

AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

OF THE

M 612

CHITRAL EXPEDITION,

1895.

COMPILED UNDER THE ORDERS OF
THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL IN INDIA

BY

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3RD DRAGOON GUARDS.



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
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PREFACE.

THIS official account of the Chitral Campaign was originally compiled by Captain W. R. Robertson, D.S.O., 3rd Dragoon Guards, who was field intelligence officer on the divisional staff of the Chitral Relief Force. Captain Robertson's work has, however, been subjected to considerable revision and editing at the hands of the Intelligence Branch ; and circumstances have arisen, which rendered it impracticable to submit the matter thus edited to its original compiler, without further delay in the production of the work—a delay which, for obvious reasons, it was very desirable to avoid. It is possible, therefore, that the account of the campaign may be found lacking in that continuity of style which might otherwise have been expected ; but every effort has been made to present the history of the events connected with the expedition as succinctly and accurately as possible.

SIMLA ;
27th October 1898. } J. WOLFE MURRAY, *Lt. Col.*,
Assistant Quarter Master General.



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
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Glossary of Hindustani and a few other words occurring in this work.

- Ata*.—Flour from which the "germ" has not been separated; in quality something like "middlings."
Bazar.—Market place, village.
Bhisti.—A water-carrier.
Bhusa.—Chopped straw or chaff: chopped stalks of lentils are called "*missa bhusa*."
Chabutra.—Terrace, platform; a raised and level piece of ground, generally under trees, to sit and converse on.
Chappar.—A thatched shed.
Chaprasi.—A messenger.
Chinar.—The plane tree.
Chogha.—A kind of cloak like a dressing gown; usually of wool or camel's hair.
Daffadar.—The rank corresponding to sergeant in the Indian cavalry and transport services.
Dal.—Split lentils.
Dandi.—A litter for sick, carried on a pole.
Darband.—A defensive position, or "choke" in a defile.
Darbar.—Court; levée; the executive government of a native state.
Darbari.—One entitled to a seat in a *Darbar*; a courtier.
Diwan.—Chief officer of state; generally head of the finance and revenue department.
Dooli.—A covered litter for sick. The ambulance pattern is carried on a pole and used as a hospital bed in field hospitals, when the cover becomes a tent for the bearers.
Draby.—The Indian transport driver: a corruption of "driver."
Ekka.—A one-horsed, two-wheeled, cage-shaped conveyance peculiar to India.
Firman.—Decree, order, royal letter.
Ghi.—Clarified butter.
Gol.—The equivalent for stream or *nala*, in the Khowar or Chitrali language.
Gur.—Raw or coarse sugar.
Havaldar.—The Indian native infantry rank corresponding to sergeant.
Naqa.—District, province, dependency, territory.
Islam.—The religion of Muhammad.
Jemadar.—The lowest commissioned rank in the Indian native army; also chief petty officer in the transport service.
Jihad.—The holy war waged by Muslims against "infidels"; to be orthodox it should be led by a crowned head.
Jirga.—A meeting or deputation of the headmen or greybeards of a tribe.
Kajawas.—Panniers, for camels or mules.
Kamkhwab.—Brocade worked with gold or silver flowers.
Khik.—See *massak*.
Khilat.—A "robe of honour," the usual present bestowed at official ceremonies in the east.
Khan Bahadur.—(*Khan* chief; *bahadur*, brave). An honorary title bestowed by the Indian Government on Muhammadans.
Khasil.—Green cereals cut for forage.
Kohistan.—Hill country; highlands.
Maidan.—Plain; level ground.
Masnad.—Royal cushion; throne.
Massak.—The entire hide of a goat or sheep made into a bag for carrying water. An inflated buffalo hide used as a float in crossing rivers; on the N.-W. E., however, these skin rafts are called "Kaik" or "Shinaz."
Maund.—The Indian "man" or standard measure (80 lbs.) sub-divided into 40 *seers* of 16 *chittaks* each.
Mehtar.—Prince, ruler and (ironically), sweeper.
Missa bhusa.—See *bhusa*.
Mulla.—One learned (or supposed to be so) in the Muhammadan scriptures and traditions.
Munshi.—Writer, Secretary.
Naik.—The lowest non-commissioned rank in the Indian native infantry, corresponding to corporal.
Nala.—Watercourse, ravine; often spelt *nullah*.
Pakhal.—A large leathern bag for holding water carried on mules or bullocks.
Palan.—A camel pack-saddle.
Salutri.—A veterinary assistant in the Indian mounted branches.
Sangar.—Stone breastwork, also entrenchment.
Sarai.—A caravansarai. The hotel of the east.
Sarkar.—This word may be applied to any rule or ruler, but generally refers to the British Indian Government (literally, master, chief, agent).
Sipah Salar.—A Commander-in-Chief, (usually used with reference to one of the Afghan provincial armies).

Soondka.—The Indian native pack saddle, consisting of a pair of pads and a *soondka* or holster on each side of the spine.

Subadar.—The second commissioned rank in the Indian native infantry.

Subadar-Major.—The senior native officer in the Indian native Infantry.

Talwar.—Sword.

Tara mera.—An oil-plant (*eruca sativa*) like colza; also the oil; the latter is given externally and internally to camels for skin disease.

Tomtom.—A small drum.

Tonga.—A two-wheeled covered conveyance drawn by mules, ponies, or bullocks. The ambulance pattern has collapsible seats, and accommodates four seated, or two lying down.

Events in Chitral and adjacent States, 1870-94.

In order properly to understand our relations with the tribes on this part of the North-West Frontier, it is necessary to enter somewhat in detail into the recent history of Chitral, Bajaur, and Dir. Chitral was formerly divided into two departments, Upper and Lower (*Bala* and *Pain*), the former including Yasin, Ghizr, and Mastuj. These departments were ruled by two different branches of the same family, descended from a common ancestor, Kathor or Katur; the Khushwakt branch ruling in Upper, the Katur in Lower Chitral. The influence of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, of the Katur branch, however, gradually extended throughout the country, until the Khushwaktis were entirely dispossessed of their territories.

The predominance of Aman-ul-Mulk was the result of the following events. In 1870, Mr. Hayward, the explorer, while travelling through Yasin, was murdered by Mir Wali, the then ruler of the district. This brought about Mir Wali's expulsion; and he ultimately either died in exile or was killed by his brother, Pahlwan Bahadur, who thereupon became ruler of Yasin and Upper Chitral. In 1874, Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, who then ruled only in Lower Chitral, proffered allegiance to the Amir of Kabul and gave his daughter in betrothal to Sardar Abdulla Jan, the Afghan heir-apparent; but the marriage did not take place, and it is probable that the proffered submission to Afghanistan was never intended to be real. Two years later the Afghans made an advance in the direction of Chitral, and Aman-ul-Mulk then sought the protection of Kashmir. In 1877, a treaty was negotiated, under the auspices of the Government of India, between Aman-ul-Mulk and the Maharaja of Kashmir, whereby the former acknowledged allegiance to the latter and received from him an annual subsidy: at the same time a Political Agency under Major Biddulph was established at Gilgit. With varying fortunes Pahlwan had continued to maintain his position in Yasin till 1880. But in September of that year he had the temerity to attack Puniel, which may be considered Kashmir territory, and his invasion was abruptly terminated by the action of Aman-ul-Mulk, who took this opportunity to invade Yasin. Pahlwan was taken prisoner, and Aman-ul-Mulk became practically master of all the territory which formerly belonged to the Khushwakt family, and which he now partitioned in the following manner. He retained Mastuj; Yasin was placed under the rule of Mir Aman, uncle to Pahlwan; while he gave Ghizr to Muhammad Wali, a nephew of Pahlwan, and son of Mir Wali. This arrangement was recognised by the Kashmir Government, and Aman-ul-Mulk's subsidy was doubled as a reward for his services on the occasion of Pahlwan's invasion.

The rising of the Yasin chief, who had previously been friendly, showed that the Political Agency established by the Indian Government at Gilgit had failed, probably through the inevitable difficulties of the situation, to secure any solid or durable influence over the petty chiefs with whom it had had dealings for some three years past. Under these circumstances it appeared that the Agency could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassment and anxieties altogether disproportionate to the advantages likely to result from its maintenance. The Government of India therefore decided to withdraw

it, and to leave in the hands of the Kashmir Darbar the local management of affairs upon the northern frontiers of the State. This was done in 1881.

Early in 1882, Mir Aman, the ruler of Yasin, entered into an agreement with Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, renouncing in his favour all claims to the Mastuj district,—that is to say, to all the Khushwakt territories on the Chitral side of the watershed. But Mir Aman's rule had proved unpopular, and Pahlwan stirring up intrigues in the neighbouring states, which ended in an attack on Yasin, gained a temporary success and captured Mir Aman. On advancing towards Mastuj, however, Pahlwan was defeated by Afzal-ul-Mulk, the second son of the Mehtar, who followed up his victory by completely occupying the whole of the Khushwakt provinces, which thenceforward remained in the Mehtar's possession.

The Political Agency at Gilgit was re-established in 1889, after careful consideration by the Government of India of the reports and suggestions of Colonel (now General Sir) W. S. A. Lockhart and Captain (now Colonel) A. G. A. Durand, who had been specially deputed in 1885 and 1888, respectively, to visit the States of the Eastern Hindu Kush and study their conditions. Since the withdrawal of the Agency in 1881 circumstances had greatly changed: events beyond our frontiers had increased the necessity for strengthening our line of defence, and among the points requiring special attention were the passes of the Eastern Hindu Kush; the Mehtar had more than once received with much cordiality British officers within his state, and his sons had been received as guests in India; the chiefs of Hunza and Nagar had of their own accord asked for an officer to visit them; the Kashmir army was being re-organized and its troops were becoming well-disciplined and well-armed. Altogether, there were many good reasons for making a fresh effort to secure this portion of our strategical frontier, and many circumstances seemed to point with reasonable certainty to a favourable result. Captain Durand, the officer selected for the post of British Agent, started for Gilgit in 1889, and thence proceeded to Chitral to set on foot the proposed new arrangements in that direction. The Mehtar's annual allowance was fixed at R6,000, and a certain number of Sniders were presented to him. A brigade of Kashmir troops and one Kashmir mountain battery were stationed at and near Gilgit, under the control of the British Agent, with whom were two junior officers of infantry and artillery, and a medical officer.

For various political reasons, the Government of India decided in 1891 to further strengthen the position of the Mehtar, and, in view of the improvement of our relations with him, they increased his subsidy to R12,000 a year, while granting to his sons, Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk, an annual present of R1,500 each, and to Shah-i-Mulk R1,000 a year. These allowances were each made contingent on good behaviour, and on the condition that the Mehtar and his sons accepted the advice of the British Agent on all matters.

On the 30th August 1892 Aman-ul-Mulk died, and the expected scramble for the Mehtarship at once commenced. Of his seventeen sons, Nizam-ul-Mulk and Afzal-ul-Mulk were, by reason of the rank of their mother, regarded as having the strongest claim to the vacant *masnad*. Afzal-ul-Mulk being in Chitral proper at the time of his father's death, while his elder brother Nizam-ul-Mulk was absent in Yasin, immediately seized all arms and treasure found in the fort, attached a large following to himself, and then proceeded to murder those of

his younger brothers who might be expected to frustrate his aims. He then advanced to Yasin for the purpose of attacking Nizam-ul-Mulk; but the latter made little or no stand and eventually fled to Gilgit. In the meantime the Government of India had acknowledged Afzal-ul-Mulk as Mehtar.

The new Mehtar, having established his authority, at once invited Government to send a British officer to Chitral; this request was acceded to, and Surgeon-Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel Sir George Scott) Robertson was nominated for the duty. While preparations for the mission were in progress, Sher Afzal, an uncle of Afzal-ul-Mulk, who had long since been driven from the country by the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, suddenly descended with a hundred or more followers into Chitral by the Dorah pass. He collected other adherents on the way, killed the governor of the valley through which he passed, and on the night of the 6th November surprised the fort of Chitral. Afzal-ul-Mulk was shot down as he tried to escape, and died almost immediately.

Sher Afzal now assumed the reins of government, but his lease of power was doomed to be even shorter than that of his predecessor; for Nizam-ul-Mulk, on hearing of the death of his brother, at once plucked up courage to make an attempt to turn out the *de facto* ruler. He wrote to the British Agent at Gilgit, Lieutenant-Colonel Durand, saying that, should he become Mehtar, he would agree to British officers being stationed in Chitral, and to the establishment of a telegraph line, and would carry out all orders of Government. He also signified his intention of moving against Sher Afzal. Nizam-ul-Mulk having come to Gilgit of his own accord, and being there as our guest, and not under detention, the British Agent was unable to refuse him permission to leave Gilgit, and accordingly allowed him to go. But Lieutenant-Colonel Durand despatched 250 rifles, two guns, and a hundred levies to Gupis, a few miles beyond the frontier of the Gilgit district, in order to strengthen his own position in the event of its becoming necessary to treat with Sher Afzal, and to preserve order in the western part of the district and in Yasin. In taking this measure without the previous sanction of Government, the British Agent acted from a conviction that immediate and decided action in anticipation of orders could alone avert a crisis. The course of events fully justified his decision: a collision was avoided, the danger to which the British Agent and other servants of Government in Chitral were exposed was to some extent diminished, and a general rising among the tribes was probably averted. The troops were afterwards withdrawn, and the condition of the border became much more satisfactory.

Nizam-ul-Mulk, on crossing the frontier, was joined by the people of Turikho and Murikho, and 1,200 men sent by Sher Afzal to oppose his advance also went over to him. He immediately marched on Mastuj, which he occupied without difficulty; Drasan fell into his hands on the 1st December; and shortly afterwards Sher Afzal fled, as rapidly as he had appeared, back to Afghan territory. Here it may be mentioned that early in 1893 Amir Abdur Rahman summoned Sher Afzal to Kabul and placed him under surveillance; while a few months later, His Highness gave a written promise to the Government of India that he should not be again permitted to create disturbances in Chitral.

Nizam-ul-Mulk, feeling that his success had been largely due to the countenance which had been given him by Government, earnestly requested

that a British officer might be sent to him. As there appeared to be no doubt that he had made good his position, Government decided that a mission under charge of Surgeon-Major Robertson, consisting of Captain F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., and an escort of 50 men of the 15th Sikhs, commanded by Lieutenant J. L. R. Gurdon, should proceed to Chitral. Surgeon-Major Robertson's instructions authorized him to congratulate Nizam-ul-Mulk on his accession, and to promise him, on suitable conditions, the same subsidy and support as were given to his late father, Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk. The mission reached Chitral on the 25th January 1893. Its arrival was generally popular with the common people, but Surgeon-Major Robertson's reports made it clear that, mainly owing to the personal unpopularity of Nizam-ul-Mulk with the *Adamzadas*, or chief men, it was regarded with considerable suspicion by the upper classes. Gradually, however, the position of affairs improved, and as it had never been contemplated by Government that the deputation should be more than temporary, instructions were sent on the 21st April authorizing Surgeon-Major Robertson to withdraw, and leaving it to his discretion to decide whether a British officer and small escort should remain behind at Chitral. He believed that there would be no unreasonable risk in leaving the two officers behind; and accordingly, on the 26th of May, he started for Gilgit, Captain Younghusband, Lieutenant Gurdon, and the whole of the escort being left at Chitral. The Government of India, while fully recognizing the risk involved, considered that after the encouragement which had been given to Nizam-ul-Mulk by the advent of the mission, it would be unjust to him to withdraw suddenly and entirely from his country; and orders were therefore issued that, as a temporary measure, Captain Younghusband should remain in Chitral, though not necessarily at the capital itself. Captain Younghusband was made clearly to understand that he was not expected to coerce the Mehtar in any way, or to interfere with the internal affairs of the State; but that he was deputed merely for the purpose of supplying Government with trustworthy information as to events on that part of the frontier, and of giving to the Mehtar that encouragement which the presence of a British officer within Chitral limits would not fail to afford. In the month of September Captain Younghusband was directed to withdraw to Mastuj, and to make that place his head-quarters. His escort was increased to a strength of 100 men of the 15th Sikhs, and a strong post was built at Gupis to keep open communication between Mastuj and Gilgit.

During 1894 nothing of special importance occurred. The retention of Captain Younghusband as Political Agent had the effect of ameliorating the conditions of government in the State, and of giving increased stability and popularity to the rule of Nizam-ul-Mulk; and at the same time it strengthened the ties by which he was bound to the British Government. On the southern frontier of Chitral, however, complications were constantly arising, owing to the aggressive action of Umra Khan; the delimitation of the Afghan boundary in this direction had not yet been completed; and, finally, the Pamir question still remained unsettled. Under these circumstances the Government of India were convinced that the time to withdraw our political officer from Chitral had not yet arrived.

To turn now to the course of events in Bajaur and Dir, and our dealings with Umra Khan. This enterprising chief was the son of one Aman Khan, ruler of the little State of Jandol, and belonging to the

Mast Khel section of the Tarkalanri tribe who inhabit Bajaur. Umra Khan's share of the ancestral property in the Jandol valley was the villages of Mundah and Tor, which were made over to him by his father. But Aman Khan, subsequently thinking that Umra Khan would probably prove a troublesome neighbour to his brother, Muhammad Zaman Khan, who held Barwa, expelled the former from Mundah and Tor and made those villages over to another brother, Mir Hasan Khan. Umra Khan then went to live in exile in the Shamozaï (Utman Khel) country, and his brother Muhammad Shah Khan accompanied him. Some three years later Aman Khan died, but on his death-bed refused to recognise Umra Khan. The latter shortly after this made a pilgrimage to Mecca, and on his return he took his first step towards obtaining power by murdering his brother, Muhammad Zaman Khan, and assuming the position of Khan of Barwa. After varying fortune he further succeeded in recovering Mundah and Tor from Mir Hasan Khan. The then Khan of Dir, Rahmatulla Khan, supported Mir Hasan Khan; and in the course of the struggle Muhammad Sharif Khan, the present Khan of Dir, quarrelled with his father; mainly in consequence of this quarrel, Umra Khan obtained possession of the forts in the Maidan valley, lying between Jandol and the Panjkora river, and also established himself at Bandai in the Baraul valley. Shortly afterwards Rahmatulla Khan died, whereupon Muhammad Sharif Khan tried to recover the Maidan forts from Umra Khan. He failed in this, and from that time onwards there was a continual struggle between the two chiefs—on Muhammad Sharif Khan's part to check Umra Khan's encroachments, and on Umra Khan's part to wrest Dir from Muhammad Sharif Khan. But Umra Khan having succeeded in procuring a considerable number of rifles from British territory, mostly stolen, but in part surreptitiously purchased in Bombay, as well as in obtaining ammunition, was enabled in 1890 to usurp the rule of the whole of Dir territory, and to finally defeat Muhammad Sharif Khan who now took refuge in Upper Swat.

About August 1890, the death occurred of Tahmasp Khan, chief of Asmar, whose daughter was betrothed to Sardar Habibulla Khan, eldest son of the Amir Abdur Rahman. Under pretext of escorting the young lady to Kabul, the Afghan Sipah Salar, Ghulam Haidar Khan, occupied Asmar with troops; but his real motive was to check the influence of Umra Khan. On the death of Tahmasp Khan, Umra Khan had set up one of the deceased chief's family, who was also a partisan of his own, as ruler of Asmar, and Umra now pretended to regard Asmar as a part of Bajaur, a large portion of which he held at this time, and over which he wished to extend his authority; the Amir's occupation of Asmar was thus undoubtedly a direct threat to him.

In April 1892 the Sipah Salar made extensive preparations for invading Jandol, and this led to the intervention of the Government of India, which probably saved Umra Khan from defeat and ruin. In June 1892 Umra Khan came into collision with the Sipah Salar by assisting the Mamunds of Shurtan in the Kunar valley, while at the same time he himself was being intrigued against by Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk who was trying to raise the Yusafzai tribes in favour of the refugee Khan of Dir. The Khan of Nawagai was, as usual, about this period also ready to attack Umra Khan. The latter appealed to the Government of India for assistance in arms and ammunition; but this obviously could not be given to him. He took umbrage at this refusal, though he continued to profess friendship and to work the postal road, which had been

opened during the year : and this umbrage doubtless increased after the Durand mission to Kabul in 1893, when it was announced to him that the disputed territory of Asmar would remain in the possession of the Amir, and he realised that Government would not insist on the withdrawal of the Afghan troops.

Meanwhile Umra Khan, having received the assurance of Government that unless he himself commenced hostilities he need fear no aggression by the Sipah Salar, and being thus relieved of all anxiety for his country, advanced to Kala Drosh, ostensibly in Government interests to support Nizam-ul-Mulk against Sher Afzal. He had first written asking for permission to go, but before he could receive a reply he wrote saying that he had despatched his men. He was, however, informed that Government had never approved of his interference in Chitral, and that his having sent a force into that country before Government had received complete information as to the state of affairs might have a very embarrassing result; so that shortly after this he withdrew his men. His next step was to occupy Nari and Sao in the then debateable strip of country known as Narsat, the inhabitants of which were originally Kafirs who had been converted to Islam. Chitral claimed Narsat because of the Kafirs having been her nominal subjects; Dir took tribute from it on the strength of having converted the people; and Asmar took tribute by virtue of proximity. In 1890, when Umra Khan's interference with Narsat had been objected to by Chitral, he had agreed to the question being settled by arbitration between himself and the Mehtar; but in his correspondence it is clearly seen that he considered he had the strongest claim to it, presumably by virtue of his position as *de facto* Khan of Dir. It was hoped that, during Surgeon-Major Robertson's deputation to Chitral in the early part of 1893, a meeting might be arranged with Umra Khan, and a satisfactory settlement of the Chitral-Bajaur claims effected, but the Khan declined the interview.

In May 1893 it became necessary to warn Umra Khan against attacking the Kafirs of the Bashgul valley, who were at that time claimed as subjects by Chitral. He replied that these Kafirs had been legitimate objects of *jihād* since olden times; that the Mehtars of Chitral had never complained in the past; and that his right to punish them was justified by the Kafirs' own behaviour. In November of the same year he practically intimated that unless he obtained what he desired—namely, rifles, and permission to purchase as much ammunition as he wished—he could not undertake to keep the postal road open, and he refused to accept payment for the expenses already incurred. At this time too he requested the return of an agreement between himself and the Indian Government, which he himself had signed, but which the Government had not accepted, on account of the terms inserted in it by Umra Khan. The agreement was returned, and thenceforward he appears to have decided to make no further effort to retain the favour of Government.

During 1894 Umra Khan's actions were again the cause of much annoyance. Early in the year he attacked some villages near the mouth of the Bashgul valley, claimed by the Mehtar of Chitral, and he was once more warned by Government to abstain from unprovoked attacks upon his neighbours. The warning had no effect, and a few weeks later he commenced the construction of forts at Arnawaj and Birkot in the Kunar valley. Meanwhile the Mehtar had reinforced

Ashreth and Kala Drosh, and only refrained from attacking him on the advice of Captain Younghusband. In July, the Khan made a further encroachment on the Mehtar's territory, and demanded tribute from the people of Damir, a Chitral village 10 miles above Arnawai.

In May 1894, preparations were being made for the despatch of the Afghan-Bajaur Boundary Commission, and Umra Khan was invited either to attend himself or to send a representative to assist in the demarcation. The mission started on the 2nd December 1894, but Umra Khan failed to meet it; his agent too, who on several occasions had visited the civil authorities at Peshawar, also declined to attend the Commission, his excuse being that he knew Umra Khan contemplated moving on Chitral. In the light of subsequent events it would seem probable that the cause of this absence was due to the fact that Umra Khan was expecting important news from Chitral, and wished to be free to act rapidly and effectively in that direction. It undoubtedly was known about this time both in Chitral and Bajaur that Sher Afzal was coming from Kabul; and from what was afterwards ascertained in Bajaur, it appears that some short time previous to the murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk, Danial Beg, a follower of Sher Afzal, had arrived at Mundah from Kabul with some 60 of Sher Afzal's followers, and had informed Umra Khan that the rest of Sher Afzal's party would continue to come in batches of five or six at a time until finally Sher Afzal himself would arrive.

The state of affairs at the end of 1894 may thus be summarised. Umra Khan and Safdar Khan (Chief of Nawagai), after being at enmity for several years, had effected a reconciliation and had sworn on the *koran* to make an offensive and defensive alliance. The former had established his authority over a considerable portion of Swat, the greater part of Bajaur, and the whole of Dir: he still remained in possession of Narsat, and all proposals of Nizam-ul-Mulk to attempt the recovery of that district by force had been discouraged. Muhammad Sharif, ex-Khan of Dir, was a refugee in Upper Swat. The two years of Nizam-ul-Mulk's reign in Chitral had been uneventful; he had proved himself a more popular and efficient ruler than had been expected, though at no time a strong man. Sher Afzal, the most popular candidate for the Mehtarship, was interned at Kabul, and the Amir had promised that he should not be again permitted to disturb the peace of Chitral. Amir-ul-Mulk, a dull-witted youth of from 18 to 20 years of age, who, on the accession of his brother Nizam-ul-Mulk, had taken refuge with Umra Khan, had returned to Chitral professing to have escaped from Umra Khan's hands, and had been kindly received by Nizam-ul-Mulk. Finally, it may be mentioned that Surgeon-Major Robertson had recently assumed charge of the Gilgit Agency, while Lieutenant Gurdon had succeeded Captain Younghusband as Assistant British Agent in Chitral; and that the Commission appointed to delimitate the boundary between Afghanistan, Bajaur, and Chitral was assembled near Asmar.

CHAPTER II,

Disturbances in Chitral, January to March 1895.

On the 1st January 1895, while out hawking a few miles from Chitral, Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot dead by a partisan of Amir-ul-Mulk. None of the Mehtar's party made any attempt to avenge their ruler's murder, and Amir-ul-Mulk promptly seized the Chitral fort, proclaimed himself Mehtar, and sent a deputation to Lieutenant Gurdon, then at Chitral, asking to be recognized as Mehtar; but he was told that the orders of Government must be awaited. The news of the murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk was quickly brought into Gupis by refugees, and on the 5th of January it was confirmed by information received at the camp of Mr. Udny, the Commissioner for the demarcation, in the Kunar valley. Various reports were received regarding the origin of the murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk, but there can be little doubt that it was the result of a conspiracy of the Sher Afzal party and of Umra Khan, the latter seeing an opportunity for his own aggrandisement in the disturbance which must necessarily follow. It is true that Amir-ul-Mulk disclaimed all connection with Umra Khan; but he was probably acting in collusion with him at the time that he was projecting Nizam-ul-Mulk's murder, though he afterwards realized the danger of Umra Khan's presence and became anxious to get rid of him. Be this as it may, immediately after the murder, Umra Khan crossed the Laorai pass with a force of 3,000 to 4,000 men, and occupied the southern Chitral valley. He sent a letter to the Governor of Kala Drosh, in which he announced his intention of starting at the head of a *jihad* to punish the Kafirs, and requested that Amir-ul-Mulk would come to Ashreth to receive him. But Amir-ul-Mulk not falling in with his wishes, Umra Khan's force advanced on Kala Drosh.

On the 1st January the troops of the Gilgit Agency were located as follows:—

		Effective strength.			
Astor, Bunji and Chilas.	{	32nd Punjab Pioneers	821	}	1,424
		5th Kashmir Light Infantry	594		
		Details	9		
Gilgit	{	14th Sikhs	99	}	878
		4th Kashmir Rifles	287		
		6th Kashmir Light Infantry	344		
		Kashmir Sappers and Miners	139		
		Details	9		
Gilgit and Hunza	{	No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Bat- tery. (4 guns).	150	}	481
		6th Kashmir Light Infantry	261		
		Bengal and Kashmir Sappers and Miners	70		
Gakuch and Roshan.	}	4th Kashmir Rifles	33		
Gupis		" " "	286		
Mastuj		14th Sikhs	103*		
GRAND TOTAL			3,205		

* Less 8 men with Lieutenant Gurdon, then at Chitral.

There were 70 men non-effective from various causes, and 297 effective mules and ponies. The Kashmir Sappers and Miners were only partially armed and trained.

At the time of the murder Lieutenant Gurdon was on a visit to Chitral with eight men of the 14th Sikhs; the remainder of his escort, commanded by Lieutenant H. K. Harley, was posted at Mastuj. Fifty men of the 14th Sikhs from the escort at Mastuj were at once despatched to Chitral upon Lieutenant Gurdon's requisition, and these reached him on the 7th January: that they were able to do so, and were not hindered or molested on the way, would seem to clearly prove that the attitude of the population was not, at that time, definitely hostile. In anticipation of trouble, however, Mastuj was reinforced by 100 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles from Gupis, two hundred men of the same battalion were moved up to Ghizr, while Gupis was strengthened by 150 men of the 6th Kashmir Light Infantry from Gilgit.

Surgeon-Major Robertson left Gilgit about the middle of January for Chitral to report on the situation. He was cautioned not to commit the Government of India to any change of policy, and not to recognise any candidate to the Mehtarship without reference to Government. Pending his arrival, Lieutenant Gurdon remained in Chitral acting with admirable coolness and judgment; he occupied a house in a good defensive position, and quietly commenced to lay in supplies. While marching to Chitral, Surgeon-Major Robertson heard at Mastuj of Umra Khan's invasion: he came to the conclusion that Lieutenant Gurdon could not withdraw from Chitral without help, and therefore determined to push on to his assistance. At the same time he wrote to Umra Khan, demanding an explanation of the presence of his forces in Chitral territory, and requesting him to retire at once. Under instructions from Government, both Mr. Udney and Surgeon-Major Robertson further addressed Umra Khan early in February asking for an explanation of his proceedings. The Khan replied that his object had been to assist and strengthen Amir-ul-Mulk and to combine with him for an attack on the Kafirs; that Amir-ul-Mulk had renounced his friendship and acted in a hostile manner, and that no alternative was now left him but to do the same; he added that he hoped his friendship with the British Government would remain unbroken. Notwithstanding these amicable professions, his agents at Sao and other places in the Kunar valley were doing their utmost to prevent communications passing between Mr. Udney's camp and the British officers in Chitral.

Surgeon-Major Robertson arrived at Chitral on the 1st February, on which date there were, roughly, 800 men between Gupis and Chitral, *viz.*, 100 of the 14th Sikhs and 700 of Kashmir Infantry. Of this total, the detachment of the 14th Sikhs and about 150 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles were with Surgeon-Major Robertson, the balance being distributed between the posts of Gupis, Ghizr and Mastuj.

The Chitralis, to the number of about 3,000 men, at first opposed Umra Khan's force, as they had always looked upon the Bajauris as their hereditary enemies, and had, on many previous occasions, resisted invasion by them. But they had now no chief to keep them together and encourage them; for their would-be leader, Amir-ul-Mulk, was quite incapable of exercising authority. Consequently their resistance collapsed, and on the 25th January they were

driven from the position which they were holding before Kala Drosh, with some loss on both sides; they continued, however, to hold Kala Drosh itself until the 9th February, when it was surrendered to Umra Khan, under an arrangement by which the lives of the defenders were spared, and many breech-loaders and matchlocks were given up to him. After the surrender of Kala Drosh the Chitralis concentrated at Gairat.

In order to stop a general stampede of the inhabitants from Chitral proper, and to neutralise the open revolt of the Khushwaktis against Amir-ul-Mulk, Surgeon-Major Robertson took over the Khushwakt country as a temporary measure, and on his own responsibility, promised protection to the Khushwakt headmen, appointing Khushwakt Governors to Mastuj and Laspur. At this time Amir-ul-Mulk was in the Chitral fort with Surgeon-Major Robertson, who was in hopes that, by showing that he and Amir-ul-Mulk were working in thorough accord, he might be able to restore confidence. But the situation in which he was placed appeared to be one of considerable difficulty. Before Kala Drosh was surrendered, he had reported that efforts were being made to bring him into collusion with Umra Khan; that he had resisted these efforts, but, that, at the same time it was clear that the Chitralis had "no fight in them"; that they undoubtedly had called in Umra Khan, that they desired to escape the consequences of their own acts, and that their general attitude was so doubtful, that, if he were to recede one yard, he would be mobbed by a crowd of refugees. The whole country would be open to Umra Khan, while he would be harassed, or permitted to retire, according to the humour of that chief and his fanatical following. Under these circumstances it was evident that any further success would render Umra Khan a serious danger to the British representative; and accordingly the Government of India authorised Surgeon-Major Robertson, on the 19th February, to give the Chitralis such material and moral support, as might be consistent with the safety of his own party, in turning Umra Khan out of Chitral territory; and to call up reinforcements from the Kashmir regiments in the Gilgit command, if necessary.

On the 21st February, Surgeon-Major Robertson reported that everything was satisfactory, supplies plentiful, the men healthy, and the Chitralis cheerful and helpful. They were still holding Gairat, and it was rumoured that Umra Khan's followers were deserting him, and that he himself was about to leave for Narsat. Suddenly, however, the whole aspect of affairs was changed by the arrival on the scene of the refugee Sher Afzal from Kabul, the chief, who a little more than two years before, having compassed the death of Mehtar Afzal-ul-Mulk, had ruled the country for about a month, and had then been ousted by Nizam-ul-Mulk. Surgeon-Major Robertson did not receive reliable information of Sher Afzal's arrival in Chitral territory until the 24th February, when he at once entered into communication with him, and received from him, through a confidential messenger on the 27th February, a demand that he should withdraw to Mastuj at once. Sher Afzal promised to be friends with Government on the same terms as previous Mehtars of Chitral, but his promise was coupled with a threat that, if his terms were not accepted, Umra Khan would at once advance. The two chiefs had, in fact, made an alliance, the basis of which was hostility to the British Government: they were to induce the British officers to quit Chitral territory, by force if necessary, and after this had been effected, they would then decide who should be Mehtar. At the same time that Sher Afzal sent his messenger to Surgeon-Major Robertson, he must have

despatched men to break down the bridges on the Chitral-Mastuj road ; for on the following day communication between those places was interrupted. Surgeon-Major Robertson replied to Sher Afzal that Kashmir was the suzerain of Chitral and that neither Umra Khan nor any one else could impose a Mehtar on Chitral, without the permission of Government ; he added that Sher Afzal's message was wanting in respect to the Government of India, that he was informing Government of Sher Afzal's demands and would communicate their instructions to him, and that, if in the meantime he attempted any overt acts of hostility, he must take the consequences on his own head.

As soon as it became known that Sher Afzal was in the country, a few Chitralis of the lower class immediately went over to him. The Adamzadas, though suspected of being his partisans, did not at first openly defend, but before the end of February they had changed their minds and practically joined him in a body. Gairat, thus denuded of its defenders, was occupied by Sher Afzal's outposts, and Surgeon-Major Robertson, who had gone out with Amir-ul-Mulk towards that place, returned to Chitral on the 1st March with the whole of his escort, while Sher Afzal had, in the meantime, reached Aiun. Amir-ul-Mulk now became very despondent, and on the 2nd March practically resigned the Mehtarship ; at the same time he made overtures to Umra Khan, promising to induce the British party to retire towards Mastuj and then to attack it on the road. Surgeon-Major Robertson therefore placed him in custody, and in order to keep together those who had followed the fortunes of Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk, he formally recognized Shuja-ul-Mulk, a boy of nine or ten years old, as provisional Mehtar, pending the orders of the Government of India. By this act he was enabled to retain with him in Chitral fort a few headmen, several of whom proved most useful during the siege about to ensue.


During February the escort of the British Agent had been reinforced from Mastuj and now amounted to about 420 men, *viz.*, 99 men of the 14th Sikhs and some 320 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, under the command of Captain C. P. Campbell, Central India Horse. The strength of Umra Khan's force is not known ; it was variously assessed at 3,000 and 8,000 men. As stated on a previous page, the former is believed to have been the strength of the force with which he originally advanced into Southern Chitral, but on circulating in Swat and elsewhere a call to *Jihad* against the British, he was reported to have been joined by 5,000 more, among whom were many Mullas from Dir and Bajaur. Of the 700 Sniders given at various times to the old Mehtar, Aman-ul-Mulk, it was estimated that 200 still remained in Chitral, but that most of the others had found their way into Umra Khan's possession.


On the afternoon of the 3rd March, in consequence of the reported arrival of Sher Afzal and his armed following in the Chitral plain (*see* map facing page 12), Captain Campbell, with 200 men, moved out from the fort in that direction. All doubts of Sher Afzal's presence and intentions were quickly dispelled by the appearance on the neighbouring heights of bodies of men with their banners displayed. Still hoping to avoid a contest, the British Agent requested Captain Campbell first to fire a single shot over the heads of the opposing force ; but this step was rendered unnecessary, as the fort in the meantime had been fired into and one man wounded. Captain J. McD. Baird, 24th Punjab Infantry, was now sent with 50 men up the high ground to the right ; fifty

men under a Native officer were posted at the *sarai*, about 600 yards south-west of the fort; and 100 men under Captain C. V. F. Townshend, Central India Horse, advanced towards a house on the plain, distant $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the south, and in which Sher Afzal was said to be. The house proved to be empty, but in a small village, some 500 yards further on, numbers of men could be seen moving about. Shots were now heard on the hill slopes to the right held by Captain Baird's party, and Captain Townshend therefore opened fire on the village in front. By keeping his men under cover as much as possible, and firing a succession of steady volleys, he arrived within 200 yards of the village, but there was now no more cover in front, and his men were being freely hit owing to the excellent shooting the enemy were making with their Martinis and Sniders. He accordingly determined to hold on to the ground he had reached, until such time as Captain Baird should move along the right and so turn the village, while he himself rushed it in front.

Time passed, and nothing could be seen of Captain Baird's party; the enemy were beginning to overlap both flanks of Captain Townshend's men, and darkness was approaching. Captain Campbell arrived at this juncture and ordered the village to be carried by assault. The order "to reinforce" was given, but the support of 50 men, placed behind some low walls 150 yards in rear, failed to advance. Captain Campbell personally brought up about a dozen men and then fell, shot through the knee, as he rejoined Captain Townshend. The latter officer, seeing that it would be useless to delay any longer the delivery of the assault, sounded the charge and led the men who were with him over the bank behind which they had been taking cover. They were met by a close and destructive fire as they scrambled over the bank and rushed on. General Baj Singh was shot dead on one side of Captain Townshend, and Major Bhikam Singh on the other side was mortally wounded. After advancing about 30 or 40 yards, the men began to hesitate, and, in spite of Captain Townshend's strenuous efforts to persuade them to come on, the assault could not be carried home. It was almost dark, and as there seemed to be absolutely no hope of carrying the village, Captain Campbell, who had refused to leave the scene of action, in spite of the severity of his wound, ordered a retirement, keeping up as heavy a fire as possible, whilst the men moved in twos and threes by word of command to the rear. The enemy followed up very closely; in fact, the little party, with a diminished supply of ammunition, was fired into from all sides—front, flank and rear—from every hamlet and wall. On reaching the *sarai* they were met by 50 men of the 14th Sikhs, under Lieutenant H. K. Harley, who had been sent for by Captain Campbell to cover the retreat, a duty which was performed with the greatest steadiness.

While the main body was thus being surrounded and driven back, Captain Baird's detachment on the right remained isolated and detached. Captain Baird himself having been mortally wounded early in the engagement, Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch went to his assistance, placed him in a *dooli*, and the party then tried to get back to the fort. The Gurkhas of the Kashmir Infantry bravely clung to the *dooli*, but in three successive shots three of them were killed and another shot severely wounded a fourth; consequently the *dooli* had to be abandoned. Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch then lifted the wounded officer on to his shoulders, and the survivors of the little band fought their way in the darkness to the river bank and thence along the water's edge to the door of the fort where they arrived about





8 P.M. Nearly every man of this detachment was wounded, and Captain Baird was again shot in the face when within a short distance of the fort walls. For his gallantry in this affair, Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross; and in forwarding the official recommendation for this coveted distinction, the British Agent remarked: "I feel sure that this simple narrative of the facts of Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch's dashing bravery, his splendid devotion and wonderful fighting instinct, needs no further comment at my hands. I have discharged my duty in officially recommending a heroic incident which seemed to illuminate a disastrous day and which stirs the heart whenever it is brought to mind." Subadar Badri Nar Singh and 12 non-commissioned officers and men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles were admitted to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit, in recognition of their bravery and devotion in bringing Captain Baird back to the fort. Jemadar Rab Nawaz Khan, 15th Bengal Lancers, was admitted to the same Order for conspicuous bravery during the action, in having most gallantly stood his ground, encountering an overwhelming charge of the enemy's swordsmen, of whom he killed two with his own hand, and having remained firm until he fell overpowered by numbers, having received upwards of twenty wounds.

The casualties in this affair were: Killed.—General Baj Singh, Imperial Service Troops; Major Bhikam Singh, 4th Kashmir Rifles; 1 Hospital Assistant; 21 non-commissioned officers and men, 4th Kashmir Rifles: Wounded.—Captain J. McD. Baird, 24th Punjab Infantry (succumbed to his injuries on 4th March); Captain C. P. Campbell, Central India Horse; 1 Native officer, 15th Bengal Lancers; 28 non-commissioned officers and men, 4th Kashmir Rifles;—or a total of 25 killed (including Captain Baird) and 30 wounded out of 200 men, of whom only 150 were actually engaged*. The enemy's losses are not known. During the day 15,935 rounds of Snider ammunition were expended, *viz.*, about 100 rounds per man.

As a result of the fighting of the 3rd March the British force was now shut up within the walls of the fort at Chitral, and nothing was heard from them for many weeks to come: an account of the siege which followed is given in the next Chapter.

Information of the serious turn which affairs had taken, began to reach Gilgit on the 6th March, and was received by the Government of India on the following day. Although complete details were not yet to hand, the last message from Chitral being dated the 1st March, it was decided that preliminary arrangements should be undertaken, in order to be prepared, if necessary, to operate against Umra Khan from Peshawar. It was believed that the garrison in Chitral could resist attack from the forces of Umra Khan and Sher Afzal and hold out as long as their ammunition and supplies lasted; but as communications on all sides were interrupted, and retreat cut off, it appeared imperative that no effort should be spared to effect the relief of the garrison by the end of April. The British Agent had written on the 13th February that he was holding the fort with 240 men, and expected an additional 50 men the same day; and on the 25th he wrote that he had plenty of supplies for three months. It was subsequently reported that reinforcements had left Mastuj, numbering, as far as Government could ascertain, 120 men; if these had reached Chitral they would, by increasing the number of mouths to feed, reduce

* The detail of killed and wounded is taken from Captain Townshend's official report; but the same report gives the total as 23 killed and 33 wounded.

the time for which supplies were available from three months to nine weeks, or till the end of April only.

On the 14th March, in order that Umra Khan might have distinct notice of the decision to which the Government of India had come, a final letter of warning was sent to him through Mr. Udny and the Commissioner of Peshawar, and an attempt was also ordered to be made to send a similar letter through the British officers at Chitral and Mastuj. This letter (*see* Appendix I) recounted the warnings given to Umra Khan against interfering with Chitral affairs, mentioned his various acts of aggression, directed him at once to quit Chitral territory, and told him that, if by the 1st of April he had not withdrawn, the Government of India would compel him to do so. At the same time a proclamation (Appendix II) was issued to the people of Swat and other tribes on the Peshawar border, announcing the intention and object of Government, assuring them that there was no intention to permanently occupy any territory through which the force might pass, or to interfere with the independence of the tribes, and promising friendly treatment to all those who did not oppose the march of the troops. Instructions were also sent to Surgeon-Major Robertson to inform Sher Afzal that the Government of India could have no dealings with him so long as he remained in alliance with Umra Khan: but these instructions never reached their destination owing to the investment of Chitral fort. Simultaneously with the above proclamation, orders were issued for the mobilisation of the 1st Division of the Field Army, with certain modifications in regard to the cavalry and artillery.

On the 17th March the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, telegraphed that reports circulated by agents of Sher Afzal were causing considerable excitement among the inhabitants of the country, and that he was anxious about a small party of 100 men of the 14th Sikhs, under Captain Ross, and 20 sappers with Lieutenant Fowler, R.E., which had recently left Mastuj for Chitral, presumably under Surgeon-Major Robertson's orders. He further reported that, under the circumstances, he had requested Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly to bring up to Gilgit the half battalion of the 32nd Punjab Pioneers, then held in readiness between Bunji and Chilas. Accordingly two hundred men arrived at Gilgit on the 20th, and two hundred more on the 22nd, March, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, who as senior military officer present, now took command of the operations in the Gilgit district.

On the 21st March, news reached Gilgit of a serious attack made early in the month, on some of our troops between Mastuj and Chitral, in which Captain Ross, 46 fighting men, 6 followers, and a hospital assistant were reported to have been killed, while another detachment, under Lieutenant Edwardes, was also said to be surrounded. This intelligence materially altered the situation; it was now known to the Government of India that, before they had taken the action described above, Umra Khan and Sher Afzal had actually waged war upon our troops. The necessity for relieving the garrison in Chitral was thus more imminent than had been supposed, while the reason for giving Umra Khan a period of grace, within which he might withdraw from Chitral, had disappeared. It was felt that the relief of Chitral from the Gilgit side was probably impracticable: Gilgit is 220 miles from Chitral, and was cut off at this season of

the year by impracticable passes from all support from India. On the other hand, the road from Peshawar to Chitral was about 190 miles in length, and on it there was only one pass—the Laorai—which might still have snow on it, and which, in any case, would not be altogether impracticable for troops. Orders were therefore issued for the despatch of the 1st Division as soon as it could be made ready. But before describing the advance of these forces it will be convenient to record the disasters which had befallen the two detachments on the Mastuj-Chitral road, and also to give an account of the course of events in and around the fort of Chitral.

On the 26th February Captain Baird, the British Agent's staff officer, had written from Aiun to Lieutenant Edwardes at Ghizr, directing him to make over charge of the Ghizr detachment to Lieutenant Gough, and to come on himself to Chitral to take command of the Puniali levies* which had been ordered up the same day from Gilgit. At the same time Captain Baird issued instructions to Lieutenant Moberly, commanding at Mastuj, in the following terms:—"As soon as Fowler and his detachment reach Mastuj, please inform him that British Agent wishes him to continue his march to Chitral. * * * Please send off 60 boxes of ammunition (Snider) under escort of a native officer and 40 men, as soon as coolies are obtainable. Let the native officer make ordinary marches, and please send warning ahead." These orders were received at Mastuj on the 28th February, and on the 1st March one native officer and 39 rank and file, 4th Kashmir Rifles, started for Chitral with 68 boxes of ammunition. On the following day three postal runners returned to Mastuj from Chitral saying that they had been stopped on the road; and as rumours of Sher Afzal's arrival in Chitral territory had been prevalent during the last few days, Lieutenant Moberly at once sent off to recall the ammunition escort. After making further inquiries, however, he learnt that the runners had not been actually stopped, but that the men had only heard that they would be stopped; and a little later a man came in who had left Chitral on the 27th February, when all was well: a second message was therefore sent to the native officer with the ammunition escort telling him to continue his march. Lieutenant Moberly also wrote to Captain Ross who, with 100 men of the 14th Sikhs, was to arrive at Laspur that day, asking him to come on to Mastuj in a single march instead of two; this Captain Ross did, arriving at Mastuj on the 3rd March. On this date the Hakim of Laspur, on his way home from Chitral, informed Lieutenant Moberly that all was well at Chitral and that Sher Afzal was friendly; that the whole of the British Agent's escort was concentrated there; that the road was broken, but that it was the work of only a few evil-disposed persons, and that no anxiety need be felt. A message was also received from the Assistant British Agent at Chitral, dated 1st March, stating that, although postal runners might be stopped for a few days, there was no cause for alarm. Meanwhile the ammunition escort had halted at Buni, as the people said the road was broken, and that it would be useless to proceed further.

It should be mentioned that on the morning of the 3rd March, Captain Baird wrote from Chitral to Lieutenant Moberly as follows:—

If communications with Mastuj are interrupted, the British Agent wishes the following measures taken to restore them—

The levies to move on to Drasan and take that place. The day after they leave

* These levies were armed with Snider carbines; they had received but little previous training and were intended to be utilised in scouting and in crowning the heights, a task for which their skill as cragsmen eminently fitted them.

Mastuj, Fowler will proceed to Drasan with 200 Raganaths* and his sappers. You go in charge of Raganaths, and as political officer. Make over political charge of Mastuj to Edwardes with all instructions. Ross and his Sikhs to remain in garrison at Mastuj. Order up the remainder of the Raganaths from Ghizr. Gough and 100 Raganaths to remain in garrison at Ghizr. Please inform Fowler that he is to take command, and on arrival at Drasan, Fowler is to re-open communications with Chitral. Above instructions depend on communications being broken.

The levies should be at Mastuj about the 12th. No British officer is to accompany them to Drasan.

But it is certain that these orders never reached Lieutenant Moberly.

On the 4th March, Captain Ross and 50 men marched to Buni in support of the party there, the native officer having reported that he was likely to be attacked and cut off that night; and on the same day a detachment of 20 men of the Bengal Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant Fowler, accompanied by Lieutenant Edwardes, arrived at Mastuj. In accordance with the orders sent from Aiun on the 26th February, this detachment started on the morning of the 5th March, with the intention of overtaking the ammunition escort and continuing the march with it to Chitral. They reached Buni without difficulty the same evening, where they joined Captain Ross' party, and found the ammunition escort all right; Captain Ross, therefore, went back to Mastuj. The total strength of the combined detachment then left at Buni under Lieutenant Edwardes, amounted to 2 British officers, 1 native officer and 39 rank and file of 4th Kashmir Rifles, 20 Bengal Sappers and Miners, with 3 orderlies.

