must be looked at with reference to the general aspect of affairs in that region, which may in a short time be considerably changed. If the Amir could be brought to abandon all idea of bringing Chitral under his control, the danger of a Chief under Afghan influence, such as Sher Afzul, obtaining power over Chitral would be much lessened. Again, should the present negotiations with Russia be brought to a successful issue, and a line of boundary be agreed on and delimited, even though in close propinquity to the Chitral boundary, another danger which you now apprehend would be materially reduced. Thirdly, if the political operations of your frontier officers succeed in dispelling the suspicions and irritation of the frontier tribes, that element of danger will be in a fair way to disappear. It seems to me, therefore, in existing circumstances, premature to decide now on permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier. In the meantime, I can only sanction the retention of Captain Younghusband in that State as a temporary measure. I quite approve of the line of action which you lay down for him, but in regard to the subsidiary measures which you propose for safeguarding the line of communication by the maintenance of posts at Gakuch, Gupis, and Ghizr, I think that they should be reduced to what is absolutely necessary for securing the present safety of the British Agent, and keeping open his communications with Gilgit.

In my Despatch No. 34, Secret, of 3rd August last, I adhered to the same policy. I said:—

“The reasons, however, which induced Lord Kimberley to declare that it would be premature to decide now on the permanent political and military arrangements for this

frontier are still of weight. It is true that the Amir of Afghanistan no longer advances any claims to exercise control in the affairs of Chitral, but the settlement of the frontier on the south-west and south of Chitral may still lead to troublesome complications; while on the north the question of the line delimitating the Russian boundary in the regions of the Upper Oxus is still unsettled. It was perhaps premature in these circumstances to raise the question of withdrawing Captain Younghusband from Chitral, and I fully concur in your decision that the moment for effecting what would certainly be regarded as a final withdrawal is inopportune, and, while adhering to Lord Kimberley's view that the present arrangements can only be regarded as temporary, I am no more prepared than Lord Kimberley was last year to formulate a definite policy (whether of abandoning or of continuing those arrangements) within a fixed period such as is indicated in Mr. Cunningham's letter to the Resident in Kashmir."

Since that Despatch was written the protracted discussion as to the limit of Russian influence in the region of the Upper Oxus has been brought to a close, and an agreement has been arrived at by which the southern boundary of Russia's possessions in these regions will be the Panja and the Pamir rivers, and a line drawn eastward from Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier. The effect of this will be, while bringing her in one direction within a very short distance of the Chitral frontier, to maintain in the other an intervening belt of country between her southern outposts and the eastern end of the Hindu Kush. Moreover, the demarcation of the Afghan boundary under the Durand agreement in which the Amir undertakes to abstain from interference in Chitral and the transfer to Afghanistan of the whole of the Kafir country up to Chitral introduces a new element into the problem.

The delimitation of these boundaries would, apart from recent events in Chitral, have introduced changes indicating that the time had arrived for some general survey of the existing situation, in order that the policy which had been provisionally adopted might now be settled on some permanent basis, but these events themselves have brought into strong relief the risk involved in maintaining a British officer in Chitral under existing conditions, a risk not unforeseen by your predecessor but one which, owing to the peculiar combination of a popular claimant to the Chitral throne with the Pathan invaders, has taken a more acute form than was probably present to the minds of the Marquis of Lansdowne and his advisers.

On the one hand it has been made clear that so long as a British Agent and his escort in Chitral can be supported only from Gilgit he may for months be cut off from any support at all, and at best can only be supplied from a small and inaccessible frontier station by means of a road 200 miles in length, and of the worst possible description for military purposes; while to maintain a garrison at Gilgit adequate for such military responsibilities as the existing combination has thrown upon you, would involve an intolerable financial burden, both upon the Kashmir Government and on your own.

On the other hand, to adopt the shorter and more direct line of communication between Peshawar and Chitral involves the gravest responsibilities, both military and financial. The establishment and maintenance of this line of communication has been recognised as an important element in the policy of your Government in Chitral, but it was at first hoped that, by the influence of Umra Khan, an arrangement might be come to with the Pathan tribes, through whose territory the route runs, for effecting this object. As it became clear that the assistance of Umra Khan was not likely to be obtained, the project was laid by; but it has always been urged by the local authorities as essential to the security of the Agency at Chitral.

The question whether such a road running for 150 miles through the territory of Pathan-tribes, notorious for their fanaticism and hostility to foreigners, can be maintained at all without constant military pressure, or even military occupation, is one which is open to discussion; but in any case it is certain that it cannot be maintained without heavy expenditure from year to year, and it is possible that if maintained by arrangements with the tribes it might at the most critical time be closed against us, and the whole work of opening it up by military force would in that case have to be undertaken again from the beginning.

With these considerations in view I addressed to your Excellency, on the 30th March,* the telegram quoted in the margin; but I am anxious that your Excellency should lose no time in considering, as soon as circumstances permit, whether any and

* See page 35.

what changes in your existing arrangements with regard to Chitral will be expedient as soon as the expedition has accomplished its immediate objects of relieving Surgeon-Major Robertson and his party, and of vindicating the rights of the Kashmir Durbar against Umra Khan.

The original objects of maintaining a British officer in Chitral were (1) to control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our interests; (2) to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes; and (3) to keep watch over what goes on beyond those passes. The question now to be considered is whether, in view of the recent changes in the situation noticed above, the strategical and political importance of Chitral is such as to require that these cardinal points of our past policy should still be maintained even at risk and expense, and whether in that case there is any method of sufficiently safeguarding them, less costly and less hazardous than by placing a British officer there, and maintaining his position by a long line of supports whether to Gilgit or to Peshawar.

It is not my intention to discuss at present other alternatives which have been proposed, or to suggest new ones myself, but I trust that your Excellency's Government will give me the benefit of your deliberations as early as may be convenient, and, if possible, by telegraph, that I may be enabled to come to a final conclusion on the subject, and to make it known without any avoidable delay.

The purport of this Despatch was telegraphed to you on the 19th instant.

No. 37.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, April 27, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 25th crossed yours of same date. Pending the final decision of Her Majesty's Government I do not object to the temporary arrangements which you consider necessary.

No. 38.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 210, dated May 8, 1895.

SIR,

IN your telegram of the 30th March last, you impressed upon us the necessity of carefully reconsidering in the light of recent events our policy with regard to Chitral and its neighbourhood, and of keeping in the meantime our hands perfectly free. In your telegram of the 19th April you defined more precisely the matters which require consideration, and the new conditions which have arisen to affect them, and in your telegram of the 25th April you asked us to place before you our detailed views and arguments upon these questions.

There are two important factors in the circumstances of the present moment which must exercise a great influence in governing our action in this region. These are the exact sequence of events in Chitral and the attitude which the Amir of Afghanistan may take up with reference to the line to be demarcated on the Pamirs and the crests of the Hindu Kush. We were conscious that, in the absence of information as to the second of these factors and without precise information regarding the first, we could not lay before Her Majesty's Government a final and complete exposition of our opinion as to future policy in Chitral. In considering the question raised by your first telegram cited above, however, we found ourselves able to arrive at certain conclusions which we lost no time in placing before you in the telegram which is given in the margin.

We fully accept the definition of the main objects of our past policy in Chitral contained in your telegram of April 19th, *i.e.*, "to control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our interests, to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes, and to watch what goes on beyond them." We may further refer to Lord Kimberley's

Despatch No. 34, dated the 1st September 1893, in which our policy and the means to be adopted for the attainment of its objects were thus described :—

“ In regard to Chitral, it has been the consistent policy of the Government of India to exclude from that country not merely the control, but even the influence, so far as possible, of the Amir of Afghanistan. But apart from the evils which might result from Chitral falling under Afghan influence or domination, it is obvious that the near prospect of the Russian occupation extending to the north bank of the Panja, which is less than a day's march from the Chitral frontier, render it a matter of importance to us to be able to control the external affairs of Chitral.

“ I cannot agree that it would be a wise policy to give to the Amir suzerainty over Chitral, it would be unjustifiable to deprive Kashmir of her acknowledged right of suzerainty over that State in order to hand it over to an Afghan ruler.”

Two alternatives are placed before us. We must maintain our position in Chitral, or change our policy and abandon the attempt to keep any effective control over the external affairs of that State.

The history of Chitral demonstrates that the State has not for the last 20 years been able to stand alone. Fear of Afghan aggression threw Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk into the arms of Kashmir, and thus led to British suzerainty. The precarious rule of the sons of Aman-ul-Mulk who have succeeded to the Mehtarship was manifestly less able to maintain the integrity of the State without assistance. The present condition of Chitral, since its invasion by Umra Khan and the investment of Mr. Robertson in the fort by Sher Afzal, is one of anarchy. It is now more clear than ever that the country must lean on some external support.

It has been suggested that we may avoid the dangers consequent on our withdrawal by inviting Afghan control. The objections to giving the Amir suzerainty over Chitral remain in our opinion as valid as when Lord Kimberley's despatch already quoted was written. Even, if the moral effect of giving to Afghanistan the control of Chitral were not so detrimental to the interests of the Indian Empire as we believe, the actual military risk is still in our opinion so great that we should hesitate to depart from the consistent line of policy described in the quotation given above. We would urge further that if, after the occurrences of the last two months, we hand over Chitral to a foreigner, or fail adequately to provide for the interests of those who in this emergency have declared themselves on our side, we shall be looked upon by Chitralis and Kashmiris alike as unfaithful friends. The value of our support now and hereafter will be depreciated, and those who at any future time might feel disposed to assist us will be deterred by the consideration that they have nothing to gain by taking our side. The tribes between Chitral and India will necessarily believe we are afraid to hold that which we have expended so much to grasp, and the Amir of Afghanistan will also ascribe our action to weakness. We have come under certain obligations to the Amir in regard to the tribes on our side of the boundary ; and we must not imagine that by handing over Chitral we should be relieved of the difficulties thence arising, for the more turbulent Bajauris, Swatis, and Mohmands would remain ready to create disturbances.

It seems to us to be demonstrated that the maintenance of our influence in Chitral is a matter of first importance ; that to abandon Chitral to the possibility of foreign occupation would involve a risk which we ought not to run ; that giving the country over to Afghanistan does not guard India, and would increase the difficulty of frontier relations with the Amir ; and that it would be unjustifiable to ignore our pledges to preserve the suzerainty of Kashmir.

Events have, however, greatly changed the conditions under which we can hope to maintain that influence. Sher Afzal, an aspirant to the Mehtarship, has ostentatiously departed from the policy of his predecessors. Not placing himself under British protection and British guidance, he came trusting to the strength of a foreign invader, Umra Khan of Jandol, perhaps to the power which he believed to be at the invader's back, and ventured to dictate his terms to the British Agent, and to offer his friendship as a favour. Together they raised the country against us, attacked our troops and cut them off in defiles where nature lent strength to their attack, entrapped our officers by treachery and deceit, and laid vigorous siege to the last strongholds in the country where any of our troops maintained themselves. The events which have culminated in the gallant defence of Chitral and the costly measures taken for its relief, both from north

and south, render it in our opinion impossible that we can ever think of maintaining British influence in that country again without the presence of British troops.

What must be faced is a consideration of the means whereby we can maintain a sufficient military occupation of the Chitral Valley. The length of time occupied and the difficulty incurred in sending troops and supplies by way of Kashmir and Gilgit and the expense of doing so are so great that some of us would prefer to abandon all attempt to occupy Chitral rather than try to hold it by so precarious a thread. The alternative is to establish communication from the Peshawar border. The expense of doing so may be prohibitive. If opening a road by Swat and the country to the north of it means subduing the tribes and holding the line by force, not only great cost but many embarrassing complications may be involved. We are not, however, convinced that these difficulties will occur. Our present operations have not aroused that general religious war upon our north-western frontier which was predicted; and this notwithstanding that the whole influence of Umra Khan and of the Mullahs was thrown into the scale for a jihad. These operations have rather demonstrated that the hostility of the tribes has been exaggerated; that the leading men are amenable to arguments of utility; that the Mullah fanatical influence is less strong than it was believed to be; and that it may be possible to come to arrangements with the intervening tribes which, backed by a sufficient but not extravagant show of force, will be adequate to keep open a route by which troops and supplies can be sent up to Chitral. It is a route by which, until closed by Umra Khan for his own purposes, a considerable trade is believed to have passed; and there is reason to think this trade may be revived. The information we have received regarding the country traversed by the Relief Expedition leads us to expect that our troops in the Chitral Valley would not be wholly dependent upon supplies imported from India. On the contrary, the fertility and state of cultivation of the valleys intervening between Swat and Chitral appear to be such that a considerable proportion of the necessary food and fodder could probably be drawn from them. It will be our endeavour to ascertain with greater precision the extent to which local production may be relied upon. It is reasonable to expect that, if we succeed in establishing relations such as are above indicated, cultivation will increase, and the surplus produce will be made more and more readily available; and it should be borne in mind that any economy thus introduced will not merely affect the cost of the new post at Chitral, but may have a material effect on the expenses of the Gilgit Agency as a whole.

The opportunity which presented itself for negotiating with the tribes along the route held by General Sir R. Low's force was one which, in our opinion, should not be thrown away. Without opening preliminary negotiations, we could not say what chance there really was of making satisfactory and permanent amicable arrangements; but we had reason to hope that they could be made. We therefore made the proposal to which your telegram of the 25th April gave approval. Under the circumstances as they now present themselves, and having regard to your desire that we should submit to you our detailed views and arguments before we take any decisive action, it will be impossible for us to do more than make indirect inquiries, until we are informed of the decision of Her Majesty's Government on the whole policy to be adopted in Chitral.

We are fully conscious that the course which we recommend may involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India can ill afford, and in an increase of responsibilities with the tribes on our north-west frontier which we would fain avoid. It may be possible to lessen these objections. If amicable relations can be established with the tribes, not only would it be easier to retain for them the autonomy which we should desire to conserve, but the cost of thus securing the defence of our frontier may be greatly reduced. In any event the interests are so large that it is our plain duty to lay before you the conclusions at which after full consideration we have arrived.

No. 39.

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 113, dated June 11, 1895.

OUR Despatch, No. 66, of the 17th April gave a narrative account of affairs in Chitral and connected matters up to the concentration of the relief force under Sir Robert Low at Mardan on the 30th of March, and the crossing of the Shandur Pass

by the small column under Colonel Kelly and his arrival at Gasht on the 8th of April. The present Despatch deals with the progress of the Chitral Relief Force, the relief of the garrison of the Chitral Fort by Colonel Kelly, and the existing situation.

On the 4th April, the day following the forcing of the Malakand Pass, the 1st Brigade of the Relief Force advanced towards Khar, and dispersed a large hostile gathering. The enemy's loss on the 3rd and 4th is estimated at about 1,000 men. The upper Ranizais, who were defeated on the 3rd April, at once submitted and set about collecting supplies. The Khan of Dir, who had joined the British camp on the 2nd April, was dismissed with a promise of reward if he rendered full assistance. He was well received by the people on his return to his country; the forts along the Panjkora river fell into his hands, he captured and disarmed 100 of Umra Khan's men, and seized the family of Muhammad Shah Khan, Umra Khan's brother. Under orders from the political officer, he sent some of his headmen towards Chitral to render assistance to Mr. Robertson, if needed.

Umra Khan left Kila Drosh towards the end of March for Barwa or Jandol, leaving 800 picked men at Kila Drosh and Chitral under his brother, Muhammad Shah Khan, and cousin, Abdul Majid Khan, respectively. Umra Khan took with him Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes and 10 sepoy who had been taken prisoners in Chitral. He treated the British officers with kindness, but at the same time was writing letters to all the surrounding tribes calling on them to join in a jihad.

On the 6th April a force visited Thana, where a gathering had been seen the previous day; the village proved submissive, the enemy having retired to a safe distance. The passage of the Swat river was forced on the 7th April, in the face of strong opposition from the enemy who crowned the opposite heights, under the command of Umra Khan's brother, Muhammad Shah Khan. The enemy were dispersed and pursued by the cavalry, who inflicted great loss on them.

On the 8th news was received that Umra Khan had recalled the men he had left behind in Chitral. Up to this time the tribal gatherings had been more or less local, and but few contingents had come in from long distances, thus showing that the prospects of a general jihad were not serious. The Adda Mullah had in a half-hearted manner attempted to raise the Northern Mohmand clans, but though restless, they did not take the field in any numbers, and the Mullah of Manki prudently refrained from active opposition. The Khan of Nawagai, as far as is known, used his influence in preventing the clans from joining Umra Khan. The Bunerwals, who at the instigation of Mullahs and in opposition to the advice of their Maliks, had collected in some strength, were sent back by the Swatis, who had been given to understand that they would be held responsible for any gatherings allowed to enter their limits.

On the 10th April a reconnaissance was made towards Miankali; the troops were fired upon on their return. Six of the sapper sepoy released by Umra Khan arrived in camp at Khar, and brought news of the safety of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler.