On the evening of the 5th March, information was forthcoming at Mastuj to the effect that Shuja-ul-Mulk had been proclaimed Mehtar, that Amir-ul-Mulk had been imprisoned, that Umra Khan had agreed to retire, and that everything had been satisfactorily settled. The road from Chitral was being mended, and a mail from Chitral was said to be on its way to Mastuj. On the 6th, the whole of Lieutenant Edwardes' party marched from Buni to Reshun, a large, straggling, village situated on a sloping plain on the left bank of the Chitral river. During the day information was received of the fighting at Chitral, and also of a gathering at Parpish. The night passed quietly, however, and at noon on the following day Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, with 20 Sappers and Miners, 10 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, and 50 coolies carrying tools and timber, moved off to repair a reported break in the road about 3 miles ahead. A native officer and the remaining men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles were left behind to guard the stores, ammunition, etc., and were ordered to throw up defences on the crest of a cliff which commands the bridge and the paths leading down to the river at this point. Immediately after leaving Reshun the road to Chitral ascends a steep spur to the height of about 1,000 feet, and descending again to the level of the river, passes for half a mile or so over a level space, and then enters a narrow defile with the unfordable river on one side and lofty cliffs on the other. On arrival at the defile the party halted; the hill-sides were carefully examined with telescopes, and as some *sangars* were observed, Lieutenant Fowler with 8 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles went up the heights on the left bank so as to be able to look down into the *sangars* on the opposite bank. Meanwhile Lieutenant Edwardes remained with the rest of the party at the mouth of the defile. With great difficulty Lieutenant Fowler scaled the almost impracticable rocky slopes, and was engaged in examining the *sangars* on the right bank, when suddenly a shot came from them, and about 200 men rushed out from the neighbouring village of Parpish into the *sangars*. Firing

* 4th Kashmir Rifles.

now became general; Lieutenant Fowler was wounded in the shoulder; the *naik* of the party was killed, two men were wounded, and he was consequently obliged to order his men to retire. Lieutenant Edwardes finding that the enemy were swarming on to the hill-sides now saw that his only plan was to retire on Reshun; and this, when Lieutenant Fowler had rejoined him, he accordingly did.

On reaching the crest of the high spur above mentioned, a few men were left to cover the retreat, and eventually the *sangar* near the village of Reshun, where the rest of the party had been left, was reached without serious loss. It was found impossible, however, to hold this *sangar*, for it was too much exposed; and it was therefore decided to occupy a cluster of houses near the polo ground, where good cover, firewood, and a certain amount of supplies could be obtained. The position taken up was somewhat thickly surrounded by other houses, walls, and trees, and their demolition was fully recognized as a matter of the first importance; however, as it was extremely risky to take the men from their places and so to expose them to be cut off at any moment, it was decided not to attempt any demolition of the objectionable cover. But the chief drawback in occupying these houses was that they were more than 100 yards from the river—the only available water-supply. The work of making good the defences was at once proceeded with, as there was every reason to expect an attempt would be made to rush the post during the night: the materials available were the mud bricks of which the houses were built, roof timbers, boxes, grain bins, etc. At sunset the enemy's fire slackened, and the whole of the ammunition, the wounded, and a few ration bags were safely brought in from the original *sangar* by volunteers from the detachment of Kashmir Infantry, who, "although already dead tired," as stated in the official report, "behaved splendidly." During the twilight the remainder of the baggage was brought in from the original *sangar*, and then the water-supply was replenished from the river, without any of the enemy being encountered.

The losses during the day had been—Killed—1 *naik*, 4th Kashmir Rifles; Wounded—1 British officer, and 10 men, 4th Kashmir Rifles; of the latter, two subsequently died. Fifty rounds of ammunition, with the sappers' tools and gun-cotton, were lost during the retirement.

The night passed quietly until just before dawn; but when the moon had gone down and the night was at its darkest, the enemy charged down through the adjacent houses, and got behind the garden wall in large numbers; none of them, however, were able to approach within twenty yards of the defenders. At about 9 A.M. they all retired, and for the rest of the day kept up a continuous fire from additional *sangars* which they had constructed on the surrounding hill-sides. Owing to the darkness, it was impossible to estimate the number of the enemy or their losses; but the assailants must have numbered several hundreds, and a large portion were armed with Martinis and Sniders. The native soldiers of the defence behaved with great steadiness during the attack; four of them were killed and seven wounded.

In the evening it was seen that the enemy had barred the road down to the water. Fully expecting another attack, the defenders strengthened their cover, and endeavoured to keep up a vigilant outlook, but "the men were terribly weary, and it was very difficult to keep the sentries awake, although posted double." The night passed uneventfully, and in the morning it was seen that the enemy had cleared off the hills, though their sharpshooters were still occupying several *sangars* from 50 to 200 yards distant, and during the night they had also made additional *sangars*. Lieutenant

Edwardes now dressed the wounded, who had so far only been bandaged; but there were no medical appliances, nor indeed sufficient water to thoroughly wash the wounds, and bandages, crutches, and splints had to be improvised in the best way possible, while a weak solution of carbolic and carbolic tooth-powder was used for dressing the wounds. At dusk Lieutenant Fowler and 20 men started down towards the river with the intention of procuring a fresh supply of water, but the enemy had now occupied *sangars* along the cliff at the river's edge, and the work of getting down to the river was one of great risk. Lieutenant Fowler, however, succeeded in getting to within ten yards of the first *sangar*, in which about twenty men could be seen sitting round a fire with their rifles lying by their sides; a volley was promptly poured into them, and a few men only succeeded in escaping down the cliff to the river bed. He then got round the flank of a second *sangar*, and fired a second volley into its occupants, six of whom were hit while others were bayoneted. Heavy firing was now heard in the direction of the defenders' position: so having collected his men Lieutenant Fowler retired at once. The enemy's attack was repulsed by the time he had arrived, but the attempt to obtain water had to be abandoned for the night.

On the following day nothing of importance occurred, and at night Lieutenant Fowler and 10 men succeeded in reaching the river by another route, and bringing back water, the supply of which was still further replenished by collecting the rain in waterproof sheets; a well was also sunk to a depth of twelve feet, but as rock was then struck the work had to be given up.

On the morning of the 13th, a white flag was shown by the enemy, and a Pathan shouted out "cease firing;" whereupon a native officer was sent out to parley, and returned with the report that Muhammad Isa Khan, Sher Afzal's foster-brother, had just arrived from Chitral to stop the fighting, and that he wished to speak with one of the British officers. A reply was sent to the effect that if Muhammad Isa would come to the defenders' side of a gap in the wall of the polo ground, situated sixty yards from the walls of the houses held by the British party, and commanded by the defenders' fire, one of the officers would go out and meet him. Muhammad Isa having agreed to this came to the gap, and Lieutenant Edwardes went out to him, Lieutenant Fowler remaining inside the post with the men standing to their arms. Muhammad Isa then informed Lieutenant Edwardes that he had just arrived from Chitral, where Sher Afzal and Surgeon-Major Robertson were corresponding with a view to the former being recognised as Mehtar; that all fighting had ceased, and that he was most anxious to be friends with the Government. An armistice was accordingly arranged, the conditions being that the defenders should remain within their walls, that no firing should take place, that none of the besiegers were to approach the walls, that *bhistis* were to be allowed to go down to the river, and that supplies were to be furnished by the Chitralis. Lieutenant Edwardes wrote to the British Agent at Chitral (see page 26), and to the Officer Commanding at Mastuj, stating in English that an armistice had been concluded pending instructions, adding in French what his losses had been, and expressing very great doubt of his being able to beat off any further determined assault. The *bhistis* were sent down to fetch water, and supplies were brought in by a Chitrali.

On the afternoon of the 14th another parley was requested, and this time Muhammad Isa was accompanied by Yadgar Beg: the latter confirmed the previous story of Muhammad Isa, and both were full of protestations of friendship. The same afternoon the *bhistis* again brought in water, and having to go

some distance through the village to fetch it, reported the houses to be full of Pathans. They were not ill-treated in any way, and Muhammad Isa sent in a sheep and other supplies. Another letter was sent to the British Agent informing him of the presumed strengthening of the enemy, and of the fact that the rations would not last beyond the 17th of March.

So far the relations between the British officers and Muhammad Isa had been conducted upon an apparently friendly footing, but they were now about to undergo a treacherous change. On the 15th, Muhammad Isa sent word that, as peace was restored he and his men wished to amuse themselves, and he asked permission to play polo on the ground immediately outside the British post. After considering the matter, the officers decided to grant the request, for no man riding on the polo ground could escape their fire. Muhammad Isa then sent to ask if both officers would come and look on, and he also offered to lend them ponies on which to play polo. Seeing that they had trusted the Chitralis so far, the officers thought they might trust them further, and accordingly when Muhammad Isa's men arrived on the ground both officers, having previously ordered the men to their posts, went out. A *charpoy* was placed in the gap of the wall of the polo ground, on the spot where the former meetings had taken place, and Muhammad Isa sat next to the officers until the players were ready to begin their game. The officers were asked to play but refused. After the polo was over, Muhammad Isa asked if his men might dance; consent was given, and the dance began. Under the excuse that there was a wet place in front of the officers, the *charpoy* was moved to the right, bringing it under cover of the end of the wall of the polo ground; to this, the officers found it difficult to object, as it seemed certain that any attempt at treachery would be attended by heavy loss to the Chitralis. As the dance proceeded, more men began to collect and to press forward in a ring round the dancers, and the officers observed that a number had come over from the further side of the polo ground. At a pause in the dance the officers stood up saying that they were tired and would now go back to their post; but no sooner had they done so than Muhammad Isa threw himself upon them, and a rush of men carried them under cover of the wall. A volley was immediately fired from the British post, but the Chitralis kept under cover, and none of them seem to have been hit; firing then became general for some time, but afterwards died down. In the meantime the officers had their hands and feet bound, and were dragged by the legs along the ground away from the gap. In about half an hour's time, they saw the enemy carrying off some of their dead and wounded, and men coming out of the post laden with loot. They were not in a position to see what happened to the garrison, but they subsequently met twelve of their men in Chitral, while others were reported to have been taken alive. It appears that the Chitralis rushed the post, killed numbers of the men, and carried off the remainder as prisoners.

In their official report, Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler say that the question of destroying a portion of the ammunition in their charge was frequently considered; but that in the hurry of improvising the defence on the first night of the siege, they had built the ammunition boxes up into a rude parapet, covered with beams, bricks, and débris, and it was consequently very difficult to get at them. Moreover, the ammunition was intended for the use of the local levies who were expected from Gilgit, and they, therefore, determined to keep it till they could hold out no longer, and then destroy it. Unfortunately they were prevented carrying out this intention, and the whole of the ammunition,

about 40,000 rounds, fell into the hands of the enemy. The advisability of making sorties had also been considered, but though the enemy would probably have been driven off for a time, Lieutenant Edwardes recognized that losses would have been inevitable, and with the small numbers at his disposal he could not, in his opinion, afford to lose a single man.

After passing the night bound at Reshun, Lieutenant Fowler was sent towards Chitral, and on the next day Lieutenant Edwardes followed and overtook Lieutenant Fowler on the road. On the way they were met by eleven of Umra Khan's men who, after quarrelling with the Chitralis, insisted upon taking the officers as their prisoners, and on the 19th March they reached Chitral, where they were met by a "Colonel" and 100 men of Umra Khan's force. They were then taken into the presence of Sher Afzal, who received them civilly, and expressed sorrow at the treachery of which they had been the victims, gave them refreshments, and promised to make strict search for all men of their party who might still be alive. The two officers were allowed to communicate with the British garrison besieged in the fort, but were not allowed to visit them. On the 24th March they were sent to Kala Drosh which they reached on the 26th, and were then told by Umra Khan that he was returning to Jandol and expected to be back in about a month's time. He asked them whether they would go with him or would prefer to await his return at Kala Drosh, or whether they would like to return to Chitral, promising to escort them thither and hand them over to the British officers in the fort. They finally decided on going to Jandol, as the Khan stated that he would not allow the captured native soldiers to accompany them to Chitral. On the following day, before starting they sent a brief report of what had befallen them to the British Agent at Chitral, informing him of certain propositions which Umra Khan had made concerning the surrender of Chitral fort and the safe conduct of the British garrison to Peshawar. Leaving Ashreth on the 28th, they and their escort crossed the Laorai pass in a violent snow-storm; Dir was reached the same evening, and Barwa on the 30th March. On the 1st April the Mussalman prisoners were released and one of them immediately left for Peshawar, where he brought the first definite news of the disaster to his party.

News now began to reach Jandol of the fighting between the Chitral Relief Force and the tribes in Swat, and great excitement prevailed. On the 12th April the officers and the Hindu prisoners were taken to Mundah, where they were met by the Shahzada, a native political officer, who had arrived from Sir Robert Low's camp at Sado. A long interview ensued between the Shahzada and Umra Khan, the result being that Lieutenant Edwardes was released, and given two letters to Sir Robert Low, while three days afterwards, Lieutenant Fowler and the four Hindu prisoners were also made over to the Relief Force. The circumstances under which the officers and the whole of their men thus unexpectedly obtained their release are more fully described in Chapter VI. During their captivity the officers were closely guarded, but were in no way insulted: they were treated with great civility and attention by Umra Khan, who gave Lieutenant Edwardes back his sword which had been seized at Reshun, and promised to obtain Lieutenant Fowler's also, if it could be found.

To turn now to the fighting which took place between Reshun and Mastuj. On the 6th March when Lieutenant Edwardes heard of the gathering of the enemy below Reshun, he at once sent this information back to Mastuj where it arrived the same evening; and Captain Ross thereupon decided to start

next morning with his detachment of the 14th Sikhs, to bring Lieutenant Edwardes' party back to Buni. The detachment, consisting of 2 British officers (Captain C. R. Ross and Lieutenant H. J. Jones), 1 native officer, 93 non-commissioned officers and men, with 17 followers, having nine days' rations and 140 rounds of ammunition per man, left Mastuj on the morning of the 7th, and reached Buni at 11 P.M. Next day they marched for Reshun, taking with them 3 days' cooked rations, and leaving at Buni 33 rank and file under a native officer. Koragh was reached at 1 P.M., and here a halt was made for about half an hour.

About half a mile from Koragh the track enters a narrow defile and for half a mile traverses a succession of precipitous rocky bluffs. Between these bluffs are great fan-shaped slopes of detritus, which fall at a very steep angle, from the foot of inaccessible crags above, to the river's edge below; these slopes are several feet in height, and at their base have an average breadth of about 100 yards. Where the path crosses them, it can be swept from end to end by a torrent of rocks, merely by loosening the soil above; and the Chitralis in their dispositions for an ambuscade or for the defence of a position, rely much on the deadly effect of this peculiar weapon. About one mile from Koragh, the track, leaving the level of the river, ascends a steep spur, beyond which the defile maintains an equally formidable character for several miles in the direction of Reshun.

Leaving Koragh at 1-30 P.M. the advanced party of Captain Ross's detachment ascended about half way up this spur, when they were fired on from across the river, and, at the same time, men appeared on the mountain tops and ridges and rolled stones down all the "shoots." At the first shot, the coolies dropped their loads and bolted. Captain Ross, after an inspection of the enemy's position, decided to fall back on Koragh, and with this object ordered Lieutenant Jones with ten men to seize the Koragh end of the defile and cover his retirement. In his attempt to carry out this order, Lieutenant Jones lost eight men wounded, and was thereupon recalled by Captain Ross, who had meanwhile occupied two caves in the river bank which afforded good cover. At 8 P. M. an endeavour was made to force a way back to Koragh, but so continuous was the fall of rocks from the cliffs above that, fearing the total annihilation of his party, Captain Ross was compelled to retire again to the caves. After a brief halt, he next made an effort to scale the cliffs, but, after a toilsome and dangerous climb, the party was confronted by a precipice, up which they searched in vain for a practicable path. Recognising that any attempt at escape in this direction was futile, and that the only course open was to force his way, at all costs, back to Koragh by the road he had come, Captain Ross rested his men in the shelter of the caves till the morning of the 10th March. Issuing thence at 2 A.M., at which hour it was hoped that the Chitralis might be taken unawares, the Sikhs drove the enemy from the nearest *sangars*, but were then met by a very heavy fire from both banks of the river and by a deadly hail of rocks from the cliffs above. Captain Ross himself was killed in front of the *sangars*; and out of the whole detachment, only Lieutenant Jones and 17 rank and file won their way to the open ground on the Koragh side of the defile. Here they halted for 10 minutes, endeavouring to silence the enemy's fire and so cover the retreat of any others of the detachment who might be near the mouth of the defile: twice they were charged by the enemy's swordsmen whom they repulsed inflicting great loss upon them, but when two more of the little party were killed, and one mortally wounded, and when the enemy began to threaten

their line of retreat, Lieutenant Jones gave the order to retire slowly upon Buni, which place he reached at 6 A. M. He at once occupied a house and, having placed it in a state of defence, held it till the 17th, when, as described below, he was relieved by Lieutenant Moberly.

Of the 15 survivors, 10 were wounded, including Lieutenant Jones: while during the three days fighting, 1 British officer, 46 fighting men, 1 hospital assistant and 6 followers were killed. The party expended 5,120 rounds of ammunition in all. About 40 rifles fell into the hands of the enemy, whose numbers were estimated at 1,000 men, and who must have lost heavily.

The circumstances under which Lieutenant Jones was relieved, and the defence of Mastuj fort by Lieutenant F. J. Moberly, now remain to be briefly recorded. On the 9th March, Lieutenant Moberly received a note from Captain Ross, written just before the latter officer reached Buni on the 7th March, in which it was stated that he was afraid the enemy had surrounded the party under Lieutenant Edwardes, and that he intended to see what could be done towards assisting him: this was the only communication received at Mastuj from either Captain Ross or Lieutenant Jones. On the 10th March, Captain G. H. Bretherton, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, with 100 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles and 6th Kashmir Light Infantry, arrived at Mastuj from Ghizr, and four days later the garrison was further reinforced by the arrival of 66 more men of the latter corps. Up to the 13th March Lieutenant Moberly was frequently informed by natives that Captain Ross had joined Lieutenant Edwardes at Reshun, and that the party was in no danger; but as no answer had been received to any one of the several notes written to Captain Ross since the latter's departure from Mastuj on the 7th, Lieutenant Moberly determined to start for Buni. Accordingly, on the 16th March he advanced as far as Sanoghar, taking with him 150 men of the Kashmir troops, carrying three days' rations, their *postins*, blankets, cooking utensils, and 120 rounds of ammunition each. At 5 P.M. on the 17th the party reached Buni unopposed, and was there joined by the few survivors of Captain Ross's detachment. Hearing that the enemy were in force near Drasan, and that they intended to cut off communication with Mastuj that night, Lieutenant Moberly ordered an immediate retirement, and reached Mastuj safely at noon on the following day. In the meantime Hamayun, the Wazir of Hunza, had reached Mastuj with some 100 Hunza and Nagar levies, who, however, were sent back to Ghizr the same evening, leaving the effective strength of the Mastuj garrison on the 18th March at a total of 327 men, *vis*: 48 men of the 14th Sikhs, 111 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, 117 of the 6th Kashmir Light Infantry, and 51 of the Punial levies.

On the 19th March news was received to the effect that the enemy had arrived in the neighbourhood of Sanoghar, and some levies were at once sent out to verify the report; on their return they stated that they had seen a few men at the Nisa Gol and a larger number in Sanoghar village. This was the force which had left Reshun under Muhammad Isa on the 17th March, after the capture of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler. On the 22nd March, a patrol having reported that there were signs of a large party of men having passed the night at Gramuli, a village one mile from Mastuj on the Laspur road, Lieutenant Moberly took out a reconnoitring party and saw several hundred of the enemy holding the Chakalwat defile, about four miles from Mastuj, thus cutting communication with Ghizr and Gilgit. That night there were fires on the surrounding hills, and at daybreak next day the enemy were seen to be completing a line of *sangars* at a distance of 800 to 1,000 yards from the fort.

During the night of the 23rd they built more *sangars* and occupied several groups of houses, at about 450 yards from the fort, forming a cordon, by which it was surrounded on three sides, while on the fourth side a high hill overlooking the fort was held by small *sangars* right up to the snow line. From the houses they kept up a dropping, harmless, rifle-fire, which was continued daily till the 9th April, when the enemy were seen to be retiring towards Sanoghar. This retirement was caused by the near approach of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly with the Gilgit column, the movements of which are described in Chapter IV. Lieutenant Moberly at once ordered out his men, but owing to some misunderstanding the men were not ready to move out before the enemy had for the most part got too far away. "For various reasons," says Lieutenant Moberly in his report, "I had not thought it advisable to try and oust the enemy from their positions round us, although I believe I could have done so, until I could cooperate with the force advancing from Gilgit. Unfortunately, however, they were unable to communicate the fact of their advance to me, and I did not fully realise, until too late, that the enemy was retiring."

From the 23rd March to 9th April, 987 rounds of Martini-Henry and 4,603 rounds of Snider ammunition were expended. With the exception of one man slightly wounded there were no casualties; the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was estimated at about 40 men.

CHAPTER III.

The siege of Chitral fort, 3rd March to 19th April 1895.

We now turn to the events which took place at Chitral between the 4th of March and the 19th of April. As already stated on page 14, the British Agent's escort had been shut up within the fort and the siege had commenced after a severe fight on the 3rd of March, in which Captain C. P. Campbell, Central India Horse, had been severely wounded and the command of the troops had devolved on Captain C. V. F. Townshend of the same regiment.

The British officers shut up in Chitral were:—Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I., British Agent; Captain C. V. F. Townshend, Central India Horse, commanding the troops; Lieutenant B. E. M. Gurdon, Assistant British Agent; Lieutenant H. K. Harley, 14th Sikhs; Surgeon-Captain H. F. Whitchurch, Indian Medical Service; Captain C. P. Campbell, Central India Horse, severely wounded. The garrison consisted of 99 men of the 14th Sikhs, and 301 all ranks of the 4th Kashmir Rifles; and there were also 52 Chitralis and 85 followers, servants, *munshis*, *chaprasis*, etc., bringing up the total number to 543 persons. For these there were supplies sufficient for two and a half months, allowing half-rations; of ammunition there were 300 rounds per Martini-Henry of the Sikhs, and 280 rounds per Snider of the 4th Kashmir Rifles.

The fort (*see* plan opposite page 24) situated on the right bank of the Chitral river, was about 70 yards square with walls 25 feet high, and 7 to 8 feet thick, with a tower at each corner some 20 feet higher than the walls; and outside the north face near the river was a water-tower to guard access to the river. The fort was of a type common to this part of the frontier, the walls being practically crates filled in with rubble, stone, and mud. It was commanded on almost every side at ranges varying from 700 yards and upwards. On the north face was the river; on the east was the fort garden, surrounded by a high wall; the south face was encroached upon by walls, trees, and houses; while on the west there were many large *chinar* trees. Captain Townshend's first care was to demolish as many as possible of the out-buildings and walls around the fort, but unfortunately he had no time to destroy the building known as the summer-house; neither had he time to cut down the numerous trees on the east and west faces. A covered way, 35 yards in length, was made down to the water-tower, as it was thought that the enemy would be certain to build *sangars* on the opposite (left) bank of the river, from which to pick off the men as they went to obtain water. Much of the demolition and other work had to be executed under the fire of the enemy from *sangars* erected on the hillsides.



On the 6th March, Umra Khan's Hindu *Diwan* arrived with a flag of truce, and was received by the British Agent. He brought a letter, which was, however, so illegible that he was told to explain the contents verbally. Umra Khan expressed therein his desire to remain on friendly terms with the British, and after complaining that the British Agent had neither accorded him an interview nor deputed a representative to meet him, he explained that he had come to Drosch merely to wage a religious war against the Kafirs; he then went on to disclaim all responsibility for the fighting which, he declared, he had endeavoured to prevent; and, in conclusion, he urged the British Agent to evacuate the fort

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and retire upon Gilgit, leaving only a *munshi* and a native doctor in Chitral, according to the arrangements that prevailed in the time of the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk. The Khan, on his part, guaranteed the safety of the British Agent and his party, and offered to escort them either to Mastuj or to Asmar, whichever they might prefer.

The British Agent in reply begged the *Diwan* to convey his thanks to Umra Khan and to explain clearly to him that it was quite impossible for him to leave the fort; that it would be better if the Khan addressed himself to Mr. Udny in future; and that as the fort was besieged, it was impossible for him under the circumstances to send letters or to receive the Khan's representative.

On the nights of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th, messengers were sent by the garrison to try and get through the enemy to Mastuj, but without success. As many men as could be spared were daily employed in making loopholes and head-cover, while planks, beams, and any other available material were built up to give protection from reverse fire: there was not sufficient material to screen the whole interior from fire, but cover from view was arranged by hanging tents, carpets, etc., across passages and doorways, so that the enemy were unable to see men passing along. Among the besiegers were several of Umra Khan's men, who were thoroughly versed in every trick and artifice of besieging forts similar to that at Chitral, and their attention was quickly directed to the water-supply; if they could but cut that off, the defenders would have to surrender, as no water was procurable in the fort. Accordingly, about an hour before dawn on the morning of the 8th, they made a determined attack on the water-tower, and a few of their men actually succeeded in entering the passage under the tower and lighting a fire. The garrison, who always slept on their alarm posts, were quickly in their places, and the enemy was driven off by some well-directed section volleys, Captain Townshend's orders being that no independent firing was to be allowed at night: some *bhistsis* with *massaks* extinguished the fire.

At the end of the first week of the siege, owing to the skilful defensive measures taken, there had only been five casualties, but not more than 80 men of the 14th Sikhs and 240 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles were fit for duty. Taking into consideration the large number of guards, sentries and patrols which had to be furnished, that the 4th Kashmir Rifles had been rather shaken by their heavy losses on the 3rd, and that the siege would in all probability be prolonged, Captain Townshend determined not to begin sallying till he heard of the approach of a force from Gilgit, unless a sortie became absolutely necessary owing to the close approach of the enemy's *sangars*. Meanwhile he devoted himself to perfecting his arrangements for a protracted defence. Outside the fort as many walls and buildings as possible were levelled; internal communications were also improved, and every kind of cover that could be devised was thrown up; boxes, commissariat bags filled with earth, carpets, and doors taken off their hinges were all utilised; traverses and paradoss were constructed of beams taken from the demolished buildings. A system for extinguishing fire was at the same time organised; *massaks* and vessels were kept ready filled with water, and night and day *patrols* went the round of the fort to guard against accidents. Military police were detailed to keep a vigilant watch on the large numbers of Chitralis in the fort. Hand-mills for grinding grain were improvised, and all extra servants and non-combatants were detailed for this and similar duties. The sanitary arrangements were, of necessity, unsatisfactory but as much as possible was

done to minimise the danger from this source. Finally, it was instilled into the minds of all, that a relieving force would soon arrive and that then they would sally out and "have their turn." Captain Townshend ordered 30 rounds to be fired daily at Sher Afzal's house at 1,100 yards range, to cause him annoyance, two or three rounds also being fired at Sher Afzal's house from the brass gun in the fort from outside the gate. The average daily expenditure of ammunition was 40 to 50 rounds of Martini and 20 to 30 rounds of Snider.

On the 11th March a good deal of correspondence passed between the besieged and besiegers, but led to no result. Sher Afzal, while expressing a desire for peace, insisted that the relations of Chitral with the Government of India should remain on the same footing as in the time of the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk. He was told in reply that, if he was sincere in his desire for peace, he had only to come in and submit. From the bearer of one letter the defenders heard for the first time of the fighting at Reshun and near Koragh, in which it was stated that one British officer and 102 men had lost their lives. The British Agent on this date received another letter from Umra Khan, also couched in similar language to that of his communication previously mentioned.

On the night of the 11th the outer walls beyond the west and south faces of the fort were successfully demolished, for which purpose the Punialis were used, and "the work was done excellently and marvellously quickly." The enemy fired hotly from their *sangar* about 250 yards from the west front, and they also opened fire from the *basar*, on hearing the sound of the falling walls, but no one was hit.

On the night of the 13th-14th the enemy made an attack on the east face, outside of which the garden was thickly planted with trees. Having sounded the "advance" on a bugle, they attacked with much shouting and beating of *tom-toms*, but on being received by a brisk fire they gradually disappeared in the darkness. During the attack a man was heard to shout repeatedly orders to attack the water-way; consequently the stables outside the water-gate were loop-holed and occupied by a detached post.

On the 15th March, letters were received from Sher Afzal, one addressed to the Chitrali headmen in the fort urging them to make their submission to him, the other representing his desire for peace and announcing that he had in his possession a letter from the British officer at Reshun, which the British Agent might have if we would send a trustworthy man to receive it. Sher Afzal was told in reply that he had better deliver the letter at once and make his submission while there was yet time. On the following day a messenger arrived at the fort, bearing two more letters, one from the Chitrali headmen with Sher Afzal, and the other from Sher Afzal himself, enclosing a letter which proved to be that written by Lieutenant Edwardes from Reshun on the 13th March, as mentioned on page 18. The letter from the headmen was to the effect that they desired that Sher Afzal should be recognised as Mehtar, and that the Government of India should adhere to the policy they had pursued towards Chitral in the time of the late Mehtar, Aman-ul-Mulk. In reply to Sher Afzal's communication, the British Agent suggested a three days truce, in order to discuss the situation, and this suggestion was accepted by the enemy.

On the 17th Amir Ali Khan, the Agency Munshi, was deputed to visit Sher Afzal, with a view to learning his real intentions. The Munshi was received with due respect by Sher Afzal, and by Abdul Majid and Abdul Ghani Khan, Umra Khan's representatives, with whom were many headmen, both Chitralis

and Jandolis. From his subsequent account of the interview, it was unmistakeably evident that Abdul Majid Khan, the head of the Jandoli faction, enjoyed a predominant influence in the enemy's councils, while the Chitralis and Jandolis were by no means unanimous as to the terms on which hostilities might be suspended. To such an extent did the views of the two factions appear to be in conflict, that on the Munshi's return, Surgeon-Major Robertson wrote asking to be clearly informed, in writing, whether Sher Afzal was really desirous of making peace, and if so, upon what terms, and what guarantees would be given if the garrison consented to evacuate the fort and retire upon Mastuj; meanwhile, pending a further communication from Sher Afzal, the British Agent consented to a continuance of the truce.

On the 18th, hostilities were accordingly still suspended, and on the following day letters were received from Abdul Majid, Abdul Ghani, and Sher Afzal. All three expressed their willingness to make peace, on condition that the garrison should evacuate the fort and proceed to India *via* the Jandol Valley: the question of suitable guarantees was, however, carefully evaded. Sher Afzal wrote at greater length and recapitulated in full the terms on which he would consent to maintain friendship with the Government of India. Later in the day, two more letters were received—one from Sher Afzal, and one from the Jandol Khans. These were to the same effect, but they also gave information of the capture of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler on the 15th, and of the subsequent fighting at Reshun, expressing regret for what had happened.

On the 20th, Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were reported to have arrived in Chitral, and that night the Munshi, on visiting the Jandol Khans at their request, saw the two officers and was assured of their safety and comfort. For the next few days the negotiations still dragged on: Sher Afzal and the Khans persisted in their demands that the British Agent should proceed to India *via* Jandol, but received the invariable reply that this was impossible without the orders of Government. On the 21st and 22nd the Munshi again visited the Khans, and on the latter date made overtures for the return of the two officers, but without success. On the 23rd matters came to a crisis; Umra Khan's Diwan arrived at the fort to obtain the British Agent's final answer whether or no he would evacuate the fort and return to India; and being informed that it was useless to repeat the suggestion, hinted that, if Umra Khan's conditions were not accepted, it might fare ill with the British officers now in the Khan's power; then when this threat failed in its effect, he asked how much longer the truce was to continue. Throughout the interview the Diwan's manner was most impertinent. He was told in reply that the truce might end whenever the enemy wished; a letter for Umra Khan was also given to him, in which the British Agent wrote that if the British officers had been captured in fair warfare, he had nothing to say, but that if they had been taken by treachery he would strongly advise the Khan to hand them over with a letter of apology.

Hostilities had thus been suspended for eight days in all, from the 16th to the 23rd March. Captain Townshend very wisely took this opportunity to strengthen the parapets of the fort, to improve the head-cover and to make more loopholes; he also commenced the clearing of an old disused well in the fort, and constructed a semi-circular loopholed *fêche* outside the water-gate. On the 22nd, it may be mentioned, the British officers killed and salted their ponies, and commenced to eat horseflesh.

The truce came to an end on the evening of the 23rd March, and for the next few days and nights the rain poured in torrents, causing the subsidence of a

large piece of the parapet on the west front, the rebuilding of which gave the garrison much work. During the night of the 25th, a gun port was made in the outer wall of a half-demolished building outside the main gate, and also an embrasure in the wall close by, for the brass gun to bear on the enemy's *sangar* in front of the west face of the fort. The gun was taken out at 7 A.M. and opened fire but without effect, as it had no sights, and wooden ones had to be made. The second shot hit the parapet of the *sangar* at the crest but did it no damage, as it was strongly made of fascines, with rude earth casemates for the men to take cover underneath.

Various measures were now taken for the improvement of the defences: the head-cover on the towers was increased; beams were put up in the stables to protect men going out of the water-gate down to the covered water-way; the top of the water-tower was further strengthened and its lower storey pierced with loopholes; and Machicoulis galleries were constructed to hold beacon fires, one on each parapet of the fort. The latter proved a great success, as the fires gave a capital light in front of the parapet, illuminating the darkness and at the same time not lighting up the defenders' loopholes. Previous to this the garrison had been in the habit of throwing out lighted fireballs which consisted of resinous wood-shavings, tow, etc., compressed into a bag made of sacking, and which were kept ready at a convenient place on the parapets with bottles of oil and matches close by. If the enemy attacked in the darkness a ball was lit by a British officer, who soaked it with oil, applied the match, and hurled it over the wall: the balls gave a clear light for about half an hour, but they consumed much oil.

The enemy continued to keep up a desultory fire throughout the day and night, but the defenders stuck doggedly to their task, and on the 29th hoisted an improvised Union Jack on the top of the highest tower (south-west), thenceforward known as the flag-tower. An attempt was made to send a messenger to Mr. Udny at Asmar, but the man returned saying he had nearly been captured by the enemy in the fort garden.

On the 30th March the state of the garrison was as follows: there were 343 men effective, of whom 171 were employed on guard and picquet duties, leaving 172 available for a sortie or other work. There were 356 rounds for each Martini-Henry rifle and 262 rounds for each Snider. The supply of grain was sufficient to last for 74 days, but of *ghi* (clarified butter) there was only enough for 12 days for the sick and wounded in hospital, and for lights. There was still some rum and a small quantity of tea; and to stop the increasing sick-list, the Sikhs were given a dram of rum every fourth day, and the Kashmir Infantry were given a tea ration every third day.

During the night of the 30th-31st the enemy made a new *sangar* on the opposite bank, about 175 yards from the place where the garrison had to take their water from the river. The defenders replied by placing screens of tents to conceal the men going down to the water, between the stables and the water-tower, and more beams were put up as screens outside the water gate. The enemy also commenced a covered way to the water running parallel to that of the defenders and at a distance of 80 yards from it from their lower *sangar* on the west front of the fort, close down to the river; but they only finished about 8 yards of it, as the garrison successfully put a stop to the work by their fire.

On the 31st, an old Chitrali woman brought a message from Sher Afzal asking the British Agent to give up the fort, and to start for Mastuj, promising to have the road repaired and to be himself responsible for the safe conduct of

the garrison, together with all stores and arms, to Gilgit. At 3 A.M. on the following morning, two Jandolis coming quite close to the fort, called out that they had brought a letter for the British Agent from the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, which they wished to deliver. It soon appeared, however, that a number of the enemy were gathered close to the *soi disant* messengers, and as it was evident that treachery was intended, the British officer of the watch ordered the party to be fired on.

From the 2nd to the 5th April, Sher Afzal continually endeavoured to re-open negotiations with the besieged garrison. He wrote daily, expressing his desire for peace and imputing to Surgeon-Major Robertson the whole blame for the outbreak of hostilities. He was informed, in reply, that the two British officers and the native soldiers who had been treacherously captured at Reshun must be delivered up, that suitable hostages must be given, and the road to Mastuj repaired, before the British Agent could even think of evacuating the fort. In all this correspondence it became increasingly evident that Sher Afzal was still entirely in the hands of the two Jandol Khans, Abdul Majid and Abdul Ghani, and that, moreover, he could place no reliance upon his own countrymen.

During the 5th and 6th, the enemy showed renewed activity in advancing their *sangars*, and they occupied the summer-house at the south-east angle of the fort, about fifty yards from the so-called gun-tower. On the morning of the 6th it was found that a large fascine *sangar* had been erected during the night at a distance of 40 yards from the main gate (west front), that a palisade had been constructed not far from the west face, while a *sangar* had been made about 40 yards from the garden gate in the east face. Owing to the proximity of these works, the enemy were able to cause increased annoyance to the garrison, and there was considerable difficulty in getting the sentries to keep a good look-out from the gun-tower owing to the accurate fire brought to bear on it from the summer-house. On the night of the 6th the walls still standing outside the main gate were loopholed, and occupied by twelve men of the 14th Sikhs and a few Puniali levies.

About 5 A.M. on the following morning a large number of the enemy opened a heavy fire from the trees in front of the north tower, and as this looked like a preliminary to an attack on the covered way to the water, Captain Townshend turned out the inlying picquet, ordered every one to their different alarm posts, and directed the Sikhs in the north tower to fire volleys, which quickly compelled the assailants to decamp towards the *basar*. During the firing on the west face, however, the enemy succeeded in placing, and setting fire to, a quantity of large faggots and logs of wood against the corner of the gun-tower on the south-east, which was soon well on fire and blazing up. As a strong wind was blowing at the time, matters began to look very serious, and Captain Townshend promptly sent up the whole of the inlying picquet with their great-coats full of earth which, with as much water as could be obtained, was thrown down upon the fire. For a short time it was thought that the fire had been mastered, but it soon blazed up again, the flames mounting in the spaces between the beams in the walls. It seemed as if it would be impossible to keep down the flames; but eventually the defenders devised the plan of picking holes into the wall inside the tower and then pouring water down: by working downwards in this manner from the top storey so as to meet the fire, it was at last extinguished, but throughout the day water was kept pouring down inside the walls. As daylight appeared, the enemy's riflemen in the *sangars* opened fire

from across the river and from high ground to the south-west, whence they could hit the men going in and out of the tower with water and earth. The Machicoulis galleries in the tower were also the targets for a hail of Snider bullets from the summer-house, the bullets smashing through the planks. The British Agent, who was in the tower superintending the putting out of the fire, was wounded at a hole in the wall, a Sikh was shot there the next minute, and a sentry of the 4th Kashmir Rifles was killed. Subadar Badri Nar Singh and Sepoy Awi Singh, of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, displayed praiseworthy bravery during the attack, going into the Machicoulis gallery when it was being ripped up with bullets; while Sepoy Bhola Singh, of the 14th Sikhs, was specially brought to notice for the efforts he made to extinguish the flames when exposed to the enemy's rifle fire. The Subadar was subsequently advanced to the 2nd class of the Order of Merit, and the two men were admitted to the 3rd class of that Order.

As a result of the fighting during this episode, twelve dead bodies of the enemy were seen by the look-out men in the towers; the defenders had nine men wounded in extinguishing the fire; and 127 rounds of Martini-Henry and 283 rounds of Snider ammunition were expended. "The enemy," says Captain Townshend, "showed great courage and enterprise in firing our tower, and our sentries showed great slackness and want of vigilance."

To guard against a recurrence of the danger, the sentries of the 4th Kashmir Rifles were replaced by men of the 14th Sikhs; the Machicoulis galleries were made stronger, and loopholed so as to fully command the ground at the foot of the tower; and a sentry always lay in each of the galleries. Vessels, mackintosh sheets, ammunition boxes filled with water, and heaps of earth were placed in every storey in all the towers and on the parapets; all the servants and syces were formed into a fire picquet under Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch; and heaps of stones were placed in the tops of the towers for the sentries to throw down from time to time in the dark.

On the evening of the 7th, some red-hot embers and a bundle of faggots were seen lying quite close to the gun-tower, and as it was evident that the enemy must have placed them there while the sentries were being relieved, orders were issued to relieve them at different times from day to day. On the 8th, the remaining walls in front of the main gate were demolished by the Punialis, and a stone tambour to hold 10 men, was built in front of the gate, so as to flank the whole of the west face with its two towers; the Machicoulis galleries in the gun-tower were improved, loopholes being made in the lower storey, and an officer with 14 men were now permanently posted in this tower.

The hardships of the siege had resulted, as might have been expected, in a considerably increased sick list; thus, the number of men unfit for duty on the 9th April amounted to 36 in hospital and 49 out-patients; or, a total of 85 non-effectives out of the garrison of some 500 men.

About this time too the Chitralis in the fort proved an additional source of anxiety: they complained that they were not trusted, that it was for this reason they had been disarmed, and they showed signs of sulkiness and discontent at this measure. They were found also to be making secret overtures to Sher Afzal and they brought round the boy Shuja-ul-Mulk a good deal to their own views, *viz.*, that under his (Shuja-ul-Mulk's) rule British influence would be established in their country to a very undesirable extent.

At 11-30 P.M. on the 10th the enemy suddenly began a tremendous beating of *tam-toms* and made an attack on the water-way, the defenders, however, by

well-controlled section volleys, caused the besiegers to beat a hasty retreat towards the *bazar*. The firing lasted half an hour, and on our side one Puniali was wounded; 335 rounds of Snider and 341 of Martini-Henry were expended. The Punialis had by this time been formed into a levy, armed with Sniders, and posted in the tower tops where they were of great use; some old Enfields found in the fort, and loaded with slugs, were also utilized.

On the evening of the 11th and on the following day, numbers of the enemy were seen hastening up the Chitral valley towards Drasan and Mastuj. The object of these movements was, as subsequently transpired, to assemble all available men in order to oppose Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's column on its way down from Mastuj, but as to this the garrison were at this time only able to indulge in vague speculations. The siege was now fast reaching its most critical period. The besiegers had heard, though the defenders had not, of the rapid advance of the Chitral Relief Force, and they knew the result of the fighting at Chakalwat. They fully realised that the capture of the fort must not now be much longer delayed, and as there was no sign of surrender, they resolved to make an immediate and final effort to break down the defence. They now commenced an almost incessant beating of *tom-toms* and playing of pipes in the summer-house, while men were set to sling stones into the fort, and a straggling matchlock fire was kept up from behind the trees in the fort garden: all these devices were intended to drown the sound of picking a mine which the enemy had commenced to make from the summer-house to the gun-tower. On the 16th, Jemadar Rab Nawaz Khan, of the 15th Bengal Lancers, reported to Captain Townshend that he thought the noise at the summer-house might possibly be for some such purpose, and accordingly the sentries were warned to be on the alert and to listen intently; at midnight one of them in the lower storey of the gun-tower reported the noise of picking, and Captain Townshend went up to listen, but could hear nothing. At 11 A.M. on the morning of the 17th the native officer in the same tower reported that he could hear the noise quite distinctly; Captain Townshend again went up, and now there was no doubt about a mine being made, and that it had reached to within a few feet of the tower. The British Agent also went up and listened, and both officers agreed that the only thing to be done was to carry the summer-house, where it was thought the shaft would be found, and destroy the mine at once, for there was no time to make a counter-mine. For this duty 40 men of the 14th Sikhs, with 2 native officers and 60 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, were placed under the command of Lieutenant H. K. Harley, 14th Sikhs, and the party was to issue from the garden gate at 4 P.M., whence they would only have about 50 yards to traverse before reaching the summer-house, so that the enemy would probably be surprised. The instructions given by Captain Townshend to Lieutenant Harley were:—

To go straight for the gap in the wall of the house, without dividing up the party, and without hurry; having rushed the place, to hold the house in front towards Fateh Ali Shah's house, and with the remaining men to destroy the mine by pulling down the uprights and wooden supports, if any; or blow it in, as he saw fit. If the *sangar* in front of the garden-gate annoyed them to send some men round it, first sounding the cease-fire to let the garrison know what he was going to do, when they would cease firing from the parapets on the *sangar* in question. There was to be no firing, the bayonet only being used; a few prisoners were to be taken if possible.

Three powder bags, with 110 lbs. of powder, 40 feet of powder hose, picks

and spades, were carried, and 40 rounds of ammunition were taken in the pouches. All officers carried matches, and one officer was told off to bring up the rear and see that no man hung back. Captain Townshend also explained to the native officers of the party the object of the sortie, in order that they in their turn might explain it to their non-commissioned officers and men.

The gallant and effectual manner in which the sortie was carried out is best told in the words of Captain Townshend's report:—

"The gate was opened, and the party rushed out; a few hurried shots, and they were into the house, and had captured it, two men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles being shot dead as they got in. About 30 Pathans were in the house and they bolted down the garden wall, but stopped at the far end of the garden and kept up a heavy fire on the house and sustained it throughout, Harley's men keeping up a heavy fire in return. The mine shaft was found just outside the house behind the garden wall, and 35 Chitralis were bayoneted in the mouth of the mine as they came out, all being armed with swords. Two Pathans were shot in the house; two prisoners were taken. In the meanwhile we had gone to our stations on the parapet and kept up a lively fire from the parapet; several of the enemy were killed running away across the open towards the *basar*. It was several times reported to me from the towers that a considerable number of the enemy were making their way down to the river-bank from Fateh Ali Shah's house and coming round behind the garden wall, round towards our water-way; and they lined the garden wall at the east end of the garden, and opened fire on us with rifles. Two Gurkhas of the 4th Kashmir Regiment were shot dead in the garden, as they crept along the wall answering this fire. A considerable number of the enemy were seen gathering along the river-bank, and this made me anxious of a counter-attack on our water-way, so I occupied the stables with 20 men, withdrew the Sikhs from the west parapet, and put them in the north-east angle of the fort, to support and flank the waterway. I sent three different messages to Lieutenant Harley to hurry up in his work at destroying the mine, and warning him of the enemy gathering at the end of the garden. Soon after 5 P.M., I heard the explosion of powder and the party came rushing back into the garden-gate, the enemy from the end of the garden keeping up a furious fusillade on them. The party lost 8 killed and 13 wounded, *viz.*, 3 Sikhs killed and 5 wounded, and 5 of the 4th Kashmir Regiment killed and 8 wounded; total 21 killed and wounded out of 100 men.

The effect of the powder-bag was excellent, although it exploded before they were ready, and it was untamped. The whole mine was burst open right up to the foot of the gun-tower and lay exposed like a trench. Two of the enemy were killed in the mine by the powder. We computed the loss of the enemy at about 60 men, taking into consideration the men shot from the parapets of the fort. The north and the flag towers accounted for 8 of the enemy. The two prisoners were brought in. Harley and his party had done their work well."

On this day 1,560 rounds of Martini-Henry and 1,435 of Snider ammunition were expended. Naik Gurja Singh, 14th Sikhs, who jumped into the mine shaft with Lieutenant Harley and bayoneted the first Chitrali, and Sepoy Nihu, 4th Kashmir Rifles, who jumped in at the same time, were subsequently admitted to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit; another non-commissioned officer and two men of the 14th Sikhs were also granted the same distinction in connection with this affair. The loss sustained in the sortie testifies to the severity of the fighting; but a great danger had been averted and the enemy were taught that the defenders had now, forty-four days after the commencement of the siege, spirit enough left in them to assume a vigorous offensive. In the evening Captain Townshend began to make a subterranean gallery round the gun-tower, so that if the enemy again attempted to mine they must run into it.

The prisoners taken in the sortie gave information that the enemy had intended to make another and determined attempt to fire the water-tower but had waited to see the effect of their mine; that they had intended to blow up the tower on the night of the 19th; that no other mines were in contemplation; that some of our troops had arrived at Mastuj, and had attacked Muhammad

Isa who was in position at the Nisa Gol, but had been defeated and had retired again to Mastuj; and that Sher Afzal had sent to Umra Khan asking him to assist him with 2,000 men.

The 18th passed quietly, the garrison toiling hard at their counter-mine, the working parties being relieved every three hours. As for the enemy, they had made their final effort; some of their bolder spirits wished to make yet one more attack, but the majority were now broken-spirited; and, on the night of the 18th-19th the whole force quietly withdrew and abandoned the siege. "About 3 A. M. in the morning," says the official report, "Lieutenant Gurdon, who was on middle watch, reported that a man was outside calling out under the fort wall that he had important news to tell. All precautions were taken; he was admitted to the main gate, and he told us of the flight of Sher Afzal and the Jandol chiefs about midnight, and of the near approach of Colonel Kelly's column from Mastuj. In the morning not a man was to be seen about Chitral; all the *sangars* were deserted: the siege which had lasted 46 days, was at an end."