On the 12th of April a bridge was built over the Panjkora river, and the Guides infantry were sent across to burn a village, the inhabitants of which had fired on the troops. During the night the bridge was broken by logs floating down the river. Next morning the Guides carried out the punitive operations which had been ordered, but were subsequently attacked by two large bodies of the enemy, and in withdrawing Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, Commanding, was unfortunately killed. The enemy suffered heavily on this occasion, and retired up the valley. The same morning Lieutenant Edwardes arrived in General Low's camp, with a letter from Umra Khan, inquiring what conditions Government intended imposing on him. We instructed Sir Robert Low to insist on the safe delivery of prisoners as an essential preliminary to any discussion of terms. The General wrote to Umra Khan accordingly on the 15th April. Shortly after the despatch of the General's letter, a letter was received from Lieutenant Fowler, saying that Umra Khan was anxious to parley and wished the construction of the bridge and the advance of the troops stopped. A letter was also received from the Khan practically admitting that, if the troops advanced through Jandol, he could not control the tribesmen. The messenger was dismissed without a reply, and on the 16th of April Lieutenant Fowler and all the other prisoners arrived safely in camp at Sado. The bridge over the river was completed the same day, and the advance was continued on the next.

The gathering in Jandol, which at this time was estimated at several thousands, now began to disperse, and with the exception of slight resistance on the 17th near Miankalai,

no further opposition has been offered to General Low's force. On the 18th of April we ordered General Low to repeat to Umra Khan that the only terms he was authorised to offer were unconditional surrender, with an honourable asylum in India for himself, his family, and a reasonable number of his supporters. Umra Khan, however, fled on the night of the 17th in the direction of the Asmar border.

On the 20th April news reached General Low that on the 16th Mr. Robertson and his party in the Chitral Fort were very hard pressed, and that the enemy's mines had reached within a few yards of the walls. General Gatacre, who had reached Bar Baraul, was ordered to immediately push on with a small force to the relief of the garrison. The details regarding the situation in Chitral were subsequently shown to be correct; but fortune had already changed, and within a few hours of the arrival of the alarming report, news was received that the Chitral Fort had been relieved, and that Sher Afzal had absconded. The relief had been effected by Colonel Kelly's force, an account of whose advance as far as Gasht, under exceptionally difficult circumstances, was given in our Despatch of the 17th April. On the 9th of April, the little force occupied Mastuj after a sharp brush with a well-posted gathering of the enemy, armed with breech-loaders, a few miles out of Gasht. Muhammad Wali, Pakhtun Wali, Muhammad Rafi (who had been appointed Governor of Laspur by Mr. Robertson) and Abdulla Khan of Mastuj are believed to have been with the enemy on this occasion. Colonel Kelly found the garrison at Mastuj all well. On the 12th April, he reconnoitred to Nisagal, where the enemy were found in some strength. The following day he advanced with 640 men, including some from the Mastuj garrison, and, after two hours' fighting, drove out the enemy, inflicting a loss of not less than 50 killed and many wounded. From Nisagal he made for Kila Drasan by a *détour* through the hills, the regular road having been broken. He found the fort empty and villages deserted. On the 20th of April the force arrived at Chitral.

For a full description of affairs in Chitral from the date of Mr. Robertson's arrival there until the relief of the garrison on the 19th April we have the honour to refer you to Mr. Robertson's report of the 30th April.

The following brief account is taken almost *verbatim* from a telegram, despatched by him immediately communication was restored:—

“Amir-ul-Mulk was merely temporarily and provisionally recognised as Mehtar of Chitral on the revolt of the Khushwaktis. The agreement between us was that he would be responsible for the Katuris, and I personally would be responsible for the Khushwaktis. Government was pledged to nothing. This point was distinctly and repeatedly insisted upon. On 2nd March, Amir-ul-Mulk practically resigned the Mehtarship; at the same time he made overtures to Umra Khan, promising to induce us to retire towards Mastuj and to attack us on the road at the Baitaripari just this side of Kari. He has been in custody ever since. He is wanting in intellect, and was merely the tool of two young unscrupulous advisers who were exploiting him. On March 2nd, Shuja-ul-Mulk was made temporary and provisional Mehtar. It was absolutely necessary to have some nominal, though temporary, Mehtar to dissipate any fear in the minds of the Chitralis that we were annexing the country. Again it was most carefully explained to everyone that the arrangement was temporary and provisional, and that the Government were not pledged to it in any way. Our position though very difficult was not hopeless until after the disaster of 3rd March. After that unfortunate event all Chitralis outside the fort were compelled from fear for their families to join Sher Afzal. They also believed he was supported by the Amir, and that Umra Khan, the Sipah Salar and Mohmands had joined in a religious war against us, and that our position was desperate, while they knew that, if in time we triumphed, they had still nothing to fear from us in the way of vengeance.”

A very interesting and full report of the siege of the Chitral Fort has been written by Captain Townshend, who succeeded to the command when Captain Campbell was wounded. To complete this narrative, it will suffice to give the following summary furnished by Mr. Robertson:—“3rd March 1895, reconnaissance found Sher Afzal in strength; lost Captain Baird killed, Captain Campbell, C.I.H., wounded; General Baj Singh and Major Bhikam Singh of the Imperial Service troops killed; 21 non-commissioned officers and sepoy of 4th Kashmir Rifles killed; and 28 wounded. 4th March, siege commenced. 8th March, enemy attempted to fire the water tower; fire extinguished. 14th March, enemy attacked east side of fort, failed. 5th April, enemy occupied summer-house in garden within 50 yards of gun-tower. 6th April, enemy advanced sangar up to 40 yards from the main gate in the

night. 7th April, enemy attacked at 5 a.m. and set fire to gun-tower and made an attack on waterway, failed; fire in tower extinguished. British Agent wounded and several men killed and wounded by enemy's riflemen. 8th April, Enemy attempted to fire the gun-tower for the second time. 11th April, enemy made an attack on all sides of fort, failed. 17th April, sortie, summer-house taken and enemy's mine blown up; our loss 8 killed and 13 wounded, of which Sikhs had 3 killed and 5 wounded, and 4th Kashmir Rifles had 5 killed and 8 wounded; enemy's loss about 60, of whom 35 were bayoneted. Summary of casualties: 101 wounded, 40 fatally. Sher Afzal, Abdul Majid Khan of Shina, Abdul Ghani Khan of Shaha, and large following retreated to Drosh last night (18th) abandoning siege of fort. Much sickness from bad food, excessive work, and exposure; conduct of troops admirable; Campbell doing well as are all other wounded. Townshend, Gurdon, Harley, and Whitchurch all well, in spite of excessive work and unceasing alarms. Our heavy casualty list due to wonderful marksmanship of enemy, to the fort being commanded on all sides, and to enemy's sangars being close up to walls. The discipline, devotion, and fortitude displayed by all ranks, under circumstances which required all those qualities, is beyond all praise. Chitral at present denuded of inhabitants who have fled to the hills from fear of reprisals."

On the news of the relief of the Chitral Fort being confirmed, we decided that the force under General Gatacre should continue to advance over the Lowarai Pass, though there was no longer any necessity for haste, and the troops marched more leisurely and constructed a road over the pass as they proceeded. The pass was crossed on the 26th April, the snow being then at places two feet deep. On the 28th April, news was received from General Low that Sher Afzal and 300 men, including two of Sher Afzal's brothers, and several men of importance, had been captured at Patrak by the Khan of Dir and brought to the British camp. Eighty-one breech-loading rifles were recovered. Sher Afzal's foster-brother, Muhammad Isa, who has been one of the chief leaders in the recent disturbances, has hitherto escaped, and is at present believed to be in hiding in Tangir.

Throughout the month of May, the Chitral Relief Force continued to hold the country between the Malakand and the Chitral Valley. Shots have been frequently fired into the various camps, and several cases of attacks on individuals, principally camp-followers and sentries, and of cutting of the telegraph wire, have occurred. Lieutenant Robertson was wounded by a ghazi on the 27th April, while reconnoitring the Panjkora route. The ghazi escaped, but was captured on the Swat border by the Paindeh Khel Jirga, who brought him to the British camp at Dir, where he was tried summarily and executed on the 1st May. There has apparently been some discussion among the Mamunds, Shamozaïs, Charmangis, and other tribes as to the desirability of commencing hostilities after they have got in their harvest. Major Deane, chief political officer with Sir Robert Low, considers, however, that it is unlikely there will be any general combination of the tribes against us. On the whole the country is quieter than might have been expected. The Khans of Swat have opened up, on their own responsibility, the Shahkot Pass route for commissariat purposes, an arrangement which will effect a reduction in expenditure. The Mullah of Manki and the Adda Mullah are much discredited, and unlikely to attempt to get together fresh gatherings.

Full and interesting reports have been received from Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler of the events preceding and following their seizure. They do not materially differ from the brief summary recorded in our Despatch of the 17th April. Lieutenant Edwardes writes in terms of the warmest praise of the men and officers of the 4th Kashmir Rifles who were with him; and both officers report that Umra Khan treated them well, and that they believe he never intended to be the direct cause of any injury to them under any circumstances. Lieutenant Jones has also submitted an account of the circumstances in which Captain Ross's detachment of Sikhs was practically annihilated while endeavouring to render assistance to the small party under Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler.

Sher Afzal, Kokand Beg, Yadgar Beg, Muhammad Afzal Beg, Danial Beg, Inayat Shah, Raza Khel, whose arrest by the Khan of Dir is reported above, arrived at Rawalpindi on the 6th of May, and have since been sent to Dharmasala, where for the present they will be detained as prisoners of war. Amir-ul-Mulk, who has now been deported from Chitral by Mr. Robertson, is also being sent there. The rest of the captives brought in with Sher Afzal were sent back to their homes. Sher Afzal has submitted a written representation disclaiming all responsibility for the recent occurrences in Chitral. He states that he was entirely in the power of Umra Khan, and had to obey orders; at the same time he protests that the conflict outside the Chitral Fort on the 3rd of March

was not of his seeking, and that his men did not commence to fight until they were attacked. He says that he was not captured by the Khan of Dir, but submitted voluntarily, using the Khan as a mediator with Government.

Mr. Robertson reports that the state of affairs at Chitral soon after the relief of the garrison was, as might have been expected, unsatisfactory. The people were almost all in sympathy with Sher Afzal, and had acquired an extreme dislike of the British; with the knowledge of the capture of Sher Afzal, however, and his deportation to India, the people soon began to settle down, and many of the Adamzadas came in to do homage to the young Mehtar, Shuja-ul-Mulk. The despatch of British troops to Chitral through Swat has quite cowed the people; they seem to have had no more idea of the power of Government to take such a step than Umra Khan had.

For some time after the relief of the Chitral Fort, the force under Colonel Kelly remained halted at Chitral in an entrenched position on a ridge south of the fort. We did not consider this an adequate assertion of military supremacy, and General Gatacre was ordered to continue his march on Chitral, with one mountain battery, one British and two Native battalions. Subsequently, on a warning from Mr. Robertson that a brigade visiting Chitral would endanger a famine by eating up the spring crops, we decided only to send the 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment, and a mountain battery; and that this force should only stay a few days at Chitral, the rest of General Gatacre's brigade being distributed along the road from Ashreth to Drosh. General Gatacre reached Chitral on the 11th May. Sir Robert Low and the divisional head-quarters arrived five days later, returning after a very brief stay. The troops belonging to the Gilgit command are on their way back to Mastuj and the Gilgit district, and the Chitral garrison and the escort of the assistant political officer in Chitral are supplied by a wing of the 4th Gurkhas from the Chitral Relief Force.

Disquieting rumours as to impending disturbances along the line between Mastuj and Gilgit were prevalent about the middle of May, but proved exaggerated or unfounded, and there is no reason to anticipate any trouble in this direction.

Towards the end of April, Umra Khan arrived at Asmar, where he was detained, pending orders from the Amir. His brothers, with the exception of Muhammad Shah Khan, are said to have been with him. Some 500 rifles were taken from the men of his party and lodged in the Asmar Fort. Eventually the Sipah Salar sent him under guard to Kabul, where he arrived on the 11th of May. His Highness has not addressed us on the subject of the arrival of the Khan at his capital, probably regarding it, like the flight of Sher Afzal from Kabul, as an incident about which it were better for him to remain silent.

No. 40.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, June 13, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government have given most careful consideration to question of future policy in regard to Chitral, and to your letter of 8th May. They fully appreciate your point of view, and it is with regret that they find themselves unable to concur in the opinions of your Government, to which in all matters they attach great weight. They have decided that no military force or European agent shall be kept at Chitral, that Chitral shall not be fortified, and that no road shall be made between Peshawur and Chitral. It will follow that all positions beyond our frontier, now held in consequence of the recent relief operations, should be evacuated as speedily as circumstances allow, but the dates and details are left to your discretion. As regards Chitral State, they request that, in view of decisions above stated, you will telegraph what are the arrangements which you would recommend for the future. Any proposals which you may make will receive most careful attention from Her Majesty's Government.

No. 41.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, June 14, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

WE deeply regret, but loyally accept, decision. We are earnestly considering question placed before us.

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No. 42.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, June 22, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Possibility of withdrawing Low's force at once, stocking Chitral with a view to temporary occupation and eventual retirement of garrison by Gilgit, after arrangements for future of country had been completed has been considered by us; but Commander-in-Chief reported this plan impracticable. Low's force would have to remain in present position whilst supplies sufficient for an adequate force at Chitral and its transport were being thrown forward, which could not be done under six weeks. It would also prove very difficult to withdraw troops via Gilgit, and expense would be enormous. Force therefore cannot be withdrawn until Chitral is evacuated, and the whole operation should be simultaneous and effected at earliest possible date.

(2.) To invite Amir to occupy any part of Chitral would be reversal of all previous policy, would impose foreign ruler on unwilling people, and could not now be arranged, if at all, without delay and uncertainty, which in present circumstances would lead to dangerous consequences and complications.

(3.) We propose in future arrangements for Chitral to divide Katur from Kushwakt country and restrict Mehtar of Chitral's authority to Katur. This is in accordance with wishes of Kushwaktis as expressed to Robertson.

(4.) Shuja-ul-Mulk's life would not be safe if left. We therefore propose to bring him to India, and to invite headmen of Katur country to elect a Mehtar, but we exclude candidature of Sher Afzul on account of grave suspicion of his complicity in acts of treachery as well as hostility.

(5.) Similarly we propose Kushwaktis should elect separate ruler. Kashmir, failing agreement, might nominate.

(6.) Propose to maintain suzerain rights of Kashmir as at present over both Katur and Kushwakt countries.

(7.) Propose to send Robertson to Chitral to report on doubtful points and to carry out settlement on above lines.

(8.) We shall withdraw Assistant British Agent hitherto deputed to Chitral from Katur country when Chitral is evacuated, and from Kushwakt country as soon as circumstances permit. East of Shandur Pass we shall maintain control of country by Kashmir troops. The question of retaining Kashmir troops in Mastuj is reserved until form of administration has been determined for Kushwakt country.

(9.) It will be necessary to reward Chiefs of tribes who have befriended us in advance from Peshawur to Chitral. Low proposes giving Khan of Dir 500 sniders, some ammunition, 25,000 rupees, and 10,000 rupees a year. We propose to approve, annual allowance being only paid if Khan can without our assistance maintain his position in Dir. We have asked for report with regard to other Chiefs and Jandol.

These proposals, if sanctioned, will admit of our taking immediate action, and we consider delay in every way most undesirable.

No. 43.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, July 2, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

PRESENT Government must reconsider Chitral question. How long can you wait for decision without grave inconvenience?

No. 44.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, July 3, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

WHAT is estimate of expenditure on Chitral expedition to 30th June, beyond provision in budget? And what is estimate of monthly expenditure at present?

No. 45.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, July 4, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

WE recognise time is necessary for consideration. Any delay must involve great expense and risk of further political entanglement and complications, but country fairly quiet at present, and Commander-in-Chief advises us that if recommendations made to carry out decision of late Government were acted on, Low's force could not be withdrawn till September. It is right also to point out large movement of troops during hot weather must be attended by serious danger of sickness. While, therefore, we should wish to know your views as soon as convenient, there would, apart from financial considerations, be advantage in definite postponement of final move till September or earliest opportunity of cool weather, political and other arrangements consequent on decision being carried out in interval. If this suggestion accepted, we should wish to announce definitely that during hot weather occupation of road will continue.

No. 46.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, July 5, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government require at least three weeks for review or modification of proposals. In the meantime you can announce that occupation of road will continue during hot weather and September. Whilst making arrangements for probable withdrawal of great part of troops by Dir road, do nothing to prevent occupation of Chitral by garrison of moderate dimensions in case ultimate decision be to that effect. Political arrangements contemplated in proposals 3, 4, 5, and 6 of your telegram of 22nd June may be commenced, and for that purpose Robertson may be sent to Chitral.

No. 47.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, July 5, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

ESTIMATED expenditure to the end of June, including initial and terminal charges, 145 lakhs beyond provision in Budget. Monthly estimated expenditure, 22½ lakhs.

No. 48.

From VICEROY, July 11, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

As decision of Her Majesty's Government may be expected within three weeks, we propose to keep Robertson at Simla, so that before his departure he may receive definite instructions as to Mehtarship and position of Shuja-ul-Mulk, who in many respects is best candidate if garrison remains, and also on other points consequent on the ultimate decision. Meanwhile we should concert arrangements with him. We have authorised Low to announce that troops occupying Chitral and Dir roads cannot be withdrawn before September, because present season is unfavourable for movement of large bodies of troops, and because time is required to decide details of permanent settlement of Chitral.