The loss of the garrison during the siege, and inclusive of the action on the 3rd March, was, according to Captain Townshend's report, 104 killed and wounded* of all ranks, *viz.*:—

	Killed.	Wounded.
British officers	1	2
Central India Horse	1	...
15th Bengal Lancers	1
14th Sikhs	6	9
Officers, Imperial Service Troops	2	...
4th Kashmir Rifles	26	44
Levies	2
Hospital Assistant	1	...
Followers	5	4
	—	—
TOTAL	42	62
	—	—

During the 19th April several Bajauri traders came to the fort with peace offerings for the British Agent. These men gave a certain amount of vague information about the approach of British troops from Peshawar and Hoti Mardan; they also said that Muhammad Sharif Khan had arrived in Dir; that this news had reached Chitral about five days ago, and that Abdul Majid and Abdul Ghani had shown much uneasiness in consequence, but had attempted to keep up the spirits of their men by giving out that the Sipah Salar was advancing from Asmar to assist them. Later in the day letters were received from the political officer with the Chitral Relief Force giving information of the advance by Bajaur and Swat, and in the evening a letter was received from Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, stating that he would arrive at Chitral with the Gilgit column on the following day.

The Gilgit column had closed the road to Badakhshan, hence there were only two lines of retreat open to the Jandolis—one by the Laorai pass and through Dir, the other by the Kunar valley. But Dir fort was now held by the Khan of Dir, whose men, acting under the orders of Sir Robert Low, had occupied Kala Drosh on the 18th; most of the Jandolis, therefore, fled down the right bank of the Chitral river and joined Umra Khan at Asmar. Sher Afzal fled towards

* These figures differ slightly from those given on page CXI of the appendix. It is worthy of note that all the gunshot wounds, except two, were caused by Martini or Snider bullets.

Bashkar, and with many other Chitralis was captured a few days later by the Khan of Dir's men—and five hundred and forty of Umra Khan's rifles fell into the hands of the Afghan Sipah Salar and were stacked at Asmar.

On the 26th April, Captain Townshend submitted a report on the defence of Chitral, in transmitting which to the Government of India, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India expressed his high appreciation of the achievement. Captain Townshend's report, and the Adjutant-General's forwarding letter, were published in the *Gazette of India* of the 25th May 1895, together with a Government General Order dated the 24th May 1895, in which His Excellency the Viceroy recorded his conviction that "the steady front shown to the enemy, the military skill displayed in the conduct of the defence, the cheerful endurance of all the hardships of the siege, the gallant demeanour of the troops, and the conspicuous examples of heroism and intrepidity recounted, would ever be remembered as forming a glorious episode in the history of the Indian Empire and of its army."

CHAPTER IV.

Proceedings of the Gilgit Column from 22nd March to end of April 1895.

It has already been stated on pages 13 and 14 that about the 6th of March reports began to reach Gilgit of the serious state of affairs in the Chitral valley; and that owing to his anxiety as to the safety of the detachments under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Edwardes, which were marching towards Chitral, the Assistant British Agent at Gilgit had a few days later requested Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly to bring up to Gilgit the half of the 32nd Punjab Pioneers, then held in readiness between Bunji and Chilas. These instructions were received by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly on the night of the 14th, and by the 22nd the half battalion had arrived at Gilgit, with 100 mules as regimental transport, the men carrying 20-lb. kits.

On the 22nd the following telegram was sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly by the Adjutant-General in India:—

In consequence of affairs in Chitral, you will assume military command in the Gilgit Agency, and make such dispositions and movements as you may think best. You are not to undertake any operations that do not offer reasonable prospects of success. So long as communications with Robertson are interrupted, you will be Chief Political Officer within the zone of your military operations. On or about the 1st April a strong force of three brigades will advance on Chitral *via* Swat. You will report direct to the Adjutant General at Calcutta till 28th, then to Simla, repeating to Resident, Kashmir.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly at once issued orders for 200 men of the half battalion at Gilgit to march for Chitral on the morning of the 23rd, and for the remaining 200, accompanied by two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery (which had been called in from Nomal), to march on the following day. Two hundred men of the other half battalion were called up to Gilgit from the Indus valley, and the remaining 242 men were directed to proceed to Chilas, thus releasing 150 men of the Kashmir Infantry to strengthen the posts on the Bunji-Chilas route.

When Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly assumed command, the only information as to the state of affairs between Mastuj and Chitral was that Surgeon-Major Robertson, with about 100 men of the 14th Sikhs and 300 of the Kashmir Infantry, was closely besieged in Chitral by the forces under Sher Afzal and Umra Khan, and that the supplies for the garrison of Chitral were believed to be sufficient to last till about the end of April: that about 60 men of the Kashmir Infantry under Lieutenant Edwardes had left Mastuj for Chitral early in March, but that it was doubtful whether they had advanced much beyond Buni: that a detachment of 60 men of the 14th Sikhs under Captain Ross, which had left Mastuj on the 8th, in support of Lieutenant Edwardes' party, had been attacked in the Koragh defile and almost entirely annihilated: that there were about 40 men of the 14th Sikhs and 180 Kashmir Infantry at Mastuj.

As far as could be ascertained at this time, the troops in the Gilgit Agency were distributed as under:—

<i>Astor</i>	5th Kashmir Light Infantry	29	men.
<i>Between Bunji and Chilas.</i>	32nd Punjab Pioneers	442	"
	Bengal Sappers and Miners	12	"
	5th Kashmir Light Infantry	466	"
<i>Hunza valley</i>	No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery (2 guns)		
	6th Kashmir Light Infantry	209	"
<i>Gilgit</i>	No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery (2 guns)		
	32nd Punjab Pioneers	403	"
	4th Kashmir Rifles	34	"
	5th Kashmir Light Infantry	108	"
	6th " " "	140	"
	Kashmir Sappers and Miners	111	"
	Details	14	"
<i>Gakuch</i>	6th Kashmir Light Infantry	23	"
<i>Roshan</i>	" " " "	10	"
<i>Gupis</i>	4th Kashmir Rifles	34	"
	6th Kashmir Light Infantry	69	"
<i>Ghizr</i>	4th Kashmir Rifles		
	6th Kashmir Light Infantry }	129	"
	Kashmir Sappers and Miners	52	"
<i>Mastuj</i>	14th Sikhs	42	"
	4th Kashmir Rifles		
	6th Kashmir Light Infantry }	181	"
<i>En route to Chitral</i>	4th Kashmir Rifles	42	"
	Bengal Sappers and Miners	20	"
<i>Chitral</i>	14th Sikhs	95	"
	4th Kashmir Rifles	322	"

Thus, excluding the troops in the Mastuj and Chitral districts, the effective troops available to march on Chitral and furnish garrisons for the numerous posts in the Indus, Hunza and Ghizr valleys, amounted in round numbers to 4 guns No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, 850 rifles 32nd Pioneers, 1,260 rifles Kashmir Infantry, and 160 Kashmir Sappers and Miners. Of the latter, those who eventually accompanied Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's column from Ghizr, were armed with Snider carbines, but had previously been armed with Enfields and had received no training in the use of Sniders.


At this critical juncture, when the flame of rebellion seemed to be spreading, and when news of the disturbances in Chitral was being assiduously circulated by the agents of Sher Afzal, it was satisfactory to find that the utmost good feeling and loyalty were shown by the States of Hunza and Nagar. In addition to the levies (one hundred men) already at Ghizr, the Mir of Hunza and the heir of the Khan of Nagar themselves brought to Gilgit some 900 men, with a fortnight's supplies, ready to serve Government in any way required. Two hundred of these men were employed as levies, one half to follow Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's column to Ghizr, and the other half to guard Roshan while others were sent to Gupis with supplies.

The task placed before Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly was indeed a difficult one. Chitral was some 220 miles distant, while between it and Gilgit was the Shandur pass, 12,250 feet high and deep in snow. From Gilgit to Gupis there was a made mule-road, which, however, owing to numerous steep ascents and descents, was extremely difficult; from Gupis onwards the road had not been made, and throughout the whole length of the route there were many strong

positions where the enemy might be able to completely block the way. All the country on the Chitral side of the Shandur pass was known to be up in arms, and there was a possibility that, on the Gilgit side also, the inhabitants would prove hostile and thus render the task of reaching Chitral almost hopeless; for both in the matter of supplies and transport the column must to a very great extent necessarily depend on the country through which it had to pass. The question of supply was further complicated by the absence of Captain Bretherton, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, who was at Mastuj; it was known that the reserves stored in Gupis would only suffice the column for the actual requirements of the road, and that at Ghizr there was stored enough to maintain 1,000 men for $11\frac{1}{2}$ days: the actual amount, however, that had been forwarded from Gupis, could not be ascertained, though it was believed that at Mastuj there were probably some '16 days' supplies for the garrison.

The first detachment of the column, consisting of 200 men of the 32nd Punjab Pioneers started from Gilgit on the 23rd, and the second detachment of 200 Punjab Pioneers with two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, on the 24th March. The column was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Kelly, with Lieutenant W. G. L. Beynon, 3rd Gurkha Rifles, as his Staff Officer, and Surgeon-Captain H. B. Luard, in medical charge. No tents were taken, and each man was allowed 15 lb. of baggage. On the 26th and 27th the detachments arrived at Gupis where the mule transport was exchanged for coolie and pony carriage, in order that the mules might be utilized in the conveyance of stores between Gilgit and Gupis. The opportunity was taken to reduce the stores to be carried, by leaving behind the pioneer equipment, etc. The march was resumed on the 27th and 28th March, and Ghizr was reached on the 30th and 31st March. Here many of the Yasin coolies absconded, which necessitated a further reduction in the number of loads, so that eventually it became impossible to carry more than six days' supplies with the troops.

Snow lay deep on the ground, and had been falling steadily for five days. The Shandur pass was two marches ahead, and it was evident that, if it could not be crossed, or if any disaster befell the column on the other side of it, the people of Yasin, who so far had shown no hostility, would believe that the Chitralis were in the ascendant, and would in consequence join them so as to save their own lives. Notwithstanding the heavy snowfall and the unpromising outlook the column continued its advance on the 1st of April, being reinforced by 40 men of the Kashmir Sappers and Miners from Ghizr, and by 100 levies (50 of Hunza and 50 of Nagar) who had been sent from Gilgit about the 7th of March to strengthen the Ghizr post. The transport consisted of 500 coolies and ponies, but after proceeding about eight miles it was found impossible for the battery mules and the pony transport to make their way through the deep snow, so that Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly reluctantly determined to return. On arriving at Teru he ordered 200 men of the 32nd Punjab Pioneers, 40 Kashmir Sappers and Miners, and 50 Hunza levies to remain there under Captain Borradaile, directing that officer to make an attempt to cross the pass next day, and on arrival at Laspur to entrench himself there, to return the coolie transport, and to endeavour to open up communication with Mastuj. To enable Captain Borradaile to advance, all the coolies were left at Teru; and after transferring all kits and excess stores to the pony transport, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly took the remainder of the column back to Ghizr, where the men could be more easily fed and where supplies could be replenished.



REFERENCES

- A, B, C, D, E ... Enemy's line of sangars on left bank of river.
- F ... Do. on right bank.
- Enemy's line of retreat
- British line of advance

Reconnaissance sketch of Enemy's Position at Chakalwat showing formation of attack at commencement of action on 9th April, 1895

St. W. Beynon, Lieut.
Staff Officer
Gilgit Field Force

8th April 1895.

would permit of a greater gathering of the enemy at Chakalwat, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly determined not to wait for the second detachment of the column but to proceed to Gasht; and on arrival there on the 8th he could distinctly see the enemy sitting in their *sangars* on the left bank of the Laspur stream. Lieutenant Beynon, with a few Hunza levies, ascended the high hills to the right rear of the enemy, and brought back a valuable sketch of the position (facing page 39).

The enemy's position was of unusual natural strength, and the disposition of the *sangars* showed considerable tactical ability. A line of *sangars* blocked the road from the river up to the alluvial slope on which they were placed, and the right of the position was protected by a mass of fallen snow which descended into the stream, and by more *sangars* extending into the snow line up the spur of the hills.

On the 9th the advanced portion of the column consisting of 2 guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, 190 men 32nd Punjab Pioneers, 40 men Kashmir Sappers and Miners and 50 men each of the Hunza and Puniali levies marched from Gasht. The road from Gasht, after traversing an alluvial slope covered with boulders and intersected with *nalas*, then ran along the foot of steep shale slopes and shoots within 500 yards of the line of the enemy's *sangars*, which crowned the opposite side of the stream. It was totally devoid of any sort or description of cover for some two miles, and it was liable to be swept by avalanches of stones set in motion by a few men placed on the heights above. The Laspur stream is fordable in winter, but not in early summer when the snow is melting.

In the early morning Lieutenant Beynon, with the Hunza levies, ascended the high hills on the left bank, to turn the right of the position and attack it in rear, while the Puniali levies were sent up the hills on the right bank to expel the enemy from above the stone shoots. The baggage was left under a small guard at Gasht with directions to remain there till further orders. The remainder of the troops in the following order,

Advanced guard—Half company, 32nd Punjab Pioneers,

Main body { Kashmir Sappers and Miners,
Half company, 32nd Punjab Pioneers,
Two guns, carried by coolies,
One company, 32nd Pioneers,

advanced towards the stream. The bridge below Gasht had been broken, but it was sufficiently repaired by the sappers for the passage of the infantry, though the guns had to ford the stream; the column then ascended to the slope on the right bank facing the right *sangar* of the enemy's position.

The orders issued for the attack were; that the advanced guard was to leave the road and form up on the highest part of the slope facing the *sangar*, marked A (see sketch facing page 39) which was to be silenced by volley firing and the guns; the same course being afterwards adopted with *sangar* B. An opportunity would then probably offer itself for the infantry to descend to the bed of the stream and to ascend the left bank so as to enfilade the remaining *sangars*, which would doubtless be vacated on the appearance in their rear of the levies under Lieutenant Beynon.

The advanced guard formed up as directed at about 800 yards from the position and, the main body soon afterwards arriving, deployed for the attack; one and a half companies were held in reserve, and the guns came into action

at a range of 825 yards. After receiving some well-directed volleys and correctly placed shells, *sangar* A was vacated; and meanwhile Lieutenant Beynon, with his active levies, speedily drove the enemy back from ridge to ridge. As soon as *sangar* A was vacated, attention was directed to *sangar* B, with a like result; and at the same time those of the enemy who were driven down from the hills streamed across the plain in full flight. A general advance was then made down to the bed of the stream, covered by the fire of the reserve; the stream was forded and *sangars* A and B were occupied. The guns were then carried across, and the column having been reformed on the slope on the opposite bank, the advance was continued for $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles further, when a halt was made. The action which commenced at 10-30 A. M. had lasted one hour. The enemy were computed at 400 to 500 men, armed with Martini-Henry and Snider rifles, and their total losses were estimated at from 50 to 60 men killed: the casualties of the column consisted of one Native officer and three men wounded.


After a brief halt the advance was continued down the left bank to within 3 miles of Mastuj, where the stream was again forded, and the British garrison was seen drawn up on the crest of the slope. They had noticed that the enemy were gradually vacating their positions round the fort throughout the day, and had now come out to join hands with the relieving column. Thus the eighteen days siege of Mastuj was at an end.

On the 10th, 11th and 12th a halt was made, during which ponies were procured for the carriage of the two guns, and the second detachment of the column arrived. The opportunity was also taken to repair the bridge over the Chitral river (here called the Yarkhun or Mastuj), one mile below Mastuj, and to make a reconnaissance with the levies towards Nisa Gol, where it was found that the enemy were preparing a strong position. A further reconnaissance by the levies, under Lieutenant Beynon, on the morning of the 12th, resulted in an excellent sketch of the enemy's position which materially aided Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly in his course of action.

The position (*see* sketch opposite page 40) was one of the strongest in the whole country, and had always been considered by the Chitralis as impregnable. It was situated on the edge of the right bank of the deep Nisa Gol ravine, which runs from far away inside the hills down to the Chitral river, between precipitous banks from 200 to 300 feet high. There were two passages across this chasm: that near the Chitral river, where the main road D winds down to the bottom of the ravine and up the other side; and that at C—a mere goat track—which had been destroyed on the Mastuj side. Both these approaches were completely commanded by the enemy's *sangars*, which were sunk into the ground and well provided with head-cover. On the left of the position the enemy had built *sangars* on a spur in a general line with those on the plain; while on the hill above, parties of men were stationed to throw down stones. On the right of the position, across the river and slightly in advance of the general line, they had another line of *sangars* on a spur stretching up to the snow line. The main valley is here about a mile wide and is bounded on both sides by very steep hills, rising several thousand feet above the river, which is about 300 yards wide.

Having obtained complete information of the enemy's dispositions, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly issued the following orders for the attack on the 13th:—

"The advanced guard, on gaining the plain, to make its way well to the right and high up the slope, where the formation of the ground favours an advance under cover, to within 500 yards of the *gol*; to direct its attack on




- British attack developed
- 1 to 18 Enemy's line of Sangars
- British line of advance
- Point where the Col was first crossed
- Path by which main body crossed
- Line of advance of Levies
- Enemy's line of retreat

Reconnaissance sketch of Enemy's Position at
NISA GOL
 12th April 1895

Showing position of British Troops and points of passage of
 the Col during attack on enemy's position on 12th April 1895.

H. Beynon, deank.
 State Officer Col. Col. Field.



sangar No. 17 with well-directed volleys, till the guns and remainder of the force come into position. *Sangar* No. 17 to be demolished first, and attention to be then directed on the main *sangars* 12—15, while the levies make their way high up the *gol* in search of a path for a possible point to cross, and so turn the left of the position, and, on the enemy being seen to retire, a general advance to be made."

The troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's orders, which had been reinforced by a portion of the Mastuj garrison, moved off at 7 A. M. on the morning of the 13th, consisting of 2 guns No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, 382 men of the 32nd Punjab Pioneers, 100 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, 40 of the Kashmir Sappers and Miners, and 100 of the Hunza and Puniali levies. The baggage was left behind till orders were received for its advance under escort of a party to be furnished by the garrison.

The advanced guard, A company, came into contact with the enemy at 10-30 A.M., and instead of making way to the right, in accordance with the orders, was drawn towards the centre of the hostile position. The company, when within 900 yards of the position, deployed into line, advanced in extended order forming its own supports, and subsequently became the extreme left of the firing line. C company, following soon after, prolonged the line to the right, and formed its own supports, while E and G companies, which were in reserve, in column of half-companies, now formed single rank and opened out to one pace as they advanced. When, shortly afterwards, it became necessary to reinforce the firing line, E company advanced and prolonged it to the right; and later on G company being called up formed the extreme right of the firing line. The levies were further to the right, rather higher up the *gol*.

While these movements were being executed, the guns coming into action with common shell against No. 17 *sangar*, at a range of 500 yards, knocked down the wall of the *sangar* to a height of about three feet, and temporarily silenced its fire. The guns then advanced against the large *sangar* No. 16, which was only visible at a distance of 150 yards and which luckily was unoccupied. The defenders of No. 17 *sangar* now resumed their fire, and the guns were directed to fire at it again; after two common shell and two case had been fired into it at a range of 275 yards, its fire ceased and the guns were withdrawn.

Meanwhile the levies were proceeding up the *gol* to carry out the turning movement entrusted to them. During the progress of this movement, A and C companies kept the enemy engaged in front along the main line of *sangars*, the latter company occasionally firing half right against the *sangars* on the hills on that flank, while the attention of E and G companies was almost entirely directed to the hill *sangars*, occasional volleys being delivered at small parties of the enemy occupying the hill-tops 800 or 900 yards distant. The guns also were again brought up to another position and opened fire on the *sangars* in the centre of the enemy's position at a range of 875 yards, and afterwards on *sangar* No. 11 on the right centre of the position.

Shortly after *sangar* No. 17 had been silenced, Lieutenant Beynon reported that he had discovered a practicable spot at which to attempt a crossing of the *gol*, and he asked that the sappers might be sent to make a path down into it as to enable the company of the 4th Kashmir Rifles to cross, covered by the fire of the deployed infantry. This request having been complied with, the scaling ladders, prepared at Mastuj during the halt, were lowered, and after

half an hour's work a path was made to the bottom of the *gol* and the ascent by the goat track on the further side was assured. A party of 10 sappers, with Lieutenants Beynon, Moberly, and Oldham then descended, and were being followed by the 4th Kashmir Rifles when some gun cotton, lying open on the ground at the commencement of the track, was ignited by a bullet. Those near the explosive were ordered to retire temporarily under cover, but they were speedily brought to the front again when no danger of an explosion was to be apprehended. Eventually, a party of about 15 men reached the further bank, almost simultaneously with the turning movement of the levies, who had now reached No. 17 *sangar*, after having run the gauntlet of a stone shoot in their course. The appearance of these bodies on the left of the position caused the enemy to beat a hasty retreat and they streamed out of their *sangars* in a long line, the guns firing on them at ranges from 950 to 1,425 yards and the infantry delivering some well-controlled volleys. The ground, however, fell away on the line of retreat and thus afforded the enemy good protection till they were almost out of range. A general advance was now made across the *gol* by the paths C and D, and as soon as a company could be mustered, it was sent in pursuit. The enemy in the *sangars* on the left bank of the river disappeared into the snow, while those on the right bank fled towards Drasan. The column bivouacked for the night opposite Sanoghar, close to the scene of action.

It will be observed that Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly adopted the same tactics which had proved so successful in the engagement at Chakalwat. He brought his artillery fire to bear on the *sangars*, keeping up an incessant rifle fire as well, while the hardy levies climbed the precipitous hill sides high up the *gol* to turn the *sangars* on the enemy's left flank.

The total number of the enemy were estimated at 1,500 men, among whom were some 40 of Umra Khan's men; they were commanded by the treacherous Muhammad Isa, and were all armed with Martini-Henry or Snider rifles. The casualties on our side amounted to 7 men killed, and one Native officer and 12 men wounded, while those of the enemy were, according to native information, 60 men killed and 100 wounded.

In reporting the above engagement, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly remarked:—

Confronted as they were by an enemy they could not see, I cannot speak too highly of the extreme steadiness and bravery of the troops during the course of the action, which lasted two hours, and during which they were subjected to a very heavy and trying fire from the front and left flank.

Sepoy Esur Singh, of the Pioneers, was subsequently admitted to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit for conspicuous gallantry displayed by him during the action. He was so severely wounded in the leg as to eventually necessitate the amputation of the limb, but he refused to allow himself to be removed to the rear and continued to advance with his section until compelled to desist through sheer exhaustion.

On the 14th the wounded were sent back to Mastuj and the remainder of the column marched to Drasan, with the object of seeing to what extent the enemy might be on the right flank, as Muhammad Isa had fled in that direction. The road along the valley of the Chitral river having been broken, a long detour had to be made up a spur some 2,000 feet above the road, which brought the column on to a grassy, down-like elevation above Drasan. This place was found to be empty; and the bridge over the Turikho stream had been destroyed by the enemy, but it was quickly repaired with material

obtained from the fort. There were large supplies of grain, etc., in the fort, but as the villages were entirely deserted and as many of the transport coolies had absconded, it was not possible to carry it away.

Kusht was reached on the 15th, rain falling steadily all day, and on the 16th the column had a very difficult and trying march to Lun, the rain continuing to fall till mid-day. The next day a march was made to Barnas, and as the bridge at Pret had been broken, the column forded the river about a mile above Barnas. The river was breast-high and running very swiftly, and the men had consequently to cross over in bands of ten or twelve with arms linked. In this difficult undertaking the levies rendered valuable assistance standing in the stream below the crossing; they saved many men from being washed away and recovered kits floating down stream.

It may here be pointed out that the usual road to Chitral crosses to the left bank of the river at Sanoghar and then runs down the opposite side of the valley to that on which Drasan is situated, and that it was by this road that the detachments under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Edwardes advancing early in the month had suffered such severe losses. By keeping high up the hill sides and along the right bank, and then descending to the river near Barnas Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly altogether avoided the formidable Koragh and other defiles, and completely deceived the enemy who had doubtless intended to make a third stand there.

It is interesting to note that on the 17th April, while Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly was within three marches of Chitral, Lieutenant Harley was making his brilliant sortie from Chitral fort, and the Chitral Relief Force was having its last engagement with Umra Khan's forces at Manugai; and that both Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and Sir Robert Low were as ignorant of what was taking place at Chitral, as the garrison there was of what was happening outside the fort.

On the 18th April the column proceeded only as far as Maroi which was reported to be held by the enemy, but which on arrival of the column was found deserted, Muhammad Isa and his following having left it that morning. On the 19th a march was made to Koghazi, and that afternoon a letter was received from Surgeon-Major Robertson stating that Sher Afzal had fled southwards and that the siege of Chitral had been raised. At 2 P.M. on the 20th, Chitral was reached, and on the 23rd the whole force, including the garrison, moved to a new camp on more open ground. On the following day steps were taken to entrench the position, and communications were opened up with the Chitral Relief Force at Dir.

On receipt of the news of the arrival of the column at Chitral the following telegram was sent from Simla, by the Foreign Secretary, to Sir Robert Low, for transmission to Colonel Kelly:—

I am desired by the Viceroy to express warm congratulations from himself and from Government of India to you and to your gallant troops on your admirable and successful advance to Chitral under circumstances of the greatest difficulty, arising not only from the opposition of the enemy, but also from enormous physical difficulties, which have been overcome with skill and rapidity.

On the 6th May 1895 Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly submitted a despatch describing the operations of the Gilgit column, in transmitting which to the Government of India, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief recorded his high appreciation of the skill and ability displayed in the conduct of this long and arduous advance to the relief of Chitral. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's despatch

and the Adjutant General's forwarding letter were published in the Gazette of India of the 25th May 1895, together with a Government General Order in which His Excellency the Viceroy expressed his deep sense of the admirable and valuable services performed by the officers and men of the Gilgit column under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty.

CHAPTER V.

Measures taken for the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force.

In the preceding chapters allusion has more than once been made to the advance of the troops from India for the purpose of relieving the beleaguered garrison of Chitral, and it now remains to describe in detail the events attending the despatch of that force. On the 14th March the Government of India ordered the mobilisation of the 1st Division of the Field Army with the object of advancing against Umra Khan from the direction of Peshawar, if by the 1st April he had not withdrawn from Chitral territory; but owing to the material alteration in the state of affairs, orders were issued on the 21st March for this force to be despatched as early as it could be made ready.

The 1st Division, being the most conveniently situated, was selected for mobilisation, but its composition had to be considerably modified owing to the fact that the field force of over 10,000 men which was still in Waziristan, included several regiments and field hospitals of that Division; that a full cavalry brigade was not required; and that at first no wheeled artillery or Imperial Service troops were considered necessary.

The following telegram was therefore despatched on the 14th March 1895 to the General Officers Commanding Districts in Bengal and to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Madras and Bombay Armies :—

In view to an advance into Bajaur *via* Swat, the 1st Division of all arms and the line of communication troops attached to it will be mobilised, with the exception of the Staff of the Cavalry Brigade, "B" Battery Royal Horse Artillery, 11th Hussars, 9th Bengal Lancers, the 15th and 50th Field Batteries, the Ammunition Column, No. 12 Company Eastern Division, Royal Artillery, and the two guns of the Derajat Mountain Battery now with the Kuram escort.

No Imperial Service Troops will be mobilised.

The following Medical and Veterinary units will also not be required unless subsequently ordered :—No. 16 Native Field Hospital; "A" Section No. 3, British Field Hospital; Nos. 5 and 6 British Field Hospitals; Nos. 20 and 21 Native Field Hospitals, and No. 3 Veterinary Field Hospital.

The following additional units will be mobilised :—Hazara Mountain Battery; No. 24 Native Field Hospital.

The following substitutions will be made :—2nd-4th Gurkhas for 1st-4th; 13th Bengal Infantry for 1st-5th Gurkhas; 29th Punjab Infantry for 2nd Punjab Infantry; Nos. 4 and 6 Companies Bengal Sappers for No. 5 Company Bengal Sappers and No. 3 Company Madras Sappers.

Special orders will be issued regarding the equipment of corps not already equipped for mobilisation.

The Ordnance Field Park will not be equipped with transport. Native infantry depôts to be formed on Scale "B." The detail of the troops and staff will be issued by post shortly.

Inform all affected in your command and take all necessary action, but no movements of corps or corps units are to take place until ordered. The furlough of corps concerned has been stopped by wire to save time.

On the 16th March the Commander-in-Chief submitted proposals (*vide* Appendix VI), which received the sanction of the Government of India for the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force, which was composed as follows:

CHITRAL RELIEF FORCE.

General Officer Commanding—MAJOR GENERAL SIR R. C. LOW, K.C.B.
Chief Staff Officer—BRIGADIER GENERAL B. BLOOD, C.B., R.E.

1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commanding—BRIGADIER GENERAL A. A. A. KINLOCH, C.B.
1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment.
1st " King's Royal Rifle Corps.
15th Sikhs.
37th Dogras.
No. 1 British Field Hospital.
" 14 Native " "

2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commanding—BRIGADIER GENERAL H. G. WATERFIELD.
2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers.
1st " Gordon Highlanders.
4th Sikh Infantry.
Guides Infantry.
No. 2 British Field Hospital.
" 35 Native " "

3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commanding—BRIGADIER GENERAL W. F. GATACRE, D.S.O.
1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.
2nd " Seaforth Highlanders.
25th Punjab Infantry.
2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles.
No. 8 British Field Hospital.
" 19 Native " "

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.*

11th Bengal Lancers.
Guides Cavalry.
13th Bengal Infantry.
23rd Punjab Pioneers.
No. 15 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
" 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
" 8 " " " "
" 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, 4 guns.
" 1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
" 4 " " " "
" 6 " " " "
Engineer Field Park, from Roorkee.
No. 4 British Field Hospital, A and B sections.
Nos. 17 and 18 Native Field Hospitals.
No. 1 Veterinary Field Hospital from Rawal Pindi.
1 Maxim gun and detachment 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment.

* The 34th Punjab Pioneers were mobilised towards the end of the month and joined the Divisional troops, in order to assist in the probable road-making requirements of the force.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION TROOPS.*

Commanding—BRIGADIER GENERAL A. G. HAMMOND, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.

1st Battalion, East Lancashire Regiment.
 29th Punjab Infantry.
 30th Punjab „
 No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.
 „ 4 British Field Hospital, C and D sections.
 „ 24 Native Field Hospital.
 Nos. 5 and 6 British Field Hospitals.
 „ 28 and 29 Native „ „
 No. 2 Veterinary Field Hospital, from Rawal Pindi.
 Field Medical Store Depôt from Mian Mir.
 British General Hospital, Peshawar.
 Native „ „ „
 ½ General Veterinary Hospital, Umballa.
 ½ Base „ Store Depôt, Umballa.
 Ordnance Field Park, Rawal Pindi.

A reserve brigade at Rawal Pindi and a movable column at Abbottabad, were also formed :—

RESERVE BRIGADE.†

Commanding—MAJOR GENERAL G. N. CHANNER, V.C., C.B.

No. 7 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
 3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade.
 26th Punjab Infantry.
 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.
 2nd Battalion, 3rd „ „
 Sections C and D, No. 3 British Field Hospital.
 „ A and B, No. 25 Native „ „
 No. 31 Native Field Hospital.

MOVABLE COLUMN.

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
 2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles.
 2nd Battalion, 5th „ „
 Sections A and B, No. 26 Native Field Hospital.

Detailed schemes for these two latter forces are given in Appendices X and XI.

Numerous offers of service were received by the Government of India from the States which maintain Imperial troops, and from other States as well, and offers were also made by chiefs and private persons to render individual services. The Jeypore and Gwalior transport corps were accepted, and quickly reached the frontier, having moved off at 48 hours' notice—a highly creditable performance. The three Kashmir regiments at Jammu, which in the ordinary course were to go up to Gilgit in relief during the year, were very anxious to join the Relief Force, and the Maharaja of Kashmir expressed his wish to accompany them; but it did not appear to Government that the occasion was one on which

* About the 9th of April, the General Officer Commanding the force was empowered to draw upon the 9th Bengal Lancers, then at Hoti Mardan, in consequence of the 11th Bengal Lancers and Guides Cavalry being required at the front. Also No. 6 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, was placed at the disposal of the officer commanding the lines of communication to assist in bridging the Swat river.

† This brigade assembled early in April at Rawal Pindi, and was temporarily placed under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab. Subsequently it was moved to Hoti Mardan and came under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Relief Force, with the exception of the 3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade, which remained at Rawal Pindi.

the Imperial Service troops other than transport corps should be employed, as it was undesirable to exaggerate the gravity of the case.

Major-General Sir Robert Low, on arrival at Nowshera on the 24th March, took over command of the force and issued the standing orders which are given in Appendix IX. Major H. A. Deane, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, Lieutenant C. B. Rawlinson, Mr. F. B. R. Spencer, Mr. S. S. Waterfield, Commandant, Peshawar Border Police, and Mr. W. S. Davies, were appointed political officers under the orders of Sir Robert Low, who was entrusted with the supreme political authority.

The following statement of the objects of the expedition was published in Government General Order No. 324, dated the 29th March 1895:—

Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, in spite of his oft-repeated assurances of friendship to the British Government, and regardless of frequent warnings to refrain from interfering with the affairs of Chitral, which is a protected State under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the Chitral valley and attacked the Chitral people. He has failed to explain his attitude when asked to do so, or to withdraw when required, and, as he has disregarded all remonstrances, the Chitral Relief Force will be despatched against him.

The first object of the expedition is to relieve Chitral territory from invasion by Umra Khan, and assure it against such aggression in future. The force will advance into Swat, and thence proceed, as strategic and political considerations may show to be best, to the territory of Umra Khan, so as to coerce him into putting an end to the pressure placed by him upon the town and country of Chitral. If this object cannot be effected without passing through Bajaur and Dir, and attacking Umra Khan in Chitral territory, that course will be adopted, and should Umra Khan not make submission and reparation, he will be punished. If further measures for the relief or reinforcement of the British officers now in Chitral are necessary, the force will advance to Chitral to effect that object.

Every possible means will be taken to make known to the people of the countries on the Peshawar border that the reasons and objects of the expedition are as above set forth, and that the only cause of quarrel is with Umra Khan and with those who have supported him in committing aggression upon Chitral and defying the lawful authority of the Government of India. As little interference as possible will be permitted in the country through which the troops have to pass in order to reach the objective of the force, and neighbouring tracts will be untouched unless the people offer opposition or show active hostility. The length of time during which the force will remain across the border must depend on its having thoroughly assured the object of the expedition.

In view of the possibility of a lightly-equipped brigade having to be despatched from the force to establish communication with Chitral, a scheme (given in Appendix VIII) was drawn up for its composition and equipment. The brigade was to be equipped with mules, 10 per cent. spare being allowed, instead of the usual 5 per cent. owing to the proposed rapidity of the movement; all transport was reduced to the lowest possible amount, to admit of supplies being carried; and officers' chargers were struck out as far as practicable, in order to minimise the difficulty that might arise in feeding animals. It was assumed that supplies on camels could be taken with the brigade as far as the Swat river, thus leaving the supplies on mules intact for the further advance. The 2nd reserve ammunition on camels was to be forwarded with the 2nd Brigade, which it was anticipated could advance with obligatory* mule-carriage by the 1st of April, while the 3rd Brigade would probably follow shortly afterwards.

* "Obligatory" mules are those supplied for the carriage of such stores and equipment as must invariably accompany the different units in the field, *e.g.*, medical stores, 1st reserve ammunition, entrenching tools, cooking pots, etc., and for which mule carriage is considered obligatory.

In accordance with the scheme drawn up for the rapid advance of the lightly-equipped brigade, orders were issued on the 27th March to the 1st and 2nd Brigades to take over 20 days' supplies for men and 5 days' grain for animals on arrival at Nowshera or Hoti Mardan, and to maintain these supplies intact as long as possible. The 1st Brigade was to be equipped with mules; the 2nd with mules and camels, and the 3rd with camels and carts; obligatory mules were not to be taken from corps.

On the 30th March Divisional Head-Quarters, with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, marched from Nowshera to Hoti Mardan, and the 1st Brigade reached the latter place on the following day, when the first concentration of the force may be said to have been completed.

The divisional troops were now allotted to each of the brigades as follows:—

1st Brigade.—11th Bengal Lancers, No. 3 Mountain Battery, R.A., No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

2nd Brigade.—1 squadron Guides Cavalry, No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.A., No. 1 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

3rd Brigade.—1 squadron Guides Cavalry, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, No. 6 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

And one squadron of the Guides Cavalry was transferred to the Lines of Communication troops.

The following appeared in divisional orders of the 30th March:—

“ His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief wires—

I would like you to publish to the Chitral Field Force, before they march off, the following order addressed from me to you and them in wishing you and the force under your command the success upon which so much depends. I can best describe the importance and sanctity of the mission on which the country now sends you forth by quoting the words in which His Excellency the Viceroy referred to it in Council on Thursday last. His Excellency said:—‘ For the present we have before us a single issue, the claim of brave men, British and Indian, who have not flinched in the performance of their duty, to the support of their countrymen in their hour of need. It is a claim that I believe will go straight home to every British and Indian heart, that will inspire our councils with unanimity, and will quicken the steps of every man whose duty calls him forth on this expedition.’ ”

It was at first thought that Peshawar should be the base of operations on account of the extensive sidings and large amount of store accommodation existing there, but it was soon seen that Peshawar, from the nature of its communications with Hoti Mardan, was not so well suited as Nowshera as a base for the operations in view, and the base was accordingly shifted to the latter place. The wisdom of this departure was fully borne out by results, but the change involved the drawing up of a programme for the railway concentration on Nowshera. Although Nowshera is but a small cantonment and possessed a mere roadside railway station, its disadvantages were but little felt owing to the excellent arrangements made by the Base Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Barrow, and his staff, and the promptitude with which the railway authorities laid $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of extra sidings. The capacious sidings at Peshawar, although 25 miles distant, were however largely used, and were found of the greatest value. On 26th March the railway concentration began, and was successfully completed on the 1st of April, in accordance with the programme.

As a test of the mobilisation arrangements and of the carrying capacities of the railway system, it is instructive to note the results attained on this occasion. As already stated, railway concentration began on the 26th March and was completed on the 1st of April, that is, within 17 days of the order

to mobilise 15,000 troops, rather more than that number of followers, and over 20,000 transport animals had been concentrated at Hoti Mardan and Nowshera; while during the same period about 40 days' supplies for the whole force had been collected at and beyond the base. Of these numbers, 10,000 troops, most of the followers and 10,000 animals had been brought up by rail (a large number of the latter from distances of over 1,000 miles), the remainder of the force moving by route march. The Base Commandant, in his report on the working of the base, also states—

“Within the period, therefore, of 21 days (*i.e.*, on 3rd April) a force of approximately 15,000 fighting men, with 19,000 followers and 26,000 transport animals, with field hospitals and ammunition train complete, and their food supplies for two months, were placed across the frontier, in a position to fight an action 46 miles from the railway terminus, having been conveyed to that terminus by a single line of rail, and thence by road, 30 miles of which was unmetalled and of the worst description.”

During the concentration period orders were issued for the mobilisation and despatch to Nowshera of certain extra units for the force; for the mobilisation and despatch to Rawal Pindi (and under subsequent orders to Nowshera) of the reserve brigade, as well as for the formation of the movable column at Abbottabad. During these supplementary movements, which were completed by the 18th April, it was found advisable to run only two or three troop trains daily so as to avoid checking the despatch of transport and supplies to Nowshera, which traffic continued with but little intermission to the end of the month. By this time the railway had delivered at Nowshera some 28,000 slaughter cattle and transport animals, exclusive of several thousand animals conveyed in troop trains, as well as more than 13,000 tons of stores and supplies.

The chief difficulties experienced were with regard to the collection of transport; nevertheless, the fact that some 20,000 transport animals, exclusive of contract carriage, were obtained and despatched to Nowshera in little over a fortnight from the receipt of orders to mobilise, cannot but be regarded as a successful achievement. On the 7th March it was intimated to the Commissariat Transport Department that necessity might arise for hiring, with great despatch, 6,000 camels for service in Bajaur, and on the following day Government ordered immediate action to be taken. As it was possible that purchasing might follow, application was at once made for the services of the officers previously detailed for that purpose on mobilisation, as also for additional officers to carry out the hiring. Besides these 6,000 camels required for the equipment of the troops, it was estimated that 5,000 others would be necessary for moving up supplies from the base: a contract was made for providing the latter number, but it fell through, and difficulty was also experienced in obtaining the 6,000 for the equipment.

Orders were also issued for the collection of 5,000 Government mules from the Bengal, Punjab, and Bombay Commands, but this number was afterwards increased by 1,600 mules, of which 600 were to be provided from the Madras Command, and 1,000 were to be hired so as to preclude the necessity of withdrawing grass mules from Native cavalry. At a later date His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief sanctioned the concentration of every mule in India fit for service at or near Nowshera as rapidly as possible, with the following exceptions, *viz.*:—(1) Mules required for obligatory transport of corps and units that were then being mobilised, (2) Mules in the Quetta district, (3) Mules of Punjab Frontier Force, (4) Grass mules of native cavalry regiments, (5) Mules on special services not available to be withdrawn. Under these orders

7,252 Government mules in all were collected at Nowshera, including those which accompanied the units from the equipping stations, and, in addition, 400 mules of the reserve brigade were available for work up to the Swat river. Subsequently 1,358 grass mules were also withdrawn for the expedition from those Native cavalry regiments not present with the force.

As there was a difficulty, as explained above, in obtaining the requisite number of camels, orders were issued for the purchase of 1,000 mules and 2,000 ponies, and for the hiring of 1,500 mules, pack bullocks or donkeys. At the instance of Sir Robert Low, Government also issued further orders to the Civil authorities to procure 5,000 pack bullocks and 2,000 donkeys.

The result of these various orders is given in the statement below, which shows the number of animals sanctioned by the Government of India and the number actually collected:—

	CAMELS.				MULES AND PONIES.				AMBULANCE PONIES, DONKEYS AND PACK-BULLOCKS.					GRAND TOTAL.
	Hired.	Depôt.	Purchased.	Total.	Purchased mules.	Purchased ponies.	Hired.	Total.	Purchased donkeys.	Hired donkeys.	Purchased ponies (ambulance).	Hired pack-bullocks.	Total.	
Sanctioned by Government.	8,000	...	3,600	11,600	1,000	3,000	5,000	9,000	2,500	4,000	1,300	6,000	13,800	34,400
Actually collected.	7,238	1,414	2,646	11,298	819	3,538	4,353	8,720	2,010	3,000	...	7,329	12,329	32,347

On the 13th May 30,669 animals were available for pack transport purposes, representing a carrying power of 103,238 maunds.

CHAPTER VI.

Operations of the Chitral Relief Force up to the 30th April 1895.

With the exception of a report by Mr. W. W. McNair of his hurried and adventurous journey in 1883 by the Malakand pass, Dir and the Laorai pass to Chitral, such information as we possessed at the time of the mobilisation of the Chitral Relief Force regarding the country that lies between the Peshawar valley and Chitral, was derived entirely from native sources.

From Nowshera the road for the first 40 miles passes over a level plain, north of which a range of rugged hills rises abruptly to a height of from 3,000 to 6,000 feet. For years this range had confronted our frontier officers, but what its difficulties really were, what the country on the other side was like, and what was the character of its inhabitants, were all to a great extent matters of conjecture, but the general impression was that the country was difficult and inhospitable. These forecasts did not prove to be entirely true, for although the country was found to be extremely difficult in some places, in others it was sufficiently open to admit of cavalry being used with good effect. On the whole, however, the existing information, though wanting in completeness of detail, was found to be fairly accurate, and this was especially the case in regard to a sketch map of the Swat-Sado-Panjhora route to Dir, which had been executed at the beginning of 1895 by a sepoy of the Guides Infantry.

With the fuller knowledge now possessed it is possible to give a more accurate description of the physical features of the country through which the force from India passed. Beyond the range of hills just mentioned lies the richly cultivated Swat valley, averaging about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in width with a length of some 40 miles, and watered by the river of the same name. At all seasons of the year a considerable stream; the river becomes very rapid and dangerous after the snow begins to melt, and at the point where it is crossed by the main route to Bajaur, it is about 600 yards in width from bank to bank. Its depth varies considerably from time to time, as also does the rapidity of the current; on the 7th April it had a velocity of 3 to 6 miles an hour, which later on increased to about 9 miles an hour. Beyond this formidable obstacle the Laram hills rise to a height of over 7,000 feet; while from the crest of this range one descends to the Panjhora valley, which at this point is narrow, with steep rocky spurs running sheer down to the water's edge, and which without extensive road-making is impassable for troops, except in winter, when the water is at its lowest. The river itself is subject to rapid and unexpected changes; one day fordable, it may the next be found a roaring torrent, and a rise of as much as 15 feet in a few hours has sometimes occurred. Its bed is half a mile broad in some places; at others, where it runs through a gorge, it is barely 100 feet wide. To the west of the Panjhora valley, and separated from it by a range of high hills, are the open, cultivated valleys of Jandol and Bajaur. At the head of the former is the range crossed by the Janbatai pass, with an altitude varying from 7,000 to 8,000 feet, and on the north side of which are a number of narrow valleys, such as the Baraul and Upper Dir, with practically no space for cultivation, and barely capable of supporting their poor and scanty population. North of Dir, again, is the high range crossed by the Laorai pass

(10,250 feet), whence the descent is made to the Kunar river and so along its difficult valley to Chitral. Thus four ranges of hills, three large rivers, besides numerous smaller, though often dangerous, streams had to be crossed between the British frontier and Chitral.

The attitude of the independent tribes inhabiting this large tract of country was an important factor in the situation. The road from Nowshera, described above, first enters independent territory about half way between Jalala and Shakot; from this point till the Panjkora river is crossed, the country through which the Chitral Relief Force had to march is inhabited by various tribes of the Akozai and Malizai branches of the Yusufzai Pathans. Thus, from the British border as far as the Swat river the road traverses the territory of the Ranizai Yusufzais, to the east of whom lie the lands of the Baizai Yusufzais, which stretch along the left bank of the Swat river as far as the northern limits of the Swat valley; while still further east is Buner, inhabited by other branches of the Yusufzais. To the west of the Ranizais are the Utman Khel, a distinct tribe of Pathans who inhabit both banks of the Panjkora river; and still further west is the country of the powerful Mohmand tribe. Crossing the Swat river at Chakdara the road to Chitral enters the territory of the Khwazozai Yusufzais who, speaking generally, inhabit the right bank of the Swat river as far as the Swat-Panjkora watershed, beyond which lie the lands of the Malizai Yusufzais who occupy the Panjkora river basin from the junction of the Swat river on the south, to Shiringal in the Panjkora highlands, and the borders of Chitral on the north. West of the Khwazozai and north of the Mohmands and Utman Khel lies the district of Bajaur, which is inhabited by another distinct tribe of Pathans (called Tarkani or Tarkalani), which is divided into four great sections—the Isazais of Baraul and Jandol, the Samilzais of Maidan, the Mamunds of the upper Watelai Valley, and the Salarzais of Nawagai, Chaharmang, and Babukarra. Unlike other Pathans, the Tarkanis submit to the control of tribal chiefs or "*Khans*"; thus Sardar Khan of Banda was the accepted head of the Samilzais and Umra Khan of the Isazais; while the Salarzais recognise a number of minor *Khans*,—such as the Khans of Khar, Jhar, Asmar, and Pashat of Babukarra—all of whom have at one time or another acknowledged the Khan of Nawagai as their feudal chief. The Mamunds, the most fanatical section, appear to be also the most independent; they had no recognised leader of their own clan, but were generally to be found ranged on the side of the Khan of Nawagai in all his wars with Umra Khan or with Dir. The whole of the above tribes are Muhammadans, and for the most part followers of a former well-known fanatical teacher, the Akhund of Swat whose descendants—the Mian Guls—still enjoy some influence in Swat and Buner; the most influential Mulla in Buner, however, is Mulla Gujar of Torsak. The Utman Khels and Ranizais acknowledge as their spiritual head the Mulla of Manki, a British subject, who owns much landed property in the Nowshera District; while, among the Mohmands, Najam-ud-Din, the Adda Mulla, who resides at Jarobi, is held in highest esteem.

This brief description of the position and influence of the various tribes between British territory and the Chitral border has been given here to assist the reader to understand clearly the events that are now to be narrated.

Since much anxiety was felt as to whether the supplies with the Chitral garrison would outlast a protracted siege, it was obviously important that no avoidable contingency should be permitted to delay the movements of the

relieving force. With a view, therefore, to minimise the chances of opposition, and thus to evade the necessity of purposeless operations, endeavours were made to come to some understanding with the Khan of Nawagai, in order to secure, if possible, his unwavering co-operation. Such was his influence over the Salarzais and Mamunds, that he might, it was hoped, successfully restrain the more fanatical spirits among them, while from the position of his territories he could, by closing his roads to the south and north-west, effectually secure the exposed (left) flank of the force against any hostile action on the part of the Utman Khel or Mohmands. In response to a communication from Sir Robert Low, which was despatched on the 30th March, before the relief force crossed the frontier, the Khan at once declared himself in favour of Government: later, from various causes his ardour cooled, and he assumed an attitude of mere neutrality.

When it is remembered that the country beyond the border has been for many years a hot-bed of fanaticism, the absence of all excitement after the issue of the proclamation to the tribes (the text of which is given in Appendix II) was little short of extraordinary, and seemed to foreshadow but slight opposition to the passage of the force into Swat. Afterwards, however, almost without exception, every trans-border Mulla and Talib-ul-Ilm* in the Peshawar District crossed the border to join such hostile gatherings as might be collecting. The attitude of the Manki Mulla was doubtful, but his most devoted followers, the lower Ranizais, agreed to allow a passage through their country; the Mulla of Adda was avowedly hostile, but failed to raise the Mohmands; while the Mullas of Buner were coerced into inaction by their own tribesmen. In Swat the influence of the Khans was all on the side of peace; Muhammad Sharif, the refugee Khan of Dir, spoke boldly in the same cause; the leading Yusufzais in the Peshawar District, the Utman Khel maliks of Kai and Pipal, the Khans of the Bazdara valley and Palli, and others of Lundkhar and Shergarh, all strove unremittingly to restrain the people from opposing the passage of the troops. That there was no general tribal rising against us may be placed to their credit; it was no fault of theirs that the baleful influence of the Mullas eventually prevailed.

On the morning of the 1st April Divisional Head-Quarters, with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, marched to Jalala, and the 1st Brigade moved to Lundkhar.†

There are three passes about 7 miles apart, which give access to the Swat valley from the frontier to the north of Hoti Mardan; taken in order from the east they are the Morah, Shakot, and Malakand. They were reported to be equally difficult, and each from 3,000 to 4,500 feet high, with a rough path barely passable by laden animals. To the west of the Morah there was a short cut dignified by the name of the Cherat pass, but it was only practicable for men on foot. With the idea of avoiding any unnecessary disturbance of possibly hostile tribes on the right flank, it was decided not to use the Morah pass, but to advance by the Shakot and Malakand; and the disposition of the troops (*vide* appendix XV) had been brought about so as to carry both these passes simultaneously on the morning of the 3rd April. But on the evening of the 1st

* A religious student, or disciple, who has entered upon the first stage of the journey (*tariqat*) towards "perfect knowledge". He is, as a rule, saturated with fanaticism, and ever ready for mischief.

† The strength of the force on this date is given in appendix XV.

April it was reported that the Shakot was held by 6,000 men, and the Morah by 13,000, while on the Malakand there were said to be only about 3,000 men. This information caused Sir Robert Low to change his plan, and he now decided to deceive the enemy by advancing the cavalry along the road to the Shakot pass on the 2nd April, while at the same time by moving the 1st Brigade to the Malakand, and by a forced march to Dargai of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades on the night of the 1st—2nd April, he hoped to carry the Malakand on the 2nd with the three brigades. Orders to this effect were issued late on the night of the 1st, and secrecy was thoroughly maintained. Unfortunately a storm of wind and rain raged all through the night, and at midnight the intention of making a night march had to be abandoned, it being impossible for the men to load the transport animals in such darkness, rain and mud. All that could be done was to start at daybreak and concentrate the three brigades near Dargai.

On the evening of the 2nd April Lieutenant Cockerill, Field Intelligence Officer, with one company of the Guides Infantry, made a reconnaissance towards the Malakand pass, and having got to within about a quarter of a mile of the path leading up to the pass, succeeded in making a sketch of the enemy's position. The party was fired on, though without effect, and having attained its object, returned to camp at Dargai. The road to the pass, after leaving Dargai, lay north-east for 2 miles up a gradually narrowing valley to the foot of the Malakand hills (see the map which faces page 56); then, turning north-west and leaving the bed of the valley, it ascended very steeply by zig-zags to the crest, which was gained near the small village (D); from this, one track descended northwards into the Swat valley direct, and another, after running north-east for nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ mile along the east side of the ridge and just below the crest, crossed by a rocky cutting through a gap in the hills, and, descending, joined the other track. North-east of this gap precipitous hills, which rise to a height of over 4,400 feet, formed the left of the enemy's position; while to the south-west of the village (D), the crest of the range, sloping very steeply upwards, culminates in three peaks nearly 4,000 feet in height, on which the right of the enemy's position rested. The whole of the intervening ridge, including the village, was held in force, and thus the position to be attacked was over 2 miles in length.

It was the intention of Sir Robert Low to use only the 2nd Brigade and the three mountain batteries in forcing the pass, the 1st Brigade remaining in rear, with its mule transport, ready to cross as soon as the pass had been taken and then march to the Swat river; but, as will be seen, the position proved to be so difficult, and was so obstinately defended, that it became necessary to utilize both brigades. The orders issued on the night of the 2nd by the Brigadier-General Commanding the 2nd Brigade were as follows:—

The Brigade will march to force the Malakand pass at 8 A.M. to-morrow. Reveillé at 6 A.M.

The following is the order of march:—

- | | |
|--|-------------------|
| (1) Guides Cavalry, 1 squadron. | } Advanced Guard. |
| (2) Guides Infantry, 2 companies. | |
| (3) Maxim gun detachment. | |
| (4) Remainder of Guides Infantry. | |
| (5) 3 Mountain Batteries. | |
| (6) Sappers and Miners, 3 companies. | |
| (7) King's Own Scottish Borderers. | |
| (8) Gordon Highlanders. | |
| (9) 4th Sikhs; and find rear guard of 1 company. | |


Each corps will be accompanied by its first reserve ammunition, and every man, British and Native, to carry half a ration ready cooked and greatcoats, as the Brigade will bivouac on the pass.

All the rest of the kits, baggage, etc., will be packed here, regimentally, and left under the charge of small regimental guards ready to be loaded up at a moment's notice and sent on; all this will be under the charge of Captain Thackwell and Lieutenant Churcher, Transport Officer.

A signalling party will be left here to communicate with the Brigade as it advances.

The 2nd Brigade marched from Dargai at the hour named, followed by the 1st Brigade which had started from Shakot village at 7 A.M., while the 3rd Brigade was held in reserve at Dargai. On reaching the point where the valley bends north-east it became apparent that the pass was strongly held on the west side, the hills being lined by men with the usual standards. Here Brigadier-General Waterfield ordered the 4th Sikhs to ascend a spur to the left, and the Guides Infantry were directed up a spur to the right of the Sikhs; on gaining the summit they were to move along it towards the pass and thus turn the enemy's right flank. The Guides had a most difficult task to perform, for they had to ascend to a height of some 2,000 feet above the valley, in the face of several large *sangars* held by the enemy's riflemen and a crowd of others who hurled down huge rocks and stones; the 4th Sikhs having an equally arduous climb, advanced parallel with the Guides up to the highest peak overlooking the enemy's position, and carried many *sangars* full of the enemy.

The whole of the artillery commanded by Major J. D. Cunningham was ordered to come into action on a low spur (A) to the right, Captain H. D. Grier assuming command of Major Cunningham's battery; but as it was found that the guns were beyond effective range, they took up a second position (B) at a range of 2,300 to 2,500 yards, whence they were ordered to shell the *sangars* in the line of advance of the Guides and 4th Sikhs, and also, at a range of 2,400 to 2,800 yards, the *sangars* below the pass. From this position they were able to effectually aid the turning movement and also the frontal attack, which soon afterwards began to assume a definite shape. The remainder of the brigade now proceeded up the narrow valley ahead of the guns and passed the cavalry, which for the rest of the day necessarily remained inactive. As the column advanced the enemy's position was disclosed, and it was seen that they held the entire crest of the hills west of the pass with numerous *sangars* down the hill-sides, each commanding the one below it, and that their main strength was on the northern end of the hills close to the actual pass. The King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Gordon Highlanders continued to move slowly up the valley, and it became evident that, owing to the steepness of the ascent, the turning movement would take longer than had been anticipated, and that the troops making it were likely to be seriously outnumbered. At about 12 noon, therefore, Brigadier-General Waterfield ordered the King's Own Scottish Borderers to make a direct attack from the bottom of the valley, some 1,000 feet below the pass, and the Gordon Highlanders to continue for a short distance up the valley, and, after ascending the hill-sides, to turn what seemed to be the enemy's left flank. The objective of the first-named battalion was the small village (D), whence three spurs radiated; the ground was covered with bushes, very broken and precipitous, and studded with *sangars* at intervals. Two companies were sent up the right and centre spurs, and the remaining four up the left spur, which allowed of a more extended formation, and which led to the high ground overlooking and commanding the village which seemed to be the



key of this part of the enemy's position. The Gordon Highlanders proceeded up the valley to the point where it bends north; here four companies were sent up the hillside to the right of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the left being directed on the village which was the objective of the last-named battalion, while the remaining four companies were led further up the valley and eventually to the crest east of the village. The Maxim guns accompanied the frontal attack of these battalions.

In the meantime the artillery had made a third change of position (C) in order to cover the advance, more efficiently, and came into action at ranges varying from 1,000 to 1,400 yards. No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, on arriving at the track leading up to the pass, was at once occupied in hastily improving it, and in removing the numerous obstacles and entanglements which the enemy had made. This company followed the fighting line when the pass was won, and was employed in making the road down the far side to the Swat valley, their place on the southern side being taken by Nos. 1 and 6 companies.

When the King's Own Scottish Borderers were about half-way up the hill, it was seen that a gap had been left between them and the Guides, to close which Sir Robert Low ordered the 1st Brigade to send a battalion straight up the hill between the battalions mentioned, and the King's Royal Rifles were detailed for the duty. The Bedfords and 37th Dogras, also of the 1st Brigade, were sent further up the valley across the foot of the enemy's position, and circling round the rear of the Gordon Highlanders attacked the enemy's extreme left, overlapping it considerably, while the 15th Sikhs were held in reserve.



The Gordon Highlanders and King's Own Scottish Borderers making, as they did, a direct attack on the strongest part of the position, met the greatest resistance; every *sangar* was obstinately held, and as each was carried it came under fire from the one next above it. Several attempts were made by the enemy to concentrate from above and to hold the lower *sangars*, but all such attempts were promptly frustrated by the admirable practice made by the mountain batteries over the heads of the advancing infantry. When the assailants neared the top of the hill, the whole line took a moment's breathing time to collect the men still struggling up in small groups: for in places the ground was so steep and broken that they had to assist each other up. As soon as all was ready the advance was sounded, and almost before the enemy had time to realise that the assaulting columns were at their very feet, the position was carried at the point of the bayonet; the Gordon Highlanders, King's Own Scottish Borderers, and the King's Royal Rifles reaching the summit at almost the same time. Meanwhile the Guides and 4th Sikhs on the left had reached the crest of the hills, and were ready to move onwards if required, while the Bedfordshire and 37th Dogras went in pursuit of the enemy, only halting when they reached the village of Khar.

Thus an exceptionally strong position was carried, which was held by an enemy who, after having been subjected during some 5 hours to a well-directed shell-fire from 16 guns, was still brave enough to stand up to a bayonet charge; and the stubborn fighting shewed the power of fanaticism and the innate courage of the people. Sir Robert Low brought to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the admirable manner in which the troops accomplished a very difficult task. The names of the officers specially mentioned in connection with the action are given in Appendix XVI, p. lxxxii.

MAP
 TO ILLUSTRATE
 ACTION AT THE MALAKAND PASS
 3RD APRIL, 1895.

Surveyed by Muhammad Ali, Sub-Surveyor.

Scale 4 inches = 1 mile



Note - Disposition of troops taken from information supplied by Officers of the Intelligence Department.

REFERENCES
 Enemy's position ... *FP*
 Lines of advance ... *---*

The Bedfordshire and 37th Dogras bivouacked for the night near Khar, and the remainder of the 1st Brigade on the top of the pass. The 2nd Brigade, with the exception of the 4th Sikhs, who bivouacked on the hills about a mile to the west of the pass, returned to Dargai. An attempt was made to send up the mules of the 1st Brigade, but the path was so difficult that only a few of them reached the summit that night. The Bedfords and 37th Dogras were re-called to the pass early next morning.

The enemy fired the first shot at 8-45 A.M., and the action was concluded at about 2 P.M., the hour previously fixed upon by Sir Robert Low. The total number of the enemy was estimated at 12,000 men, of whom 3,000 were said to have been armed with firearms, but it was afterwards ascertained that the number with firearms was much larger. The enemy's loss was estimated at not less than 500 killed; the number from the Swat valley alone who were killed amounted, as stated by the Swatis themselves, to 300 men: it was impossible to estimate the numbers wounded, but among them was their leader Sheikh Yamin. The casualties on our side amounted to a total of 11 killed and 50 wounded.

The ammunition expended during the day amounted to 331 shrapnel, 115 ring shell, and 16,563 rounds of Lee-Metford and Martini-Henry.

The capture of the pass, which had hitherto been considered impregnable, was an excellent lesson for the tribesmen, and it afforded the majority of those collected at the Shakot and Morah passes, the opportunity they desired of quietly dispersing and going to their homes; it diminished the chances of our troops being drawn into Upper Swat for punitive measures; it saved the Khans and others, who were friendly to us, from the unpleasant position in which they would have been placed had the Shakot pass been attacked, of either having to fight or of incurring odium by coming out to welcome the troops, as they had sent word that they intended to do; and it saved unnecessary bloodshed of people with whom we had no quarrel.

A curious circumstance in connection with the pass may be mentioned here. The track leading to the summit from the south ascended the hill-sides by the usual short zig-zags, over boulders, and often under protruding crags; and when first seen, on the 3rd of April, it appeared impossible in any reasonable time to make it fit for animal transport. But in his report of the action of the 3rd, the Officer Commanding the King's Royal Rifles stated that after going half-way up the hill he came upon "an old pathway." On examination this turned out to be an old Buddhist road, disused for hundreds of years, but so well-made originally that it took our engineers and sappers but two days to make it into a camel road from near Dargai to the top of the pass. The discovery of this hitherto unknown road, on a good alignment and easily repaired, enabled the force to advance with much less delay than would have been the case had the usual path been followed.

The movements ordered to take place on the 4th April were:—1st brigade to descend to the Swat river; 2nd brigade to take the place of the 1st brigade on the Malakand; 3rd brigade to remain south of the pass, pending the passage of the baggage and supplies of the advanced brigades. At 1 P.M. the 1st Brigade began to descend from the pass, the advanced guard being furnished by No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and the 1st Bn. Bedfordshire Regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Patterson; the main body consisted of No. 3 Mountain Battery R. A., 1st Battalion King's Royal



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE ACTION NEAR KHAR,

4TH APRIL.

REDUCED FROM PLANE-TABLE SURVEY BY
MUHAMMAD ALI, SUR-SURVEYOR.

Disposition of troops taken from information supplied
by officers of the Intelligence Department.

Scale 2 Inches = 1 Mile.



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Rifle Corps, 1 company 15th Sikhs, and the 37th Dogras. The remainder of the 15th Sikhs furnished the baggage and rear guards.

When the advanced guard arrived near Piran (*see* map facing page 58) numbers of the enemy estimated at about 4,000 men were seen on the spur D, and between the hill F and the spur towards G, H and I. Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson at once took steps to secure the exit from the defile, sending forward two companies on each flank to the spurs B and C, and one company up the spur A to guard the right flank. Meanwhile the main body having come up, Brigadier-General Kinloch ordered the guns into action a little north of Piran, whence they shelled the spur D and the main ridge to the right, along which the enemy were advancing, with the result that the spur was vacated and the further advance of the enemy along the ridge to the pass was checked. The 37th Dogras and the company of the 15th Sikhs were then sent forward to clear the hill F; which was successfully accomplished, and the enemy pushed back over to the further side. The remainder of the force had now advanced and deployed to the left of the road near C, where the guns again came into action, directing their fire on the enemy holding the main ridge to the right; and orders were sent to the Dogras to hold the hill F, which then lay in rear of them, at all costs. The battalion accordingly retired by alternate companies and took up a position on the hill, where they beat off several determined rushes which were covered by the enemy's marksmen posted on the crags of the main ridge. The remainder of the force again advanced and deployed near E, in the following order from the right:—King's Royal Rifles, Maxim gun, the Mountain Battery, and the Bedfordshire. The Sappers and Miners were sent to reinforce the Dogras.

Towards evening the enemy, mistaking the defensive attitude of the main body of the brigade (which was merely covering the issue of the transport from the defile), came down from the hills and tried to work round the left flank of the Dogras. They were, however, suddenly met by two troops of the Guides Cavalry under Captain Adams, which having just crossed the Malakand had been ordered by Brigadier-General Kinloch to move round the base of the hill F and charge. This handful of cavalry attacked about 1,200 of the enemy and cut down 30 of them; the remainder fled back to the hills, the result being that pressure was at once removed from the Dogras. The going was very heavy and the ground closely cultivated, while two or three awkward *nalas* had to be crossed; but this charge clearly proved, if proof were necessary, the wholesome dread that hill-men have of cavalry, and the utility of even small bodies in a country where parts of it are flat enough to admit of cavalry being used against such an enemy—a fact to which additional testimony was afforded a few days later at the crossing of the Swat river.

The brunt of the fighting fell on the Dogras supported by No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners and the company of the 15th Sikhs, who repulsed repeated attacks of large bodies of the enemy. The casualties in the 1st Brigade were:—2 killed and 18 wounded. Seventy-four shrapnel, 12 ring shell, and 24,915 rounds of Lee-Metford and Martini-Henry rifle ammunition were expended during the day. The names of the officers who took a conspicuous part in the action are given in Appendix XVI, p. lxxxii.

The enemy's force consisted of a purely fanatical gathering of some 5,000 or 6,000 men, most of whom had moved across from the Shakot and Morah passes to join in the defence of the Malakand, which they did not believe had yet been taken. Their losses were estimated at 600 killed alone, 350 of whom belonged to the Swat valley.

During the action the transport of the brigade passed down the road and was parked about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile south-west of Khar. About 7-45 P. M., the troops on the hills slowly retired towards the bivouac, and by 9 P. M. all had been allotted to and were in their proper places. The night passed quietly, and on the following morning not a sign of the enemy remained.

On the 5th April the 1st brigade halted at Khar to reorganise its transport; the 2nd brigade, leaving the Gordon Highlanders and Guides Infantry on the Malakand, joined the 1st; while the 3rd brigade marched to the southern foot of the pass. In the meantime Brigadier-General Blood with two squadrons Guides Cavalry reconnoitred the Swat river opposite Chakdara, and the leading men of the Adinzai valley, who had come across, were informed that if their people remained quiet during the advance of the troops they would not be molested. Chakdara and Ramora fort were both found devoid of hostile people, but a gathering of some 3,000 fanatics was observed above the large village of Thana, the inhabitants of which were warned that, unless the gathering dispersed at once, troops would be sent against them. The Khans and headmen came in that evening, with the Ranizais of Aladand, under Muhammad Sharif Khan, expressing their readiness to assist the troops, and the gathering above Thana moved away from that village, but occupied a position threatening the road down to the river. Next day, the 11th Bengal Lancers crossed the Malakand and encamped at Khar; and the 1st Brigade remained halted at Khar, having been ordered to hand over its mule transport to the 2nd and 3rd Brigades. The 2nd Brigade, less the Gordon Highlanders and Guides, but with the 15th Sikhs (which rejoined their own brigade—the 1st—in the evening) and No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery, which had come up on the previous day, visited Thana and then encamped between Aladand and the river. The gathering of the enemy seen near Thana on the previous day was visible some 4 miles up the valley; and although there was nothing to be gained by moving after them, it was necessary that they should be broken up. They were therefore informed that if they did not disperse at once, troops would be sent into Upper Swat and inflict severe punishment. No enemy was seen on the right bank of the river, but in the evening it was reported that a large force of Umra Khan's personal followers, under command of his brother Muhammad Shah Khan, had arrived and occupied Chakdara and Ramora.

On the evening of the 6th the troops were distributed as follows:—


<i>Aladand</i>	.	{	2nd Brigade, less Gordon Highlanders, and Guides Infantry. No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.	
<i>Khar</i>	.	{	Divisional Head-Quarters. 1st Brigade. 1 Squadron, Guides Cavalry.	
<i>Malakand</i>	.	{	1st Bn., Gordon Highlanders. Guides Infantry. 2nd Bn., 4th Gurkha Rifles, from 3rd Brigade.	
<i>At southern foot of pass.</i>		{	3rd Brigade, less 25th Punjab Infantry and 2nd Bn., 4th Gurkha Rifles. 23rd Punjab Pioneers.	
<i>Dargai</i>	.	{	25th Punjab Infantry, from 3rd Brigade. 13th Bengal Infantry.	
<i>Falala</i>	.	{	1st Bn., East Lancashire Regiment. 29th Punjab Infantry. Wing, 30th Punjab Infantry.	} Lines of Communication troops.

J. B. Soper, Supt. S.W. 1781.
 2nd. ©. J. A. September 1895.

8 Mtn Batty. R.A.

SKETCH OF ENEMY'S POSITION COVERING THE FORDS OF THE SWAT RIVER, 7TH APRIL 1895.


Looking north from a point 800 yards south of central knoll.



(Sg.) G. X. Cockrill, Supt.

G. J. O., 2nd Brigade,
 7th April 1895.

No. 1,100-I., 95



On the evening of the 6th Sir Robert Low ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, 11th Bengal Lancers, to take his regiment with one squadron of the Guides Cavalry, to march early on the following morning to the 2nd Brigade camp, and from thence to ford the Swat river and make a reconnaissance up the Adinzai valley towards Uch, being supported by other arms from the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Waterfield who was directed to cross the river and destroy the fort of Ramora.

About 6-30 A.M. on the morning of the 7th, one company 4th Sikhs, one of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, and No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, the whole under command of Major F. J. Aylmer, V.C., R.E., marched towards the Swat river in the order given, with the view of selecting a site for a bridge. At the same time a squadron of Guides Cavalry, under Captain Barton, proceeded in the direction of Thana to observe the gathering seen in that neighbourhood on the previous day. The path followed by Major Aylmer's party ran along a narrow causeway through low-lying irrigation, intersected by numerous channels varying from three to twelve feet in width. It struck the river bank opposite the knoll marked 2,850 (*see map facing page 60*); and when the party neared the river, fire was opened on it from this knoll and from the small detached knoll to the east of it. The two companies of infantry immediately deployed, and after firing a few volleys moved up the river bank and formed in front of the detached knoll. The enemy's line was then seen to extend from the peak 3,517 on the left, down the spur to Chakdara and the adjoining village, while Ramora fort and the adjacent hamlets were also occupied by armed men: the position was naturally a strong one, the rocky hills on the enemy's side completely commanding the perfectly open and level left bank. On hearing the sound of the firing, Brigadier-General Waterfield ordered his troops to turn out and march down to the river, two companies being left in camp as a guard, and at about 8-30 A.M. No. 8 Mountain Battery came into action at a range of from 1,300 to 1,500 yards.

Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, with three and a half squadrons of his regiment and the Guides squadron, reached the river bank from Khar about 9 A.M., and delivered to Brigadier-General Waterfield the orders he had received the previous evening regarding the reconnaissance up the Adinzai valley. In consequence of this, the cavalry were directed to cross the river covered by the fire of No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.A., and of a wing of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. In the meantime the 4th Sikhs and the Maxim guns had opened fire from the river bank, and the 15th Sikhs (7 companies), who had been sent by Sir Robert Low from the 1st Brigade, had arrived.

The river was in several distinct channels, from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep, flowing at the rate of about 5 miles an hour, and as soon as the cavalry entered the second channel the enemy began to evacuate their positions and to retreat up the Adinzai valley, headed by about 150 to 200 horsemen. Brigadier-General Waterfield now ordered the 15th Sikhs and the 4th Sikhs to cross by a ford opposite Chakdara. The former battalion, having crossed and re-formed, sent two companies against Chakdara and two against Dalbar, the whole being supported by the three remaining companies: two companies were subsequently pushed on to Uch in support of the cavalry. Of the 4th Sikhs, one company remained as escort to No. 8 Mountain Battery; one had already accompanied the Maxim guns to an island, whence they were enabled to sweep the ground to the north-east of the detached knoll above mentioned; two

crossed and occupied this knoll, and the remainder advanced on Dalbar. This village and Chakdara were occupied without further resistance, and about 300 men, many swords and guns, some cattle, and about 2,000 maunds of barley fell into the hands of our troops.

The cavalry in the meantime had taken up the pursuit, and although the enemy had a considerable start of the attacking squadrons, they quickly realised that they had begun their retirement all too late, for they were overtaken and at least 100 were killed, the majority falling to the 11th Bengal Lancers. Many of them abandoned their horses and took refuge in the broken ground, and Muhammad Shah Khan narrowly escaped capture. The pursuit was continued to the top of the Katgola pass, about $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the Swat river. The squadron of Guides cavalry under Captain Barton, which had crossed by a ford higher up, joined in the pursuit. The cavalry being well over the river, Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon with the other wing of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, and No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners moved up to a ford about a mile below Ramora, where three companies of the infantry and a section of the sappers crossed by a breast-high ford. It was desired to blow up the fort and to utilize the timbers for a bridge over the Swat river*, but the walls proved too thick to be destroyed by the explosives available. On the return of the cavalry from the pursuit about 4 P.M. the troops withdrew across the river and returned to camp at Aladand, with the exception of the 4th and 15th Sikhs, who occupied the villages of Chakdara and Dalbar, and the detached knoll to the south-west of Chakdara.

The enemy, estimated at 4,500 men, were commanded by Muhammad Shah Khan, and amongst them were other relatives of Umra Khan and many fanatics from Upper Swat. Their losses could not be accurately estimated, but they were said to have lost 250 in killed alone. Our casualties consisted of:—1 man drowned, 2 killed, and 9 wounded; three horses were killed and 8 wounded. Our trivial loss, says Sir Robert Low, was mainly due to the able manner in which Brigadier-General Waterfield handled his troops. The names of the other officers who were specially mentioned in connection with this action are given in Appendix XVI, p. lxxxii.

During the day 82 shrapnel, 13 ring shell, and 1,637 rounds of Lee-Metford and Martini-Henry rifle ammunition were expended.

The movements of the troops which did not participate in this action were as follows: the 1st Brigade moved camp beyond the village of Khar; the Gordon Highlanders and Guides Infantry rejoined the 2nd Brigade at Aladand in the evening; the Seaforth Highlanders and 25th Punjab Infantry of the 3rd Brigade arrived at the top of the Malakand; the East Kent Regiment remaining at the southern foot,

The 2nd Brigade was now ordered to lead the further advance of the force, the 3rd brigade to follow, and the 1st brigade† to remain and guard the Swat valley. Accordingly on the 8th April, the 11th Bengal Lancers reconnoitred from Chakdara over the Katgola pass to Shamshikhan in the Talash valley, while a squadron of Guides Cavalry went up the Adinzai valley to the foot of the Laram pass. The latter reported the road easy as far as Kotigram, but the path over the Laram was said to be unfit for transport animals: the former found the Talash road passable for transport, with abundant water and fuel. As a

* For a description of this bridge, see page 79.

† The 15th Sikhs did not again rejoin the 1st Brigade, but remained on the Lines of Communication.


MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE ACTION AT THE
SWAT RIVER,

7TH APRIL 1895,

Surveyed by Muhammad Ali, Sub-Surveyor.

Scale 2 Inches = 1 Mile.

mile $\frac{1}{2}$ 0 $\frac{1}{2}$ mile



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support to this reconnaissance, one squadron Guides Cavalry, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery and the Guides Infantry went forward and occupied the Katgola pass, while the 11th Bengal Lancers moved into bivouac 1 mile south of Uch, and the reconnoitring squadron of the Guides joined the main body of the 2nd Brigade at Chakdara. This brigade had moved with all its baggage and hospitals across the river and was now joined by the 23rd Pioneers from the Malakand pass. The 3rd Brigade moved to Khar.

The delay in the Swat valley from the 4th to the 8th April was chiefly due to the difficulty encountered in conveying supplies over the Malakand pass. To feed the troops on the north side of the pass it was found necessary to use during the 4th, 5th, and 6th all the mules of the force, as these were the only animals that could cross the pass by the zig-zag road then existing; and consequently it was not till the 8th, when camels had been crossing the pass for two days, that it was possible to re-equip the 2nd and 3rd Brigades with transport for their baggage and 20 days' supplies.

The time thus lost in the actual advance was utilized in settling down the Upper Ranizais who had left their villages, and in impressing on them the responsibility for peace within their boundaries. After the final warning had been sent to the gathering near Thana, the conduct of Swat generally, notwithstanding repeated efforts to stir up fanaticism, remained excellent. The Mian Guls, who were anxious to pose as rulers, attempted to enter into correspondence regarding Government intentions in Swat, but a reply was sent informing them that, until they showed a *firman* appointing them rulers of Swat, no further correspondence would be held with them. No strong feeling against us existed amongst the true Pathan population in the valley who openly cursed their religious leaders.

There were many reports at this time of hostility on the part of Buner, to which, however, no great importance was attached; for although the Bunerwals were ready to fight in the event of their own country being entered, it was felt that they would not move against the troops in Swat so long as they were left alone and undisturbed. There were also various reports of gatherings of Utman Khels and Mohmands.

As regards news from the Chitral direction, reliable information was received about the 5th April of Umra Khan's return to Barwa from Kala Drosh, and of his holding Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler as prisoners. It was also known that he had left his main force in Chitral and had brought down with him only a few selected men. Seeing that there was a probability of hearing shortly from Umra Khan regarding the disposal of the British officers whom he held prisoners Sir Robert Low had telegraphed to the Government regarding the reply which he proposed to make, and on the 8th of April he received the following telegraphic instructions:—

Your telegram of April 6th. The Government of India agree that you should not be the first to open negotiations with Umra Khan about the prisoners: it can only delay their release to let him see our anxiety about them. In case Umra Khan makes overtures, you are authorised to say, that before we consider overtures, all Umra Khan's prisoners, both British and Native officers and men, must be released; and if a hair of their heads is injured, the arm of England's just vengeance will pursue him to the end leaving him neither land nor name, and her means will be spent in dealing out to him the just punishment for any ill-treatment of his prisoners, for whose safety he will be held personally responsible. Nothing will turn us from the enterprise on which we have

entered and Umra Khan now knows that the *Sarkar* never uses empty threats, and he will find every word now sent to him will be fulfilled.

It has been previously observed that the refugee Khan of Dir endeavoured to persuade the Swat councils against opposing the advance of our troops. Failing in this attempt he came down to British territory, accompanied by some 200 followers; he was received in camp at Dargai on the 2nd of April, and expressed his readiness to render assistance. It was pointed out to him that Government by moving against Umra Khan had afforded him an opportunity of recovering the position from which Umra Khan had ousted him; that though he could not accompany the troops he could proceed ahead of them to raise his own clans, and by these means recover possession of the forts held by Umra Khan in the Panjkora valley, and those of Dir and Atan. He was informed that if he performed good service for Government, he would be rewarded with money and arms in order that he might in future maintain his position; but that on the withdrawal of the troops, Government would be in no way responsible for the maintenance of his authority. Accordingly he crossed the Malakand after the fighting on the 3rd April, and on the following day, when approaching Khar, was attacked by the gathering which was dispersed later by the 1st Brigade. On the 5th April he was sent on across the Swat river, and a few days afterwards reports were received that all the forts on the Panjkora and Maidan routes were held in our interests, and that the Khan himself was attacking Dir fort. This news was received at Chakdara on the 9th April and, in order to relieve the pressure on Chitral, Sir Robert Low directed the Khan to despatch a force thither. Dir fort having been captured by the Khan on the 12th, with a loss on his side of 60 men, he at once pushed forward a force under his brother towards Chitral.

This alliance with the Khan of Dir secured for the troops an unopposed passage in the Baraul valley and thence through to Dir and over the Laorai pass: it also afforded immunity from trouble by the most powerful of the Khwazozai Yusafzai clans, the Painsa Khels and Sultan Khels, who abstained from opposing the troops near Dir, as they might have done; and it also prevented trouble in the Maidan valley, and provided a powerful check against the Shamozaï, Nikpi Khel,* and other fanatical sections, including the Kohistanis of Upper Swat.

On the 9th April, Divisional Head-Quarters moved from Khar to Chakdara and the 3rd Brigade from Khar to the left bank of the Swat river. At the same time a reconnaissance to Sado on the Panjkora was made by the 11th Bengal Lancers, one squadron Guides Cavalry, the 4th Sikhs, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery and the Guides Infantry. The road through the Shigu Kas was found to be just passable for camels but commanded on both sides; and the river was fordable for horsemen, though rising rapidly: on the other hand the road over the Kamrani pass (3,300 feet) was reported unfit for camels, but it had the advantage of not being commanded. On the completion of the reconnaissance the infantry bivouacked for the night at the junction of the Shigu Kas-Kamrani roads; and the 11th Bengal Lancers and the squadron of the Guides near Gumbat.

* The Shamozaï and Nikpi Khel are sections of the Khwazozai tribe of Yusufzai Pathans, and inhabit the right bank of the Swat river between Chakdara and the Arnawai valley.

The advanced troops, preceded by the cavalry, moved on the 10th April to Sado, the 4th Sikhs marching by the Kamrani pass, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, the Guides Infantry, and the transport by the Shigu Kas defile. The squadron of Guides Cavalry, after fording the river, advanced for about 6 miles up the left bank of the Jandol stream, and soon after passing Kotkai fort, which was found to be deserted, the squadron was fired upon by a small body of the enemy concealed in the rocks high above the left bank; the fire was returned by dismounted men, and the enemy moving off, the reconnaissance was continued somewhat higher up the valley, when the squadron returned to Sado without meeting further opposition. Meanwhile the remainder of the 2nd Brigade, accompanied by Divisional Head-Quarters and 2 companies 23rd Pioneers, marched to Gumbat, and a small post was formed near Uch for two companies of the 15th Sikhs with a detachment of the Guides Cavalry. The Head-Quarters and two battalions of the 3rd Brigade also marched to within three-quarters of a mile of Uch, the remainder of the troops with the transport and supplies remaining on the left bank of the Swat river. As Sir Robert Low found it necessary to accompany the leading brigade in its advance, the troops in Swat valley and the Lines of Communication were now placed under the command of Brigadier-General Kinloch, the next senior officer.

Umra Khan was at this time in Mundah. He had released and sent to Khar six of the Muhammadan prisoners taken at Reshun, who gave news as to the health and good treatment of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler. Accordingly the following letter was sent to Umra Khan :—

After compliments.—Troops are marching into Jandol. If you wish to avoid your home and country being laid waste, you will deliver to me unhurt the British officers that you have with you and will come and submit to such terms as the Government of India may impose. You will be allowed to enter and leave my camp unmolested.

Owing to the political aspect of affairs at this time, and the possibility of trouble among the Mohmands and Bunerwals, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief considered it advisable to move the reserve brigade from Rawal Pindi to Hoti Mardan, and he also strongly recommended the formation of a second reserve brigade at Rawal Pindi, suggesting at the same time that as Sir Robert Low, on the move of the reserve brigade to Mardan, would have under his command four brigades besides the divisional troops and those on the lines of communication, he should be granted the temporary rank of Lieutenant-General while commanding the Relief Force. These proposals were approved by the Government of India, and the following troops were warned to be in readiness as a second reserve brigade, *viz.* :—No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 28th Punjab Infantry, 39th Garhwal Rifles. The corps forming this brigade never left their stations, hence no further allusion will be made to them.

As the river had become quite unfordable on the morning of the 11th April, the leading portion of the 2nd Brigade halted at Sado and Khungai and proceeded to collect materials for a raft bridge, while the remainder of the brigade and Divisional Head-Quarters marched *via* the Shigu Kas to Sado and Khungai. Owing to the extreme difficulty experienced in passing through the Shigu Kas, the baggage did not get into camp till very late, and the last portion of it was fired upon from across the river by men near the village of


Zulm Baba. During the day a reconnaissance was made for a few miles up the river by Lieutenant Cockerill, Field Intelligence Officer, with a view to discover a ford or a more suitable site for the bridge, but without success. The leading portion of the 3rd Brigade arrived at Gumbat and the rest of the brigade crossed the Swat river and encamped at Chakdara.

During the 12th April rapid progress was made with the construction of the raft bridge by No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, under the command of Major Aylmer, assisted by two companies of the 23rd Pioneers, and on the evening of the 12th was ready for passenger traffic. The river had shown no signs of rising and the weather was clear; and as it was important to have some troops across the river to guard the head of the bridge, six companies of the Guides Infantry were passed over to the right bank, where they formed an entrenched post in a strong position, commanded at short range by the high ground on the left bank and bivouacked for the night. One company was left with the regimental transport at Sado, and one remained on the left bank to guard the reserve ammunition, etc. The 3rd Brigade was ordered to concentrate at Gumbat, and also to improve the road over the Kamrani pass.

On the evening of the 12th the distribution of the troops was as follows:—

	Divisional Head-Quarters.
	11th Bengal Lancers.
	1 squadron, Guides Cavalry.
<i>Sado, Khungai and neighbourhood</i>	No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
	No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
	2nd Brigade.
	2 companies, 23rd Punjab Pioneers.
	No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
<i>Gumbat and Kamrani pass</i>	3rd Brigade.
<i>Uch</i>	$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, Guides Cavalry.
	2 companies, 15th Sikhs.
	$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, Guides Cavalry.
<i>Chakdara</i>	6 companies, 15th Sikhs.
	6 companies, 23rd Punjab Pioneers.
	Nos. 1 and 6 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
	1 squadron, Guides Cavalry.
<i>Khar</i>	No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
	1st Brigade (except 1st Sikhs).
	13th Bengal Infantry.
	1st Bn., East Lancashire Regiment.
<i>Malakand pass</i>	29th Punjab Infantry.
	Wing, 34th Punjab Pioneers.
	2 companies, 30th Punjab Infantry.
	1 squadron, 9th Bengal Lancers.
<i>Dargai</i>	No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.
	2 companies, 30th Punjab Infantry.
<i>Jalala</i>	1 squadron, 9th Bengal Lancers.
	2 companies, 30th Punjab Infantry.

On the evening of the 12th April Sir Robert Low had directed Brigadier-General Waterfield to order the Guides Infantry to march down the right bank of the Panjkora on the following morning and burn certain villages on that side from which there had been persistent firing on the transport which, till the completion of the Kamrani route, was obliged to use that by the Shigu Kas defile. Accordingly, at 6 A.M. on the 13th, Lieutenant-Colonel Battye moved off with five companies, leaving one company under 2nd-Lieutenant Johnson to guard the entrenched post. It had been intended to support the Guides with



Subhan Kilai

Manrai

Taraji

Landa Kur

Garhai

Dehrai

Ziurati

Kuzani

Harangai


Landa Stream

Panjhora River


REFERENCES

- Line of advance ————
- " " retirement ————
- Routes followed by detached parties - - - - -

Scale 6 inches = 1 mile



SKETCH OF GROUND



other troops from the left bank, but during the night the river suddenly rose and, bringing down large logs of timber, so damaged the bridge that by 9 A.M. it was rendered totally useless. The company of the Guides and the ammunition which had been left on the Sado side of the river over-night were, however, taken across on rafts during the morning.

Lieutenant-Colonel Battye led his men up the left bank of the Jandol stream, the advanced guard marching direct on Subhan Kilai (*see* map), while parties were detached to burn the villages of Walai, Khazana and Dehrai. At 9 A.M. the companies were concentrated at Subhan Kilai, whence they proceeded to ford the Jandol stream and ascend the heights on the right bank of the Panjkora. Garhai and some small hamlets were burnt on the way up, and at 10-30 A.M. the companies were assembled on the crest, with an advanced post thrown out to cover the front. Lieutenant-Colonel Battye now despatched D company and one section of C, under Lieutenant Stewart, into the valley running down towards Harangai to burn that village, while F Company, under Lieutenant Codrington, was sent along the crest of the ridge to cover the burning party. About noon, large numbers of the enemy were noticed near Kotkai, some 3 miles up the Jandol valley, and strong parties were also seen crossing to the right bank of the stream and advancing towards the Guides. This information was heliographed to Head-Quarters at Sado, and a reply was sent, which was received by Lieutenant-Colonel Battye at 1 P.M., ordering him to retire to his entrenched post. The 2nd Brigade was ordered out to cover the retirement. At about the hour first named the troops at the disposal of Brigadier-General Waterfield had marched down from Sado, a distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and had lined the high bank overlooking the river.

Lieutenant-Colonel Battye's first care was to ensure the safe return of the burning party, and orders for its immediate retirement were sent to Lieutenant Codrington, who had in the meantime caused Lieutenant Stewart to collect his party at a village below Harangai. The line of retreat of the latter lay either up to the crest, where Lieutenant Codrington's party was, or over a lower *col* and then down a *nala* direct to the Panjkora a little above Zulm Baba. The latter route was chosen, and both parties ultimately joined on the bank of the river. Lieutenant-Colonel Battye frequently expressed anxiety regarding the parties detached to his left, as it was impossible to see whether they had evacuated the valley or not; and it was not until the enemy pressed on in considerable strength that he at length ordered the main body of the battalion to commence its rearward movement. When about one-third of the descent had been accomplished, the enemy charged down one of the spurs, but they were promptly stopped by some steady volleys, though some few of them got within twenty paces. The slow deliberation of the retirement had given Lieutenant Codrington's party on the left time to move along the right bank of the river, and a message from the Brigadier-General commanding the 2nd Brigade on the opposite bank to look out to the north and prevent surprise, caused him to push up the hill again in the direction from which he heard the heavy firing. The main body of the battalion was thus reinforced by D Company and one section of C, F Company remaining lower down the spur to cover the flank.

As soon as the enemy showed over the ridge, the batteries opened fire, and afterwards, as the hostile masses approached, the infantry rendered material aid and prevented them from closing on the Guides. Very deliberately the

different companies retired, fiercely assailed on all sides, yet coolly firing by word of command, and relinquishing quietly and almost imperceptibly one position only to take up another a few yards back. On arrival in the open fields at the foot of the hill, the enemy pressed on still more vigorously and bayonets were fixed by the Guides for the second time during the day, but no charge by the enemy ensued. At this moment Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, who had been conspicuous among the last at every retirement, fell mortally wounded, and the command of the battalion devolved on Captain Campbell. Seeing his commanding officer wounded, Subadar Rajah with the portion of his company at hand dashed towards the advancing enemy and shot down several of them at close quarters. For his conspicuous bravery in thus checking the enemy when his battalion was hard pressed, the Subadar was subsequently admitted to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit; and four non-commissioned officers and men were also granted the same distinction for their gallantry in supporting the Subadar and assisting in the removal of Lieutenant-Colonel Battye's body.

Having crossed a wide space of level ground, on which the crops were standing waist-high, the companies forded the Jandol stream, here about 3 feet deep, and then moved by alternate portions through more fields to the bridge-head. As the front of the troops on the left bank of the Panjkora became unmasked, their fire most effectually stopped the enemy from harassing the Guides as they crossed the Jandol stream. During the latter part of the retirement numbers of the enemy, who had advanced directly down the left bank of the Jandol, attempted to make a turning movement by the east of Khazana and thus cut off the retreat, but this was frustrated by the companies, left at the bridge-head in the morning, under 2nd-Lieutenant Johnson who moved out and took up a position on some high ground to the north. It was nearly dark by the time the entrenched post was reached.

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery and five companies of the Gordon Highlanders were posted on the left bank of the Panjkora to support the Guides during the night; two Maxim guns under Captain Peebles and one company of the 4th Sikhs were sent over on *massak* rafts to reinforce; while the remainder of the brigade returned to camp. Firing continued till nearly 11 P.M., and it was reported that the enemy had made every arrangement to rush the post; but they were probably disconcerted at the light given by the star-shell fired at intervals and did not carry out the intended attack. The majority of them dispersed early on the morning of the 14th, and soon after day-break the whole had withdrawn up the Jandol valley, but not before we had to lament the loss of another officer, Captain Peebles.

The enemy were composed of men from Mundah and large numbers of Shamozi Utman Khels, and their losses were afterwards reported by their own people to be over 500 men. Our losses during the retirement and on the night of the 13th-14th consisted of:—Two British officers and three men killed; one British officer, five British and ten Native soldiers, and five followers, wounded. Of these numbers, the Guides' casualties were:—Lieutenant-Colonel Battye and three men killed, and nine men wounded.

During the 13th and morning of the 14th the Guides expended 10,554 rounds of ammunition; the total expenditure by the whole force employed being 158 shrapnel, 12 ring and 7 star-shell, and 49,287 rounds of Lee-Metford and Martini-Henry ammunition.

In his despatch of the 1st May 1895,* Sir Robert Low described the retirement of the Guides Infantry as a "splendid performance"; and in submitting this despatch to the Government of India, the Commander-in-Chief recorded his admiration of the way in which the retirement was carried out, while a special tribute was paid to the memory of Lieutenant-Colonel Battye in Government General Orders.

On the 14th April the 3rd Brigade concentrated at Sado. Six companies of the 4th Sikhs were ferried across the river to the Guides entrenchment, the operation lasting 12 hours, as up to noon only two rafts were available, and after that time three. Rain fell heavily at intervals during the day and the river rose rapidly. The current increased at the same time to such an extent that it was impossible to make a serviceable raft-bridge, and it was realised that the only resource would be a suspension bridge. A suitable place, where the main span would be 90 feet, was selected about two miles lower down the river where it enters a gorge, and a design was adopted by which the cables of the bridge were made of strands of telegraph wire. On the night of the 14th rain set in, which continued all that night and through the following day and night as well, thus delaying work on the suspension bridge.

On the morning of the 15th, one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers and half a battalion of the East Kent Regiment made a reconnaissance up the left bank as far as Robot, and found the road to be exceedingly difficult, though the inhabitants were friendly and the country quiet. During the course of the morning a few men were rafted across to join the Guides, and some stores got over, but at 11 A.M. the river became so swollen and rapid that one of the rafts was carried away by the current and further attempts had to be abandoned. One British and one Native soldier and one boatman were drowned, while one British soldier, who managed to climb on to the overturned raft, was luckily rescued by Major Aylmer under the circumstances related in Sir Robert Low's despatch given in Appendix XVI, p. lxxxiii.

The 3rd Brigade was now ordered to lead the further advance, and instructions on this head and for the re-arrangement of transport were issued. The 2nd Brigade was ordered to retain sufficient mules for its equipment, ammunition, tools and 5 days' supplies, and then to hand over the remainder to the 3rd Brigade, which would thus have enough mules to carry its equipment and 5 days' supplies.

On the morning of the 16th April the situation was one of some little anxiety. The Swat river in rear was reported to be steadily rising; in front, the Panjkora was gradually becoming a powerful torrent, and had risen to within 18 inches of the piers of the new suspension bridge, while the two remaining rafts could no longer be utilized for passing over supplies to the troops on the right bank. Later in the day, however, the rain ceased, the sky cleared, the river began to fall, and matters assumed a more favourable aspect. By evening the suspension bridge † was completed for foot-passengers, working parties from the 3rd Brigade being sent across to make a road up the right

* See Appendix XVI, p. lxxiii.

† It may be recorded here that the suspension bridge withstood a constant and heavy traffic over it for two months. The average number of men employed in its construction daily for the 14th—16th was 120 Sappers and Miners and 150 Infantry. It was finally washed away, but not until the water had risen above the roadway. A second suspension bridge was erected during the last fortnight of April (main span approximately 200 feet), which is in use at the present time.


SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE ACTION AT

MANUGAI,

17TH APRIL 1895,

by Lance-Duffadar Sikandar Shah.

Scale 3 inches = 1 mile
 yds. 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 yards 1 mile



References taken from a sketch made during the action by Capt. W.R. Robertson, Field Intelligence Officer.

A... First position, No. 2 Derajat Mtn. Battery.

B... East Kent Regiment (Reserve).

C&D. 2 Companies East Kent Regiment.

bank; meanwhile the Divisional Head-Quarters and the 3rd Brigade moved camp to a place near the bridge, and orders were issued for the force to advance early on the morning of the 17th.

The troops commenced crossing the bridge at daybreak on the 17th April, and by 10-45 A.M. 3 squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers, 1 squadron Guides Cavalry, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, the 3rd Brigade, 2 companies 23rd Punjab Pioneers, $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and the King's Own Scottish Borderers had reached the right bank.

The road along the face of the cliffs on the right bank from the bridge up to the open valley was merely a footpath over which every man and animal had to march in single file, and it was clear that both brigades and their transport could not hope to get across and move up the Jandol valley during the day. Sir Robert Low therefore directed Brigadier-General Waterfield to pass over as much of the 3rd Brigade baggage as could reach that brigade the same night, and then to cross with his own brigade (the 2nd) and join the 3rd brigade next morning.