No. 49.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, July 22, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram of 22nd June. If you are waiting for sanction no objection to your proposed rewards for the Khan of Dir.

No. 50.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, August 1, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

HAVE you any further information as to possibility of arrangement with tribes for road between Peshawur and Chitral? See Despatch, 8th May. Assuming satisfactory road arrangements and good fortified position what is minimum strength of proposed garrison at Chitral? What is strength of force you would leave at Mastuj, assuming Chitral evacuated?

No. 51.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, August 3, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF has been consulted on points in your telegram of 1st. We have avoided open negotiations with tribes, but reports received from Lowe and Deane warrant confident expectation that peaceful arrangement for road can be made. Road along left bank Panjkora now open, and is considered in every way best. By using it we deal only with Dir and Swat. Khan of Dir's position depends on our support. Swat Khans are quite friendly. Both are said to expect us to remain. Military authorities propose for garrison in Chitral two Native infantry regiments, two guns Mountain Battery, one company of Sappers; but this admits withdrawal of Pioneer regiment from Gilgit, therefore only one additional Native regiment is required for whole district of Gilgit and Chitral. Head-quarters would be placed at Kila Drosh, Chitral itself being held by probably half battalion in strong position, and Robertson thinks it would then be possible to withdraw garrisons from Ghizr and Mastuj, concentrating at Gupis. Commander-in-Chief proposes for first year or two to keep brigade of three Native regiments, one Mountain Battery, and one company of Sappers, on Malakand, one of these battalions being at Chakdara to guard bridge over Swat river. Road from this point to Kila Drosh to be held by levies, probably 250 from Swat and 500 from Dir. Bridges at Chakdara and Chutiatan reported by Lowe sufficient, with minor additions, to last seven years. Commander-in-Chief assures me this scheme drawn up to meet all eventualities, including even necessity of holding road in force next year whilst supplies and reliefs are going up, though he thinks this unlikely. No addition to army is asked. If Chitral evacuated, Commander-in-Chief concurs in objections to permanent garrison at Mastuj. After consultation with Robertson, I think that we could arrange for fort being held by local government during winter, and that this would suffice, our officers visiting it whilst the passes are open.

No. 53.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, August 9, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government assent to proposals contained in your Despatch of 8th May, as explained and defined by telegram of 3rd August—(1.) No increase to Army. (2.) Future garrison for whole district of Gilgit and Chitral to be only one Native regiment in addition to troops previously stationed in Gilgit Agency. (3.) Head-quarters to be placed at Kila Drosh. (4.) Road between Swat River and that place to be held by tribal levies.

Make no permanent arrangement for cantonment on Malakand and neighbourhood until fuller details both of cost and numbers can be sent home. Do nothing in any way to infringe terms of Proclamation. Despatch will follow on whole subject.

No. 54.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, August 10, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

WE have informed General Low of decision of Her Majesty's Government and authorised commencement of negotiations with the Swat Khans and Khan of Dir, assuring them again that all we wish is to open road, to insist on order being maintained along it, but to leave to the people their independence and not annex their country. Pending detailed instructions he is not to conclude any arrangements with either. Robertson will be sent up immediately to Chitral to make arrangements. As soon as practicable Pioneers now in Gilgit district will be withdrawn.

No. 55.

COPY of DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 30, August 16, 1895.

MY LORD,

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the proposals which, in reply to my predecessor's telegram of the 13th June, your Excellency's Government have embodied in your telegram of the 22nd June, for the withdrawal of our troops from Chitral, and for the future control and administration of the country.

2. The objects of our policy in the past have been defined in Sir H. Fowler's Despatch* as—

- * No. 15 of 26th April 1895.
- “ (1) to control the external affairs of Chitral in a direction friendly to our interests ;
- “ (2) to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes ; and
- “ (3) to keep watch over what goes on beyond those passes.”

3. The first step in this direction was the treaty which, in 1878, was negotiated under Lord Lytton's auspices between the ruler of Chitral and the Maharajah of Kashmir, whereby the former acknowledged allegiance to the latter and received from him an annual subsidy at the same time that a political agency was established at Gilgit. This agency, though withdrawn in 1881, was re-established in 1889 on the recommendation of Lord Lansdowne's Government, after a careful consideration of the report and suggestions of Colonel Lockhart and Captain Durand, who were specially deputed in 1885 and 1888 respectively to visit the States of the Hindu Kush and study their conditions.

4. The Government of Lord Lansdowne, in recommending* the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency, dwelt specially on the importance of Chitral, to which State an allowance in money and assistance in the shape of arms was proposed, and the opening up of the direct road from Peshawur to Chitral by means of the adjacent tribes was recommended. “ Altogether,” they said, “ we desire to expend a total sum of a little more than half a lakh of rupees a year in strengthening our position in this quarter, and we trust that our proposals may be sanctioned. If so, we shall have the Upper Hindu Kush well watched, and the countries to the south of it closed against interference, and we shall get some useful information from the districts beyond. We shall be protected from any *coup de main* from the northward. We shall have provided for a really important part of our scheme of frontier defence, and at small cost to ourselves.”

5. Lord Cross, who was at that time Secretary of State, replying in his Despatch, No. 22, of the 28th June 1889, recognised that recent movements of other Powers on the frontier had “ admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening every point in the line of defence of the north-western frontier of India, and among the points requiring special attention are the northern passes of the Hindu Kush.” Lord Cross accordingly sanctioned the establishment of a British Agency at Gilgit, which was to be garrisoned by Kashmir troops under the training of British officers, the payment of an annual subsidy to the ruler of Chitral, and the endeavour to open up by means of the neighbouring tribes the direct route from Peshawar to Chitral.

6. With a view to carrying out these orders, Dr. Robertson was deputed to Chitral, where he was well received by the Mehtar, who readily agreed, in return for his subsidy and the gift of arms, to assist in opening up the Peshawar-Chitral road, to improve the communications in his own territory, and to fortify certain selected positions, but even at that time Dr. Robertson foresaw the danger of Aman-ul-Mulk's kingdom falling to pieces at his death owing to the hostility among his sons.

7. In 1891, owing to the condition of affairs on the Pamirs, and the agitation among some of the minor States in the Hindu Kush, the Government of Lord Lansdowne proposed to increase the subsidy of the Mehtar from Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 12,000 per annum, to give some military instruction to his troops, and a further present of arms, on the condition that he should assent to the extension of the telegraph line to Chitral and to the permanent residence of a British officer in the country.

8. These proposals were approved in Lord Cross's Despatch of the 13th November 1891, No. 40, but before they were fully carried out the Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk died in the summer of 1892, and the struggle for the chiefship began.

9. The policy which Lord Lansdowne's Government then laid down for the local officers (letter to Resident in Kashmir, of 27th No. 193, of 19th October 1892. September 1892*) was as follows:—

“It should be our endeavour to avoid, as far as possible, entangling ourselves in disputes which may arise between Afzul-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk, or in any tribal quarrels occasioned by them. The main object should be to provide adequately for the safety of the Gilgit Agency, and to adopt such measures as may be indispensable for that purpose.”

The quarrels, however, for the chiefship, under these conditions, led first to the elevation of Afzul-ul-Mulk, who put to death all the dangerous competitors in his family that he could lay hands on, then to his murder at the hands of his uncle, Shere Afzul, and they were only brought to a temporary termination by the success of Nizam-ul-Mulk, who, with the consent and indeed the co-operation of your Agent, Colonel Durand, successfully attacked his uncle Shere Afzul and drove him as a refugee to Kabul. Your Government justified the action of Colonel Durand as having in all probability averted civil war and a general disturbance among the frontier tribes; but the episode was significant as showing how impossible it was, even at that stage, for the controlling power to avoid interference with the internal affairs at Chitral, except at the cost of anarchy and civil war, which would lead to widespread disturbance in the adjacent territories. Two other events of political importance took place about this time in regard to your relations with Chitral which deserve notice. During the brief tenure of power by Afzul-ul-Mulk, Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, whose borders, by the annexation of Dir, had become coterminous with Chitral, took advantage of the internal disturbances to seize Nari and the surrounding district, which he continued to hold till a few months ago, and so became an important factor in Chitral politics. On the other hand, the condition of affairs on the Pamirs, as well as on the southern borders of Chitral and at Asmar, led Lord Lansdowne's Government to strengthen the staff of the Gilgit Agency on the avowed ground (India Letter, No. 192, of 19th October 1892) “that it has become more than ever necessary for us to exercise constant vigilance in this quarter, and that our position should be one which will enable us to obtain timely information of all events of importance on or near the border, to afford a reasonable amount of support to Kashmir and its dependencies, including Gilgit and Chitral, to convince the adjoining tribes that it is for their advantage to depend upon us rather than upon Russia or China, and to resist successfully a *coup de main*.” One of the additional officers thus asked for was intended for Chitral, and the recent anarchy in that country was adverted to as showing that it was not yet in a condition to be left to its own devices.

10. The assumption of power by Nizam-ul-Mulk was followed, in the winter of 1892-93, by the despatch of a mission under Dr. Robertson to the new Mehtar. Dr. Robertson found the position of Nizam-ul-Mulk to be at first very insecure, though it improved decidedly during his stay in the country. The outcome of Dr. Robertson's reports was the proposal to retain a British officer in Chitral, and the strengthening of the Gilgit garrison to secure an effective control over the State. On this subject Lord Lansdowne's Government wrote (Letter, No. 142, of 11th July 1893):—

“ We have come to the conclusion that recent events do not call for any departure from the policy which has hitherto been adopted with regard to Chitral. We believe that it is essential that it should continue to be under the suzerainty of Kashmir, and under British influence, and we consider that, in order to secure this end, it is indispensable that a British officer should for some time to come remain in the State. Nizam-ul-Mulk is not a strong ruler, and so long as the Afghan troops remain close to his border above Asmar, and Shere Afzul is believed by the Chitralis to have the support of the Amir, his position cannot be free from difficulty. But we have never concealed from ourselves that there was risk in sending British officers to Chitral, and it does not seem to us that the risk is now any greater than it was when Dr. Robertson's mission started. The latest reports tend to show that Nizam-ul-Mulk is beginning to establish his authority, and that his prospects are more hopeful at this moment than they were at the beginning of the year. Writing on the 12th of May, Dr. Robertson reported that the condition of affairs had of late very greatly improved, and was still improving, but that more time was required, and that to withdraw now altogether from the country would be most inexpedient. On the 18th of May he reported that there was a profound quiet everywhere. Finally, in his report written on his return to Gilgit, on the 6th June, Dr. Robertson writes :—

“ ‘ There is now no reasonable risk in officers living in Chitral if properly protected ; any sudden withdrawal of the whole of my party would create such a general feeling of insecurity throughout the country that it would be probably impossible for the Mehtar to maintain his authority, even if it did not impel him to leave Chitral altogether.

“ ‘ An Englishman now may travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort unless Mr. Bruce's four Gurkhas may be so denominated. There were no sentries at night. No suspicion of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five months' work in the country.’

“ It had, moreover, always been in our contemplation that one of the additional officers sanctioned for the Gilgit Agency should be posted in Chitral for the purpose of watching events on that part of the frontier, and this arrangement has received your Lordship's specific sanction.* We consider that after the encouragement which has been given to Nizam-ul-Mulk by the advent of the mission, it would be unjust to him, as well as detrimental to our own interests, to withdraw suddenly and entirely from Chitral at the present moment. We have carefully considered whether a Native Agent would be sufficient for the purposes which we have in view. It may be found possible hereafter to replace Captain Younghusband by a Native official, but we have come to the conclusion that for the present such an arrangement would fail to give the Mehtar the necessary support and secure the adequate protection of our interests. It is, in fact, the arrangement which was in force until the despatch of Dr. Robertson's mission, and we doubt whether it has worked altogether well. We have, therefore, decided that Captain Younghusband shall remain in the State for the present, though not necessarily in the capital itself. Colonel Durand has proposed that he should take up his headquarters at Mastuj, which, though within 63 miles of Chitral, which on an emergency Captain Younghusband could reach in a day, would be only 45 miles from our proposed frontier post at Ghizr. We shall make it clearly understood that Captain Younghusband is not expected to coerce the Mehtar in any way, or to interfere with the internal affairs of the State, but that he is deputed merely for the purpose of supplying us with trustworthy information as to events on that part of the frontier, and of giving to the Mehtar that amount of encouragement which the presence of a British officer within Chitral limits will not fail to afford.”

11. Lord Kimberley accepted this policy as a temporary necessity, subject to subsequent alterations when the conditions should be so favourably modified as to admit of them. He said (Despatch, No. 34, of 1st September 1893) :—

“ In regard to Chitral, it has been the consistent policy of the Government of India to exclude from that country not merely the control, but even the influence, so far as

possible, of the Amir of Afghanistan. But apart from the evils which might result from Chitral falling under Afghan influence or domination, it is obvious that the near prospect of the Russian occupation extending to the north bank of the Panja, which is less than a day's march from the Chitral frontier, renders it a matter of importance to us to be able to control the external affairs of Chitral.

"I cannot agree that it would be a wise policy to give to the Amir suzerainty over Chitral. Besides the difficulties which your Government experiences in your relations with the Amir, and the improbability that any successor to Abdur Rahman would be able to maintain his authority over Chitral, it would be unjustifiable to deprive Kashmir of her acknowledged right of suzerainty over that State in order to hand it over to an Afghan ruler.

"I observe that, in your opinion, the maintenance of an English officer as Political Agent in Chitral renders necessary the retention of strong posts along the line of the Gilgit and Ghizr rivers, and it is partly on this account, and partly to paralyse any hostile action of the tribes having relations with the Gilgit Agency, that your Excellency's Government desires the permanent addition of a Bengal Infantry battalion to the garrison of the Gilgit Agency. But, in determining our future policy towards Chitral, a wider view must be taken, and the question must be looked at with reference to the general aspect of affairs in that region, which may in a short time be considerably changed. If the Amir could be brought to abandon all idea of bringing Chitral under his control, the danger of a Chief under Afghan influence, such as Shere Afzul, obtaining power over Chitral, would be much lessened. Again, should the present negotiations with Russia be brought to a successful issue, and a line of boundary be agreed on and delimited, even though in close propinquity to the Chitral boundary, another danger which you now apprehend would be materially reduced. Thirdly, if the political operations of your frontier officers succeed in dispelling the suspicions and irritation of the frontier tribes, that element of danger will be in a fair way to disappear. It seems to me, therefore, in existing circumstances, premature to decide now on permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier. In the meantime, I can only sanction the retention of Captain Younghusband in that State as a temporary measure. I quite approve of the line of action which you lay down for him but in regard to the subsidiary measures which you propose for safeguarding the line of communication by the maintenance of posts at Gakuch, Gupis, and Ghizr, I think that they should be reduced to what is absolutely necessary for securing the present safety of the British Agent, and keeping open his communications with Gilgit."

12. The question of our relations with Chitral was again raised soon after your Excellency had taken charge of the Government of India. A suggestion had been

made that it might be possible to withdraw our Agent from Chitral after the winter was over on the ground of economy. It was opposed by the local officers, and your Government, after considering the objections of these officers, reported your conclusions in the following terms* :—

"The recommendations of the officiating British Agent, Colonel Bruce, show that the local officers advocate a policy of activity which we are not prepared to support. It is unnecessary under the circumstances to enter on any examination of the points advanced by Colonel Bruce, but the consideration to which, in our opinion, much weight must at present be attached is that, as noted by Captain Younghusband, immediate withdrawal from Chitral would deprive us of the best means we possess of watching events on the Hindu-Kush frontier. The negotiations with Russia still continue. On the southern frontier of Chitral, complications have arisen owing to the action of Umra Khan of Jandol, who has attacked certain Kafirs over whom Chitral claims control, and has threatened Chitral territory. The attitude of Umra Khan need not be regarded as a matter of the first importance, and we are not without hopes that an understanding may be arrived at with him in the course of the Afghan frontier delimitation; but we are convinced that to withdraw our Political Officer from Chitral while the Pamir question is still unsettled would be premature and unwise. We have accordingly decided that our position as regards Chitral must for another year remain on the present footing."

13. To this Mr. Fowler replied in his Despatch of 3rd August 1894, No. 24 :—

"The perusal of Captain Younghusband's interesting reports has satisfied me that the policy adopted last year, under Lord Kimberley's instructions, has so far been successful.

The despatch of the mission and the retention of Captain Younghusband as Political Agent in Chitral have had the effect of ameliorating the conditions of Government in that country, and of giving increased stability and popularity to the rule of the Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk, and at the same time have strengthened the ties by which he is bound to the British Government.

“The reasons, however, which induced Lord Kimberley to declare that it would be ‘premature to decide now on the permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier’ are still of weight. It is true that the Amir of Afghanistan no longer advances any claims to exercise control in the affairs of Chitral, but the settlement of the frontier on the south-west and south of Chitral may still lead to troublesome complications; while on the north, the question of the line delimitating the Russian boundary in the regions of the Upper Oxus is still unsettled. It was, perhaps, premature in these circumstances to raise the question of withdrawing Captain Younghusband from Chitral, and I fully concur in your decision that the moment for effecting what would certainly be regarded as a final withdrawal is inopportune, and, while adhering to Lord Kimberley’s view that the present arrangements can only be regarded as temporary, I am no more prepared than Lord Kimberley was last year to formulate a definite policy (whether of abandoning or of continuing those arrangements) within a fixed period such as is indicated in Mr. Cuninghame’s letter to the Resident in Kashmir.”