The squadron of Guides Cavalry, accompanied by the Chief Staff Officer, Brigadier-General Blood, led the advance up the Jandol valley, and when it had proceeded as far as Gosam (*see* sketch map) a large collection of the enemy became visible near Miankalai, and the advanced groups of the squadron were fired at from near Dagh. The enemy now streamed out of Miankalai in a southerly direction, crossed to the right bank of the Jandol stream, carefully avoiding ground where the cavalry might have acted against them, and then advanced eastwards to occupy the Ghannah, Andak and Derai forts, and the spurs running down towards the river from the south. As the main body of the brigade was still some distance in rear, the Guides squadron retired slowly to Ghobani, where they were joined by the 11th Bengal Lancers, and at 11 A.M. by the head of the advanced guard which was furnished by the 25th Punjab Infantry. The main column consisted of No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, 2nd battalion Seaforth Highlanders, and the 2nd battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles, while the East Kent battalion formed the rear guard. Brigadier-General Gatacre at once directed the 4th Gurkhas to cross the Jandol stream, advance up the spurs towards Manugai, and thence to move westwards, supported on the right by the Seaforth Highlanders with the 25th Punjab Infantry in reserve. At 11-45 A.M. the mountain battery came into action just west of Ghobani and shelled the enemy in and around the above-mentioned forts at ranges varying from 1,800 to 2,500 yards; and while the attack was progressing the East Kent battalion reached Ghobani, relieving the 25th Punjab Infantry, which was then pushed forward to support the two battalions in the first line. Sir Robert Low had reached Ghobani just as the brigade was going into action. The Gurkhas advancing with half a battalion in the firing line and half in support, and the Seaforths in a similar formation, engaged the enemy at 12-30 P.M., driving him from ridge to ridge and encountering only trifling opposition. During the advance of the infantry up the southern slopes of the valley, the whole of the cavalry moved up the bed of the stream, with orders to endeavour to catch the enemy as he retired across the ford by which he had crossed earlier in the day; but the hostile force kept well away on the west side of the valley, and the ground was so broken that the cavalry were unable to act against them. "Cease fire" was sounded at 3-30 P.M. The Seaforth



Highlanders halted for the night in Andak fort, and the remainder of the brigade with Divisional Head-Quarters bivouacked at Ghobani.

The total number of the enemy engaged was estimated at 3,000 to 4,000, composed of a miscellaneous gathering of Mamunds, Salarzais, some Mohmands, and a few inhabitants of Asmar and Kunar; and it is believed that Umra Khan was not present in person. The casualties on our side amounted to 1 British and 7 Native soldiers and 9 horses wounded. Twenty-eight shrapnel, 18 ring shell, and 23,385 rounds of Lee-Metford and Martini-Henry ammunition were expended during the action.

On the 18th April, the 2nd Brigade marched from the Panjkora bridge at 4 A.M., reaching Ghobani at 7 A.M., and an hour later both brigades advanced on Mundah and Miankalai, the former place being found deserted, while only a few Hindu traders remained in Miankalai. While the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were advancing, a reconnaissance was made by two squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers, to the foot of the Janbatai pass; a few supplies were found, and the people were apparently peaceably inclined. Up to this time no reliable information of what was occurring at Chitral had been received: it was believed that the place had supplies sufficient to last till the end of April, but as to how the garrison itself was situated no news could be obtained. Sir Robert Low therefore decided to send on the 3rd Brigade as rapidly as possible, and accordingly No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, the 1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment, the 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles, half No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and two sections of a Field Hospital, under Brigadier-General Gatacre marched to Barwa in the afternoon carrying seventeen days' supplies.

It now transpired that Umra Khan had passed the previous night at Mahyar, and, at about the same time as our troops entered the Jandol valley proper, had fled to Shahi on the hill above the Maskini valley, where he was joined by his family and Muhammad Shah Khan. Thence passing over the hills into Afghan territory, he took refuge with the Afghan Sipah Salar by whom he was sent on to Kabul. At this stage of the operations, when all serious opposition to the advance of the force had been overcome, it may not be out of place to describe the negotiations which had taken place between Umra Khan and Sir Robert Low. At Sado, on the 11th April, the day following the despatch of the first letter to Umra Khan (*vide* page 65), a note was received from Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, who were at that time in the village of Barwa; and on the same day the officer commanding the party working on the Panjkora reported that two men from Umra Khan had arrived on the bank of the river, stating that the Khan, who was said to be close behind, had no wish to fight, and that he would release the prisoners and accept any terms imposed. A native political assistant was sent across the river to receive the men, who eventually proved to be irresponsible messengers, but who in the meantime had crossed at another point. The native political assistant, not finding the messengers, went on to Mundah, and was received by Umra Khan who then sent for the British officers from Barwa; on their arrival, the Khan then sent Lieutenant Edwardes into camp at Sado on the 13th April, accompanied by the political assistant and his own agent.

Lieutenant Edwardes brought with him the following questions which he had taken down at Umra Khan's dictation:—

- (1) What have I done that Government is angry with me, and instead of friendship has inflicted so much loss? I can give written proofs in support of my

answers. (2) Information as to what conditions Government proposes to impose on me? (3) Until when will Government remain angry with me—until I die, or until I give up my country, or how long?

To which an answer was then sent in these words :

I have received from Lieutenant Edwardes the three questions which he took down in writing from you. You first ask what have I done that Government is angry with me, and instead of friendship has inflicted so much loss. I can give written proofs in support of my answers. The reply to this has been given in the letter from the Government of India, Foreign Office, which was despatched to you on the 18th of March last and received on your behalf by your brother, Muhammad Shah Khan, at Dir on 25th March. Secondly—information is asked for by you as to what conditions Government propose to impose on you. In reply to this I say that the General Officer Commanding, Chitral Relief Force, is pleased that you treated the British officers and prisoners with you with kindness, and that you have sent Lieutenant Edwardes to him in safety. He now imposes the following conditions, namely, that you shall deliver to him safe and sound Lieutenant Fowler and the remaining prisoners with you; that troops march through your territory unopposed to Chitral; and that you render such assistance as you are able in regard to supplies and agree to accept any further condition which the Government of India may impose in regard to the maintenance of a road to Chitral; and that under no circumstances will you in future interfere in the affairs of Chitral. I am to assure you that so long as you and your people are friendly to Government and commit no acts of hostility, you will not be disturbed in the possession of your hereditary country of Jandol, and no damage will be caused to your country or property. Thirdly—the third question you ask is until when will Government remain angry with me—until I die or until I give up my country, or how long? The reply to this is that the matter is in your own hands. On the delivery of the prisoners safe and sound, and the unopposed passage of troops through your country, Government will no longer be angry with you. Government are now compelled to despatch troops to Chitral to repair the damage which has been caused there by your disobedience of their orders not to interfere with Chitral; and the question as to whether Government is angry or pleased with you in future must depend on your future behaviour, namely, whether you act in accordance with their wishes or contrary to them. I inform you that the burning of villages in your "*ilaka*" of Jandol has been brought about by men from your country firing into our camp, and on to the road to the camp. In order that you may have an opportunity to comply with the terms above mentioned, the General Officer Commanding, Chitral Relief Force, has given orders for no further destruction of villages unless further acts of hostility are committed against his troops. In regard to the discussion of matters, it will be best that we should discuss them in person and not through a third party.

On the following day Umra Khan wrote asking for operations against him to be suspended while he thought matters over, but he was told that hostilities could not be delayed. As there appeared to be some reluctance on the part of Umra Khan to come to terms, Sir R. Low, acting in accordance with the instructions of the Viceroy, wrote a further letter to the Khan on the 15th April, informing him that as he had so long delayed in accepting the terms offered him on the 13th, those terms were now cancelled; and that until he delivered Lieutenant Fowler and the other prisoners safe into the hands of Sir Robert Low, no further intercourse would be held with him; and that the imposition of terms would rest entirely with the Government of India. On learning that this communication had been made to Umra Khan, the Government of India telegraphed as follows to Sir R. Low on the 15th April:—

Government of India have learned with satisfaction that you have cancelled your letter to Umra Khan. The Government of India are not prepared at present to offer to Umra Khan any terms except his unconditional submission. For your information I am to add that the terms to be ultimately arranged must depend first on Umra Khan having surrendered all his prisoners safe and sound, in which case you may guarantee that his life will be spared, and second on our ascertaining the real course of events in

Chitral and Umra Khan's responsibility for and participation in them. This cannot be ascertained until we have opened up communication with Robertson, and you will understand that nothing should delay the advance of your force to Chitral.

On the 16th April Lieutenant Fowler and the remaining prisoners arrived safely at Sado, bringing with them the following letter from Umra Khan:—

You wrote informing me that Government troops had arrived at my boundaries, and that if I wished to save my life and property from ruin,* I should make over to you the two English officers, and should submit to whatever conditions the Government of India might impose. I have now acted according to this writing: one of the two officers has already been sent in and the other whom I had kept only to advise me, I now send in with the Sahibzada. The conditions you write in your second letter I have accepted, and I have recalled my forces from Chitral. I was not present in the fight of Ranikojj (that of 13th April). On the strength of former services rendered by me, I ask that the Government troops may go to Chitral by some other road, because Jandol is near to other tribes. If any one should show hostility, I shall get into trouble. I shall be obliged by your granting this. If Government come by Jandol, I shall withdraw from Jandol, and when the Government troops have returned to Peshawar, I will return to Jandol. You may trust whatever the Sahibzada may tell you. I ask to be informed of such as is agreed to.

To this Sir Robert Low replied:—

I am glad that you have sent to me Lieutenant Fowler and the remaining prisoners. I have also received your letter, in which you say that you have accepted the terms laid down for you, but you are aware that I informed you by letter yesterday that the conditions laid down by me were cancelled owing to your delay in accepting them, and I can now only inform you that I have sent your letter to the Government of India for their consideration and for such orders as they may see fit to give.

In submitting this correspondence to the Government of India, Sir Robert Low asked to be informed what further reply should be sent, pointing out that Umra Khan had treated his prisoners well and had handed them over safely, adding: "If he is deprived of his hereditary position and property, Jandol will be a bone of contention between Nawagai, Dir and others, rendering maintenance of road to Chitral impracticable, except by our annexing the country. If no further reply is given him, he will probably abscond. I would suggest that Government assume as proved, his responsibility for affairs in Chitral, and instruct me definitely what terms are to be imposed, rather than leave him on our flanks and rear in a state of uncertainty, and possibly of hostility, as he is unlikely to surrender on guarantee of his life only. His remaining hostile without surrender may lead us indefinitely into expeditions against the Mamunds, Salarzais, and others."

In reply Sir Robert Low was instructed to inform Umra Khan that the only terms which he was authorised to offer to him were unconditional surrender coupled with an honourable asylum, if he (Umra Khan) wished, in India for himself, his family and a reasonable number of followers. At the same time Sir Robert Low was directed to make known to the Bajauris that if they offered no further opposition, their villages and property would be spared. Umra Khan had, however, fled to the Asmar border before these instructions were issued, and it was therefore decided that no further communication should be held with him unless he first made overtures.

* The Khan is referring to the first letter sent to him (vide page 65).

The whole of the leading men having gone off with Umra Khan, Sir Robert Low realised that it would be a difficult task to re-settle the Jandol valley, but steps were taken, as far as time would admit, to induce the cultivators to return to their villages. It was also evident that the valley presented a likely place where trouble might be expected from the Utman Khel, Nawagai, Mamund and Salarzai tribes, who were on the left flank of the line of advance, and who had not yet received a sufficiently severe lesson to keep them thoroughly in order. Up to this time the Nawagai Khan had rendered no assistance in the matter of supplies, nor had he taken any active steps to show that he appreciated the offer which had been made to him; he merely contented himself with maintaining an attitude of neutrality and made no effort to restrain others from joining against the troops or to prevent the Adda Mulla, whose hostile intentions were well known, from passing through his territory. Finally, instead of coming forward to meet the troops, the Khan had merely sent in the usual letters of friendship.

To revert now to the movements of the force. The distribution of the troops beyond the frontier on the evening of the 18th April was as follows:—

<i>Barwa</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Brigade Head-Quarters. No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain battery. 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment. 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles. Half No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners. 	} Part of 3rd Brigade.
<i>Mundah</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Divisional Head-Quarters. 11th Bengal Lancers. No. 3 Mountain Battery, R. A. 2 companies, 23rd Punjab Pioneers. 2nd Brigade. 1 squadron, Guides Cavalry. No. 8 Mountain Battery, R. A. 2nd Bn., Seaforth Highlanders. 25th Punjab Infantry. 	} Divisional troops.
<i>Sado</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 13th Bengal Infantry. Half No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners. Nos. 1 and 6 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners. 	} Remainder of 3rd Brigade.
<i>Gumbat</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 squadron, Guides Cavalry. 23rd Punjab Pioneers (6 companies). 	
<i>Uch</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 15th Sikhs (2 companies). 	
<i>Chakdara</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 15th Sikhs (6 companies). 	
<i>Khav</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1st Brigade, except 15th Sikhs. 2 squadrons, 9th Bengal Lancers. 1 squadron, Guides Cavalry. No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery. 	
<i>Malakand</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1st Bn., East Lancashire Regiment. 29th Punjab Infantry. Wing, 34th Punjab Pioneers. 	
<i>Foot of pass</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two companies, 30th Punjab Infantry. 	
<i>Dargai</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 15th Field Battery, R. A. Wing, 30th Punjab Infantry. Wing, 34th Punjab Pioneers. 	

On the 19th April the advanced portion of the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Gatacre, marched to the Janbatai pass (7,270 feet). It was hoped that Janbatai fort would have been reached by the evening, but the road proved long and very difficult, the result being that only five companies of the Gurkhas,

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, 2 Maxim guns, and three companies of the Buffs (East Kent Regiment) succeeded in reaching the bivouac, some two miles to the north of the summit of the pass, shortly after 6 P. M. Only a portion of the baggage reached the top of the pass that night, the rest parking at different places on the road where there was water and forage.

Leaving their bivouac at 12 noon on the following day, the troops marched to Bandai, about six miles, where the baggage caught them up. On the afternoon of this day (20th April), Brigadier-General Gatacre reported to Sir Robert Low that, according to news just received, the garrison of Chitral was reduced to great straits, and he suggested that he should push on with a small body of 500 men. To this Sir Robert Low consented, as being the only possible method of quickly passing through the intricate country the troops were then traversing, and apparently the only chance of rescuing the garrison. To support this small column the Seaforth Highlanders, with all the supplies that could be collected, were sent forward the following day from Kanbat, where they had arrived on the 20th, and arrangements were made for Divisional Head-Quarters and the remaining battalion of the 3rd Brigade (25th Punjab Infantry) to advance as soon as more supplies became available.

On the morning of the 21st, the troops at Bandai moved from bivouac in the following order, each of the detachments being followed by its baggage and supplies, with the intention of getting as far on the road to Dir as possible :—

At 5-30 A.M.—

½ No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners,
2nd Bn., 4th Gurkha Rifles,
2 guns, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery,
1 section, No. 19 Native Field Hospital.

At 9 A.M.—

1st Bn., East Kent Regiment,
2 guns, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery,
1 section, No. 8 British Field Hospital.

On the evening of the 21st the first portion of the column reached a point within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Dir, the rear portion marching as far as Chutiatan; and both columns concentrated at Dir on the 22nd.

In the meantime, while this advance was in progress, reassuring news regarding the situation at Chitral had been received; thus, on the night of the 20th it was learnt that the garrison was still holding out on the 17th; and on the 21st intelligence was obtained that Sher Afzal had abandoned the siege and had absconded. This information was sent in by the Khan of Dir who, after having been delayed for two days by a heavy snow-storm on the Laorai pass, had reached Kala Drosh and had occupied the fort there on the 18th April. Further confirmation of this news was received on the 22nd April. As soon as the news of the flight of Sher Afzal and the relief of Chitral was received, Brigadier-General Gatacre was instructed to advance less hurriedly and with due consideration for his troops; at the same time measures were taken, by utilising the services of the tribesmen, to close the passes leading to the Swat highlands, and the Khan of Dir was directed to capture Sher Afzal if possible.

On arrival at Dir, Brigadier-General Gatacre immediately began the making of a road up to the Laorai pass, and steps were taken to improve the Dir-Chutiatan road. On the 23rd April the Seaforth Highlanders arrived at Dir from their bivouac near Chutiatan, which they had reached on the previous

day from Zerani near the Janbatai pass, thus marching about 23 miles by a very difficult road. On the evening of the 22nd Brigadier-General Gatacre gave orders for a flying column consisting of the 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment (The Buffs), 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles, the two Maxim guns Devon Regiment, half No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, 1 Section, No. 8 British Field Hospital and 1 Section, No. 19 Native Field Hospital, to be ready to move out from Dir with ten days' supplies towards the Laorai pass (10,450 feet approximately). The route to Gujar, at the foot of the pass, lay for 11 miles up the Dir valley beside the tumbling snow-fed torrent that streams from the south side of the pass. The track was in general extremely difficult, frequently losing itself among the boulders that choked the bed of the stream, or rising steeply to traverse the face of a rocky bluff, only to fall again with equal abruptness on the further side. This portion of the road had to be realigned and reconstructed throughout, the river had to be bridged in some four or five places, and stone staircase ramps had to be built in the water at more than one point, to enable laden animals to pass where the stream washed the foot of precipitous cliffs. From Gujar (8,450 feet) to the summit of the pass, a distance of 3 miles, the track lay over frozen but often treacherous snow, at first at a fairly easy gradient but growing steeper and more slippery as the pass was approached. Beyond the crest a great snow cornice, 15 feet in height, overhung the head of the glen, down which the track descended for about 1,000 yards at a gradient of 1 in 3 or 4, over vast drifts of avalanche snow, in which great rocks and the uprooted trunks of gigantic trees lay deeply imbedded. From the foot of this descent the route lay down a steep and rocky gorge, now following the tangled bed of the torrent, now winding through fine forests of pine and cedar, or traversing open grassy slopes, clogged with the drainage of the melting snows. Above this richly-coloured belt of trees, rise pine-topped crag and rugged precipice, while dimly impending over all, the cloud-swept, snow-capped peaks perfect the grandeur of the scenery. About 3 miles from the pass, there is a delightful camping ground, called Ziarat, situated high above the torrent at an elevation of 7,200 feet and surrounded by a forest of pine trees. Onwards from Ziarat to Ashreth, a distance of about 6 miles, the character of the valley remains the same. Throughout its entire length of 23 miles, from Dir to Ashreth, the road was a mere goat-track, offering extraordinary difficulties to the passage of troops, and requiring extensive improvements before laden animals could follow it.


On the 22nd April Lieutenant Cockerill, Field Intelligence Officer, reconnoitred as far as the small village of Kolandi, 5 miles from Dir, and reported that the road was very bad and that the river required bridging at this point. The Sappers and Miners, with 2 companies of the Buffs, and 1 company of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkhas, as a working party, were therefore pushed on at 5.30 A.M. on the morning of the 23rd to improve the road, and construct the required bridge. Later in the day they were followed by two more companies of the Buffs with the section of No. 8 British Field Hospital, and the whole of the advanced party bivouacked for the night at lower Kolandi. On the 24th, General Gatacre having personally reconnoitred the Laorai pass, satisfied himself of the possibility of making the passage with the troops under his command, and the advanced party with the exception of the Field Hospital, marched 3½ miles to Mirga, bridging the river three times on the way; while the

ROUTE
GUJAR TO ZIARAT
VIA THE LAORAI PASS.

Scale 2 Inches = 1 Mile.

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other half battalion of the Buffs marched to lower Kolandi. On the 25th the 2-4th Gurkhas left Dir for Kolandi, while the troops at Kolandi and Mirga moved on to Gujar (a bleak, miserable spot at the foot of the snows, marked only by a few empty shepherds' huts) and were employed all day in clearing the track to the pass by removing fallen trees and rocks and cutting through the deep drifts of snow. Heavy rain fell, the weather was bitterly cold, and the troops, being without tents, passed a very comfortless night. At 3-30 A.M. on the morning of the 26th, the half company Sappers and Miners, and the company, 2-4th Gurkhas, accompanied by about 200 coolies, carrying light loads, and taking with them their baggage and all animals with the supplies, left their bivouac at Gujar in heavy rain to make the passage of the pass. Strong fatigue parties from the right wing of the Buffs, which was to remain at Gujar another night, were sent forward to assist the advance party which was followed later in the day by the head-quarters and left wing of the Buffs. Owing to the late appearance of the coolies, the unusual nature of the track, the many holes and pitfalls, the heavy rain, and the long single line of animals, the advanced-guard with leading mules did not reach the top of the pass till 7 A.M. Here a sharp thunderstorm accompanied by hail and sleet took place; a high wind was blowing and it was very cold; all combined tended to delay the crossing. The order of march was:—Advanced-guard of Sappers, tramping party of the Buffs, coolies with loads, main body of Sappers, equipment and baggage mules of Sappers divided into sections of 15 animals, accompanied by 10 Sappers as escort and baggage guard, followed by the company of the 2-4th Gurkhas, in similar order. Two additional companies of the Buffs were stationed along the line of ascent to assist struggling animals in the rifts, to mark dangerous spots and snow bridges, and to aid the column generally. On arrival at the summit of the pass, the half loads were completed to full ones, the track was beaten down as before by the advanced-guard and laden coolies, and the laden mules were turned loose singly on the steep descent described above. "As may be imagined," wrote General Gatacre in his interesting report, "animals travelling on such a slope were, in many cases, quite unable to control their pace or their loads, and at corners would frequently plunge into the soft snow and turn somersaults; at one point I saw 20 mules in succession slide on their haunches quite solemnly, some hundreds of feet, turn over in the snow and remain there till extricated by their escort; but there were no casualties, hardly a contusion, and the loss through broken boxes and rent bags was very trifling." Beyond the pass, progress was very slow owing to the difficulties of the road; and the Sappers and the company, 2-4th Gurkhas, did not reach Ashreth till about 7-30 P.M.; their baggage guard with the last animals came in at 9-30 P.M., while the Buffs, who moved from Gujar at 11 A.M., were unable to reach Ashreth at all that night, but were obliged to bivouac in detachments amongst the pine woods and in the river-bed, drawing up their supply animals as far as possible, and parking them in walled enclosures.

On the 27th, leaving 3 companies, 2-4th Gurkhas, to garrison Gujar, the remainder of the column, *i.e.*, half battalion the Buffs, and half battalion 2-4th Gurkhas, with the hospital sections and the two Maxim guns Devon Regiment, followed in the tracks of the advanced party, but struck out new lines of road and made diversions wherever it was found possible to improve on the

hasty track of the day previous. These detachments did not reach their camping-ground at Ashreth till 6 P.M., much of the roadway made the day before having been cut away by water or traffic. Meanwhile the Sappers and the company, 2-4th Gurkhas, moved on Badulgah, while the left wing of the Buffs advanced 2 miles beyond Ashreth.

It is interesting to note that during the crossing of the pass on the 26th April, not a man fell sick nor was a single mule injured, while on the 27th, only one mule was killed by having its leg broken in a rocky waterway on the pass. In forwarding the report of Brigadier-General Gatacre on the crossing of this pass, Sir Robert Low remarked :—

“The report shows the difficulties that had to be surmounted by the example and indomitable energy of Brigadier-General Gatacre, and the strength and endurance of the troops under his control; the passing of troops, stores, and animals over the pass in the state in which it then was, reflects the greatest credit on the 3rd Brigade.”


During the 28th and 29th April the men were employed in improving the road leading down from the pass to Badulgah, and on the 30th the whole column, with the exception of two companies of the 4th Gurkhas left at Ziarat, was concentrated at Ashreth, where it was ordered to remain pending further instructions, as with the capture of Sher Afzal, to be related below, peace had been re-established in Chitral.

It has been stated on page 75 that the Khan of Dir was instructed on the 21st April to capture Sher Afzal if possible. In pursuance of these instructions the Khan, having heard that Sher Afzal and his party had been surrounded in Bashkar, proceeded thither in person, and on the evening of the 27th April he brought into the head-quarters camp at Dir, Sher Afzal and his son, Muhammad Afzal Beg, Danial Beg, Kokand Beg, Yadgar Beg and Inayat Shah, with several other leading Chitralis and a number of men, women, and children, some 900 persons in all. Sir Robert Low having proposed to Government that Sher Afzal and the principal men captured should be sent to India, and that they should be assured of an honourable asylum being given them, received the following reply—

Viceroy desires me to congratulate you on success of steps you have taken to secure capture of Sher Afzal. Your action has the complete approval of the Government of India, whose acknowledgments you may convey to the Khan of Dir for assistance rendered by him. The Governor General in Council thinks it inexpedient to make Sher Afzal and his companions the same offer as was made to Umra Khan, who was not in our power, and had acted honourably to our men in his hands. These men are prisoners, taken with arms in their hands, and at least suspected of complicity in acts of treachery and cruelty to our officers and men. We think they should be told that Government have no wish to deal harshly with them, but until the facts of the recent transactions in Chitral are fully known, cannot decide how far they are individually or collectively responsible. That therefore they must be treated as prisoners of war and conveyed to India pending the enquiry which will be instituted.

On the 29th April the majority of the prisoners were sent back to Chitral, and on the 1st May the following were despatched as prisoners to India:—Sher Afzal, Kokand Beg, Yadgar Beg, Danial Beg, Muhammad Afzal Beg and Inayat Shah; and later Sher Afzal's daughter, the widow of Nizam-ul-Mulk, followed them. Muhammad Isa, who was mainly concerned in the treachery practised against Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler at Reshun, still remained in hiding in the Shishi Kuh.

While the events above described had been in progress the following movements had taken place. The divisional head-quarters moved from Mundah



LAORAI PASS SHOWING NORTH SIDE.

No. 1,165-L. 96.

J. S. Expo. Dy. 570 (1929)
Gen. C. S. G. September 1896.



to Janbatai on the 20th April, and next day the 11th Bengal Lancers were withdrawn from Mundah into the Swat valley owing to the lack of forage in Jandol. On the 22nd April, the 3rd Mountain Battery, R. A., left Mundah to join the 3rd Brigade, while two companies of the 4th Sikhs marched to Kanbat, and two companies formed a post at Janbatai, the remaining companies of the battalion reinforcing these detachments a few days later. The remainder of the 2nd Brigade halted at Mundah for the rest of the month. On the 23rd April the divisional head-quarters left Janbatai for Dir, arriving at the latter place on the 25th of the month.

Reconnaissances were made in various directions on the flank of the main line of advance. Of these the principal were to the Bajaur valley, the Mashkini valley, the Maidan valley, and the Panjkora valley. In the course of the last mentioned Captain Robertson, Field Intelligence Officer, was suddenly attacked by one of his escort—a man from Dir, and severely wounded before he could defend himself. His assailant was subsequently apprehended and executed.

In order to complete the description of the military operations on this side of the theatre, mention must briefly be made of the state of affairs on the Line of communications. From the 4th April the 1st Brigade remained halted near Khar; and from the 8th, for reasons already given on page 65, all troops between Uch and Hoti Mardan were placed under the command of Brigadier-General Kinloch. The troops of the 1st Brigade were employed in collecting material for a trestle bridge over the Swat river, in improving the road between the Malakand and Chakdara, and in making the walled village of Nawa Kala into a defensible depôt for stores. Reconnaissances were made to the Shakot and Laram passes, and down the Swat river to its junction with the Panjkora. No opposition was anywhere encountered, and from the 7th, the date of the action at the Swat river crossing, the valley remained perfectly quiet. No. 15 Field Battery, Royal Artillery, which had proceeded as far as Dargai early in the month, was about this time ordered to return to Nowshera, field artillery not being required at the front.

A trestle bridge over the Swat river was commenced on the 8th April and completed on the 15th. It was 1,350 feet in total length, and $5\frac{1}{2}$ feet wide; the height of the roadway was fixed at 6 feet above the level of the water on the 9th April, and a uniform span of 12 feet between the trestles was adopted. The timber for its construction was obtained by demolishing a native fort and some villages in the neighbourhood. With constant repair and frequent substitution of new and heavier trestles, this bridge successfully withstood two floods, but finally collapsed on the 26th June. It was evident from the first that such a temporary structure could not be depended upon to withstand heavy floods, and it was therefore decided to build a suspension bridge; as, however, this would be an extensive work involving a considerable time for construction, the ontoon train was ordered up from Rurki, so as to secure this weak link in the lines of communication pending the completion of the suspension bridge. The pontoons with superstructure were successfully moved over the Malakand pass, the pontoons on trucks being hauled over the pass by hand and thence dragged to Chakdara by bullocks and by elephants taken from the heavy battery at Campbellpore. This bridge was established on the 4th May, and

was practically maintained throughout the whole of the operations ; it rendered service of great value in enabling wheeled transport to be used beyond the Swat river and the manner in which it was maintained in a very rapid current was both remarkable and creditable. The suspension bridge was commenced on the 19th April, and was ready for foot traffic on the 8th June ; six days later it was available for transport. Its total length was 948 feet, with two suspension spans of 250 and 110 feet, respectively, over the two main channels of the river.

On the 23rd April the Quarter-Master General in India submitted for the sanction of Government a scheme (*vide* appendix XII) for the lines of communication, under an officer of the rank of Major-General to command from the base to the advance depôt, under Field Service Manual, Part XI, paragraph 50. The object of appointing an officer of the rank of Major-General was to ensure his being senior to all Brigadier-Generals in case their brigades might be extended along the lines of communication or in case of its being necessary to form movable columns. Major-General E. Stedman, C.B., was accordingly appointed to command the line then existing, which was divided into four sections, No. 1, Base to the Panjkora, No. 2, Panjkora to Dir, No. 3, Dir to Ashreth, No. 4, Ashreth to Chitral. Major-General Stedman arrived at Nowshera on the 28th April and took up his duties, which were defined in divisional orders of the 29th as under :—

- (a).—He (Major-General Stedman) will be in immediate command, under the Lieutenant General Commanding the Force, of the base and lines of communication up to and including Bandai.*
- (b).—He will be in immediate command of the whole of the troops within the above mentioned limits, namely, of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, the line of communications troops, and such of the Divisional troops as are attached to them ; Brigadiers and Officers commanding the posts concerned making all reports to him.
- (c).—The Divisional Commissariat and Transport officers, the Special Transport officer, the Special Forage officer, and the Divisional Ordnance officer will report direct to him, and will be at his disposal. These officers will place themselves in communication with General Stedman at once.

The troops of the Relief Force had now arrived in Chitral territory, Chitral fort had been relieved, the British prisoners who were in Umra Khan's hands had been restored to freedom, Umra Khan himself was a fugitive, and Sher Afzal was our prisoner ; the main objects of the expedition had thus been accomplished, and Sir Robert Low received the following congratulatory telegrams :—

From—The Adjutant-General in India,

Chief desires me to convey his hearty congratulations on the success that has so far attended your efforts in the completion of the task allotted to you. The gallantry and dash displayed by officers and men in action, both British and Native, fill him with admiration, while the spirit with which all have endured the hardships and privation incidental to this campaign is equally praiseworthy. He regrets the loss of the brave officers and men who have fallen, and trusts that every success will follow your future operations.

From—Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

I am directed to convey to you and to the gallant troops under your command the warm congratulations of the Governor General in Council upon the successful issue of your operations in relief of Chitral. The primary object of the Government of India in

* On the 8th May, Major-General Stedman's command was extended to Dir inclusive, where the advanced Commissariat depôt had been formed.

sending the Chitral Relief Force under your command has been attained within the time which they calculated as necessary and with uniform success and skill.

From—Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy.

Pray convey to my brave troops my admiration of their gallantry and endurance, my sorrow at the loss of valuable lives, and anxiety for the recovery of the wounded and sick.

Sir Robert Low in his despatch of the 1st May 1895,* gave an account of the operations since the date of crossing the frontier, and, in submitting this despatch to the Government of India, the Commander-in-Chief expressed his concurrence with Sir Robert Low's remarks on the admirable spirit displayed by officers and men in this expedition.

* See Appendix XVI, p. lxx.

CHAPTER VII.

Events from the 1st of May until the withdrawal of the Relief Force.

The state of affairs in Chitral immediately after the relief of the garrison was not altogether satisfactory : the population was almost entirely in sympathy with Sher Afzal, and manifested an extreme dislike of the British. Disquieting rumours as to impending disturbances in the country between Mastuj and Gilgit were prevalent about the middle of May, but they proved exaggerated or unfounded, and no further trouble was experienced in this direction. The despatch of our troops towards Chitral through Swat and Bajaur had moreover quite cowed the people ; and after the capture of Sher Afzal and his deportation to India became known, they began to settle down, and many of the Adamzadas came in to do homage to the provisional Mehtar, Shuja-ul-Mulk.

The Gilgit column had remained halted at Chitral as already observed in Chapter III, after the relief of the fort ; the presence of this force under Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly was deemed an inadequate assertion of our military supremacy ; but it was also considered expedient to complete and maintain communication by the Peshawar route, pending a decision as to our future policy and action. Sir Robert Low was accordingly directed on the 1st May, to send on to Chitral one British,* two Native battalions, and a mountain battery ; but, owing to the scarcity of supplies in the Chitral valley, and the necessity of leaving the standing crops for the use of the inhabitants, he was subsequently instructed to send on the 1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment, and one mountain battery only ; the remainder of the troops, with the exception of those required on the lines of communication and for convoy duty, being moved south of the Laorai pass. In pursuance of these instructions orders for the following movements were issued on the 10th May. The Buffs, Derajat Mountain battery and 4th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, taking with them 10 days supplies to march at once to Chitral : the 4th Gurkhas to be distributed along the line of communication from Broz to Ziarat ; the 25th Punjab Infantry to hold Dir with a detachment at Gujar ; and the Seaforth Highlanders to occupy Bandai, and Janbatai, one company of the battalion (then at Gairat) accompanying the Head-Quarters of the force as escort to Chitral.

The troops detailed in the first portion of these orders, together with a company of the 4th Gurkhas, reached Chitral on the 15th, where Sir Robert Low arrived on the morning of the 16th. The troops under the command of Brigadier-General W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O, together with a portion of the garrison of the fort during the siege, and the Gilgit column, were drawn up in readiness to receive Sir Robert Low, who was met on the parade-ground by the British Agent and the boy Shuja-ul-Mulk.

After inspecting the troops, Sir Robert Low formed them into three sides of a square and addressed them as follows :—

This parade is a very remarkable one. The troops that composed the garrison of Chitral are present, and they are supported on the right by the troops under Colonel Kelly, who marched to relieve the Chitral garrison from Gilgit ; and on the left, by troops of the 3rd Brigade of the Chitral Relief Force, who are representatives of the large expeditionary force despatched by the Government of India, through Swat, Bajaur, and Dir, to the relief of the Chitral garrison.

* The distribution and strength of the Chitral Relief Force on this date will be found in Appendix XV.

Each man here has received the congratulations of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress, and I need not enlarge on the work which you have all done; but I may tell the Chitral garrison that the manner in which the defence of Chitral was conducted, and the devoted gallantry of the defenders, is the pride and admiration of all their comrades in the army, and that the defence of Chitral will be recorded in history as one of the most brilliant achievements of the troops of the Indian and Kashmir armies. I may likewise tell Colonel Kelly and the troops which he led so resolutely, that his march to Chitral is regarded as an example of what troops can do when led with the determination of overcoming every obstacle.

It would no doubt have been more satisfactory to all of us if Umra Khan had decided to make his final stand at this place, and had been attacked simultaneously by Colonel Kelly from the north, and by the troops under General Gatacre from the south, but our enemies do not usually act as we desire, and, as you all know, the Khan preferred to withdraw and fight in the Jandol valley, thereby causing a delay of some days in pushing forward troops to Chitral itself; and I calculate that, even with General Gatacre's inexhaustible energy, he could not have reached Chitral before the 25th of April, while Colonel Kelly and his troops arrived on the 20th of April. The honour of being the first to arrive in Chitral will always remain with Colonel Kelly, and the troops he led so well.

Of the part taken by the troops under my command I need not speak on this occasion, but I take the opportunity of thanking General Gatacre and the troops of the 3rd Brigade for the splendid work which they have done on the lines of communication ever since we learnt that Chitral had been relieved and the garrison was safe, and that there was no necessity for a hurried advance. The energies of every man in the 3rd Brigade have been given to road-making and bridge-making, and the result is a marvel of what our troops can do. I do not believe that the troops of any other nation could do such work in an enemy's country, and with field service equipment, as has been done by the 3rd Brigade between Dir and Chitral.

Having selected sites for the proposed new fort and bridge and made arrangements for passing Amir-ul-Mulk down the line, on deportation to India, Sir Robert Low left on the 18th for the Janbatai pass, where he arrived on the 28th.

On the 10th May the Government of India sanctioned the formation of a 4th Brigade of the Relief Force, composed of the troops hitherto detailed for duty on the Lines of Communication. The brigade, placed under the command of Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., with Captain G. J. Younghusband, Corps of Guides, as his Brigade-Major, consisted of:—1 squadron 9th Bengal Lancers; 1st Battalion East Lancashire Regiment; 29th Punjab Infantry and 30th Punjab Infantry.

About the middle of May* the King's Royal Rifles and the Bedfordshire regiment took up summer quarters on the Laram pass, while a wing of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and a wing of the Gordon Highlanders, marched from Mundah to the Janbatai pass. On the 24th May the troops belonging to the

* It may be recorded here that during May the number of animals employed at each stage on the road under the stage system, which had been recently introduced, was as follows:—

At Dargai	1,250 camels	} In addition, hired bullocks and 400 of the mules of the reserve brigade worked on this section. Maundage animals also worked up to Mundah.
" Khar	1,250 "	
" Chakdara	1,200 "	
" Serai	1,250 "	
" Panjkora bridge	1,250 camels.	
" Mundah	1,250 camels.	
" Kanbat	3,000 mules and ponies.	
" Bandai	1,500 donkeys.	
" Dir	1,800 mules and donkeys.	
" Gujar	660 donkeys.	
" Ziarat	330 "	
" Ashreth	660 "	
" Drosh	500 mules.	
" Gairat	450 "	
" Broz	400 "	
" Chitral	200 "	

Gilgit command started on their way back to Mastuj and the Gilgit district, the Chitral garrison and the escort of the Assistant British Agent at Chitral being supplied by five companies of the 4th Gurkhas from the 3rd Brigade. The remaining troops of this brigade north of the Laorai were distributed, on the 29th, as follows: three companies 4th Gurkha Rifles between Broz and Gairat; the East Kent Regiment along the line from Drosh to Ziarat, with the Derajat Mountain Battery at the latter place, while the 4th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, was employed in improving the Dir-Chitral road.

During June various movements of minor importance took place, which need not here be detailed; and certain changes occurred in the composition of the different brigades, so that on the 1st July the following organisation was published in divisional orders.

	<i>1st Brigade.</i>	
11th Bengal Lancers.		1st Bn., K.R. Rifle Corps.
No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.		29th Punjab Infantry.
1st Bn., Bedfordshire Regt.		37th Dogras.
	<i>2nd Brigade.</i>	
Guides Cavalry.		4th Sikh Infantry
2nd Bn., K.O. Scottish Borderers.		13th Bengal Infantry.
1st Bn., Gordon Highlanders.		Guides Infantry.
	<i>3rd Brigade.</i>	
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.		25th Punjab Infantry.
1st Bn., East Kent Regt. (The Buffs).		2nd Bn., 4th Gurkha Rifles.
2nd Bn., Seaforth Highlanders.		
	<i>4th Brigade.</i>	
* squadron, 9th Bengal Lancers.		30th Punjab Infantry.
1st Bn., East Lancashire Regt.		2nd Bn., 3rd Gurkha Rifles.
	<i>Divisional Troops.</i>	
No. 4 Co., Bengal Sappers and Miners.		23rd Punjab Pioneers.
	<i>Lines of Communication.</i>	
Nos. 3 and 8 Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery.		15th Sikhs.
No. 1 Co., Bengal Sappers and Miners.		34th Punjab Pioneers.
No. 6 " " " "		Pontoon Section, R.E.
No. 6 " Madras " "		Engineer Field Park.

The distribution of the force on this date is given in Appendix V.

During July work was commenced on the Panjkora route, and on the 15th of the month Sir Robert Low left Dir and marched by that route to the Laram pass, where he remained till the 9th August. By the end of July the road had been rendered practicable throughout, and the Government approved the abandonment of the Baraul valley and the adoption of the Panjkora route as the line of communication. All troops were therefore directed to be removed from Jandol to the left bank of the Panjkora as soon as circumstances would admit; and accordingly, on the 8th August, they were withdrawn from Banda, and Surbat in Baraul, for location in the Panjkora valley, while those posted at the Janbatai pass and Kanbat were concentrated at Mundah on the 10th preparatory to withdrawal from Jandol.

On the 9th August, Divisional Head-Quarters left the Laram pass for Sado and reached that place on the 10th: Sir Robert Low visited Mundah on the 12th and returned to the Panjkora on the following day. On the latter date, the 13th Bengal Infantry proceeded from the Panjkora bridge to take up their posts in the Panjkora valley as far as Warai, and the troops began the evacuation of the Jandol valley, which was completed on the 15th August, when the whole of them were withdrawn to the left bank of the Panjkora.

About the 14th August, the Bedfordshire Regiment, East Lancashire Regiment, Guides Infantry, and No. 6 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, began their return march to India. The 4th Brigade was broken up on the 15th, the troops being transferred to the 1st Brigade, the command of which was taken over by Brigadier-General Hammond from Brigadier-General Kinloch, who was at this time transferred to the Peshawar District. The reserve brigade at Hoti Mardan broke up on the 17th, and the staff officers left the same day to join their permanent appointments. The Abbottabad movable column had commenced to demobilise on the 10th August.

On the 16th August, Sir Robert Low and Divisional Head-Quarters returned from the Panjkora to the Laram pass; while the head-quarters of the 2nd Brigade, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, Gordon Highlanders, and No. 3 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, moved to Barchanrai. Steps were also taken to bring the troops of the permanent garrisons as near to their new posts as possible; and on the 17th the troops returning to India began to move down the line, their places being taken by troops detailed for Chitral. Consequently, from the 18th August all troops at and beyond Serai and Barchanrai up to Chitral, were placed under the direct command of Sir Robert Low; while all troops moving towards the base were to come under command of the General Officer commanding the Lines of Communication, on leaving Serai or on arrival at the Laram, as the case might be. The distribution of the troops on the 19th August is given in Appendix XV.

Throughout the month of August supplies and stores were continually being pushed forward to Chitral, and by the end of the month the greater portion of the required amount was either at, or in course of transit to, Drosh.

On the 4th September Lieutenant-Colonel H. D. Hutchinson assumed command of the troops in Chitral, and from that date the troops composing the Chitral garrison ceased to form part of the Relief Force. On the same day the East Kent regiment having reached Laram, was transferred from the 3rd to the 1st Brigade, and on the following day the 4th Gurkhas were transferred to the divisional troops; while, the Seaforth Highlanders, and No. 8 Mountain Battery having marched from Serai for India, and the 25th Punjab Infantry having joined the Chitral garrison, the 3rd Brigade ceased to exist and its staff was ordered to demobilise.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief left Simla for the Swat valley on the 6th September, and arrived at Malakand on the 8th; he inspected the troops there and also at the Khar post on the 9th, and on the following day he proceeded to Laram, inspecting the troops at Chakdara and Biran *en route*. After inspecting the troops at Laram on the 11th, His Excellency left that place on the 12th for Barchanrai, whence, accompanied by Sir Robert Low, he returned direct to the Malakand, subsequently leaving for India on the morning of the 14th. On this date the East Kent regiment marched from Laram for India, and on the 5th September, Divisional Head-Quarters rejoined Sir Robert Low at the Malakand.

On the 16th September, the General Officer commanding the Lines of Communication issued the necessary orders for the withdrawal of the troops (see Appendix XX). On the 18th the last convoy for Chitral left Gujar, and on the following day the troops holding the Gujar post moved back to Dir. In order to enable the dates fixed for the withdrawal to be adhered to, and to permit of the transport animals being sent back, political arrangements were

made for forwarding to Chitral, through the agency of the Kaka Khels, such stores as remained. The final retirement commenced on the 20th, and was accomplished without trouble or disturbance of any kind. The telegraph line from Drosh to Chakdara was dismantled between the 19th and the 26th, the stores being placed partly at Drosh, partly at Dir in charge of the Khan, and partly at the Chakdara post, where they are available in the event of the line being reconstructed in the future.

On the 25th September, all troops north of Nowshera were placed under the orders of the General Officer commanding the Lines of Communication, and on the 28th the Divisional Head-Quarters demobilised at Nowshera. On relinquishing command of the force, Sir Robert Low issued the following special order:—

In taking leave of the Chitral Relief Force on its demobilisation, the Lieutenant-General Commanding avails himself of the occasion to place on record his high appreciation of the fine services of the troops whom it has been his privilege to command in the field for the past six months.

The storming of the difficult and obstinately held Malakand pass, the victorious engagement at the Amandara defile*, the brilliant passage of the Swat river, the gallant fight on the Panjkora, the final overthrow of Umra Khan, and the relief of the beleaguered garrison of Chitral, which these operations made possible, are achievements which have added to the reputation of the British army, and of which every man who took part in them may well be proud. The admirable spirit of this force has been not less clearly shown in other ways throughout the six months over which its operations have extended. An unexampled amount of manual labour has fallen upon the troops; they have been exposed with little shelter to cold and wet, and to long-continued and excessive heat; while they have had constant and heavy duties by day and night; and it gives Sir Robert Low the greatest pleasure to place on record that they have uniformly evinced discipline, devotion to duty, and a martial spirit, which can hardly be too highly commended. Their good behaviour, and especially their good conduct towards the people of the country which they have overrun, are illustrated by the fact that the people in question are now earnestly petitioning Government for their retention among them. In short, all ranks in this force may feel assured that they are worthy to stand in the places of those who have gone before them in the British army, and no greater praise than this could be given them.

These remarks would be incomplete if a word were not said about that useful and much-enduring class, the followers, to whom the fighting men of the army of India owe so much. These men have worked and conducted themselves in the most admirable manner throughout the campaign, and it is most satisfactory to know that they have been well cared for, and that there have been relatively few casualties among them.

In conclusion Sir Robert Low bids farewell, with all good wishes, to all ranks of the Chitral Relief Force, to have commanded which will ever be a source of pride to him.

On the 27th September Brigadier-General H. G. Waterfield assumed command of the Malakand Brigade and of all troops remaining across the frontier, and the office of the General Officer commanding the Lines of Communication was closed at Nowshera on the 5th October.

Sir Robert Low's final despatch will be found in Appendix XVI; p. lxxix and returns of casualties in the actions fought on the 3rd, 4th, 7th, 13th, 14th and 17th April, are given in Appendix XVII. The Government General Order, together with other correspondence relative to the operations of the Chitral Relief Force, has been reproduced in Appendix XVI. Extracts from the reports on the commissariat-transport arrangements, field telegraph and post office, signalling, survey, and engineering operations, on the working of the veterinary department and on the lines of communication, will also be found in the appendices.

* Otherwise spoken of as the action at Khar.

Having thus briefly described the movements of the troops from the commencement of May until the withdrawal of the force, it will not be out of place to give some description of the state of the country and its inhabitants during the same period. After the relief of Chitral, at the end of April, no further opposition of any magnitude was organized by the tribesmen, but in the Jandol* valley shots were frequently fired into the camps, while attacks on individuals and thefts of telegraph wire† were of continual occurrence up to the time the force was withdrawn. Thus, from the 2nd to the 31st of May, telegraphic communication was interrupted no less than 17 times, and about 2,000 yards of telegraph wire were stolen or destroyed. At 1 A.M., on the 15th May, a sentry of the King's Own Scottish Borderers was shot dead at Mundah; and at about the same time a party of swordsmen attacked some unarmed Hazara coolies who were sleeping close to a picquet of the 4th Sikhs at Kanbat, killing 4 men and wounding 23, of whom 3 died shortly afterwards.

There appeared no reason at first to attribute this state of things to causes other than the disorder then existing in the valley, and to the display of sympathy with Umra Khan by certain of his followers, who had not yet settled down in their homes, and by certain of his allies, more especially the Mamunds. Subsequently, however, these outrages developed into attempts to attack camps by parties varying in strength from 80 to 300 men, which pointed to causes other than those just mentioned. At this time, too, there were other indications which gave rise to a suspicion that serious trouble was brewing: one of these was the absence of all efforts to cultivate the land in the valley, and the other was the anxiety of some of the Peshawar people, who were employed in collecting supplies on the lines of communication, to be allowed to return to their homes. Steps were taken for enforcing, as far as possible, the good behaviour of the inhabitants, by arresting the leading religious characters and by inflicting fines on the villages, which were realised principally in grain and cattle. The question of cultivating the lands was peremptorily dealt with, and in less than a fortnight the valley presented a different appearance. In the absence of better men, Sajad Ahmad and his cousin Sher Afzal of Shahi, relations of Umra Khan, were made use of in working a system of tribal police. The arrest of the religious characters led to deputations on their behalf being sent to the Shamozaïs (Utman Khel) and the Lower Salarzais, whose *jirgas* promptly came in; and it was now realized that extensive intrigues had been, and were, at work amongst all the tribes around the Jandol valley, with a view to raising them against Government. The Adda Mulla, with the consent, though without the active co-operation, of the Manki Mulla, had sedulously impressed on inhabitants of Nawagai, the Utman Khels, Salarzais, Mamunds, and Chaharmungis, that Government intended to annex their country, to disarm the people, and to assess their lands with revenue. At the same time the Kabuli Mulla, Haji Ahmad Ali, had similarly disturbed Buner to such an extent that the men had sent their women and children to the hills, and had occupied the passes giving access to their territory. A letter was therefore sent to the Bunerwals by Major Deane, and this had the effect of dispersing and quieting them.

* From about the middle of April to the date of the withdrawal of the force, the total number of killed and wounded in these numerous outrages amounted to 2 British soldiers and 49 followers killed; and 1 British, 2 native soldiers, and 47 followers wounded. Nineteen men who had committed fanatical attacks were arrested and executed, and 6 men were known to have been wounded by sentries.

† The telegraph material stolen or destroyed during the expedition amounted to 4,490 yards of wire, 8 posts and 75 insulators: the greater portion of this damage was done in the Jandol valley.