14. In this recapitulation of the leading events in our connexion with Chitral, two points stand out with special clearness—one is that the policy as laid down in the beginning of this Despatch has been steadily and consistently pursued by successive Viceroys and Secretaries of State; the other is that Chitral is, as a State, too weak and unstable to stand alone. The dread of external aggression on the one hand, or of successful rebellion on the other, has caused each ruler in turn to look to one or other of the more powerful States in the neighbourhood for support, and whenever that support has been withdrawn or temporarily obscured, the result has been anarchy and civil war, and encroachment on the external borders from without.

15. On the 1st January 1895, the Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk, was shot by order of his brother, Amir-ul-Mulk, a young man who had taken refuge two years before with his relative Umra Khan, and the murder is believed to have been inspired by the latter, in conjunction with the party of Shere Afzul, the youth, Amir-ul-Mulk, being a tool in the hands of his ambitious brother-in-law.

16. This state of affairs at the time of the murder was as follows: The two years of Nizam-ul-Mulk’s reign had been uneventful. He had proved himself a more popular and more efficient ruler than had been expected, though at no time a strong man. Umra Khan had remained in possession of the Nari or Narsat district, and all proposals of Nizam-ul-Mulk to attempt the recovery of the district by force had been discouraged. The Commission appointed to delimitate the boundary between Afghanistan, Bajaur, and Chitral was at that time, assembled near Asmar, a few miles lower down the valley, and Umra Khan had been asked to attend and lay his claims before them. Shere Afzul, the most popular candidate for the Mehtarship, was interned at Kabul, and the Amir had given a written promise that he should not be again permitted to create disturbances in Chitral. The Amir had moreover undertaken, in the Durand Agreement (signed 12th November 1893), that “he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral.”

17. At the date of the murder, Lieutenant Gurdon, who had succeeded Captain Younghusband as political officer, was on a visit to the Mehtar at Chitral with only a few Sikhs as his escort. To him Amir-ul-Mulk applied for recognition as Mehtar, but Lieutenant Gurdon refused to commit himself, saying that the question had been referred to the Government of India and he must await orders. It was in these circumstances that Mr. Robertson, the Political Agent at Gilgit, was deputed to Chitral to report on the situation, but he was “not to commit Government to any change of policy in regard to Chitral and not to recognise any candidate to the Mehtarship, or conclude any ‘permanent arrangement’ without reference to your Government. He arrived on the 1st February; but by that time the situation had changed for the worse owing to the

invasion of Chitral territory by Umra Khan with a large force of Pathan tribesmen who had succeeded in investing Kila Drosh, which was surrendered to them by arrangement on the 9th February. Dr. Robertson's reasons for not at that time attempting to retire, as explained in your letter of the 17th April 1895, were certainly sound, and such a course would have been consistent neither with honour nor with safety. But the appearance of Shere Afzul on the scene on the 21st February, and his co-operation with Umra Khan, materially altered the aspect of affairs, leading to the desertion of Mr. Robertson by the great majority of the people of Chitral proper, and ultimately to his being besieged in the fort of Chitral, and to the arrangements which, with the approval of the Secretary of State you made for the despatch of a relieving force from Hoti Mardan under General Sir R. Lowe and of Colonel Kelly with his smaller party from Gilgit.

18. The brilliant achievements which marked the advance of the relieving forces and the heroic tenacity of the defenders of Chitral fort, culminating in the flight of the besiegers on the 20th April, are too well known to need further reference in this Despatch, but it is well to advert to the attitude of the tribes generally, as this has an important bearing on the ultimate decision of the problem.

19. Before the relieving forces advanced, you issued a proclamation to the tribes, the essential part of which, for present purposes, is as follows:—"The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and to prevent any further, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and as soon as this object has been attained the force will be withdrawn. The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes, and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards tribesmen, so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops."

20. It is probable that this proclamation was not without effect, at all events on the tribes in immediate contact with us. Though in Chitral Mr. Robertson found the people less well-disposed towards us than they had been two years ago, and thought the attitude of non-interference which he was bound at first to take up was of necessity prejudicial to his influence, leading, on Shere Afzul's appearance, to a general rising against us of the people of Chitral proper, yet during all this time there was no sign of hostility from Upper Chitral or Yassin. Further eastward the levies from Hunza and Nagar and from Punyal volunteered to help us, and rendered to Colonel Kelly the most efficient co-operation, nor did the Indus Valley tribes take the opportunity of giving trouble, though this was fully expected. Turning southward we find that the ex-Khan of Dir willingly joined us and gave much assistance, as did the Khan of Nawagai, whose territory is contiguous to Umra Khan's own tribal possession of Jandol. On the west the Mohmunds, who were appealed to by some of their turbulent priests to join Umra Khan's jihad, refused generally to rise, and, to the east, the Bonerwals, who were our great opponents in the Umbeyla campaign of 1862-63, also remained neutral. More than that, their headmen threatened to burn the houses of the priests if they did not desist from opposition. Some of the Swat sections opposed us, but the headmen of the Lower Ranizais, between our territory and the Swat river, offered us free passage, and the opposition in this part of the country appears to have been that of fanatics collected in large numbers by the preaching of the priests rather than that of the tribes acting under their headmen. The hostility shown by the Bajauris when we came into the territory ruled by Umra Khan was to be expected, and the casual firing at night into the camps and isolated attacks on camp-followers and individuals, after open opposition had discontinued, is inseparable from military operations in Pathan tribal countries. Your letters also show that outside influence of an important character have been at work throughout the troubles on the Chitral frontier to maintain and inflame opposition, without which the difficulties we had to contend with might have been much less acute.

21. Before the relief of Chitral was actually achieved, my predecessor telegraphed to you to the following effect:—

"From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 19th April 1895.—My telegram of 30th March. The policy accepted by Lord Kimberley in his Despatch of 1st September 1893, and by me in my Despatch of the 3rd August 1894, was avowedly provisional. The agreement with Russia on Pamir question and demarcation with Amir of internal boundaries would

have made an early decision as to future policy in any case desirable, but events in Chitral, and the operations of General Lowe's forces render it expedient that the question should be taken into immediate consideration by your Government. Recent events show the peril of maintaining a British officer with escort in Chitral, so long as he can be supported only *via* Gilgit. To arrange for his support by the shorter line of the Peshawur-Dir route involves questions financial, political, and military, of serious difficulty and importance. I wish you to consider and advise me whether the strategical and political importance of Chitral is such in your opinion as to render desirable in the face of these difficulties the maintenance of the main objects of our past policy in Chitral, which, as I understand, were to control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our interests; to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes, and to watch what goes on beyond them. Also, whether you can suggest any method of securing these objects less costly and less hazardous than that lately in force. I should be glad to receive an outline of your views by telegram, if possible."

This telegram was further developed in Sir H. Fowler's Despatch, No. 15, of the 26th April 1895, which, while fully indicating the nature and complexity of the problem, left your Government to propose the most favourable solution of it which circumstances would allow.

22. Those communications of my predecessor were, however, crossed by your telegram of the 18th April, in which you reported that—

"We are agreed that the military occupation of Chitral, supported by a road (to the Peshawur border, is a matter of first importance.

"If a road is not opened from Peshawur, we have not unanimously come to conclusion in regard to expediency of occupying Chitral; but

"We are unanimous in asking your permission to enter into negotiations with the tribes with the view to obtaining their consent to the opening up of this road, when, in our opinion, the opportunity arises in connection with General Lowe's advance, and in thinking it would be serious mistake to lose this opportunity."

23. This permission was given, conditionally on the Government not being committed to the policy of occupation, in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 25th April.