The fanatical party in the Bajaur neighbourhood also was undoubtedly obtaining the upper hand, and the Mamunds being openly hostile, the only means of maintaining the peace was to pursue such a course as would compel the malcontents to make overtures to Government; to abandon, in short, all attempts to conciliate them by inviting visits from, and subsidising, their *jirgas*. Efforts on our part to get their *jirgas* to come in would have created suspicion, and would have been unsuccessful, because of the opposition of those amongst the tribes who were interested in bringing about a disturbance. Moreover, there was no time to interview all the *jirgas* concerned, and delay might have meant the tribes being worked upon sufficiently to undertake combined hostilities against the Government. The Shamozaï and Lower Salarzai *jirgas* were, however, interviewed by Major Deane on the 1st June, and left, begging for time to visit the Mamunds and others. As a result of their interview, two days later the Upper Salarzais with Khalid Khan and the Khan of Pashat came in, and after learning our views they too left asking for time to visit the Mamunds. A letter also was now sent to the Khan of Nawagai, ordering him to attend and to explain why he had allowed raids against our troops to be made from his borders. On receipt of this letter, he commenced to make some display of energy, joining the *jirgas* and collecting those of all the tribes implicated, and on the 11th June he came into Mundah, where Sir Robert Low had arrived from the Janbatai pass two days previously.

The Khan and the *jirgas* were then interviewed and told plainly what was expected of them: at the same time the opportunity was taken to reassure them as to the intentions of Government in regard to the annexation of their country, disarmament, and the imposition of revenue. Their manner entirely changed on being assured that their suspicions were groundless, and on learning that Government had no desire to appoint a Khan over them. They asked that our intentions might be put into writing, so that they might show it to their own people, and they were given the following note:—

The Khan of Nawagai, with the Shamozaï, Salarzai, Mamund, and Chaharmungi *jirgas*, came in to-day and were interviewed. They were given to understand that the mischief and trouble caused by their tribes must cease. They have promised to do their utmost in the matter and to stop further trouble, and that they will arrest offenders and burn their houses. Finding that it had been impressed on the minds of the tribes that Government intends annexation of their country, to disarm the people, and impose payment of revenue on them, I explained that this is false, and that Government does not intend in any way to interfere with the independence of the tribes, but that Government desires they should remain quietly in their homes and carry on their ordinary occupation, and protect their own boundaries, so that evil-disposed men may be prevented from committing mischief. If these tribes act in accordance with the above, Government will not interfere with their country; but if they act to the contrary, they will be themselves to blame for whatever may happen.

After the interview with the *jirgas*, outrages became less frequent in the Jandol valley; and, considering that that this part of the country is filled with a fanatical element, there was not more trouble than might have been expected. Having thus disposed of these matters Sir Robert Low left Mundah for the Janbatai pass on the 12th June, and, on the 14th Divisional Head-Quarters moved to Bandai *en route* for Mirga, reaching that place on the 16th of the month.

In addition to the foregoing troubles several outrages were also perpetrated in the Baraul valley; but they were the work of men from Asmar, and it was not practicable to stop offences by these people without making reprisals, which

might have caused considerable complications. About 1 A.M., on the morning of the 19th June, the picquet on the west of the Bandai camp was aroused by a sentry hearing a noise in the mule lines. The picquet turned out, but finding the noise had ceased turned in again. At daybreak, however, it was discovered that nine mule drivers had been cut up, five of whom were dead, one died shortly afterwards, and the three others were seriously wounded. Several other followers were murdered about this time, and convoys were frequently fired on. Men from Asmar were also concerned in the offences committed in the Jandol and Talash valleys.

When the withdrawal of our troops into the Panjkora valley (see page 84) had been completed, about the middle of August the Jandol headmen, the son of the Khan of Nawagai, the Pashat Khan, and the Salarzai and Shamozaï *jirgas* attended at Sado, and reported that they had carried out the orders given to them, their men had lined the hills around the valley and, to prevent the least misunderstanding, they had forbidden even the customary firing of guns at marriage festivals in the neighbourhood during the retirement. For a week before the retirement took place not a shot was fired, nor was Government property in any way interfered with. Instead of making attempts to remove all signs of our occupation of the country, by breaking down the bridge over the Panjkora, the tribes not only asked that the bridge might be left standing, but went so far as to make proper arrangements for preventing its being used by ill-disposed people. Many *jirgas* from the Utman Khel people, with whom we had not previously come in contact, came in also about this time.

About the middle of July the Amir had deported to Peshawar several of Umra Khan's relations, together with their families and servants; in all 114 persons. In a letter to the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division, His Highness wrote that these people had asked to be allowed to return to Bajaur, but thinking that this might create disturbances there, he had refused to agree to it and had sent them to Peshawar. Thence they were forwarded to Sir Robert Low's camp, whence they were at once despatched to Jandol. On the 13th August the lands in Jandol were assigned to them as follows:—Barwa to Saiad Ahmad Khan; Satbar to Sher Afzal; Shahi to Muhammad Zaman Khan's sons; Chauda to Mir Hasan Khan; Damtal to Zanulla Khan; Tor to Mir Afzal Khan; Mundah to Abdul Majid Khan; Kaskothi to Abdul Ghani Khan and other cousins; and Maskini to Muhammad Shah Khan's family. Needless to say, this arrangement did not please all of them, but as they were unable to settle the matter amicably between themselves, it became necessary to give them orders as to what they were to do. This was the only feasible course, short of nominating one man as Khan of Jandol, and giving over to him land which belonged to other members of the family; and in that case it would also have been necessary to support the nominee with a gift of rifles and an allowance. It may be mentioned here that the British Agent at Kabul subsequently reported that Muhammad Shah Khan also wished to come to India, but that the Amir had detained him, pending reference to the Government of India. The Viceroy thanked His Highness for his consideration for their wishes, and at the same time informed him that permission would likewise be given to Muhammad Shah Khan to return to Jandol, if the Amir thought fit to send him to Peshawar. The Amir replied that he would send him, and he arrived at Peshawar on the 24th August, but he refused at first to go to Bajaur and live at Maskini, though afterwards he became more reasonable and left Malakand for Maskini on the 14th September.

On the 11th September final arrangements were entered into with the Khan of Dir for maintaining the road through his territory from Chakdara to Ashreth, the details of which will be found in Appendix IV. In addition to the annual allowance sanctioned in this agreement, the Khan of Dir received a present of ₹25,000 for his services on our behalf during the previous six months; and a sum of ₹28,000 was also sanctioned for the construction of levy posts on the line Chakdara-Laorai pass, while a separate payment of ₹1,500 a month was made for postal arrangements. An allowance of ₹6,000 a year was also made to the Khan of Nawagai, Sir Robert Low expressing his opinion that this sum represented the maximum outcome of his conditional promise to the Khan at the commencement of the operations. It will be remembered that the attitude of this Khan during the first period of the operations was far from satisfactory: although he at no time took any active part against the troops, yet by his actions at a later period in assisting to maintain peace in the Jandol valley, he showed what it would have been possible for him to have done at an earlier date, had he not feared that Umra Khan would remain in Jandol, and had he not submitted to fanatical pressure.

The Khans, Khan Khels, and Ranizais of Swat and Ranizai had also made petitions (see Appendix V) for the assistance of Government to enable them to keep open the road through their country and to maintain internal peace; and the Adinzais of the Uch valley, with the people of the Talash valley, had not only asked that troops might remain in their country but that Government would take over the administration. Oppressed for years past by the Khans of Dir, and later by Umra Khan, they had experienced during the occupation of their country by our troops a peace hitherto unknown to them; the whole population of these valleys came *en masse* to Chakdara, and were most importunate on the subject. They were informed that the Government had already proclaimed that there was no intention of interfering with their independence, and that there was no desire to depart from that policy; though for a time, at all events, troops would be left to help the Swatis and Ranizais in maintaining the road through their country. With this object in view, agreements (see Appendix IV) were drawn up with the Chiefs of Ranizai and Swat providing for the maintenance of local levies, and for the abolition of tolls upon the road.

With the occupation of Chitral, the question of our future policy in regard to that country forced itself into prominence and formed the subject of correspondence between the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government. In dealing with this question, the Government of India had two alternatives placed before them: either to maintain their position in Chitral, or to change their policy and abandon the attempt to keep any effective control over the external affairs of that State. In their despatch to the Secretary of State, dated the 8th May 1895*, the Government of India remarked: "The history of Chitral demonstrates that the state has not, for the last 20 years, been able to stand alone. Fear of Afghan aggression threw Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk into the arms of Kashmir, and thus led to British suzerainty. The precarious rule of the sons of Aman-ul-Mulk, who have succeeded to the Mehtarship, was manifestly less able to maintain the integrity of the State without assistance. The present condition of Chitral, since its invasion by Umra Khan and the investment of Mr. Robertson in the fort by Sher Afzal,

* Correspondence relating to Chitral, presented to Parliament, Parliamentary paper No. C-7864.

"is one of anarchy. It is now more clear than ever that the country must lean on some external support." The despatch went on to urge that "if, after the occurrences of the previous two months, we failed to adequately provide for the interests of those who in the recent emergency had declared themselves on our side, we should be looked upon by Chitralis and Kashmiris alike as unfaithful friends. The value of our support would be depreciated, and those who at any future time might feel disposed to assist us would be deterred by the consideration that they had nothing to gain by taking our side. The tribes between Chitral and India would naturally believe we were afraid to hold that which we had expended so much to grasp, and the Amir of Afghanistan would also ascribe our action to weakness. It seemed to be demonstrated that the maintenance of our influence in Chitral was a matter of first importance; that to abandon Chitral would involve a risk which we ought not to run; that it would be unjustifiable to ignore our pledges to preserve the suzerainty of Kashmir.

"Events have, however, greatly changed the conditions under which we can hope to maintain that influence. Sher Afzal, an aspirant to the Mehtarship, has ostentatiously departed from the policy of his predecessors. Not placing himself under British protection and guidance, he came, trusting to the strength of a foreign invader, Umra Khan of Jandol, perhaps to that power which he believed to be at the invader's back, and ventured to dictate his terms to the British Agent, and to offer his friendship as a favour. Together they raised the country against us, attacked our troops, and cut them off in defiles, where nature lent strength to their attack, entrapped our officers by treachery and deceit, and laid vigorous siege to the last strong holds in the country where any of our troops maintained themselves. The events which have culminated in the gallant defence of Chitral and the costly measures taken for its relief both from north and south, render it, in our opinion, impossible that we can ever think of maintaining British influence in that country again without the presence of British troops."

The Government of India then proceeded to point out that the means whereby a sufficient military occupation of the Chitral valley could be maintained had therefore to be faced. The length of time taken and the difficulty and expense incurred in sending troops and supplies by way of Kashmir and Gilgit were so great, that it seemed preferable to abandon all attempt to occupy Chitral, rather than try to hold it by so precarious a thread. The only alternative was to establish communication from the Peshawar border. To keep order among the tribes along this route might involve not only great cost, but also many embarrassing complications. The recent operations had not, however, aroused the predicted religious war but had "rather demonstrated that the hostility of the tribes had been exaggerated; that the leading men were amenable to arguments of utility; that the fanatical influence was less strong than it had been believed to be; and that it might be possible to come to arrangements with the intervening tribes which, backed by a sufficient but not extravagant show of force, would be adequate to keep open a route by which troops and supplies could be sent up to Chitral." By this road a considerable trade is carried on; and the country, through which it passes, furnishes supplies to an amount which led the Government to expect that the troops in the Chitral valley would not be wholly dependent upon supplies imported from India. Moreover it was reasonable to anticipate that if friendly

relations were established with the tribes, cultivation would increase, and the surplus produce would be made more and more readily available.

In reply to the above quoted despatch, the Government of India received the following telegram from the Secretary of State on the 13th June:—

Her Majesty's Government have given most careful consideration to question of future policy in regard to Chitral, and to your letter of 8th May. They fully appreciate your point of view, and it is with regret that they find themselves unable to concur in the opinions of your Government, to which in all matters they attach great weight. They have decided that no military force or European agent shall be kept at Chitral, that Chitral shall not be fortified, and that no road shall be made between Peshawar and Chitral. It will follow that all positions beyond our frontier, now held in consequence of the recent relief operations, should be evacuated as speedily as circumstances allow, but the dates and details are left to your discretion. As regards Chitral State, they request that, in view of decisions above stated, you will telegraph what are the arrangements which you would recommend for the future. Any proposals which you may make will receive most careful attention from Her Majesty's Government.

On the 22nd June the Government of India replied that they had considered "the possibility of withdrawing the Relief Force at once, stocking Chitral with a view to temporary occupation and eventual retirement of the garrison by Gilgit, after arrangements for the future of the country had been completed; but the Commander-in-Chief reported this plan impracticable. The force would have to remain in its present position whilst supplies sufficient for an adequate force at Chitral and its transport were being thrown forward, which could not be done under six weeks; it would also prove very difficult to withdraw troops *via* Gilgit, and the expense would be enormous. The force therefore cannot be withdrawn until Chitral is evacuated, and the whole operation would be simultaneous and effected at the earliest possible date."

As regards the future arrangements for Chitral it was proposed, among other points, to divide Katur from the Khushwakt country and restrict the Mehtar's authority to Katur; to invite the headmen of Katur to elect a Mehtar, but to exclude the candidature of Sher Afzal on account of the grave suspicion of his complicity in acts of treachery as well as of hostility; similarly to invite the Khushwaktis to elect a separate ruler; to maintain the suzerain rights of Kashmir over both the Katur and Khushwakt countries; to withdraw the Assistant British Agent hitherto deputed to Chitral from the Katur country, when Chitral is evacuated, and from the Khushwakt country as soon as circumstances permit; the country east of the Shandur Pass to be controlled by Kashmir troops, and the question of retaining troops in Mastuj to be reserved until the form of administration had been determined for the Khushwakt country; to reward the chiefs of the tribes who had befriended us in the advance of the Relief Force.

Before an answer was received to these proposals a change of Government took place, and on the 2nd July the Secretary of State telegraphed that the new Government must reconsider the whole question. On the 10th July Sir Robert Low was authorized by the Government of India to make public the fact that, as Her Majesty's Government required time to decide on the details of the permanent settlement of Chitral, and as the season was unfavourable for the movement of troops, the force would not be withdrawn at all events before September.

On the 1st August the Secretary of State telegraphed for any further information the Government of India might have, as to the possibility of coming to an arrangement with the tribes for maintaining and securing the

Peshawar-Chitral road, such as was contemplated in the despatch of that Government of the 8th May; and, assuming that satisfactory arrangements could be made, and with a good fortified position, he asked to be informed of the minimum strength of the proposed garrison at Chitral. The Government of India replied on the 3rd of August to the effect that, though no regular negotiations had been carried out, the reports of the political officers on the spot warranted a confident expectation that peaceful arrangements could be made for keeping the road open; that the Panjkora route was considered in every way the best; and that by using it they would have to deal only with the Khan of Dir and the Swat Khans, who were friendly to us. From the Swat river to the Chitral border the road would be kept open by levies, and only at Chakdara and on the Malakand pass would troops be employed. For the garrison in Chitral territory two Native battalions, two mountain guns, and a company of Sappers and Miners were recommended; the head-quarters of the whole to be at Drosh, and a detachment at Chitral itself. This would probably admit of the garrisons at Mastuj and Ghizr being relieved, and would certainly enable the Pioneer battalion in the Gilgit Agency to be withdrawn.

This information removed the doubt which had been felt by Her Majesty's Government as to the possibility of opening up the road by peaceful means alone, and of maintaining it without an intolerable burden of expense being imposed on the Indian revenues. With the removal of this doubt the main obstacle to the acceptance of the recommendations made by the Government of India in their despatch of the 8th May was cleared away, and on the 9th August the following telegraphic instructions were sent by the Secretary of State to His Excellency the Viceroy:—

Her Majesty's Government assent to proposals contained in your despatch of 8th May, as explained and defined by telegram of 3rd August. (1) No increase to army. (2) Future garrison for whole district of Gilgit and Chitral to be only one Native regiment, in addition to troops previously stationed in Gilgit Agency. (3) Head-quarters to be placed at Kala Drosh. (4) Road between Swat river and that place to be held by tribal levies. Make no permanent arrangement for cantonment on Malakand and neighbourhood until further details, both of cost and numbers, can be sent home. Do nothing in any way to infringe terms of proclamation. Despatch will follow on whole subject.

This decision was communicated to Sir Robert Low on the 10th August and he was authorized to settle with the Ranizais, Swatis, and the Khan of Dir, the terms upon which the road would be kept open (see page 93) and guarded, and to make arrangements for keeping troops on the Malakand pass and at Chakdara, without departing from the terms of the proclamation issued when the operations for the relief of Chitral were initiated. The details regarding the garrisons of Chitral and Malakand were drawn up in the Quartermaster-General's Department and submitted by direction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for the approval of the Government of India; these schemes, as approved, are given in Appendices XIII and XIV.

Umra Khan who, as already stated in Chapter VI, had gone to Kabul in May 1895, made a pilgrimage to Mecca in March 1896, the Government of India consenting to his travelling through India by Quetta and Karachi. He returned to Bombay on the 23rd of June 1896, when he was visited by the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, in order to ascertain his proposed movements. On his stating that he intended proceeding to Peshawar, the Government of India caused him to be informed that this was not permissible; but that they had no desire to treat him with hostility and were willing to give him a suitable

allowance if he would agree to live at or near Quetta. He refused this offer, and left Quetta for Kabul on the 24th of August 1896.

It only remains to be mentioned that on the 2nd September Surgeon-Major Robertson formally installed Shuja-ul-Mulk as Mehtar of Chitral, in the name of the Maharaja of Kashmir his suzerain, with the authority and approval of the Government of India, an account of the proceedings on which occasion will be found in Appendix III.

APPENDIX I.

Letter sent by the Government of India to Umra Khan, 14th March 1895.

"The Government of India have heard with great regret of your advance in to the southern portion of Chitral and your continued stay there.

"So long ago as the 11th February 1891, corresponding to 1st Rajab 1308 H., the Foreign Secretary wrote to you that you should not interfere with the territories of Chitral, and that any hostility on your part towards that State would be viewed with strong disfavour. In April 1892, corresponding to Ramzan 1309 H., you showed that you understood the wishes of Government in this respect, inasmuch as in the draft of the agreement regarding the opening of the Peshawar-Chitral road, which you then offered for the acceptance of Government, you embodied a clause that you would not interfere with the territory of the Mehtar of Chitral.

"On the 19th of April 1893, corresponding to 1st Shawal 1310 H., the Commissioner of Peshawar conveyed to you a distinct warning that you must abstain from unprovoked aggression against Chitral, and that, if you failed to do so, you must expect no further favours from the British Government.

"You have acted in direct opposition to the wishes and warnings of the Government of India. You have advanced into the Chitral valley as far as Kila Drosh whence you have driven out the Chitrali garrison and have on more than one occasion been in conflict with the Chitrali forces, causing loss of life on both sides. Mr. Uday and Mr. Robertson, under orders from the Government of India, addressed you asking for an explanation of your proceedings, and you replied that you had come to help Amir-ul-Mulk and to combine with him for an attack on the Kafirs, but that Amir-ul-Mulk had acted in a hostile manner and no alternative was left you but to do the same.

"In spite of your own unwarranted interference in Chitral affairs, against which you have been so often warned, you write to the British officers that you have no intention of acting in a way calculated to displease the British Government, and you express a hope that your friendship with Government will remain unbroken.

"This matter rested in your own hands. Your proceedings have shown no consideration for the wishes of the Government of India; and there appears to be little room for doubt that your aims have been directed to imposing a ruler on Chitral independently of the will of the Government of India or the assent of Kashmir, the State to which Chitral owns suzerainty.

"The Government of India cannot allow you to continue to act in this manner. Mr. Uday, acting under the orders of Government, wrote to you on the 24th of February—28th Shaban 1312 H.—demanding your withdrawal to Bajaur, but you have taken no notice of this demand. The Government of India now give you a final warning that you must at once quit Chitral territory. If by the 1st of April, corresponding with the 5th day of Shawal 1312 H., you have not withdrawn, they will compel you to do so. They are now making preparations to send forward their forces for that purpose, and you will only have yourself to blame for any evil results that fall upon you."

APPENDIX II.

Proclamation to the tribes on the Peshawar border, dated 14th March 1895.

"To all the people of Swat and the people in Bajaur who do not side with Umra Khan.

"Be it known to you, and any other persons concerned that,

"Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, in spite of his often repeated assurances of friendship to the British Government, and regardless of frequent warnings to refrain from interfering with the affairs of Chitral, which is a protected State under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the Chitral valley and attacked the Chitrali people.

"The Government of India have now given Umra Khan full warning that, unless he retires from Chitral by the 1st of April, corresponding with the 5th day of Shawal 1312 H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In order to carry out this purpose, they have arranged to assemble on the Peshawar border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance, and to march this force through Umra Khan's territory towards Chitral.

"The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and prevent any future, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and, as soon as this object has been attained, the force will be withdrawn.

"The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes; and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. Supplies and transport will be paid for, and all persons are at liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations in perfect security."

APPENDIX III.

Report of proceedings of Darbar held at Chitral for the installation of Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk.

The Darbar was fixed to take place at 5-30 P. M. on Monday, the 2nd September 1895, on an open space outside the main gate of the Chitral fort.

2. Every leading Chitrali throughout the country on this side of the Shandur pass had been summoned to attend, and a general pardon proclaimed for all political offences committed during the late disturbances. Except a very few prevented by sickness or other unavoidable causes, all, to the number of some 270, had answered the summons.

3. At the appointed time, Sir George Robertson, K.C.S.I., British Agent, Gilgit, accompanied by Major Aylmer, V.C., R.E., Commanding at Chitral, Captain Minchin, Assistant British Agent, Chitral, and all the British officers of the garrison rode down to the fort.

4. On the British Agent's approach to the fort, the Mehtar, supported by the chief Chitrali Princes and nobles, came out some little distance from the fort to receive him and both proceeded hand in hand, as is the custom of the country, to the place fixed for the Darbar. A salute of eleven guns was fired from the Mehtar's guns and the Guard of Honour of the 25th Punjab Infantry presented arms. The British Agent and the Mehtar took their seats on a raised dais, the Mehtar on the chair which had been presented to his father, the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, by Government and used by him as a throne. On the British Agent's right hand were seated the British and Native officers in order of seniority. On the Mehtar's left the Mehtarjaos (Princes) of Chitral and other Chitralis of high rank were seated. The remaining Chitralis of rank were seated in rows in front of the dais, while beyond them again, and on every spot where a view of the Darbar could be obtained, was a large gathering of the common people. The assembly was one of the largest yet seen in Chitral.

5. About 3-30 P.M. a heavy shower of rain had come down, but the weather cleared at about 5 P.M., and with the exception of a few drops of rain towards the end of the proceedings, the weather was fine though cloudy.

6. When all were seated, the British Agent made the following speech, which was translated into Persian, paragraph by paragraph, to the assembled *darbaris* by Khan Sahib Abdul Hakim :—

"It is well-known to you all that during the late troublous times in Chitral, on the 2nd of March, I appointed Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk to be Mehtar of the whole of the Katur country, temporarily, and subject to the approval of the Government of India. It now gives me great pleasure to inform you that the Governor-General in Council has approved of Shuja-ul-Mulk being Mehtar, has confirmed my former proceedings, and has done me the honour of deputing me to Chitral to formally and officially instal Shuja-ul-Mulk as Mehtar of all the Katur country, in the name of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir as his suzerain, and with the authority and approval of the Government of India.

"It is happily unnecessary for me to refer at any length to the terrible calamities which befell this country at the beginning of the present year, when a few ambitious, unscrupulous men were able, (such was the evil fate overhanging the land,) to mislead a large number of the people of Chitral and induce them to throw aside all thought of honour and all respect for repeated loyal assurances, and behave in the most foolish and ungrateful manner towards the great power which had always shown the Chitrali people a peculiar kindness and friendliness.

"There can be no doubt that the Government of India would have been fully justified in punishing with severity a people who have behaved so faithlessly and so outrageously; but, pitying your foolishness, ignorance and feebleness, and recognising the fact that you were misled, the Government of India, instead of punishing all for the sins of many, has resolved to treat you all with leniency and take you back again under its protection in kindness and in mercy. The Government of India, therefore, forgives every one who is at present before me, and no single man here need fear that his past actions during the troubles of the early part of this year will ever be remembered against him: while for the

future each one is the master of his own fate. Good behaviour and loyalty will not be overlooked, while on the other hand evil-doers will be sternly repressed.

"And now for the arrangements which have been decided upon by the Government of India for the future of Chitral.

"Recent events, to which I have already alluded, have forced the Government of India to reconsider the extent of country over which the Mehtar should hold sway. The circumstances of the Katur and Khushwakt tracts differ materially, and the Khushwaktis have frequently declared their desire to have no more Mehtars over them, and to come under the direct management of the Gilgit Agency. In these circumstances it has been decided by the Government of India that the Mehtar's control shall not extend beyond the Katur country as hitherto understood. The British Agent at Gilgit will on behalf of the Kashmir State, appoint and pay the Governors and headmen of the Khushwakt country, and their relations will be direct with him, except that, as a matter of convenience, the Governor of the Mastuj valley will, for the present, correspond with the Political Officer in Chitral.

"The general internal administration of the country will be left in the hands of the Mehtar and of his advisers. The Government of India do not intend to undertake themselves the management of the internal affairs of Chitral, their concern being with the foreign relations of the State, and with its general welfare. It, however, has to be remembered that Shuja-ul-Mulk is only a boy, and that, at an age when other boys are engaged in education and amusement, he has been called upon to hold the reins of State. Bearing this fact in mind the Government of India recognise the necessity of his receiving some help during the time of his minority, and it has consequently been decided to leave at Chitral an experienced Political Officer upon whom the Mehtar may always call for advice and assistance, while it is proposed to appoint three persons, Raja Bahadur Khan, the Governor of Mastuj, Wazir Inayat Khan, and Aksakal Fateh Ali Shah to give him help, instruction, and advice in the management of his State and in the laws and customs of the people. Ordinarily, the entire country will be governed in accordance with their experience and judgment; but nevertheless the Assistant British Agent, if he thinks it necessary to do so may, at any time, ask the Mehtar to delay action recommended by his three advisers, until the opinion of the British Agent at Gilgit has been obtained, whose decision shall be final and authoritative.

"The desirability of abolishing traffic in slaves is a matter to which the Government of India attach much importance, and they have lately interested themselves with some success in procuring the release of natives of Kashmir and her dependencies, including Chitralis, who are held in bondage in Chinese Turkistan. It is in accordance therefore with the general policy of the Government of India that in Chitral also all buying and selling of slaves, whether for disposal in the country or with the intention of sending them abroad, should be altogether prohibited. Any such selling of slaves is therefore from this time forward absolutely illegal.

"The Government of India has also decided that Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk may be given a subsidy of Rs. 1,000 a month; and in consideration of the loss of revenue arising from the separation of the Khushwakt country from his control, he may be given an additional sum of Rs. 8,000 a year. Monthly stipends will also be paid to the Governor of Mastuj, etc., and to the three advisers of the Mehtar.

"It must be borne in mind that the relation of a suzerain to a State under its protection implies, on the one side, protection from foreign aggression, of which the payment of a subsidy may or may not be a part, and on the other, the loyal adherence of the protected ruler to the wishes of the suzerain, especially as regards all correspondence with foreign powers. The Government of India, in leaving a garrison in the country amply sufficient to guarantee it from foreign aggression, will provide for the Mehtar a guard during his minority, and the presence of British troops, will it is hoped, lead to a reformation of the government and the establishment of law and order on a firmer basis. As I have already said, there is no intention to interfere with internal administration, but you are all to distinctly understand that the Mehtar and his Government will have our full support in dealing with crimes such as murder and outrage, which constitute a public scandal, and I warn you most strongly and emphatically that the Government of India cannot and will not countenance in a State under their protection a Government that permits the murderous outrages, which have unfortunately been too frequent in Chitral and which led directly to the late disturbances.

"I now formally declare Shuja-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of the whole of the Katur country, in the name of the Maharaja of Kashmir as his suzerain and with the authority and approval of the Government of India; and I call upon you one and all to accord him and his government loyal and implicit obedience. May the bountiful season which witnesses the beginning of Shuja-ul-Mulk's reign be a propitious sign of its general prosperity. God grant that peace and happiness may be the lot of both him and his subjects, and that the sad events of the beginning of the year may cease to be remembered, save as the half-memory of a terrible dream."

7. The British Agent, as he announced the formal installation of Shuja-ul-Mulk as Mehtar of the Katur country, threw over his shoulders a handsome *Kamkhwab chogha* in token of installation. At the conclusion of the speech, the British officers present came up, and each in turn congratulated and shook hands with the Mehtar. *Khilats* were then presented to one hundred and fifty of the most important headmen of Chitral. The British Agent then closed the proceedings and the Darbar broke up. The Mehtar and his court conducted the British Agent to his horse, the Guard of Honour presenting arms and the Mehtar's guns firing a salute in honour of the Mehtar's accession to the throne.

APPENDIX IV.

Agreement with the Khan of Dir.

WHEREAS the Government of India have no desire to annex the territory of the Khan of Dir, but require a road to be kept open from the Swat valley to Chitral territory, the Khan of Dir, on behalf of himself and of his successors, fully and freely undertakes:—

that he will keep open the road from Chakdara to Ashreth,
 that he will make any postal arrangements required,
 that he will protect the telegraph on any occasion when it is put up,
 that he will maintain the road, levy posts and camping-ground enclosures in good repair, and
 that he will protect the whole line with levies.

II.—In return for the above considerations the Government of India undertake to grant the Khan a payment of ten thousand rupees a year, and a present of four hundred Snider rifles with such a supply of ammunition as may be deemed advisable; and they will defray the cost, as may be necessary, of the maintenance of the levies.

III.—The Government of India further undertake on their part, in consideration of the Khan accepting the conditions aforesaid and performing the services required by them, that they will not interfere with his administration of the country as fixed by its present boundaries.

IV.—In consideration of receiving from the Government of India an annual payment of 10,000 rupees the Khan of Dir, on behalf of himself and his successors, declares that trade passing along the road from Chakdara to Ashreth shall for ever be free from all toll or tax within his territories.

V.—The payments for the levies will be made at the end of every month; the payment of the allowance to the Khan mentioned in clause II, and of the sum mentioned in clause IV in consideration of freedom of trade from taxes, shall be made in equal half-yearly instalments, one payment in the spring of the year, and one in the autumn. The first payments on these accounts will become due on the 1st of April 1896.

VI.—The Khan of Dir, on behalf of himself and of his successors, undertakes, at any time when the Government of India may wish to place troops temporarily on the Laram hill or on the Doshia Khel range, to give sufficient ground for their accommodation upon receiving a fair rent for the site or sites.

LARAM: } (Sd.) MUHAMMAD SHARIF KHAN,
 The 12th September 1895. } *Khan of Dir.*

Translation of agreement with the Khans of Swat and the Upper and Lower Ranizais.

WE, the Khans and Khan Khels of Thana and Khans and Maliks of Aladand, Dheri, Batkhela, Khar, Dheri-Jolagram, Totakan and Matkanai in Upper or Bar Ranizai, and Maliks of Dargai, Shakot, Kharakai, Usman Khel Garhi, Warter, Dobandi, Khan Garhi, Mehrdi, Hiroshah and Kadam Khela, *viz.*, all Maliks of Sam Ranizai, do hereby of our own free will agree that we will fully protect the Peshawar-Chitral road which Government desires to keep open, that we undertake to be responsible for that part of the road which lies through our country, that whenever Government troops or supplies pass through our country we will protect them in every way as well as also traders, etc., that we (*viz.*, those who formerly levied tolls and others) will not levy any tolls or taxes. Government will give us such compensation for the tolls as they deem reasonable.

II.—That we have petitioned that Government troops should remain for our assistance for the protection of road, and we now agree that, as stated in our petition, we will give such land as may be required by Government for posts and camping-grounds, that we will store firewood, grass, *bhusa*, etc., at every camping-ground, and will furnish such supplies which our country can afford, on payment at the current rates.

III.—That we will give any number of armed men (sepoys and sowats) that may be required by the British Government for the protection of road, etc., in our country. Government will pay them at reasonable rates.

IV.—That if British officers come to our country for shooting, etc., they will be fully assisted and protected by us.

V.—That the Government will pay us compensation for land which may be taken up for posts.

Translation of agreement, dated 12th September 1895, executed by the Khans and Khan Khels of Swat.

WHEREAS the British Government desires to keep open the Malakand, Shakot, Morah, Cherat, and Swat roads for trade, and to keep the trade free from tolls, and whereas the Government grant us an annual allowance of Rs. 10,000 in lieu of our rights to tolls, we, Inayat-ulla Khan and Aslam Khan, Khans of Thana ; Sharif Khan and Saadat Khan, Khans of Aladand ; and Sarbuland Khan of Palli, on behalf of ourselves and our successors, do hereby declare that, in consideration of the sum of Rs. 10,000 per annum we have sold all tolls on the above passes and in our country ; that we will not in future collect any tolls on the above passes nor in our territory from traders ; that all traders and trades, animals, etc., are exempted from tolls, and that we will not interfere with them. That this agreement shall have effect from 1st October 1895, and the first instalment of Rs. 5,000 will be due by Government on the 1st April 1896, and that the half-yearly instalments in future will be due in the spring and autumn of every year by the Government of India. Further, that we will divide the above sum of Rs. 10,000 among the rightful persons in proportion to *daftar* (hereditary shares in land) owned by each person

APPENDIX V.

*Translation of the petition of Khans, Khan Khels and Bar Ranizais.**

WE, the Khans and Khan Khels of Thana and the Khans of Aladand, Dheri, Bakhela, Khar, Dheri-Jolagram, Totakan and Matkanai, beg to request that Government will kindly keep a strong force in our country, so that we may not suffer injury at the hands of other tribes. Many of the tribes have the idea that as we have rendered services to Government; they will injure us after the withdrawal of British troops. Moreover, if troops be kept in our country we shall be safe, and we shall also derive advantages in trade. In fact, we shall have peace and safety instead of disputes and fights amongst ourselves.

2ndly.—We will give as much land for road, posts and camping-grounds as may be required by Government. If Government pays compensation for the land so taken up, it is their kindness; otherwise we do not demand it. Troops should not be withdrawn on the idea that we demand compensation.

3rdly.—We will produce our relations for Government employment and protection of road, so that there may be no chance of offences being committed on it. We are grateful to Government for furnishing us with service in our own country. We beg respectfully to request that a strong force should be kept at Malakand, which is a dangerous place. Government can erect forts anywhere they like in our country.

Translation of the petition of Adinzais.

WE, the representatives of the people of the Adinzai Tappa, make the following petition:—

I.—That the British Government may take possession of our country and should not make it over to anybody else, that we will pay any revenue which Government may impose. We wish Government troops to remain in our country, so that there may be no disturbance. The presence of Government troops is necessary for the reasons (1) to check thefts, robberies and other offences, as well as riots which take place on disputes for land and women and often result in bloodshed; (2) to give us protection and safety from other tribes, because owing to our having rendered services to Government since the arrival of troops in our country, there is apprehension of other tribes being displeased with us and of their causing injury to us. We heartily request that Government may not leave our country. If Government does not like to take revenue from us and wants to make us over to some Khan, we pray that revenue may be realized through some Government servant. Whether Government keep the revenue for themselves or pay it to somebody else, we request that Government troops may remain in our country so that we may live in a state of safety and peace. By the presence of troops we will get assistance for the protection of the road from Peshawar to Kashkar,† and the military and civil officers will be of great assistance to us.

II.—That if you cannot accept our request, we may be permitted to go to Lahore and Simla to lay our petition before higher authorities. We humbly request that Government may keep and rule our country. During the period that Government troops have been in our country, the advantages which we have derived are fully known to us. Before the advance of British troops, the hardship and difficulties which we underwent were numerous, and our women used to be subjected to disgrace and our lands used to be forcibly taken. Now in these days, although the number of troops in this country is considerable, there has been no trouble in our villages, and our women have not been disgraced or offended, although they move about. The officers of Government deputed in our country listen to the representations of all persons concerned. We beg that our request may be granted.

* The petition of the Sam Ranizais was couched in practically identical terms.

† *i.e.*, Chitral.

Translation of the petition of Talash valley people, dated 13th September 1895.

WE, the representatives of the people of Talash valley, make the following petition :—

I—We heartily wish that the British Government may take possession of our country and keep their troops here, so that we shall pass our lives in peace and safety, and the tribes opposed to us may not be able to cause us injury or damage, and besides we shall get an opportunity for rendering services to Government, just as we did before. In short, we request that Government will annex our country.

II—We are quite ready and willing to pay revenue which Government may be pleased to impose on our lands.

III—Before the advance of British troops we were in great troubles and our lives and property were not safe from bloodshed and theft and robbery, but since the time Government are here we are quite safe and comfortable.

IV—We will give as much land for road and posts as may be required by Government, whether we are paid compensation for it or not. We shall protect the road which passes through our country, and the presence of Government troops in this country will give us assistance for the protection of the road from Peshawar to Chitral.

V—If Government do not like to take revenue from us and want to grant it to some Khan, we pray that the revenue may be realized through Government servants and then paid over by Government to the Khan in question, so that we may be freed from the interference and aggressions of the Khan's servants.

VI—If Government grant this request of ours, we shall ever pray, etc.

APPENDIX VI.

Scheme for the organisation of the Chitral Relief Force, 16th March 1895.

1. *Formation of the force.*—The force will consist of the 1st Division for mobilisation, without the wheeled artillery (except one field battery), and the British and one Native regiment of cavalry. One or two other slight modifications are necessary as it is undesirable to employ any troops from the Waziristan Field Force.

DETAILS OF TROOPS.

1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.

1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment.
1st " King's Royal Rifle Corps.
15th Sikhs.
37th Dogras.
No. 1 British Field Hospital.
" 14 Native " "

2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.

2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers.
1st " Gordon Highlanders.
4th Sikh Infantry.
Guides Infantry.
No. 2 British Field Hospital.
" 35 Native " "

3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE.

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.
2nd " Seaforth Highlanders.
25th Punjab Infantry.
2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles.
No. 8 British Field Hospital.
" 19 Native " "

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.*

11th Bengal Lancers.
Guides Cavalry.
13th Bengal Infantry.
23rd Punjab Pioneers.
No. 15 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
" 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
" 8 " " "
" 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.
" 1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
" 4 " " "
" 6 " " "
Engineer Field Park, from Roorkee.
No. 4 British Field Hospitals A and B sections.
Nos. 17 and 18 Native Field Hospitals.
No. 1 Veterinary Field Hospital from Rawal Pindi.
1 Maxim gun and detachment of 8 men, 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION TROOPS.†

1st Battalion, East Lancashire Regiment.
29th Punjab Infantry.
30th Punjab " "
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, 4 guns.

* The 34th Punjab Pioneers were mobilised towards the end of the month and joined the Divisional troops in order to assist in the probable road-making requirements of the force.
† About the 9th of April, the General Officer Commanding the force was empowered to draw upon the 9th Bengal Lancers, then at Hoti Mardan, for such additional cavalry as might be required on the lines of communication; and No. 6 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, were placed at the disposal of the Officer Commanding the lines of communication to assist in bridging the Swat river.

No. 4 British Field Hospital, C and D sections.

24 Native Field Hospital.

5 and 6 British Field Hospitals } For sick and wounded returning from
28 and 29 Native " " } the front.

No. 2 Veterinary Field Hospital, from Rawal Pindi,

Field Medical Store Depôt from Mian Mir.

British General Hospital, Peshawar.

Native " " "

½ General Veterinary Hospital, Umballa.

½ Base " Store Depôt, Umballa.

Ordnance Field Park, Rawal Pindi.

The above details will proceed on the Field Service scale of strength, establishments etc., as laid down in the Field Service Equipment Tables for the different branches, except that the number of British officers with regiments of Native cavalry and infantry will not be increased above the peace establishment.

Depôts will be formed as laid down in the "Mobilisation Measures" in the Field Service Equipment Tables. Depôts of Native infantry will be on scale B.

2. Movements in relief—

1st Battalion, Devonshire Regiment, from Nowshera to Peshawar. (By rail.)

1st Bengal Infantry, Jubbulpore to Peshawar. (By rail during general concentration.)

27th Punjab Infantry, 6 companies, Jullundur to Kohat. (By rail to Khushalgarh.)

Wing 1st R. W. Survey, Umballa to Ferozepore. (By rail *via* Mian Mir and Raewind, to arrive 23rd.)

12th Bengal Infantry, Bareilly, etc., to Nowshera and Hoti Mardan. (By rail to Nowshera, one wing preliminary to, and the other during, the general railway concentration.)

9th Bengal Lancers (3 squadrons), Rawal Pindi to Hoti Mardan. (By road.)

No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, Rawal Pindi to Abbottabad. (By road.)

These corps will move on relief scale, but without heavy stores and families, as they will return to their stations at the close of the operations.

The 1st-5th Gurkha Rifles will return from Edwardesabad when available *via* Peshawar.

These movements will leave the following Infantry garrisons:—

Nowshera Head-Quarter wing 12th Bengal Infantry.

Hoti Mardan Wing 12th Bengal Infantry (also 9th Bengal Lancers.)

Rawal Pindi 3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade.
33rd Punjab Infantry.

Dera Ismail Khan, etc. Wing 2nd Sikh Infantry,

4th Punjab Infantry.

19th Punjab Infantry.

Wing 26th Punjab Infantry.

22nd Punjab Infantry, arriving 29th instant.

3rd Sikh Infantry,

38th Dogras

Wing 14th Sikhs.

} Dera Ismail Khan,
Jandola, Khajuri Kach,
and other minor
outposts.

} Wano.

Barwand.

Kohat, Samana and 5th, Kuram. 21st and 27th Punjab Infantry,
until 6th Punjab Infantry returns
from service; 21st then returns to
Lucknow, the 5th, 6th and 27th
Punjab Infantry then constituting
garrison.

Bannu, post in Datar 1st Sikh Infantry.

and other outposts. 2nd Punjab Infantry.
 20th Punjab Infantry.
 36th Sikhs.
Peshawar . . . 1st Battalion, Devonshire Regiment.
 1st Bengal Infantry.
 31st Punjab Infantry.
Sialkot . . . 6 companies, 2nd Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Abbottabad . . . 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles. (On arrival.)
 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.
 1st Punjab Infantry.

3. *Concentration of the force—*

1st Brigade at Peshawar.
 2nd „ „ Hoti Mardan.
 3rd „ „ Hoti Mardan.
 Divisional Troops at Nowshera.
 Line of communication Troops at Nowshera

} Concentration to be completed by 1st April.

receiving their further orders from the General Officer Commanding Field Force.

4. *Details, command and staff—*

(For complete list of commands and staff as finally approved by the Government of India see Appendix VII.)

5. The clerks, office boxes, and furniture of staff offices will be sent to their stations of assembly as laid down in Adjutant-General's Nos. 112 to 132-M., dated 26th October 1894, at which stations ordnance and other equipment of these offices will also be drawn.

Special arrangements have been made for the collection at Peshawar of the equipment, etc., of the Divisional staff office, as its equipment has not yet been brought together pending the establishment of the Head-Quarters of the two new Army Commands, at which it was to have been stored.

The Adjutant-General in India will arrange for the issue of the Field Service Forms and Field passes, as well as of the duplicating machines and stencil paper for the same which remain to be supplied to staff offices on mobilisation, as also all G. G. O.'s, G. O.'s, etc., published on and after the 15th March 1895, the first day of mobilisation.

6. *Clothing.*—The summer scale of clothing for troops and followers as laid down in the Field Service Departmental Code, "Commissariat," and Field Service Equipment Tables. The clothing will be issued in bulk by the Commissariat Department to corps and units, but will not be distributed to individuals until further orders.

A reserve of clothing and water gear will be maintained at Nowshera by the Commissariat Department.

CLOTHING

Sets for British Troops	200
„ „ Native „	300
„ „ Followers	500

WATER GEAR.

100 sets.

Hob nails and toe plates.—The hob nails and toe plates in possession of corps for mobilisation are to be put on the boots.

7. *Concessions and privileges.*—The troops and followers of the force will be considered on "Field Service" for all concessions and privileges from the date of crossing the frontier.

Concessions which are admissible from or between certain dates fixed by regulations will have effect from such dates; free rations will not be given until the troops advance beyond Hoti Mardan. Staff officers will draw pay from the date on which they join their appointments.

8. *Equipment.*—Departments concerned will complete the equipment of corps previously detailed for the 1st Division, by issuing the articles hitherto kept for them in departmental charge pending mobilisation.

They will also equip, without submission of indents, corps now warned for service which were not previously detailed for mobilisation.

Equipment and stores, and the obligatory mule transport with 5 per cent. spare, will be made over to corps at the equipping stations laid down for them in the mobilisation scheme. The balance of the transport will be supplied at the detraining station.

N.B.—A preliminary issue of the Field Service Manual has been made to corps and staff officers concerned as far as possible.

The Hazara Mountain Battery which was not previously in the mobilisation scheme is to be equipped at Hoti Mardan.

9. *Ammunition.*—As laid down in the Field Service Departmental Code "Ordnance," also Field Service Manual, Part V, and Field Service Equipment Tables.

The Ordnance Field Park will contain the authorized proportions of stores and ammunition.

10. *Supplies.*—The Commissariat Department will arrange for 15 days' concentrative period, and 45 days' reserve; 30 days' supplies would be pushed forward into the Swat valley with the force and thence Miankalai where depôt will be formed.

11. *Transport.*—All corps will be equipped with transport on the normal scale laid down in the Field Service Equipment Tables, except that wheeled transport is to be replaced by camels.

Camels for one month's supplies (excluding fodder and fuel) will be maintained for three-fourths of the force.

In view to a brigade, strengthened by a Native Mountain battery and 1 company Sappers and Miners, being completely equipped with mule transport, the Commissary General-in-Chief will arrange for the necessary reserve of mules required.

12. *Medical.*—Reserves of medicines and medical comforts to be arranged for by departments concerned. Strict medical examination of followers as well as troops to be made before they leave their respective stations.

Riding mules or ponies with riding saddles to be substituted for ambulance *tongas*.

Camel *kajawahs* (with camels) will be taken by corps of Punjab Frontier Force.

Twelve additional ambulance *tongas* (with cattle, etc) will be sent to Jalala, with reliefs of cattle at Hoti Mardan and half-way between Jalala and Hoti Mardan and Hoti Mardan and Nowshera, for conveyance of sick and wounded returning to Nowshera.

13. *Veterinary.*—The Veterinary arrangements will be as laid down for the 1st Division on mobilisation, omitting No. 3 Veterinary Field Hospital.

14. *Engineer Field Park.*—As for the 1st Division on mobilisation; but the Commanding Royal Engineer can indent for such extra entrenching tools as may be necessary. Cutting tools to be sharpened in arsenal before issue.

As it is possible that the rivers Swat and Panjkora may have to be crossed by rafts, the Commanding Royal Engineer will arrange through the Civil authorities for the supply of 300 bullock *massaks* (locally "*khih*") for the purpose of making rafts.

15. *Ordnance Field Park.*—To be prepared at Rawal Pindi but to stand fast there. The Ordnance Officer in charge should accompany the General Officer Commanding, and indent as may be required on Rawal Pindi, forming a depôt at Nowshera.

16. *Signalling equipment.*—Any extra signalling equipment considered necessary should be indented for by the General Officer Commanding from the Rawal Pindi arsenal.

17. *Post office.*—As for a Division on mobilisation, less the one office for the cavalry brigade.

18. *Telegraphs.*—The Director General of Telegraphs will lay a line from Hoti Mardan into Swat, estimated distance 60 miles.

19. *Supply of maps.*—Maps will be supplied as under by the Intelligence Branch, Simla :—

For every officer. A map of theatre of operations on cloth. To all commanding officers and staff officers the report on country embraced in theatre of operations.

Mobilisation maps and gazetteers kept at Peshawar for the 1st Division are not to be issued.

The Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence with the Division will obtain a reserve supply of maps and gazetteers.

20. *Submission of reports and returns.*—As laid down in Appendix F, Part II, Field Service Manual, until further orders.

21. Officers' messes will be on the scale laid down in the Field Service Manual, Part XII, Section III.

22. The General Hospitals, the Medical and Veterinary Base Store Depôts, and the Commissariat Base Depôt, will be at Peshawar under the General Officer Commanding Peshawar District, who will act as Base Commandant there.

APPENDIX VII.

Details of Commands and Staff of the Chitral Relief Force, as finally approved by the Government of India :—

DIVISIONAL STAFF.

<i>To Command the Division—</i>	Major-General Sir R. C. Low, K.C.B.
<i>Aide-de-Camp</i>	Lieut. R. B. Low, 9th Bengal Lancers.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	„ A. A. Irvine, 3rd Bengal Infantry.
<i>Chief Staff Officer</i>	Colonel B. Blood, C. B., R.E. (with rank of Brigadier-General).
<i>Assistant Adjutant General</i>	Lt.-Colonel J. H. S. Craigie, Highland Light Infantry.
<i>Assistant Quarter Master General</i>	Lt.-Colonel G. H. C. Dyce, 33rd Bengal Infantry.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch.</i>	Capt. J. E. Nixon, 18th Bengal Lancers.
<i>Intelligence Officer</i>	Lt. W. R. Robertson, 3rd Dragoon Guards.
<i>Colonel on the Staff, Royal Artillery.</i>	Colonel W. W. Murdoch, R.A.
<i>Staff Captain, Royal Artillery</i>	Captain M. F. Fegen, R.A.
<i>Colonel on Staff, Royal Engineers.</i>	Brevet-Colonel H. P. Leach, D.S.O., R.E.
<i>Adjutant, Royal Engineers</i>	Captain J. A. Tanner, D.S.O., R.E.
<i>Field Engineer</i>	Major C. C. Ellis, R.E.
<i>Assistant Field Engineers</i>	Lieut. G. M. Duff, R.E. Lieut. F. R. F. Boileau, R.E.
<i>Superintendent, Army Signalling.</i>	Capt. T. E. O'Leary, Royal Irish Fusiliers.
<i>Assistant Judge Advocate General.</i>	Capt. E. O. Owen, 5th Bombay Cavalry.
<i>Provost Marshal</i>	Capt. W. F. Shakespear, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
<i>Field Paymaster</i>	Capt. W. St. J. Richardson.
<i>Principal Medical Officer</i>	Surgeon-Colonel T. Maunsell, A.M.S.
<i>Chaplain (Church of England)</i>	Rev. H. W. Bush.
<i>Chaplain (Church of Scotland)</i>	Rev. T. Scott.
<i>Chaplain (Roman Catholic)</i>	Rev. F. Van Mansfield.
<i>Survey Officer</i>	Captain W. J. Bythell, R.E.
<i>Inspecting Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary-Major R. Poyser, A.V.D.
<i>Divisional Commissariat Officer</i>	Lt.-Colonel A. G. Yaldwin.
<i>Divisional Transport Officer</i>	Major C. M. FitzGerald.
<i>Assistant to ditto ditto</i>	Major R. H. Lombe, Norfolk Regiment.

1ST BRIGADE STAFF.

<i>Commanding—</i>	Brigadier-General A. A. Kinloch, C.B.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Captain J. G. Turner, 2nd Bengal Lancers.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.</i>	Captain W. E. Bunbury, 25th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
<i>Brigade-Major</i>	Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., R.A.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	Captain R. P. Jackson, Commissariat-Transport Department.

2ND BRIGADE STAFF.

<i>Commanding—</i>	Colonel H. G. Waterfield (with rank of Brigadier-General).
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Lieut. P. E. Ricketts, 18th Bengal Lancers.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.</i>	Captain W. G. Hamilton, East Lanc. Regiment.
<i>Brigade-Major</i>	Captain A. C. Batten, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Commissariat-Transport Department.

3RD BRIGADE STAFF.

<i>Commanding—</i>	Brigadier-General W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Lieut. R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General</i>	Captain L. Herbert, Central India Horse.
<i>Brigade-Major</i>	Captain G. C. I. Stockwell, Highland Light Infantry.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	Captain A. B. Williams, Commissariat-Trans- port Department.

STAFF OF DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

<i>Brigade-Major</i>	Captain G. J. Younghusband, Corps of Guides.
<i>Commanding Royal Artillery</i>	Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, R.A.
<i>Adjutant, Royal Artillery</i>	Captain G. C. Dowell, R.A.
<i>Additional Adjutant, Royal Artillery.</i>	Captain C. P. Fendall, R.A.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	Captain R. W. Nicholson.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION STAFF.

<i>Commanding—</i>	Colonel A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C. (with rank of Brigadier-General).
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Lieutenant E. B. C. Boddam, 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.</i>	Brevet-Major S. C. H. Monro, Seaforth Highlanders.
<i>Commanding Royal Engineer</i>	Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Shone, D.S.O., R.E.
<i>Adjutant, Royal Engineers</i>	Captain B. B. Russell, R.E., Bombay Sappers and Miners.
<i>Field Engineers</i>	Major H. E. Abbott, R.E. Captain W. G. R. Cordue, R.E. Captain G. Williams, R.E.
<i>Assistant Field Engineers</i>	Lieutenant A. Walpole, R.E. " H. F. Thuillier, R.E. " F. F. N. Rees, R.E. " A. J. H. Swiney, R.E. " S. D'A. Crookshank, R.E.
<i>Principal Medical Officer</i>	Surgeon-Colonel G. Thomson, I.M.S.
<i>Base Commandant, Nowshera</i>	Major A. F. Barrow, C.M.G., 12th Bengal Infantry.
<i>Road Commandant on the Lines of Communication.</i>	Major F. S. Gwatkin, 13th Bengal Lancers.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.</i>	Captain C. W. Somerset, 12th Bengal Infantry.
<i>Veterinary Officer at the Base</i>	Veterinary Captain F. W. Forsdyke, A.V.D.

The following officers were subsequently appointed for signalling duty:—

- Captain G. W. Rawlins, 12th Bengal Cavalry.
- Lieutenant N. R. Radcliffe, 1st Battalion, Devonshire Regiment.
- " V. Lewis, 2nd Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
- " H. J. Thackeray, Highland Light Infantry.

and in accordance with paragraph 10, Section 2, Field Service Departmental Code, Intelligence and Survey, the following additional Field Intelligence officers were appointed:—

- Captain E. W. S. K. Maconchy, D.S.O., 4th Sikh Infantry.
- " J. G. Turner, 2nd Bengal Lancers.
- Lieutenant G. K. Cockerill, 28th Punjab Infantry.

The undermentioned Ordnance officers were detailed for duty with effect from the dates specified:—

<i>Ordnance Officer with the General Officer Commanding.</i>	Major K. S. Dunsterville, R.A., from 25th March to 25th June 1895.
"	Captain M. W. S. Pasley, R.A., from 26th June 1895.
<i>In charge of advanced ordnance depôt.</i>	Captain C. H. L. F. Wilson, R.A., from 6th April 1895.

APPENDIX VIII.

Strength and composition of a lightly-equipped brigade in view to the possibility of its being despatched from the Chitral Relief Force to open up communication with the British Agent at Chitral.
20th March 1895.

	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Warrant Officers.	Staff Sergeants.	Hospital Assistants and Native Clerks.	British Rank and File.	Native Rank and File.	Public Followers.	Private Followers.	Chargers.	Ponies.	Commissariat Followers.	Transport Followers.
Brigade Staff	7	2	6	6	30	10	5	...	7
2 Battalions of British Infantry	58	...	4	12	...	1,590	...	94	30	4	2	72	178
2 " of Native "	18	32	2	...	1,442	106	34	4	2	...	132
1 Battery of Native Mountain Artillery (7-pr.)	5	3	1	...	231	66	8	1	1	...	4
1 Company of Sappers and Miners	4	3	1	2	169	18	7	1	1	...	60
1 British Field Hospital	5	...	7	1	2	4	...	195	16	2	1	...	150
1 Native "	4	1	7	...	13	153	14	2	1	...	141
TOTAL	101	38	11	16	19	1,596	1,855	638	139	24	13	72	672

Baggage, Chargers, and Tentage.

BAGGAGE	General Officer	1 mule	} To include baggage of personal servants.
	Staff	3/4 "	
	Regimental "	3 to a mule	
	Warrant "	40 lb. each	
	Native "	5 to a mule	
	Staff Sergeants	20 lb. each	
	British and Native N.-C. O. and Men	10 lb. each	} To include great-coats for which no extra mules will be allowed.
	Followers	10 lb. each	
CHARGERS	General Officer	Discretionary up to amount allowed by Field Service Equipment Tables.	
	Staff Officers	1 charger, 1/2 grass-cutter's pony.	
	Medical Officers	2 seniors with each field hospital, 1 charger, 1/2 grass-cutter's pony; others nil.	
	Commanding Officers and Adjutants	1 charger, 1/2 grass-cutter's pony, each.	
	Other Officers	No charger, no pony.	
	Warrant and N.-C. O.	Nil.	
TENTAGE	Nil, except for Field Hospitals and Surgeries.	

Estimate of mules required for one brigade moving light without tents, with 20 days' supplies.

	Mules.
Carriage of baggage, equipment, etc.—	
Brigade Staff × 17 =	17
2 Battalions of British Infantry × 226 =	452
2 " Native " × 169 =	338
1 Native Mountain Battery (7-pr.) × 11 =	11
1 Company Sappers and Miners × 105 =	105
1 British Field Hospital × 244 =	244
1 Native " × 216 =	216
Commissariat and Transport departmental stores	26
	<u>1,409</u>

	lb.
Supplies for 20 days—	
1,724 European Troops × 3 1/2 lb. × 20 =	120,680
1,912 Native " × 2 1/2 " × 20 =	95,600
1,521 Followers × 2 lb. × 20 =	60,840
	<u>277,120</u>

Add 10 per cent. for wastage, etc. 27,712

* 143) 304,832

* 171 per mule have to be deducted for supplies and baggage of transport establishments.

(a) Allow 10 per cent. spare 213
2,345 mules.

	lb.
Grain for 5 days—	
24 Chargers × 8 lb. × 5 =	960
13 Ponies × 5 lb. × 5 =	325
138 Ordnance mules × 6 lb. × 5 =	4,140
956 1st class mules × 6 lb. × 5 =	28,680
2,870 2nd class mules × 5 lb. × 5 =	71,750
	<u>† (128) 105,855</u>

(b) {

(a) Add 10 per cent. spare 83

† Grain for each animal 25
Share of Drivers' kit 3 1/2
" " " food 3 1/2
TOTAL DEDUCTION 83
910 mules.

Transport allowed per unit.

ITEM.	BRIGADE STAFF.		BRITISH INFANTRY BATTALION.		NATIVE INFANTRY BATTALION.		BRITISH MOUNTAIN BATTERY.		NATIVE MOUNTAIN BATTERY, 7-PR.		COMPANY OF Sappers and MINERS.		BRITISH FIELD HOSPITAL.		NATIVE FIELD HOSPITAL.		REMARKS.
	Mauddage.	Mules.	Mauddage.	Mules.	Mauddage.	Mules.	Mauddage.	Mules.	Mauddage.	Mules.	Mauddage.	Mules.	Mauddage.	Mules.	Mauddage.	Mules.	
Kits of British Officers	...	4	19½	10	6	3	4	2	3½	2	2½	2	3½	2	2½	1½	No extra mules allowed great-coats
„ of Warrant Officers	½	½	3½	2	
„ of Native Officers, Native Clerks, etc.	...	4	6½	3½	1½	1	1½	2	1	½	2½	1½	
„ of Staff Sergeants	...	4	1½	3	½	½	½	½	½	½	
„ of British non-commissioned officers and men	157½	79	21½	11	½	½	4	½	4	½	
„ of Native non-commissioned officers and men	142½	72	32½	16½	46½	23½	33½	17	2½	1½	
„ of Public followers	...	½	5½	3	6½	3½	7½	4	8½	4½	2½	2	24½	13	19½	10	
„ Private „	
1st Ammunition Reserve (Small Arm)	64	32	60	30	2	1	18	9	
Ammunition Reserve (Artillery)	40	20	40	20	
Cooking pots and felling axes	15	8	16	8	6	3	4	2	
Kajawahs for spare arms	4	2	4	2	2	1	
Pakhals	16	...	8	...	3	...	3	...	2	...	4	...	4	
Entrenching tools	10	5	10	5	
Hospital stores, tentage and baggage of establishment	4½	3	5	3	6	3	5	3	5	3	215½	108	170½	86	
Equipment and baggage of signallers	6	3	6	3	2	1	2	1	
Office books and furniture	13	6½	2	1	2	1	1	½	1	½	1	½	
Quarter-Master's stores	4	2	2	1	1	½	1	½	1	½	
Armourer's tools, forge, etc.	2	1	2	1	22	11	22	11	
Treasure chest	2	1	2	1	
Oil and Handcuffs	
Scales and weights	2	1	2	1	
Institute stores	3	2	3	2	
Engineer equipment	100	50	
Commissariat equipment, baggage, etc., of establishment	48½	25	19	10	
Veterinary stores	1	1	1	1	
Riding mules in lieu of ambulance tongas	80	...	80	
Officer's mess	4	2	12	6	6	3	4	2	4	2	2	1	4	2	4	2	
Deduct Battery Baggage mules	...	14	...	200	...	149	...	92	...	74	...	91	...	212	...	187	
Carriage for kits of transport establishment	...	14	...	200	...	149	...	16	...	2	...	91	...	212	...	187	
add 10 per cent. spare	...	1	...	6	...	5	...	1	...	1	...	4	...	10	...	9	
	...	2	...	20	...	15	...	10	...	8	...	10	...	22	...	20	

APPENDIX IX.

Standing orders issued by Major-General Sir R. C. Low, K.C.B.

24th March 1895.

The following standing orders are published for the guidance of all officers serving with the Chitral Relief Force, and are to be strictly adhered to as far as circumstances permit.

Officers Commanding Brigades, etc., will see that these orders are thoroughly explained by Officers Commanding Corps and Departments to all under their command; every officer should be in possession of a copy.

By order,

B. BLOOD, *Brigadier-General,*

Chief Staff Officer, Chitral Relief Force.

STANDING ORDERS.

I. Sanitary.

1. The strictest attention of Brigadiers and Commanding Officers is directed to the sanitary arrangements of camps and bivouacs. In camps, latrines are to be provided for all troops and followers, British and Native, (corps will make their own arrangements for flags for the required latrines; Heads of Departments and Brigadiers for those of their lines and Brigade camp).

2. The Provost Marshal will be directed to take severe notice of any infringement of the rules laid down. The greatest care must be taken to keep the supply of drinking water unpolluted, and sentries will be posted with this object; separate drinking places should always be established for animals down stream.

3. Quarter-Masters of the day and all Medical Officers in charge of corps will report verbally to the Brigade-Major of the Brigade as to the sanitary state of camps.

4. During the advance, when there are no regular camps, latrines will be provided when practicable, and night latrines constructed well within the line of picquets; night latrines must be always filled in at daybreak. Men must be prohibited from proceeding for purposes of nature beyond the outlying picquets.

5. In standing camps latrines are to be distinguished by a red flag, and fresh trenches are to be dug daily, the old ones being filled in.

II. Followers' passes.

1. All followers are to be provided with metal badges to be worn round the neck outside the coat. These will be furnished by corps and departments at their own expense.

2. Printed passes will be issued to all traders by the Provost Marshal, for which a charge of 8 annas each will be made; similar passes will be issued to all natives whose business brings them within the lines of the force, and any native found to be without a pass is to be apprehended and forwarded to the Provost Marshal.

III. Marches and baggage.

1. In all columns of route the following order is to be observed:—
Immediately in rear of each unit are to follow—

- (a) Reserve ammunition (first).
- (b) Pakhals.
- (c) Signalling equipment.
- (d) Entrenching tools.
- (e) Dandies and hospital panniers.

2. In rear of the brigade, or mixed force, marching under one command,—

- (a) Reserve ammunition (second).
- (b) Cooking utensils.
- (c) Field hospitals.

- (d) Tents.
- (e) Kits.
- (f) Supplies.
- (g) Spare animals.

IV. Foraging.

1. Care must be taken that crops and fodder are not to be taken indiscriminately, but as pointed out by the Brigade Commissariat Officer, or his representative.
2. No village houses or property of any description is to be burnt or destroyed without clear orders to that effect.

V. Orders and reports.

1. No verbal reports or messages of any kind are to be sent in by officers on detached duty. All officers are to provide themselves with note books and pencils and send in written reports, date, hour, and place whence despatched, to be invariably noted, and the sender's name, rank, and designation, to be clearly written at the bottom of message. The addressee's name to be written in block letters at the head.
2. All orders in camp or bivouac are to be written, and staff officers when despatching them must obtain a written acknowledgment of their delivery. The cover initialled will usually suffice. In the field, all orders should, if possible, be written.

VI. Officers' chargers.

Officers should, previous to crossing the border, register their chargers with the Staff Officer of their respective brigades, in view to compensation being paid if killed during the operations.

VII. Working parties.

Working parties will always take their arms with them, and it will be the duty of the Officer in charge to see that there is a sufficient covering party.

VIII. Night alarms.

1. On arrival in camp, alarm posts will at once be appointed and the troops told off to them.
2. On an alarm taking place the men should fall in at the alarm posts of their corps and await orders.
3. While pushing forward on the light scale, and at any time when in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, all transport animals and public followers should be parked *inside* the camp, or bivouac, at night.
4. Followers should be warned that, in case of any alarm or attack by night, they should remain lying down where they are, where they will be far safer than moving about.

IX. Outposts.

1. Patrolling at night in the hills is often useless, and, as a rule, likely to do more harm than good, and should not be employed as a means of protecting camps.
2. Picquets to be placed before dark and at once to erect hasty defences.
3. When owing to steepness of the slopes, ground in front of a picquet cannot be observed, the enemy may be deterred from creeping up to the post by stones being rolled over the parapet at intervals.
4. On very dark nights a line of obstacles (such as brushwood) may usefully be placed a short distance in front of the post, the removal of which would disclose the presence of the enemy.
5. All people of the country should be turned out of camp before the picquets are placed.

X. Hill-fighting.

1. In the ascent of a long hill or spur the leading scouts and extended line, followed closely by their supports, should proceed very slowly, halting occasionally on marked defensive knolls or ridges to enable the main column and baggage to close up; and also that the men may not be fatigued by too rapid and continuous an advance. When within effective rifle range of the enemy's position, say 800 or 900 yards, the extended line should halt, and information of the enemy's position sent back to the Officer Commanding the brigade. *Fire should not be opened without orders.*
2. The Brigade Commander will then make his dispositions for attack. Suitable positions should be sought for to enable the artillery and infantry to cover the advance of the

attacking force. The latter should then, if possible, advance slowly without firing, towards their objective point, the supports well up in a closely extended line, artillery and covering infantry being mainly trusted to keep down the fire of the enemy.

3. When nearing the enemy's position (about 300 yards off) bayonets should be fixed and the line prepared for a sudden charge of the enemy's swordsmen. The superiority of our weapons gives us great advantage over any odds in numbers, and experience proves that a steady front will effectually check a rush. On the other hand the slightest giving way will inevitably lead to mischief.

4. When advancing to attack up a steep hill, on no account is there to be any rushing from ridge to ridge, or from cover to cover; a slow steady advance without much firing is the surest way of gaining the objective. Officers should remember that they must not lead their men too quickly, but regulate their own pace to the condition of the men and the nature of the ground, keeping the line as much intact as possible, and avoiding undue separation from their supports.

5. In retiring off a hill a small party should be left on the top to cover the retirement. In this manner successive positions should be occupied on the slopes down the hill.

6. In retiring over ground not previously traversed scouts must always be employed to give timely notice of difficult or precipitous places, and to show the best line of retirement. The attention of Officers Commanding brigades is particularly directed to this point. Special signals from the scouts should be previously determined on.

7. Let the men, if possible, have a meal before going into action.

8. The enemy are adepts at long range firing, but cannot stand close quarters.

9. Always keep a portion of your troops (however small) as a reserve to send to a critical point.

XI. Communication between brigades.

Signalling between brigades will be maintained whenever practicable. Officers Commanding brigades will at once communicate any important information, movements, and occurrences to the Major-General Commanding, whose location will be duly notified. In the absence of any special events they will communicate morning and evening.

XII. Signalling parties.

1. All regimental or supernumerary signallers are to be placed at the disposal of the Superintendent of Signalling for employment either as divisional signallers or with their respective brigades. A proper proportion will always be left with corps for regimental purposes. Brigade Commanders are responsible that suitable guards are told off daily to accompany signalling parties.

2. The Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent Signalling Officers should be informed as early as possible of any intended movements, so that all signalling details may be considered and arranged.

3. All arrangements for transport, rations, etc., are to be made by the corps furnishing the party. When British and Native signallers compose the same party, the former must be rationed, etc., by the corps from which they are detailed.

4. The immediate vicinity of a signal station should be kept clear of all persons unconnected with the working of the station.

5. The General Officer Commanding the force is alone empowered to send "clear line" messages beyond the limits in the Field Lines. Brigadiers and officers in command of detached parties may send "clear line" messages in case of emergency. The words "clear line" must be written at the commencement of the text of the message.

XIII. Intelligence.

1. Officers detailed for intelligence purposes are held responsible that all information collected is at once reported to the Officer Commanding the column or party, who will in turn report to Brigade Head-Quarters.

2. Brigadier-Generals will transmit such portion of the intelligence as they may consider necessary at once for the information of the General Officer Commanding.

3. Brigadier-Generals will arrange that sketches, scale 2 inches to the mile, of every route taken by their columns, or of detached portions of it, are submitted. All the information should be given in the body of the sketch, in cases where it would not interfere with the detail; and where detail would be interfered with, it should be recorded in the margin or on a separate piece of paper, and referenced by figures to the localities to which it refers.

4. All sketches are to be finished in pen and ink; colours are not to be used, nor are hills to be stumped in. Contours are to be shown where possible.

5. The sketches should be elucidated, when possible, by outline freehand drawing showing the road in a dotted line. The names of villages, hills, etc., should be written in the top margin exactly above them and a thin line drawn downwards to mark the exact spot. The point from which, and the point of the compass towards which, the sketch was made, must be noted.

6. All sketches will invariably be submitted through the officer ordering the execution of the work, to the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, Divisional Head-Quarters, for final disposal.

7. Any person may, when time can be saved thereby, communicate direct with the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, information of an important nature which has come to his personal notice, such report being, nevertheless, made to his Commanding Officer as well.

8. When submitting reports of any action with the enemy, a plan sketch of the country should, wherever possible, be furnished: scale 6 inches to a mile.

9. Commanding Officers will keep a list of the names of officers and men in their corps who are capable of giving or obtaining information regarding the country in which the troops are operating.

XIV. Postal.

1. The base (post) office for the Chitral Relief Force has been established (for the present) at Nowshera; officers and others arriving for service in the field are requested to intimate to the postmaster, Base Office, the number of the brigade, the regiment, etc., to which they will be attached.

2. Separate field post offices will be attached to Divisional Head-Quarters, and to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd brigades.

3. Field post offices will also accompany the Divisional troops and the Lines of Communication troops on the march up from Nowshera.

4. The base and field post offices will work according to the Field Service Departmental Code.

5. Letter mails to and from the field will be made over, for conveyance, to the political department. There will usually be one despatch of mails daily to and from the field. As postmen are not attached to field post offices, Officers Commanding regiments and departments are requested to send their orderlies to the post office to take delivery of mails.

6. Parcel bags of paid parcels will be handed over to the Commissariat Department at Mardan for conveyance by convoy to field post offices, where the parcels will be delivered through orderlies and agents.

7. All complaints should be addressed to the Superintendent, Field Post Offices, Chitral Relief Force.

APPENDIX X.

Detailed scheme for the Reserve Brigade, dated 29th March 1895.

The Government of India have approved of the formation at Rawal Pindi of a Reserve Brigade to the Chitral Relief Force, composed as under:—

No. 7 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade.
26th Punjab Infantry.
2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.
2nd Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Rifles.
Sections C and D, No. 3 British Field Hospital.
" A and B, No. 25 Native " "
No. 31 Native Field Hospital.

The above details will proceed on the Field Service scale of strength, establishments, etc., as laid down in the Field Service Equipment Tables for the different branches, except that the number of British officers with regiments of Native Infantry will not be increased above the peace establishment.

Depôts will be formed as laid down in the "Mobilisation Measures" in the Field Service Equipment Tables. Depôts of Native Infantry will be on scale B.

2. *Concentration.*—The above units—with the exception of the 26th Punjab Infantry, which will remain at Jhelum until actually required—will be concentrated at Rawal Pindi as early as possible. The units from out-stations will be located in the hut barracks on the West Ridge.

3. *Details, Commands and Staff.*—The Brigade will, if moved beyond Rawal Pindi, come under the general direction and control of the General Officer Commanding Chitral Relief Force. (For staff as finally approved *see* below.)

4. *Clothing.*—The summer scale of clothing for troops and followers, as laid down in the Field Service Departmental Code, "Commissariat—Transport," and Field Service Equipment Tables. The clothing will be issued in bulk by the Commissariat Department to corps and units, but will not be distributed to individuals until further orders.

Hob-nails and toe-plates.—The hob-nails and toe-plates in possession of corps having field service equipment are to be put on the boots. Corps not already in possession of these articles are to be equipped with them as early as possible.

5. *Concessions and privileges.*—If moved beyond Hoti Mardan, the Brigade will come under the concessions and privileges authorised for the Chitral Relief Force. Staff officers will draw pay from the date on which they join their appointments.

6. *Equipment.*—Departments concerned will complete the equipment of corps, already in possession of field service equipment, by issuing the articles hitherto kept for them in departmental charge pending mobilisation.

They will also equip, without the submission of regular indents, the corps now warned for service not already in possession of field service equipment.

Equipment and stores will be made over to corps having mobilisation equipment, at the equipping stations laid down for them in the mobilisation scheme.

The corps not in possession of mobilisation equipment will be equipped as under:—

No. 7 (Bengal) Mountain Battery at	.	.	.	Dehra Dun.
3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade at	.	.	.	Rawal Pindi.
26th Punjab Infantry at	.	.	.	Jhelum.

No transport will accompany units to Rawal Pindi.

7. *Ammunition.*—As laid down in the Field Service Departmental Code, "Ordnance," also Field Service Manual, Part V, and Field Service Equipment Tables.

The Ordnance Field Park, Chitral Relief Force, will contain the authorised proportions of stores and ammunition for this brigade.

8. *Supplies and transport.*—These questions will remain for consideration hereafter.

9. *Medical.*—Reserves of medicines and medical comforts to be arranged for by departments concerned. Strict medical examination of followers as well as troops to be made before they leave their respective stations.

The question of ambulance transport will remain for consideration hereafter.

10. *Ordnance stores.*—Those required for the brigade will be contained in the mobilised Ordnance Field Park, Chitral Relief Force.

11. *Signalling equipment.*—Any extra signalling equipment considered necessary should be indented for by the General Officer Commanding from the Rawal Pindi arsenal.

12. *Telegraphs.*—The Staff and Departmental officers of the brigade will be permitted to send telegrams on the "debit note" system from the Rawal Pindi telegraph office.

13. *Supply of maps and reports.*—Maps and reports will be supplied as under by the Intelligence Branch, Simla :—

For every officer.—A map of theatre of operations, on cloth.

To all commanding and staff officers.—Report on country embraced in theatre of operations.

14. *Reports and returns.*—As laid down in Appendix F, Part XI, Field Service Manual, through the General Officer Commanding Chitral Relief Force after movement from Rawal Pindi to the front.

15. *Officers' messes.*—If moved from Rawal Pindi, officers' messes will be allowed on the scale laid down in the Field Service Manual, Part XII, Section III.

The following appointments were made to the Staff of the Brigade :—

Commanding—

Orderly Officer

Major-General G. N. Channer, V.C., C.B.

Captain B. H. Boucher, Hampshire Regiment.

*Deputy Assistant Adjutant and
Quarter Master General.*

Major H. L. Smith-Dorrien, D.S.O., Derbyshire Regiment.

Brigade-Major

Captain H. H. Dobbie, 30th Punjab Infantry.

Brigade Commissariat Officer

Lieutenant W. T. Vincent, Commissariat Transport Department.

Assistant Commissariat Officer

Lieutenant G. T. Robinson, 33rd Punjab Infantry.

Brigade Transport Officer

Captain A. B. H. Northcott, Royal Scots Fusiliers.

Brigade Signalling Officer

Captain W. E. M. Norie, Middlesex Regiment.

Field Engineer

Major J. W. Thurburn, R.E., Public Works Department, Punjab.

Assistant Field Engineers

Lieutenant P. G. Grant, R.E., Military Works Department.

Lieutenant F. G. Howard, R.E., Public Works Department, North-West Provinces.

APPENDIX XI.

Detailed scheme for the Abbottabad movable column, dated 29th March 1895.

The Government of India have approved of the garrison of Abbottabad being strengthened by the following units:—

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery from Dera Ismail Khan ;
2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles, from Dehra Dun ;
1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles, from Edwardesabad as soon as it can be spared ;

Sections A and B, No. 26 Native Field Hospital, from Jubbulpore ;
and of the formation of a movable column for a possible advance from Abbottabad to Chilas, should the latter post be threatened.

2. *Formation of column.*—The following units will form the movable column:—

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles.
2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.

Sections A and B, No. 26 Native Field Hospital.

The units of the column will move to Abbottabad on the field service scale of strength and establishments, but on the relief scale of baggage ; and the number of British officers with regiments of Native Infantry will not be increased above the peace establishment.

Depôts will be formed as laid down in the " Mobilisation Measures " in the Field Service Equipment Tables. Depôts of Native Infantry will be on scale " B."

In the event of an advance beyond Abbottabad, the column will move on a reduced scale of establishments, baggage and equipment, which will be specially indicated.

3. *Concentration and designation of column.*—The column will be concentrated at Abbottabad with the least possible delay. It will be designated the " Abbottabad Movable Column," and from date of concentration will come under the general control and direction of the General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force.

4. *Clothing.*—The summer scale of clothing for troops and followers, as laid down in the Field Service Departmental Code, " Commissariat-Transport," and Field Service Equipment Tables. The clothing will be issued in bulk by the Commissariat Department to corps and units, but will not be distributed to individuals until an advance beyond Abbottabad is ordered.

Hob-nails and toe-plates.—Those in possession of the equipped corps are to be put on the boots. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles, will be equipped with these articles if possible.

5. *Concessions and privileges.*—The troops and followers will be considered on " Field Service " for all concessions and privileges from the date of crossing the frontier.

Concessions which are admissible from or between certain dates fixed by regulations will have effect from such dates ; free rations will be given from date of leaving Abbottabad. Staff officers will draw pay from the date on which they join their appointments.

6. *Equipment.*—Departments concerned will complete the equipment of the corps, already in possession of field service equipment, by issuing the articles hitherto kept for them in departmental charge pending mobilisation.

The 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles, will be equipped, as far as possible, from the field service equipment of the 1st Battalion, any articles required to complete being supplied by departments without the submission of regular indents.

Equipment and stores will be made over to No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery and 2nd Gurkha Rifles at the equipping stations laid down for them in the mobilisation scheme. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles, will be equipped at Abbottabad.

Transport will be supplied at Abbottabad.

7. *Ammunition.*—

Infantry	.	.	{	70 rounds Martini-Henry ammunition carried per man.
				50 " " " " " on mules.
Artillery	.	.		146 rounds per gun.
Revolver	.	.		24 rounds carried on person.

and reserve ammunition will be pushed up as may be found practicable.

The supplies.—The Commissariat Department will arrange for 35 days' supplies for the column being collected at Abbottabad.

9. Transport.—The column will be equipped with mules as far as possible; the deficiency being completed by camels. The required transport will be concentrated at Abbottabad as early as possible, under the orders of the General Officer Commanding Punjab Frontier Force in communication with the Commissary General, Western Circle.

10. Medical.—Reserves of medicines and medical comforts to be arranged for by departments concerned. Strict medical examination of followers as well as of troops to be made before they leave their respective stations. Riding mules or ponies with riding saddles to be substituted for ambulance tongas.

11. Engineer stores.—A supply of road-making tools and dynamite, as may be considered necessary by the General Officer Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, should be arranged for. Any extra entrenching tools considered necessary may be indented for. Cutting tools to be sharpened in the arsenal before issue.

12. Signalling equipment.—Any extra signalling equipment considered necessary should be indented for by the Officer Commanding from the Rawal Pindi arsenal.

13. Supply of maps, etc.—Maps and reports will be supplied as under by the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

For every officer:—

A map of theatre of operations, on cloth.

To all Commanding and Staff officers:—

Report on country embraced in theatre of operations.

14. Post office.—The Officer Commanding the column will make such arrangements as he may find practicable, in communication with the Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, for posts to be sent up to the force.

15. Telegraphs.—Visual signalling will be depended upon.

16. Submission of reports and returns.—As laid down in Appendix F, Part XI, Field Service Manual.

17. Officers' messes.—Will be allowed on the scale laid down in the Field Service Manual, Part XII, Section III.

APPENDIX XII.

Arrangements for the Lines of Communication, Chitral Relief Force, sanctioned in G. G. O. No. 478 of 10th May 1895.

Organization.—An officer of the rank of Major-General will command the Line of Communications from the base to the advanced depôt. The duties of the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications will be as defined in the Field Service Manual, part XI, paragraph 51.

The line will be divided into four sections, each in charge of a Road Commandant:—

1. Base to Khar, about 58 miles.
2. Khar to Mundia Khan, about 42 miles.
3. Mundia Khan to Dir, about 48 miles.
4. From Dir onwards.

The General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications will take orders only from the General Officer Commanding the Chitral Relief Force. His powers will be as defined in the Field Service Manual, Part XI, paragraph 52, with the following addendum:

“Detached operations will be conducted entirely under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Chitral Relief Force, but in the event of communication with the latter being, from any circumstances, impracticable, the General Officer Commanding Line of Communications will assume the command and responsibility, but he must not himself leave the Line of Communications.”

All requisitions that he may make on Brigadier-Generals, or other officers, for duties on the Line of Communications must at once be complied with.

The principal Commissariat Officer of the force and the principal Transport Officer will be under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications; as well as all Commissariat Officers and all Transport Officers, except Brigade Commissariat and Brigade Transport Officers who are under General Officers Commanding Brigades. The exception to this will be when Brigade Transport is used on the line apart from the brigades, and the Transport Officer accompanies it.

All Ordnance Officers and Depôts, as they stand, will be under the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications.

The Inspecting Veterinary Officer and all other Veterinary Officers will be under the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications.

STAFF OF THE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

<i>General Officer Commanding</i>	Major-General E. Stedman, C.B.
<i>Aide-de-Camp</i>	Lieutenant H. W. F. Cooke, 24th Punjab Infantry.
<i>Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.</i>	Colonel I. S. M. Hamilton, D.S.O.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.</i>	Captain G. V. Kemball, Royal Artillery.
<i>Principal Medical Officer</i>	Surgeon-Colonel G. Thomson, Indian Medical Service.
<i>Chief Commissariat Officer</i>	Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Yaldwyn, Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Chief Transport Officer</i>	Major C. M. Fitzgerald, Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Base Commandant</i>	Major A. F. Barrow, C. M. G., 12th Bengal Infantry.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General at the Base.</i>	Captain G. W. Somerset, 12th Bengal Infantry.
<i>Road Commandants</i>	Major F. S. Gwatkin, 13th Bengal Lancers. Brevet-Major S. C. H. Monro, Seaforth Highlanders. Major G. H. W. O'Sullivan, Royal Engineers. Major A. J. Watson, Suffolk Regiment

<i>Commanding Royal Engineer</i>	. Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Shone, D. S. O., R. Es.
<i>Adjutant, Royal Engineers</i>	. Captain B. B. Russell, R. Es.
<i>Field Engineers</i> Major H. E. S. Abbott, R. Es. Captain G. Williams, R. Es. Captain W. G. R. Cordue, R. Es. Captain H. C. Nanton*, R. Es.
<i>Assistant Field Engineers</i>	. Lieutenant A. J. H. Swiney, R. Es. Lieutenant A. Walpole, R. Es. ,, H. F. Thuillier, R. Es. ,, F. F. N. Rees, R. Es. ,, S. D'A. Crookshank, R. Es. Lieutenant E. C. Ogilvie*, R. Es. ,, H. A. L. Hepper*, R. Es.

* Detailed in G. G. O. No. 503, 17th May 1895.

APPENDIX XIII.

Extracts from the scheme for the garrison of Chitral, dated 15th August 1895, as approved by the Government of India.

Garrison.—The garrison will consist of the following troops:—

2 Guns, No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery (Sikh section).
No. 1 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
2nd Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Rifles.
25th Punjab Infantry.
2 Maxim guns.
One Native Field Hospital.

The above details will be on field service scale of strength, establishments, etc., as laid down in the Field Service Equipment Tables for the different branches, except as follows:—

Baggage	Relief scale.
Quarter Master's stores	Discretionary, calculated for one year.

The 32nd Pioneers will be withdrawn from the Gilgit Agency this autumn, but the detachment of sappers will be relieved by a fresh detachment from India.

Head-quarters of garrison.—The head-quarters of the garrison, pending the building of the fort at Chitral, will be at Kala Drosh; Chitral itself will be garrisoned by 3 companies of infantry with one of the Maxim guns. One company of infantry will be at Gairat, between Kala Drosh and Chitral, covering the position there, and the remainder of the troops at Kala Drosh.

Hutting troops.—The Officer Commanding is authorised to hut his troops at Kala Drosh, Chitral and Gairat.

Chitral fort.—A fort will be built as soon as possible at Chitral.

Details, Command and Staff.—

Commanding: Lieutenant-Colonel H. D. Hutchinson, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Rifles.
Brigade Major: Captain J. M. Stewart, 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.
Transport Officer: Lieutenant E. C. Haag, 18th Hussars.

Clothing—Troops.—The summer and winter scale of clothing will be issued to all troops forming the garrison. In addition to this every fighting man will be provided with a warm coat (British troops pattern). Two extra pairs of boots (Messrs. Cooper, Allen and Co.'s universal ankle-boot, infantry, No. 1 quality) per fighting man will be provided as a reserve, and issued under the orders of the officer commanding the garrison. Ordinary warm clothing will be taken as on relief.

Followers.—The summer and winter scale will be issued, but boots instead of shoes and two pairs boots each as a reserve.

Concessions and privileges.—The concessions and privileges will be the same as those enjoyed by the regular troops in the Gilgit Agency, *viz.*, free clothing, rations and family pensions to heirs of deceased men.

	ROUNDS.	<i>Ammunition.</i> —As laid down in Field Service Manual,
Case	50	Part V, namely, 400 rounds per rifle and 500 rounds per
Common	55	gun. In addition to above there will be a further reserve
Shrapnel	105	of 250 rounds per gun, made up as per margin. The number
Double shell	20	of rounds per Maxim will be 13,200.
Star shell	20	
	<u>250</u>	

Supplies and Transport.—Supplies for the whole force for one year will be placed in Kala Drosh at once and moved to Chitral as required.

*For gun and carriage	3	As regards transport, 3 mules will be left per Maxim
For relief	3	and 10 mules* per mountain gun; also 34 mules for the
For ammunition	2	company of sappers; besides these no other mules will
Spare	2	remain with the troops forming the Chitral garrison.
	<u>10</u>	

A body of 100 specially selected Punjabi coolies will be engaged for the guns and any other purposes at discretion of the Colonel on the Staff at such rates of pay as may be found necessary. Five hundred Sind donkeys will also be left for general purposes. All other transport will be coolie transport and will have to be obtained locally.

*1 Commissariat Sergeant.
 1 Transport Agent.
 1 Sirdar.
 2 Mates.
 126 Bearers.

12. *Medical—Ambulance transport.*—In addition to two field dandis per battalion with 6 bearers each, 20 dandis, with the establishment authorised,* will accompany the field hospital.

Stores, etc.—The medicines, medical comforts and other expendable stores of the Native Field Hospital will be made up to a 12-months' supply.

Reserves.—A reserve of essential medicines and medical comforts will be arranged for at the discretion of the Principal Medical Officer in India.

Anti-scorbutics.—A supply of lime-juice will be provided at the discretion of the Principal Medical Officer in India. Garden seeds will be supplied from India.

Any additional entrenching tools, signalling equipment, etc., considered necessary by the General Officer Commanding the Chitral Relief Force should be handed over to the Officer Commanding the Chitral garrison. A special supply of artificer's tools for building forts and hutting troops to be sent up from India.

APPENDIX XIV.

Extracts from the scheme, dated 1st October 1895, for maintaining communication with Chitral by the Peshawar-Chitral road, as approved by the Government of India.

It having been decided to retain a garrison in Chitral, the following scheme is proposed for keeping open communication by the Peshawar-Chitral road.

A scheme has already been drawn up for the garrison of Chitral, and the present proposals only deal with the arrangements for the road.

Troops.—The following troops are detailed to hold Malakand and Chakdara :—

One squadron, Guides Cavalry.
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
15th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
29th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
31st " " " "
34th " Pioneers. 1 field hospital

The above troops will be on field service scale of strength, except that each infantry battalion will have eight British officers.

Details, command and staff—

Commanding	Brigadier-General H. G. Waterfield, I.S.C.
Orderly Officer	Captain G. J. C. Hall, 12th Bengal Cavalry.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General.	Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40th Pathans.
Assistant Superintendent of Army Signalling.	Lieutenant H. E. Cotterill, Royal West Surrey Regiment.
Principal Medical Officer	Brigade-Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Calthrop, M.D., I.M.S.
Transport Officer	Captain A. B. H. Northcott, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Provost Marshal	Captain G. H. C. Colomb, 1st Bn., 4th Gurkha Rifles.

Clothing.—A free issue of clothing on summer and winter scales.

Concessions and privileges.—These will be similar to those allowed to the regular troops in the Gilgit Agency, *viz.*, clothing, free rations and pensions to the heirs of deceased men.

Ammunition—

400 rounds per rifle.
144 rounds per gun and 6 star shell, total 150 rounds.
Also ammunition for the Maxima and 9-pr. S. B. guns.

Supplies.—All arrangements will be made by the Commissariat Department, who will receive godown accommodation in Chakdara and Malakand posts, for one month's supplies for their respective garrisons, and platform accommodation at the Malakand under the protection of the fire of the post for 10,000 maunds of fodder, and 10,000 maunds of food and grain. This amount gives approximately six weeks' supplies for men and animals for the whole force.

Transport.—Transport will be kept up on the following scale for a movable column :—

2½ battalions, Native Infantry. Normal scale (mules and camels).
1 Mountain Battery. Normal scale (mules).
1 company sappers. " " "
1 squadron cavalry. " " "
1 Field Hospital. Half transport for all ranks.

In addition to the above, mule transport for five days' food and supplies for men, and two days' grain for animals, will be provided for the troops forming the movable column. In all, some 1,500 animals will have to be provided for in the Malakand camp, where all animals will be kept.

Equipment.—Any additional tools and signalling equipment necessary will be handed over by the Chitral Relief Force to the General Officer Commanding.

Medical Stores, etc.—Medicines, medical comforts and other expendable stores will be made up to a-12 months' supply.

Reserves.—A reserve of essential medicines and medical comforts will be arranged for at the discretion of the Principal Medical Officer in India.

Anti-scorbutics.—A supply of lime-juice will be provided at the discretion of the Principal Medical Officer in India. Garden seeds will be supplied from India.

Fortified posts.—A post will be constructed at Malakand and another post at Chak-dara.

Accommodation.—

Chakdara.—The Native Infantry and hospital in huts inside the post. The cavalry in European privates' tents (twelve men to a tent) with stone in mud walls inside a defensible enclosure.

Malakand post.—The Native Infantry and hospital in huts inside the post. Huts will be built for four companies.

Malakand camp.—European privates' tents for all officers and fighting men (twelve men to a tent) with stone in mud walls.

General service tents (160 lbs) for followers (fourteen to a tent), with side tents.

General service tents will also be stored for the movable column at the Malakand post.

Sanitary.—Cinerators will be supplied for the Malakand camp as well as for the Chakdara and Malakand posts.

Roads.—The existing camel road to Dir will suffice for all requirements at present. Up to Dargai the metalled road to be maintained as a provincial work; it is estimated the annual cost will be Rs. 500 per mile. Beyond Dargai up to Chakdara the road to be kept in repair by the troops. Beyond Chakdara to Ashreth it is estimated that the cost of maintaining the existing road in repair will be about Rs. 100 per mile per annum, *i.e.*, about Rs. 10,000 per annum. The bridges on the road are calculated to last seven years; the only one that requires any further work is that over the Swat river, the foundations of which must be improved. This will be done this winter. The cost is estimated at Rs. 40,000.

The following roads will have to be made:—

- (1) A metalled cart-road connecting the Malakand camp with the existing graded road between Malakand post and Chakdara.
- (2) A camel road between Malakand post and Malakand camp.

Telegraphs.—The telegraph line will be maintained as far as Chakdara, but between there and Kala Drosh it has been dismantled. One office will be required at each of the following places, *viz.*—Chakdara, Malakand camp, Malakand post, with the necessary signallers.

The troops for occupation of Chitral and Swat territory, *viz.*, 5 battalions, will be found by withdrawing 4 battalions of Punjab Infantry from the Bengal Command, *viz.*, from Cawnpore, Nowgong, Jhansi, and Lucknow. Three of these battalions will be replaced in the Bengal Command by battalions from Madras or Bombay under proposals which are being separately submitted.

APPENDIX XV.

Strength and distribution of the Chitral Relief Force on various dates.

TABLE I.

Strength of Chitral Relief Force on 1st April 1895.

CORPS.	Guns.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		REMARKS.
		Officers.	Other ranks.	British officers.	Native ranks.	
<i>Divisional Head-Quarters.</i>						
Staff	26	3	...	28	
<i>Divisional Troops.</i>						
Staff	6	1	
11th Bengal Lancers	10	500	
Guides Cavalry	8	340*	* Strength on 8th April; no reliable information available before that date.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	6	5	110	...	148	
No. 8 " " " "	6	5	104	...	155	
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery .	4	3	180	
No. 1 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	...	3	2	...	165*	
No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	...	4	2	...	171	
No. 6 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	...	2	2	...	150*	
13th Bengal Infantry	8	723*	Arrived at Nowshera, 1st April.
23rd Punjab Pioneers	10	732	Strength on 1st May; no reliable information available before that date.
<i>1st Brigade.</i>						
Staff	8	1	
1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment	24	801	
1st " King's Royal Rifle Corps	20	790	
15th Sikhs	9	722	
37th Dogras	9	736	
<i>2nd Brigade.</i>						
Staff	8	1	
2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers.	...	24	768	
1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders	23	748	
Guides Infantry	10	664	
4th Sikh Infantry	9	650	

CORPS.	Guns.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		REMARKS.
		Officers.	Other ranks.	British officers.	Native ranks.	
<i>3rd Brigade.</i>						
Staff	8	1	
1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment	25	805	
2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders	19	802	
25th Punjab Infantry	7	736	
2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles	10	736	
<i>Lines of Communication.</i>						
Staff	6	1	
Staff at Base	3	
No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery	6	5	235*	* Strength on 8th April.
1st Battalion, East Lancashire Regiment	29	663†	† Strength on 22nd April.
29th Punjab Infantry	11	730*	
30th Punjab Infantry	9	721*	

TABLE II.

Strength and distribution of the Chitral Relief Force on 1st May 1895.

Post.	Corps.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		REMARKS.
		Officers.	Other ranks.	British Officers.	Native ranks.	
Chitral	Details	1	2	
Ashreth	Staff, 3rd Brigade	8	1	
	Half No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	2	1	...	80	
	1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment	24	805	
Ziarat	Details	1	8	
Laorai pass	2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles	4	342	
Gujar	Half No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	1	81	
	23rd Punjab Pioneers	4	347	
Dir	2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles	4	335	
	Divisional Head-Quarters	27	3	...	30	
	Staff, Divisional Troops	6	1	
Surbat	No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	3	175	
	2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders	24	772	
	25th Punjab Infantry	8	556	
Janbatai	2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles	1	48	
	25th Punjab Infantry	1	181	
Chashma (Kanbat).	23rd Punjab Pioneers	6	385	
	4th Sikh Infantry	2	285	
Mundah	Guides Cavalry	37	
	No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	5	105	...	151	
	4th Sikh Infantry	8	330	
	Staff, 2nd Brigade	8	1	
Panjkora bridge	Guides Cavalry	3	106	
	No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	5	110	...	156	
	2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers	29	798	
	1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders	24	726	
	Guides Infantry	10	665	
Maidan valley	Guides Cavalry	1	135	
	No. 1 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	3	3	...	171	
Serai	13th Bengal Infantry	8	673	
	Guides Cavalry	4	65	On reconnaissance.
Serai	11th Bengal Lancers	1	61	
	15th Sikhs	2	176	

Post.	Corps.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		REMARKS.
		Officers.	Other ranks.	British Officers.	Native ranks.	
Chakdara . . .	Staff, Lines of Communications . . .	8	1	...	4	Arrived on the 21st April to assist in bridging the Swat river.
	11th Bengal Lancers	56	
	No. 6 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	2	2	...	164	
	No. 6 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners	4	2	...	164	
	15th Sikhs	7	552	
	Staff, 1st Brigade	8	1	
	11th Bengal Lancers	9	378	
Khar	No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery	5	224	
	1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment	26	764	
	1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps	26	745	
	2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders	29	
	37th Dogras	11	734	
	1st Battalion, East Lancashire Regiment	30	666	
	29th Punjab Infantry	11	731	
Malakand	34th Punjab Pioneers	10	611	
	Foot of Malakand	30th Punjab Infantry	2	182
Dargai	30th Punjab Infantry	6	369	
	Details	4	
Jalala	9th Bengal Lancers (2 squadrons)	1	95	
	30th Punjab Infantry	1	167	
	Staff	12	1	
Hoti Mardan	No. 7 (Bengal) Mountain Battery	4	232	
	2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles	10	727	
	2nd Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Rifles	9	755	
	26th Punjab Infantry	9	735	
	Details	2	29	

Reserve Brigade less 3rd Bn., Rifle Brigade, which stood fast at Rawal Pindi.

TABLE III.

Distribution of the Chitral Relief Force on the 1st July 1895.