24. Your Excellency's Government reported your views at full length in your letter of the 8th May. In that letter, after adverting to the definition quoted at the beginning of this Despatch, of the objects of your past policy in Chitral, a definition which your Government fully accepts, and after quoting Lord Kimberley's views as to the necessity of excluding Afghan control from Chitral, you point out that there are only two alternatives before you, either to maintain the position in Chitral or to abandon the attempt to retain any effective control over its external affairs. "The history of Chitral," you point out, "demonstrates that the State has not for the last 20 years been able to stand alone. Fear of Afghan aggression threw Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk into the arms of Kashmir, and thus led to British suzerainty. The precarious rule of the sons of Aman-ul-Mulk who have succeeded to the Mehtarship was manifestly less able to maintain the integrity of the State without assistance. The present condition of Chitral, since its invasion by Umra Khan and the investment of Mr. Robertson in the fort by Shere Afzul, is one of anarchy. It is now more clear than ever that the country must lean on some external support." You then point out the great danger involved, both politically and strategically, if Chitral should fall under the control of Russia, and the objections to giving it to the Amir, and you conclude that the maintenance of our influence in Chitral is a matter of the first importance; but events, you add, have greatly changed the conditions under which you can hope to exercise that influence. "The events, which have culminated in the gallant defence of Chitral and the costly measures taken for its relief, both from north and south, render it," you say, "impossible that we can ever think of maintaining British influence in that country again without the presence of British troops," and you go on to explain the policy you would adopt, which is to garrison Chitral, and make communication direct between it and Peshawar by the construction of a road. You were not then in a position to estimate what the cost of such an undertaking might entail. It might, in your judgment be prohibitive, it might be very much less than was generally anticipated. Time evidently was necessary for the investigation and decision of the question of cost.

25. Your views were not adopted by Her Majesty's late Government, who sent in reply the telegram, dated 13th June 1895, informing you that they have decided that no military force or European Agent shall be kept at Chitral, that Chitral shall not be fortified, and that no road shall be made between Peshawar and Chitral. All positions beyond the frontier in our occupation were to be evacuated as speedily as circumstances

allowed; and the Government of India were asked to telegraph the arrangements as regards Chitral State, which under these conditions they would recommend for the future.

26. The proposals asked for in Sir H. Fowler's telegram quoted above were formulated in your telegraphic reply of the 22nd June. These proposals involve a division of Chitral into two parts, the western portion, or Chitral proper, being left to itself under the nominal suzerainty of Kashmir, while the eastern would be controlled from Gilgit, and garrisoned by Kashmir troops, and in each part the headmen would be invited to elect their own ruler, the candidature of Shere Afzul being excluded. The proposals were not unanimously approved by your Excellency's colleagues, and they have some very obvious disadvantages. Western Chitral or the Katur country, without Mastuj, would be reduced to complete impotence and would invite aggression, which, while we maintain the suzerainty to Kashmir, we should be bound to repel, though no longer in a position to control the course of events which might lead up to such aggression. The position of Mastuj again as part of the Kushwakt country was one which could not but lead to trouble. If it were garrisoned by us the position of our garrison would be precisely the same as it was at the time of Nizam-ul-Mulk's murder, with the Shandur Pass intervening between it and its supports; if it were not garrisoned from Gilgit, it would inevitably be a source of contention, between the Katur and Kushwakt rulers which could only be settled by force, and must inevitably lead to our intervention. We should thus have incurred all the inconveniences and loss of prestige consequent on abandoning Chitral, without securing the freedom from responsibility for its condition, which was the object of the policy of abandonment. It was, moreover, clear that the policy of abandonment would not cease with the mere evacuation of the territory of Chitral. One of the main objects of the establishments of the Gilgit Agency was the facilities it would afford in watching over and keeping under control the Chitral and Mastuj valleys, which lead to the easiest and most important passes over the Hindu Kush. To abandon these objects would be to deprive the Gilgit Agency of its main value, whilst the cost of its maintenance would be as heavy as before. Gilgit and its Agency would under these conditions cease to be worth maintenance, and the whole country over which it previously had authority would probably lapse into disorder and disturbance. The delimitation of frontiers between the Indian Empire and neighbouring Governments has of recent years been more accurately defined, and it seems more than probable that if your Government had in these districts by its retirement announced its inability to discharge its previous functions, other authorities would step in and undertake the duties then cast off.

27. This was the state of affairs which Her Majesty's Government had to consider on taking office, and the serious objections involved in your alternative proposals, illustrating as they do the difficulties inseparable from giving effect to the policy of abandonment, have led Her Majesty's Government again to examine the proposals contained in your telegram of the 18th April and your letter of the 8th May.

28. It seemed to Her Majesty's Government that the policy which, as explained above, has been continuously pursued by successive Governments in their relations with Chitral, ought not lightly to be abandoned, unless its maintenance had become clearly impossible. Your Government had before said that to abandon Chitral was to forego the advantages of that policy, and that no middle course was possible, and it is certain that the alternative course proposed in your telegram of the 22nd June would not have sufficed to secure those advantages, and, indeed, was open to much of the objection which in your letter of the 8th May you attach to abandonment.

29. Nor did it seem to Her Majesty's Government that recent events had in any way decreased the necessity for adhering to the above line of policy. If it was necessary, owing to the situation on the frontier in 1892, to strengthen the Gilgit Agency for the express purpose of keeping a closer watch on the Chitral frontier, the necessity of maintaining that watch is no less obvious at the present day. The advance of Russia to the line of the Oxus and that of the Amir to the Eastern border of Kafiristan are not likely to diminish the tension which has, in past years, prevailed on this part of the frontier.

30. Moreover, Her Majesty's Government attached considerable importance to the argument that our withdrawal at such a moment could scarcely fail to have a demoralising effect, not only upon the tribes concerned, but throughout the whole frontier, the population of which would ascribe our retirement to inability to maintain the advantage we had gained in recent military operations.

31. It was manifest, therefore, that unless the financial and political reasons against maintaining our occupation were of such gravity as to be insuperable, there should be no change made in the former line of policy, which was already shown to depend for its effectiveness on the presence of a British officer with troops at Chitral. It was also clear that the safety of these could only be secured if the direct route between Peshawar and Chitral could be maintained. It was apparent from your letter of the 8th May that your Government was not without apprehension that the task of opening up this road might, if it were to necessitate the military coercion of the tribes and the interference with their independence, be one of such great cost and involving such embarrassing complications, as to render it of doubtful expediency; but, in your opinion, this question, both in its financial and political aspects, depended on the attitude which might be assumed by the tribes, and you indicated that if amicable relations could be secured and they could be persuaded to become responsible for the safety of the road, the cost need not be prohibitive. But when your letter of the 8th May was written, you had not had the opportunity of sounding the tribes and ascertaining how far the scheme was feasible.

32. I accordingly telegraphed on the 1st August, asking if you had any further information as to the possibility of coming to an arrangement with the tribes for maintaining and securing the road from Peshawar to Chitral, such as was contemplated in your letter of the 8th May, and in that case, and with a good fortified position, what would be the minimum strength of the garrison you propose for Chitral? Your reply of the 3rd August is to the effect that, though no regular negotiations have been carried out, the reports of the political officers on the spot warrant a confident expectation that peaceful arrangements can be made. The road you keep open is that along the left bank of the Panjkora River, so that you would have to deal only with the Khan of Dir and the Swat Khans, who are friendly to us. From the Chitral border to the Swat River the road would be kept open by levies, and only at the crossing of this river near Chakdara, and on the Malakand, would you employ troops, who would be limited to three Native regiments, one mountain battery, and a company of Sappers. For the garrison of Chitral you recommend two native infantry regiments, two mountain guns, and a company of sappers, the headquarters being at Kila Drosh, and a detachment in Chitral itself. This would probably enable you to relieve the garrisons at Mastuj and Ghizr, and certainly to withdraw the pioneer battalion from the Gilgit Agency. The troops thus located would, I gather, be merely transferred from existing frontier garrisons without increasing the numerical strength of the army.

33. The information now conveyed materially alters the position. It removes, if your officers have rightly estimated the conditions, the doubt which was felt as to the possibility of opening up the road by peaceful means, and maintaining it without an intolerable burthen of expenditure being imposed on the Indian revenues. With the removal of this doubt the main obstacle to the acceptance of your unanimous recommendations in your letter of the 8th May was cleared away, and in my telegram of the 9th August I communicated to you the acceptance of your scheme by Her Majesty's Government.

34. But your information is still incomplete as to the exact cost of the scheme, and I felt some doubts as to the absolute necessity of permanently maintaining regular troops on the Malakand Pass, and as to whether the tribes would see in this an infringement of the proclamation. I therefore added to my telegram the injunction that the arrangements for this part of the scheme should be held over pending the receipt of fuller details of expense and a caution for strictly keeping to the conditions of the proclamation.

I now request that in addition to this information you will favour me with a report as to the amount of supplies which the Gilgit garrison may expect to obtain from local sources; what saving will be derived from this cause, and from the shorter route by which stores and supplies locally unobtainable will now be forwarded; what saving and alteration these new dispositions will enable you to effect in the cost and strength of the staff and troops in the Gilgit Agency which will be dependent for protection in future mainly on Kashmir Imperial Service troops.

A statement showing the strength of the combined garrisons of Gilgit and Chitral as compared with the former garrison will be of assistance.

You will also have to consider whether the relations of your political officer at Chitral should in future be with your Agent at Gilgit or whether any change in this respect will be desirable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.