<i>Chitral</i>	. . .	2nd Bn., 4th Gurkha Rifles (5 companies).
<i>Kala Drosh</i>	. . .	No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners. 1st Bn., East Kent Regiment (2 companies). 2nd Bn., 4th Gurkha Rifles (3 companies).
<i>Ashreth</i>	. . .	1st Bn., East Kent Regiment (2 companies). 23rd Punjab Pioneers (4 companies).
<i>Gujar</i>	. . .	25th Punjab Infantry (1½ companies).
<i>Mirga</i>	. . .	Divisional Head-Quarters. Lines of Communication Head-Quarters. 3rd Brigade Head-Quarters. No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery. 1st Bn., East Kent Regiment (4 companies). 2nd Bn., 4th Gurkha Rifles (detachment).
<i>Kolandi</i>	. . .	25th Punjab Infantry (1 company).
<i>Dir</i>	. . .	25th Punjab Infantry (5½ companies).
<i>Surbat</i>	. . .	2nd Bn., Seaforth Highlanders (1 company).
<i>Bandai</i>	. . .	" " " " (3 companies).
<i>Fanbatai pass</i>	. . .	2nd Brigade Head-Quarters. No. 3 Mountain Battery, R. A. (6 guns). No. 8 Mountain Battery, R. A. (4 guns). No. 6 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners (detachment). 2nd Bn., King's Own Scottish Borderers. 2nd Bn., Seaforth Highlanders (4 companies). 1st Bn., Gordon Highlanders. Maxim gun (Devonshire Regiment).
<i>Kanbat</i>	. . .	Guides Cavalry (22 men). 4th Sikh Infantry.
<i>Mundah</i>	. . .	Guides Cavalry (2½ squadrons). 13th Bengal Infantry. Guides Infantry.
<i>Untkar</i>	. . .	23rd Punjab Pioneers (4 companies).
<i>Panjhora valley</i>	. . .	No. 1 Bengal Sappers and Miners.
<i>(Various places)</i>	. . .	No. 6 " " " No. 6 Madras " " 34th Punjab Pioneers.
<i>Panjhora bridge</i>	. . .	No. 8 Mountain Battery, R. A. (2 guns). Guides Cavalry (18 men). R. E. Field Park. 15th Sikhs.
<i>Serai</i>	. . .	11th Bengal Lancers (½ squadron). 29th Punjab Infantry (2 companies).
<i>Laram</i>	. . .	No. 6 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners (detachment). 1st Bn., Bedfordshire Regiment. 1st Bn., King's Royal Rifle Corps.
<i>Chakdara</i>	. . .	11th Bengal Lancers (½ squadron). Pontoon section. 29th Punjab Infantry (6 companies).
<i>Khar</i>	. . .	1st Brigade Head-Quarters. 11th Bengal Lancers (3 squadrons). No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery (6 guns). 37th Dogras.
<i>Malakand pass</i>	. . .	4th Brigade Head-Quarters. 9th Bengal Lancers (6 men). 1st Bn., East Lancashire Regiment. 2nd Bn., 3rd Gurkha Rifles. Maxim gun (1st Bn., East Surrey Regiment).

APPENDIX XVI.

Government General Orders Nos. 530, 531, and 532, dated Simla, the 24th May 1895.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

GILGIT.

No. 530.—The Right Hon'ble the Viceroy and Governor-General of India has very great satisfaction in ordering the publication of a letter from the Adjutant General in India transmitting a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Kelly, 32nd Pioneers, Commanding the Gilgit Force, relating to the advance of the force under his command from Gilgit to the relief of Chitral in March and April 1895.

2. This force, composed of 396 men of the 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers), two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, some Kashmir Sappers and Miners, and a small body of levies of Cher Kila, Hunza, Nagar, and Sai, marched a distance of 220 miles, over a country presenting very great physical difficulties, crossed the Shandur Pass 12,230 feet high, in deep snow, relieved the Garrison at Mastuj, twice defeated the enemy posted in the strongest natural positions, and finally relieved Chitral on the 20th April, after a most arduous and difficult march.

3. Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, has already signified Her gracious approbation of this remarkable exploit, and His Excellency in Council now desires to express his deep sense of the admirable and valuable services performed by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men under his command under extraordinary difficulties, which were so successfully overcome by the ability and fortitude of the commander and his officers, and by the discipline, spirit, and courage of the soldiers and levies under them.

No. 768-G.,—"Field Operations,"—dated Simla, 22nd May 1895.

From—The Adjutant-General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a despatch, with enclosures, from Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Kelly, 32nd Pioneers, Commanding the Gilgit Force, describing his advance from Gilgit to Chitral in March and April 1895, and to express His Excellency's warm approbation of the manner in which, in the face of extraordinary difficulties, the advance and operations of the force were conducted, and of the indomitable energy displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and the officers and troops under his command in overcoming them.

2. In consequence of the situation of affairs in Chitral, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly was, on the 22nd March 1895, directed by the Commander-in-Chief to assume military command in the Gilgit Agency, and to make such dispositions and movements of the forces under his command as he might consider necessary.

3. On the 23rd March, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, having made suitable arrangements for the protection of Gilgit, Chilas, and the posts along the Indus river at Bunji and Ramghat, left Gilgit on his march of 220 miles to Chitral, with a force consisting of 396 men of the 32nd Pioneers and two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery.

This force was subsequently reinforced during the advance by 40 men of the Kashmir Sappers and Miners and 150 levies.

4. Ghizr was reached on the 31st March, and here Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly had to face not only the physical difficulties of crossing the Shandur Pass, at a period of the year when the pass is almost impracticable, but also difficulties as regards transport, which had been greatly increased by the desertion of many coolies.

5. On the 1st April 1895 an attempt was made to cross the pass, which, however, was unsuccessful, the artillery mules and transport ponies being unable to make their way through the deep snow. This necessitated the abandoning of mule and pony transport and obliged Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly to utilize the services of his men to carry the guns over the pass.

The task was a most formidable one. Owing to recent falls, the snow was three or four feet deep; all tracks were obliterated, and the severity of the weather was such that 43 cases of frost-bite and 63 of snow-blindness occurred. The difficulties encountered

are further demonstrated by the opinion held by the enemy (as expressed in a letter which was discovered after their flight from Mastuj) that it would be absolutely impossible for our troops to cross the pass for some time.

His Excellency considers the arrangements made, the perseverance and skill displayed by the officers, and the excellent behaviour of the troops, worthy of the highest praise, and while commending all, wishes to record the important part taken by Captain H. B. Borradaile, 32nd Pioneers, and his detachment, who were the first over the pass.

The detailed report of the arrangements made by this officer will be found in enclosure D.

6. The Gilgit force first encountered the enemy in a strong position at Chakalwat (Darband) on the 9th April, when Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly with 280 men and two guns defeated a gathering estimated at 400 to 500 strong, reaching Mastuj the same day, and raising the siege of that place, which had been invested for eighteen days.

7. A second engagement occurred on the 13th April, at Nisa Gol where Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's force, then 622 men and two guns, again defeated 1,500 of the enemy under Mahomed Isa in a very strong position.

8. Sir George White considers that the tactical dispositions of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly were most creditable to that officer, and that, but for the ability he displayed, the loss in attacking such strong positions held by men armed with Martini and Snider rifles would have been much greater among the troops and levies engaged. His Excellency would also express his appreciation of the manner in which the two guns were handled, and the excellent fire discipline of the men of the 32nd Pioneers.

9. No further opposition was met with, the enemy retiring as Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's force advanced; but considerable physical difficulties had still to be overcome.

On the 17th April the bridge over the river having been broken, the troops had to ford it breast-high at the imminent risk of being carried off their feet. Successfully surmounting these and other difficulties, the force reached Chitral on the 20th April 1895, twenty-nine days after leaving Gilgit.

During this period Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and his small force were completely cut adrift from their base; were liable to attack at almost any moment; and had to contend with formidable natural obstacles, and great difficulties in respect to transport and supplies.

His Excellency therefore finds it a pleasing duty to publicly place on record his appreciation of the skill and ability displayed by Colonel Kelly in the conduct of this long and arduous advance to the relief of Chitral; of the services of the officers who so ably seconded him, and of the exertions and endurance of the troops, all of which combined to crown the undertaking with success.

10. The Commander-in-Chief cordially endorses the commendations bestowed by Colonel Kelly on the following officers:—

Lieutenant S. M. Edwardes, 2nd Bombay Infantry,

Lieutenant J. S. Fowler, Royal Engineers,

both of whom so gallantly defended the position at Reshun before they fell into the hands of the enemy by treachery,

Lieutenant H. J. Jones, 14th Sikhs,

Lieutenant F. J. Moberly, D. S. O., 37th Dogras,

whose defence of Mastuj during its investment was conducted with great credit.

His Excellency also notices with satisfaction the excellent services rendered by the Kashmir troops with Lieutenant Moberly and the levies, *viz.*, those under Raja Akbar Khan of Cher Kila, the Hunzas under Wazir Humayan, the Nagar under Wazir Taifu, the Sai under Wazir Shah Mirza, and the Punyal levies under Raja Jawahal Shah.

No. 1-C., dated Chitral, the 6th May 1895.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL KELLY, 32nd Pioneers, Commanding Gilgit Force,
To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the following report of the operations of the Gilgit force in the relief of Chitral, from the 23rd March to the 23rd April 1895.

2. About the 9th February I received orders from the Resident in Kashmir to hold half the 32nd Pioneers in readiness to move to Gilgit, but not to do so till I received

his or Surgeon-Major Robertson's orders. I therefore selected 400 men to carry 20 lb kits and to move with the 100 mules forming the regimental transport in the Indus valley.

3. *Indus Valley, Gilgit, 14th to 22nd March.*—On the night of the 14th March I was directed by the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, to move my men up to Gilgit, which I accordingly did from Buner and Jullipur, arriving there on the 20th and 22nd.

4. *Disposition of troops remaining in Gilgit.*—In accordance with your telegram No. 592-F.C, I assumed command of the Gilgit Force and marched out with 200 Pioneers, and directed the other half to escort next day the two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, which I had suggested should be brought in from Nomal to Gilgit, and also called up 200 more Pioneers from Buner to Gilgit, and directed the remainder of the 32nd Pioneers to discontinue work on the road and proceed to Chilas Fort, releasing 150 Kashmir troops to strengthen the posts along the Indus valley in strength at Bunji and Ramghat bridge.

5. *Gupis-Ghizr, 23rd to 31st March 1895.*—The two detachments arrived at Gupis on the 26th and 27th March, where the mule transport was changed to coolie and local pony carriage, to enable the Government transport to work in the conveyance of stores between Gilgit and Gupis. An opportunity was taken here to further reduce the stores required to be carried by dropping our Pioneer equipment, etc. The march was resumed again on the 27th and 28th March, and Ghizr was reached by the two columns on the 30th and 31st March, respectively, snow lying on the ground to the depth of a foot.

6. *Supplies.*—The unfortunate absence of Captain Bretherton, Deputy Assistant Commissary General in Mastuj, was a source of some anxiety as to the supplies available for the column, as I wished to be independent of the stocks that might be available in the places we were attempting to relieve. At Gupis we could not ascertain what supplies had been sent forward, and the balances there were insufficient to take more than was necessary for the road, although they were near the base at Gilgit for replenishing their stock. At Ghizr I found there was sufficient for 1,000 men for 11½ days, and probably supplies in Mastuj for the garrison there for 16 days. I was able after passing Laspur to somewhat supplement our resources locally.

7. *Transport.*—The collection of transport at Ghizr was a matter of some difficulty, and on the 1st April, before marching, it was found that many of the Yasin coolies had absconded, which meant that a further reduction would have to be made in the supplies to be carried. An attempt was made to bring them back, but only a few returned, and I eventually found that I had only six days' supplies to carry us on to Mastuj, but I hoped to obtain some on the road there.

8. *Shandur Pass, 1st April.*—On the 1st April I marched out with the entire column, as per margin, with some 500 coolies and ponies for transport, but after proceeding about eight miles I found it was impossible for the mules of the Battery and the pony transport to make their way through the snow over the unbeaten track, as they sank up to their girths

2 guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery.
306 of the 32nd Pioneers.
40 of the Kashmir Sappers and Miners.
100 Levies.

I therefore determined to return, and on arriving at village Teru, I directed 200 of the 32nd Pioneers, 40 Kashmir Sappers and Miners, and 50 Hunza Levies to remain there under Captain Borradaile, and directed him to make an attempt to cross the pass next day, and on arrival at Laspur, to entrench himself there, return the coolie transport, and endeavour to open communication with Mastuj. The manner in which he carried out these instructions is fully given in his report, herewith attached and marked D.

9. *Shandur Pass, 2nd and 3rd April.*—To enable him to proceed I left all the coolie carriage, at Teru, and after transferring all kits and excess stores to the pony transport, I took the remainder back to Ghizr, where they could be more easily fed, and I could replenish myself with stores there, as the Hakim was beginning to bring in wheat. Snow began to fall in the evening and continued through the night and the greater part of the following day, 2nd April, preventing Captain Borradaile's departure. I permitted trials being made for the transport of the guns on sledges, and for that purpose they were sent out to Teru on the 3rd April, and eventually accompanied Captain Borradaile's party, who were able to make a start on that day.

10. *Shandur Pass, 5th to 9th April.*—Having assured myself of the state of commissariat supplies, I started with my staff officer, Lieutenant Beynon, and 50 Nagar levies, on the 5th April, and reached Laspur on the 6th. The second party under Lieutenant Peterson were not able to leave till the 8th April and reached Laspur on the 9th April.

The crossing of the Shandur Pass was an arduous undertaking, and at the most unseasonable time of the year, but I am proud to say that the trials were most cheerfully borne. Unfortunately for us recent falls had made the snow some three to four feet deep and obliterated any track that may have existed. We could hardly expect to cross without some cases of snow-blindness and frost-bite, and of these in the whole column the total cases were 63 of the former and 43 of the latter; only the cases of frost-bite were severe.

11. *Laspur, 6th and 7th April.*—On the afternoon of his arrival, Captain Borradaile, hearing of the enemy in the neighbourhood, reconnoitred about two miles in the Mastuj direction, and on the following day, 6th April, advanced as far as Gasht with his reconnaissance. The levies going in advance discovered that the enemy had constructed *sangars* on our line of advance at Chakalwat. On the recommendation of the medical officer to allow of the cases of snow-blindness recovering, a halt was made on the 7th April. Raja Akhbar Khan and 50 levies arrived in camp on this day.

12. *Gasht, 8th April.*—Considering that any delay would permit of a greater concourse of the enemy at Chakalwat (Darband on the map), I determined not to wait for the second detachment of the 32nd Pioneers, under Lieutenant Peterson, and to proceed next day, 8th April, to Gasht, which I accordingly did with a force, strength as per margin, the guns being carried by coolies. On arrival I proceeded to some high ground beyond the village of Gasht, and could distinctly see the enemy sitting in their *sangars* on the left bank of the river and men creeping up the steep Shalaf hill on the right bank to positions above their stone shoots.

Lieutenant Beynon with a few picked Hunza levies ascended the high hills almost behind the right rear of the enemy's position, and brought back an extremely good sketch of the whole of the position, a copy of which is attached to the report. I immediately sent back for Raja Akhbar Khan and his 50 levies, who joined us during the night.

13. *Action of Chakalwat, 9th April.*—On the morning of the 9th April I advanced to the attack of the enemy. In the early morning Lieutenant Beynon, with the Hunza levies, ascended the high hills on the left bank of the river, to turn the right of the position and attack in rear. The Punyal levies were sent up the hills on the right bank to turn out the men above the stone shoots.

I advanced in the following manner :—

Half company, 32nd Pioneers—advanced guard.	} Main body.
Kashmir Sappers and Miners.	
Half Company 32nd Pioneers.	
Two guns, 1st Kashmir Mountain Battery, carried by coolies.	
One company, 32nd Pioneers	

The baggage, under escort of the rear guard, remained in Gasht till ordered forward after the action.

An advance was made to the river where the bridge had been broken, but sufficiently repaired by the Sappers and Miners for the passage of the infantry, the guns forded the river, and the force ascended to the fan facing the right *sangar* of the enemy's position.

13 A. *Orders for attack.*—My instructions for the attack were that the advanced guard were to leave the road and form up on the highest part of the fan facing "A" Sangar (see sketch facing page 39) which was to be silenced by volley firing and the guns; the same course to be afterwards adopted on "B" Sangar when an opportunity would probably offer itself for the infantry to descend to the river bed and ascend to the left bank to enfilade the enemy in the remaining *sangars*, which would, no doubt, be vacated on the appearance of the levies under Lieutenant Beynon in their rear.

14. *Configuration of ground.*—The configuration of the ground was as follows:—The road from the river after leaving Gasht brought us on to an alluvial fan, the ascent to which was short and steep, it was covered with boulders and intersected with *nalas*, the road led across this fan and then along the foot of steep shale slopes and shoots within 500 yards of the line of *sangars* crowning the opposite side of the river bank, and totally devoid of any sort or description of cover for some two miles; it could also be swept by avalanches of stones set in motion by a few men placed on the heights above for that purpose.

15. *Enemy's position.*—The enemy's position consisted of a line of *sangars* blocking the roads from the river up to the alluvial fan on which they were placed. The right of the position was protected by a snow glacier which descended into the river bed, and furthermore, by *sangars* which extended into the snow line up the spur of the hills,— (vide sketch facing page 39).

16. *Course of the action.*—The course of the action was as follows:—

The advanced guard formed up at about 800 yards from the position, and the main body in rear.

The 32nd Pioneers then advanced to the attack—

One section, "C" Company	extended (left of line).
One " " " " "	in support.
Two Sections, "C" Company	} in reserve.
"A" Company	

The guns now took up position on the right and opened on "A" *Sangars* at a range of 825 yards.

As the action progressed, the supporting section of "C" Company advanced and reinforced. The remaining half of "C" Company advanced, and leaving sufficient space for the guns, took up their position in the firing line on the extreme right.

Volley firing at first was opened at 800 yards, but the firing line advanced 150 to 200 yards as the action progressed. At a later stage one section of "A" Company was pushed up to fill a gap on the right of the guns in action in the centre of the line.

The enemy, after receiving some well directed volleys and correctly-placed shells, were seen to vacate "A" *Sangar* by twos and threes, until it was finally emptied.

17. *Flank Attack.*—During our advance to the fan, shots were heard in the direction of the hills, Lieutenant Beynon having come into contact with the enemy in their *sangars* up the hill-side, who were driven from ridge to ridge.

18. *Flight of enemy.*—When "A" *Sangar* was vacated, attention was directed on "B" *Sangar*, and the same course adopted with the same result: at the same time those driven down from the hills above streamed into the plain and there was then a general flight. Six shrapnel were fired into the flying enemy at ranges of 1,000, 1,200, and 1,350 yards (three rounds per gun).

19. *Capture of enemy's position.*—A general advance was then made down precipitous banks to the bed of the river, covered by the fire of the reserves, the river forded, and *Sangars* "A" and "B" occupied. The guns were then carried across, and the whole line of *sangars* having been vacated, the column was re-formed on the fan; the time taken in crossing enabled the enemy to get well on their way to Mastuj: the advance was then continued to a village a mile and a half further along the bed of the river, where a halt was made.

20. *General details.*—The casualties consisted of one man of the 32nd Pioneers severely wounded, and the three Kashmir Sappers slightly.

The action commenced at 10-30 A. M., and lasted one hour. The position was of unusual natural strength, and the disposition of the *sangars* showed considerable tactical ability, being placed on the edge of high cliffs on the left bank of the river.

The enemy were computed at 400 to 500 and were armed with Martini-Henry and Snider rifles; several dead were found in the *sangars* and the losses I estimate to have been from 50 to 60.

The whole action was carried out with the extreme steadiness of an ordinary morning parade, the volleys being well delivered and controlled.

21. *Advance on Mastuj.*—After a halt we continued our advance by the left bank till within three miles of Mastuj, where the river was forded and the garrison of Mastuj was seen drawn up on the crest of the fan.

During the day-time the garrison had noticed the enemy gradually vacating their positions; some were said to have heard our volleys and guns. By evening the enemy had all gone towards Chitral, and the garrison were able to turn out after an investment of eighteen days.

The column arrived in Mastuj at about 5 P. M., and the baggage guard by 8 P. M.

22. *Mastuj, 10th to 12th April.*—From the 10th to 12th a halt was made in Mastuj to allow of arrangements for supplies and transport for our own onward progress; the guns were mounted on local ponies and the second detachment of the 32nd Pioneers

arrived on the 11th April, accompanied by Surgeon-Captain Luard, Indian Medical Service, with the base hospital, which was established at Mastuj.

On the 10th April I ordered Captain Bretherton, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General, to return to Ghizr and carry out the duties of his office between Gilgit and that place.

Opportunity was taken during this period to repair the bridge over the Yarkhun river, one mile below Mastuj, and on the 11th April a reconnaissance was made by the levies, who reported that the enemy were preparing a strong position on the Nisa Gol.

23. *Reconnaissance of Nisa Gol.*—On the 12th April a further reconnaissance was made with the levies under Lieutenant Beynon, the enemy perceiving his actions.

An excellent sketch (facing page 40) of their position was the result, and clearly guided me in my course of action, and ladders were also made to use in crossing the main *nala* where practicable.

24. *Description of enemy's position at Nisa Gol.*—The position of Nisa Gol was a practically strong one and considered by the Chitralis to be impregnable. It is situated on a fan, having a deep *nala* bisecting it from far away inside the hills to the Yarkhun river, the walls of the *nala* being perfectly precipitous and from 200 to 300 feet deep. The main road "D" (sketch facing page 40) runs along the whole length of the fan, winding down to the bottom of the *nala* near the river and up the other side into the corresponding half of the fan. The second path "C" (*vide* sketch facing page 40) is a mere goat-track, which goes almost straight down and up the other side; this was destroyed on our side of the *nala*. The enemy had erected *sangars* at the head of these roads which entirely commanded the approaches, and would have swept us away if we had used them.

The *sangars* were sunk into the ground, and head-cover as provided by a covering of timber and stones.

On the left of their position they had *sangars* on the spur of the hill in a general line with the *sangars* on the plain, and on the hill above, parties of men were stationed to throw down stones. Sangar No. 16 (see sketch facing page 40) was fortunately unoccupied. On the right of their position, across the river and slightly in advance of the general line, they had another line of *sangars* on a spur stretching away high up into the snow line.

25. *Orders for attack.*—My orders for the attack were therefore as follows:

The advanced guard, on gaining the *maidan*, was to make its way well up to the right and high up the fan, where the formation of the ground favoured an advance under cover to within 500 yards of the *nala*. It was directed to direct its attack on Sangar No. 17 with well directed volleys, till the guns and remainder of the force came into position. Sangar No. 17 was first to be demolished, and attention then to be directed on the main *sangars*, 12—15, while the levies made their way high up the *nala* in search of a path for a possible point to cross and turn the left of the enemy's position, and on the enemy being seen to retire a general advance to be made.

26. *Advance from Mastuj, 13th April.*—I advanced from Mastuj at 7 A.M. on the 13th April with the force as per margin, the baggage being left behind till orders were received for its advance under the escort of a portion of the garrison. There was some time lost and difficulty experienced in crossing the Yarkhun river. The advanced guard coming in contact with the enemy at 10-30 A.M., advanced too much towards

the centre of the plain and the attack was carried out as follows:—

27. *Action of Nisa Gol, 13th April 1895.*—The advanced guard, "A" Company, deployed into line and advanced in extended order when within 900 yards of the position forming its own supports and became the extreme left of the firing line. "C" Company, following soon after, prolonged the line to the right, also forming its own supports, "E" and "G" Companies in reserve, in column of half-companies, forming single rank and opening out to one pace as they advanced.

Reinforcements being called for, "E" Company advanced and prolonged the line to the right. "G" Company being called up similarly, later on formed the extreme right of the firing line. The levies well on the right rather higher up the *nala*.

While these movements were being executed, the battery came into action opposite No. 17 Sangar, at a range of 500 yards, with common shell, which knocked down the wall of the *sangar* to a height of about three feet, and fire from it was for a short time silenced. The guns then advanced against the large Sangar No. 16, which was not

2 guns of No. 1, Kashmir Mountain Battery.
382 of the 32nd Pioneers.
40 of the Kashmir Sappers.
100 of the 4th Kashmir Infantry.
100 Levies.

visible till within 150 yards and was luckily unoccupied. The defenders of No. 17 *Sangar* having resumed their fire, I directed the guns to fire at it again; after two common shell and two case had been fired into it at a range of 275 yards, its fire ceased and the guns were retired. The fire from this *sangar* was desultory for the remainder of the action; the levies now proceeded up the *nala* to carry out their turning movements, and were left to their own devices in carrying them out.

The infantry having deployed, "A" and "C" Companies kept the enemy engaged directly in front along the main line of *sangars*, the latter company occasionally directing its fire half right against the *sangars* on the hills on that flank. "E" and "G" Companies' fire was almost entirely directed against the hill *sangars*, occasional volleys being directed on small parties of the enemy occupying hill-tops 800 or 900 yards distant.

The general average distance at which fire was opened to the front was opened and kept up at 250 to 300 yards.

The artillery moving to another position opened fire on *sangars* in the centre of the enemy's position at a range of 875 yards, and afterwards on *Sangar* No. 11 on the right centre of the enemy's position, at ranges from 1,050 to 1,200 yards.

28. *Method of crossing the nala.*—After *Sangar* No. 17 had been somewhat silenced, Lieutenant Beynon, my Staff Officer, informed me that a goat-path had been observed on the other side of the *nala* and a practicable spot to attempt a crossing, and asked me for leave to take the Kashmir Sappers to make a practicable path down into the *nala*, and the company of the 4th Kashmir Infantry to cross it, when made, under cover of the fire of the deployed infantry. The scaling ladders were brought up and lowered, and after half an hour's work a track was made to the bottom of the *nala* and an ascent by the goat-track on the further side assured. A party of 10 Kashmir Sappers, with Lieutenant Beynon, Lieutenant Moberly, commanding the company of the 4th Kashmir Infantry, and Lieutenant Oldham, Royal Engineers, commanding the Kashmir Sappers, descended, and were being followed by the 4th Kashmir Infantry, when some guncotton lying open on the ground at the commencement of the track was ignited by a bullet striking it. A temporary retirement of the line of those near the explosive to cover some thirty yards in rear was ordered, but speedily brought to the front again when no danger of an explosion was to be apprehended. Eventually a party of about fifteen reached the other bank, and almost simultaneously with the turning movement of the levies, who had reached No. 17 *Sangar* and its vicinity, having run the gauntlet of a stone shoot in their course.

29. *Flight of the enemy.*—The appearance of the bodies on the enemy's left caused a general flight, and they streamed out of their *sangars* in a long line, with the guns firing at ranges from 950 to 1,425 yards and under volleys from the infantry. The ground falling away near their line of retreat did not favour our fire and protected them till almost out of range.

30. *Advance of main body across nala.*—A general advance was then made across the *nala* by paths "C" and "D," and as soon as a company could be mustered, it was sent in pursuit; but their flight was extremely rapid and came no longer under our fire; the enemy in the *sangars* on the left bank of the river disappeared into the snow, while those on the right bank who escaped our fire fled towards Drasan.

31. *General details of action.*—We bivouacked that night opposite Sanoghar, close to the scene of action. I attach a list of our casualties.

Confronted as they were by an enemy they could not see, I cannot speak too highly of the extreme steadiness and bravery of the troops during the course of the action, which lasted two hours, and during which they were subjected to a very heavy and trying fire from the front and left flank.

Some 40 of Umra Khan's Jandolis were reported to be in the enemy's *sangars*; the fire was entirely from Martini-Henry and Snider rifles, the wounds being principally from the former.

The fire discipline on our side was excellent and contributed materially in keeping down the fire from the *sangars*.

32. *Enemy's casualties.*—I estimate the number of the Chitralis opposed to us to have been some 1,500 or more, and their casualties from native reports to have been some 60 killed and 100 wounded.

33. *Wounded.*—Our wounded were returned to Mastuj under the escort of the garrison (who brought out the baggage) the next morning, under the personal superintendence of Surgeon Captain Luard, Indian Medical Service, charpoy's having been obtained for them from Sanoghar.

34. *Kila Drasan, 14th April.*—On the 14th April I marched to Kila Drasan, with the object of seeing to what extent the enemy might be on my right flank, as Muhammad Isa had fled in that direction; the road being broken, a long detour had to be made up a spur some 2,000 feet high above the road, which brought us on to a pamir-like elevation, and led over grassy downs straight above Kila Drasan, which was found to be empty; the bridge here was destroyed, but repaired from material obtained from the fort by the levies and 32nd Pioneers. The rear guard did not get in till after dark, and many of the coolies deserted. There were large supplies of grain, etc., in the fort, but as the villages were entirely deserted, no coolies could be found to carry it away.

35. *Khusht, 15th April.*—On the 15th the column marched to Khusht, rain falling steadily all day.

36. *Lun, 16th April.*—On the 16th I marched to Lun, the rain ceasing about midday; this was a very bad and trying march.

37. *Barnas, 17th April.*—On the 17th a march was made to Barnas; the bridge over the river at Pret having been broken, the troops forded the river breast-high, about a mile above Barnas; this was carried out under great difficulties, and I received great assistance from the levies, who stood below the crossing in the stream and saved many men from being washed away, and recovered kits floating down the stream.

38. *Maroi, 18th April.*—On the 18th we proceeded only as far as Maroi, which the enemy were reported to be holding, but was found evacuated on arrival. Mahummad Isa and his following, keeping a march ahead of us, had only left the place that morning.

39. *Koghazi, 19th April.*—On the 19th I arrived at Koghazi. Having heard that the Guland Gol was being held, preparations were made to bridge the river in order to crown the heights on the right bank. The levies being sent ahead to reconnoitre found the Guland Gol unoccupied; having mended the bridge over the torrent bearing that name, they advanced into Koghazi. The bridging operations over the river were therefore discontinued, and the column marched direct to that village. In the afternoon a letter was received from Surgeon-Major Robertson, C.S.I., informing us that Sher Afzal had fled southwards and the investment of Chitral had been raised.

40. *Chitral, 20th April to 23rd April.*—On the 20th the column marched at 6 A.M., and arrived in Chitral by 2 P.M.

The garrison had been invested for 47 days and some of the enemy's *sangars* were within twenty yards of the fort walls.

The column encamped for three days south of the fort, and on the 23rd April the whole force including the garrison moved into a new camp on more open ground, on a spur commanding the valley, leaving a guard of 50 men in the fort for the protection of the new Mehtar.

On the following days steps were taken to entrench the position, and communications were opened up with the Chitral Relief Force at Dir.

I am thankful to say that my task was carried out with so little loss of life.

41. *Levies.*—I would beg to record the excellent assistance I received from the levies, *viz.*, those under Raja Akhbar Khan of Cher Kila, the Hunza Levies under Wazir Humayun, the Nagar Levies under Wazir Tyfoo, and the Sai Levies under Wazir Shah Mirza; all but the Nagar levies were continually with me, and were of the greatest value to me in scouting and crowning the heights; both at Chakalwat and Nisa Gol they rendered me the greatest assistance in turning the respective positions and clearing the way for an advance, and I trust their services may receive some recognition from the Government of India.

42. I desire to bring to the favourable notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the following officers:—

Captain H. B. Borradaile, 32nd Pioneers, who has commanded the regiment throughout. This officer showed great determination and resolution in taking the first party and guns over the Shandur Pass, and has commanded the regiment with great spirit and gallantry throughout the arduous march to Chitral, and I strongly recommend him for some mark of distinction.

Lieutenant W. G. L. Beynon, 3rd Gurkhas, Staff Officer to the Force, to whose valuable aid I am much indebted for reconnoitring the enemy's positions at Chakalwat and Nisa Gol, in carrying out which he showed great spirit and resolution, and I strongly recommend him for some mark of distinction.

Lieutenant C. G. Stewart, Royal Artillery, on special duty, Gilgit, to whose energy and determination I am indebted for the guns being carried successfully over the Shandur Pass and his gallantry and example in exercising them in the field, for their presence had a great moral effect on the enemy.

Sergeant Reeves, Commissariat Department, who had entire charge of the commissariat arrangements of the column; his task was not a light one, as transport had to be locally obtained, as well as provisions to supplement our scanty stock.

Hospital-Assistant Narinjan Dass, 32nd Pioneers, who carried out his duties in the field with great spirit and resolution.

Captain Borradaile brings to my notice the excellent service rendered in the field by the following Native officers, and I concur in his recommendation:—

Subadar Baga Singh, 32nd Pioneers.

Subadar Prem Singh, 32nd Pioneers.

Lieutenant Stewart, Royal Artillery, Commanding No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, brings to my notice the following men of his battery:—

No. 64, Havildar Dharm Singh, No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery.

No. 63, Havildar Bulwan Singh, No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery.

All these recommendations I would cordially beg to endorse.

I desire also to record that the medical arrangements were worked with precision throughout the march, particularly when crossing the Shandur Pass, when there were so many cases of frost-bite and snow-blindness to be dealt with.

I would beg to bring to your notice the services of Lieutenant F. J. Moberly, D.S.O., who commanded the posts at Mastuj after the departure of Captain Ross, and for the able manner in which he proceeded to Buni and withdrew the small party under Lieutenant Jones.

Since writing this despatch I have had an opportunity of reading the combined report of Lieutenants Edwardes, 2nd Bombay Infantry, and Fowler, Royal Engineers, on the defence of their position at Reshna, in which they showed the greatest gallantry, and I now recommend both these officers for the Distinguished Service Order. Their preparations for and the way in which they carried out the defence of their post reflect the highest credit on them both, and they were ably assisted by the sepoy of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, who nobly devoted their lives in the defence of their position.

I would also beg to bring to your notice, for favourable consideration, the gallant behaviour of Lieutenant Jones, 14th Sikhs, who successfully brought off the survivors of his party after Captain Ross had been killed at Koragh. I have already forwarded this officer's report from Mastuj.

D.

Dated Laspur, the 7th April 1895.

From—CAPTAIN H. B. BORRADAILE, 32nd Pioneers,

To—The Staff Officer, Gilgit Column.

I have the honour to submit the following diary of my movements since the 1st instant, for the information of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, Commanding the Force.

April 2nd.—Halted at Teerah, owing to snowstorm.

April 3rd.—Started for Langar, with 200 Pioneers, 40 Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant Oldham, Royal Engineers, and one section of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, under Lieutenant Stewart, Royal Artillery, at 11 A.M. Advanced guard and baggage reached Langar, 8 P.M. Guns and rear-guard did not reach till 10-30 P.M. Guns were carried the last seven miles through heavy snow by Pioneers and some men of the Ragonath Regiment.

April 4th.—Marched for Laspur, 9 A.M. Guns and detachment of Ragonath Regiment were left behind to come on next day. Arrived Laspur, 7 P.M.

April 5th.—Selected portion of village suitable for entrenching. Moved all the men in. Twenty-five cases of frost-bite, result of last two days' march through snow; many cases of snow-blindness, more or less serious, although the greater portion of the men were provided with snow-goggles. Section No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, and detachment of Ragonath Regiment, under Lieutenant Gough, marched in to-day, 4 P.M. Guns were carried by coolies from Langar to this place. At 5 P.M. on information received of small body of enemy having been seen about a mile from Laspur, started with 100 men, to reconnoitre. At 6 P.M. saw smoke in distance, and several men on horseback and on foot running in that direction. As it was getting dark, I returned to camp. One of the Hunza levies, who had gone on ahead of the main body, was seized by a party of men in ambush, and taken off; report of this was only received on our return to camp.

April 6th.—Started at 7 A.M. with 120 Pioneers and one section of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, to reconnoitre in the direction of Rahman village. Passed place from whence we saw smoke issuing during yesterday's reconnaissance. Sangars had been

constructed, and every preparation made to resist an advance. Learnt from local sources that the enemy, some two hundred strong, had retired beyond Rahman. During the day I pushed the reconnaissance as far as the village of Gasht, some ten miles distant: here I learnt that the enemy, in numbers varying by report from three hundred to five hundred, were entrenched near Chakalwat three miles further on. As it was late, and the men were tired, many of them, especially the gunners, suffering from sore-eyes, I made up my mind to return.

Some Hunza levies, whom I had sent on beyond Gasht, to reconnoitre, reported having seen the enemy in the distance, occupying *sangars* on both sides of the river. The force returned to camp at 8 A.M.

GILGIT FORCE.

Return of Casualties in action at Chakalwat on 9th April 1895.

SUMMARY.

Officers—killed nil—wounded 1—missing nil.

Non-Commissioned Officers and Men—killed nil—wounded 3—missing nil.

NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICERS WOUNDED.

Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of wound.
Subadar	Manktu	Slight	Gunshot wound in neck.

NOMINAL RETURN OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN WOUNDED.

Regimental No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of wound.
KASHMIR SAPPERS AND MINERS.				
407	Sepoy	Kaku	Slight	Gunshot wound, finger.
395	"	Guta	"	" " crown of head.
32ND PIONEERS.				
2633	Sepoy	Budha Singh	Severe	Gunshot wound, neck and right shoulder.

CHITRAL;
The 8th May 1895.

J. G. KELLY, Lieutenant-Colonel,
32nd Pioneers, Commanding Gilgit Force.

GILGIT FORCE.

Returns of Casualties in action at Nisa Gol on 13th April 1895.

SUMMARY.

Officers—killed nil—wounded 1—missing nil.

Non-Commissioned Officers and Men—killed 7—wounded 12—missing nil.

NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICERS WOUNDED.

Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of wound.
32ND PIONEERS.			
Jemadar	Sher Singh	Severe	Gunshot wound, right side of chest.

NOMINAL RETURN OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN KILLED.

Regimental No.	Rank	Name.	Nature of wound.
32ND PIONEERS.			
1893	Sepoy	Jiwan Singh	Gunshot wound, chest.
3006	"	Bhagat Singh	" " "
NO. 1 KASHMIR MOUNTAIN BATTERY.			
14	Naick	Kojoo	Gunshot wound in chest.
TEMPORARY ESTABLISHMENT:			
...	Driver	Suja Shah	Gunshot wound in head.
...	"	Alewah	" " "
4TH KASHMIR INFANTRY.			
342	Sepoy	Mani Ram Ranna	Gunshot wound, chest.
421	"	Parbir Gharti	" " "

NOMINAL RETURN OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN WOUNDED.

Regimental No.	Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of wound.
32ND PIONEERS.				
1699	Havildar	Wadhawa Singh	Dangerous	Gunshot wound, chest.
1867	Naick	Harnam Singh	Severe	" " left thigh.
2167	Lance-Naick	Jawahir Singh	"	Gunshot wound, neck.
2448	Sepoy	Duma Singh	Slight	" " graze forehead.
2835	"	Ishar Singh	Severe	Gunshot wound, right ankle.
2978	"	Wazir Singh	"	Gunshot wound, right leg.
2991	"	Mal Singh	"	" " left foot.
NO. 1 KASHMIR MOUNTAIN BATTERY.				
38	Havildar-Major	Piranditta	Slight	Gunshot wound, right arm and shoulder.
63	Havildar	Bulwan Singh	"	Gunshot wound, right buttock.
182	Gunner	Sonoo	Dangerous	Gunshot wound, right side, left groin; and left thigh.
KASHMIR SAPPERS AND MINERS.				
71	Havildar	Kiwan Singh	Dangerous	Gunshot wound, thigh.
51	Sepoy	Rupa	Severe	" " shoulder.

CHITRAL;

The 8th May 1895.

J. G. KELLY, Lieutenant-Colonel,

32nd Pioneers, Commanding Gilgit Force.

CHITRAL.

No. 531.—The Right Hon'ble the Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council has the utmost gratification in directing the publication of a letter from the Adjutant-General in India, forwarding a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Kelly, 32nd Pioneers, Commanding the Gilgit Force, with which is transmitted a despatch from Captain C. V. F. Townshend, Central India Horse, commanding the garrison of Chitral during the siege of that fort from the 3rd March to the 18th April 1895 by the forces of Sher Afzal and Umra Khan of Jandol.

2. The Commander-in-Chief in India has expressed his high appreciation of the achievement recounted in the despatch, and his words will, His Excellency in Council feels assured, be deeply felt by every subject of Her Majesty throughout the British Empire. The steady front shown to the enemy, the Military skill displayed in the conduct of the defence, the cheerful endurance of all the hardships of the siege, the gallant demeanour of the troops, and the conspicuous examples of heroism and intrepidity recorded, will ever be remembered as forming a glorious episode in the history of the Indian Empire and of its army.

3. The Governor General in Council joins with the Commander-in-Chief in deploring the loss of Captain Baird, General Baj Singh and Major Bhikam Singh, and of so many other brave soldiers who fell in the discharge of their duty; their widows, children, and dependent relations will not be forgotten by the Government of India; and His Excellency in Council directs that the grant of six months' pay to the garrison, notified in a separate General Order of this date, shall be paid to the heirs of those killed, in addition to the pensions to which they may be entitled.

4. Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, has already been pleased to express Her gracious approbation of the successful efforts of Her troops, and His Excellency in Council desires to tender to Surgeon-Major Robertson, C.S.I., British Agent, to Captain Townshend, commanding the troops, and to the whole garrison his heartfelt congratulations on their gallant defence of the position entrusted to them, while it is an especial pleasure to His Excellency in Council to recognise the devoted aid given by the loyal troops of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir.

No. 769-G., dated Simla, the 22nd May 1895.

From—The Adjutant-General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honor by direction of the Commander-in-Chief to forward a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Kelly, 32nd Pioneers, Commanding the Gilgit Force, enclosing a report by Captain C. V. F. Townshend, Central India Horse, of the siege of Chitral from the 3rd March to 18th April 1895.

His Excellency recommends that Captain Townshend's report may be treated as a despatch.

2. The exemplary coolness, intrepidity and energy exhibited by Captain Townshend (on whom the military command of the troops devolved on Captain C. P. Campbell, Central India Horse, being wounded), and the valour and endurance displayed by all ranks under his command in the defence of the Fort of Chitral, have added greatly to the prestige of the British arms, and will, His Excellency confidently thinks, elicit the admiration of all who read this account of the gallant defence made by a small party of Her Majesty's Forces combined with the troops of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir against heavy odds, when shut up in a fort in the heart of an enemy's country many miles away from succour and support.

3. The investment of the Chitral Fort began on the 4th March 1895 after an unsuccessful attempt to oppose the advance of Sher Afzal's troops in the vicinity of Chitral on the preceding day.

The casualties in the engagement were heavy,—Captain J. McD. Baird, 24th Punjab Infantry, General Baj Singh and Major Bhikam Singh of the Imperial Service Troops, a Hospital-Assistant and 21 non-commissioned officers and men being killed, whilst Captain Campbell, Central India Horse, Jemadar Rab-Nawaz Khan, *Khan Banadur*, 15th Bengal Lancers, and 28 non-commissioned officers and men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles were wounded.

4. From the 4th March to the date of the raising of the siege, Captain Townshend's diary is a record of arduous work cheerfully performed, of difficulties encountered and

surmounted, and of privations suffered without murmur by the small and gallant garrison. Every night officers and men were at their posts, or sleeping accoutred ready to receive and repulse each assault; every day fatigue parties were employed in strengthening the defences; the enemy was no despicable one; they were mostly armed with modern rifles and possessed unlimited supplies of ammunition, and the method in which they conducted the siege showed them to have considerable tactical skill.

The careful plans adopted by Captain Townshend in order to defeat the tactics of the enemy are in His Excellency's opinion deserving of high praise.

5. Whilst the whole history of the siege forms a brilliant chapter in the annals of Indian military history, His Excellency refers specially to what proved to be one of the most noteworthy episodes of the siege, *viz.*, the sortie made by Lieutenant Harley, 14th Sikhs, with a small party of his men and of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, for the purpose of blowing up the enemy's mine, which had come into dangerous proximity to the fort. The sortie was most gallantly and successfully conducted with a loss of 21 killed and wounded on our side, and 60 on that of the enemy.

6. On the 3rd March the strength of the garrison, all told, was 400 of native ranks 14th Sikhs—99 of all ranks. with 5 British officers. At the end of the siege of 46 4th Kashmir Rifles—301 of all ranks. days, one British officer had been killed and two wounded, whilst amongst the native ranks the casualties amounted to 41 killed and 60 wounded.

7. The Commander-in-Chief deplures, in common with the rest of the Army, the loss of the lives of the brave men who fell during the siege, and would especially allude to the death of Captain J. McD. Baird, 24th Punjab Infantry, a gallant and accomplished officer of great promise. His Excellency also deplures the loss sustained by the Maharaja of Kashmir in the deaths of General Baj Singh, Major Bhikam Singh and the other brave soldiers who fell in this heroic and successful defence of the Fort of Chitral.

8. A list of the officers and men recommended for rewards has been submitted separately, but His Excellency especially wishes to place on record here his appreciation of the meritorious services rendered by Captain C. V. F. Townshend, Central India Horse and the officers mentioned by him, *viz.*,—

Lieutenant B. E. M. Gurdon, Indian Staff Corps, Assistant British Agent at Chitral.

Lieutenant H. K. Harley, 14th Sikhs.

Surgeon-Captain H. F. Whitchurch, Indian Medical Service.

The conspicuous bravery shewn by the last-named officer on the occasion of Captain Baird's death having already been reported in a separate communication.

His Excellency also concurs in the terms in which Captain Townshend has mentioned certain Native officers and non-commissioned officers of the 14th Sikhs and the 4th Kashmir Rifles.

Field Operations
No. 4-C., Chitral Fort, dated Chitral, 6th May 1895.
Gilgit Force

FROM—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL KELLY, 32nd Pioneers, Commanding Gilgit Force,
TO—The Adjutant-General in India.

In accordance with your telegram No. 616.G., dated 1st May 1895, I have the honour to forward the despatch of the Officer Commanding the Chitral Garrison during the siege which, on account of the wound received by Captain C. P. Campbell, Central India Horse, on the 3rd March 1895, devolved on Captain C. V. F. Townshend, Central India Horse.

The story as told in the pages of his diary reflects the greatest credit on his skill and arrangements, coolness and bravery; for there is no doubt he was the life and soul of the defence, and I strongly recommend him for some mark of distinction for his services. I quite concur in the recommendation of the officers brought to notice by him.

I have under a separate cover forwarded the recommendation for the bestowal of the Victoria Cross on Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch, Indian Medical Service.

With regard to the recommendation of the services of Subadar Gurmukh Singh, 14th Sikhs, I beg permission to recommend this valuable Native officer for a Bahadurship.

I strongly commend the granting of the Order of Merit on the Native officers and men of the 14th Sikhs and Kashmir Imperial Service Troops brought to notice in the diary.

The history of the siege is a bright chapter in the annals of military warfare, and I strongly recommend the rewards to those brought to notice for conspicuous gallantry during those trying events.

Dated Chitral, 26th April 1895.

From—CAPTAIN C. V. F. TOWNSEND, Central India Horse (late Commanding Chitral Fort and Officer Commanding the Escort to the British Agent),

To—The Officer Commanding the Gilgit Force.

I have the honour to forward a report of the siege of Chitral Fort in diary form.

2. In forwarding the report I have the honour to mention the services of the following officers serving under my command throughout the siege.

3. *Lieutenant B. E. M. Gurdon*, Indian Staff Corps, Assistant British Agent, Chitral, was put under my orders and I attached him to the detachment of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, Imperial Service Troops. This detachment was in his charge throughout the siege. He is an excellent officer and cool to the utmost extent. I always had the utmost confidence in him, and I cannot sufficiently praise him. He accompanied the British Agent on the 3rd March 1895, and afterwards joined Captain Baird's party on the right, taking command of it after that officer was wounded.

4. *Lieutenant H. K. Harley*, 14th Sikhs.—A very promising officer; has his detachment in a high state of discipline, order and efficiency; in every way thoroughly reliable. The way he carried out the sortie and capture of the summer-house where the mine was on 17th April 1895 was very dashing and excellently done.

5. *Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch*, Indian Medical Service, 24th Punjab Infantry.—The official report of the siege shows what his work has been. He has been recommended for the Victoria Cross. His care and skilful attention to the wounded, his alacrity in undertaking all duties, are the admiration of all who have served with him.

6. The following Native officers have done excellent work during the siege:

Subadar Gurmukh Singh, 14th Sikhs.—Should certainly be promoted: a most excellent Native officer and I have not met a better. He keeps his men in first-rate order and discipline. His vigilance during the siege was untiring; he has proved himself an excellent company officer in action, the men working perfectly under him. If ever a Native officer deserved promotion, Gurmukh Singh does. He deserves high praise for the excellent way he brought his party of 60 men from Mastuj to Chitral to Lieutenant Gurdon's assistance, when Nizam-ul-Mulk was murdered. If Gurmukh Singh had not shown tact and care on the march, at a time when the people were not certain as to whether they should attack his party or not, a catastrophe would have been the result.

Femadar Attar Singh, 14th Sikhs.—A very steady and good man I found him; he was in the party which captured the mine on 17th April 1895.

IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS.

Colonel Jagat Singh, 4th Kashmir Rifles.—Did very well on the 3rd of March 1895, going back to fetch up the support at my request just before the assault on the enemy's village took place. He has much influence in the regiment and is much respected by the men.

Major Bhagwan Singh, 4th Kashmir Rifles.—Did excellent service in the siege; ever cheery and eager in the execution of his duty. Took part in the capture of the mine on 17th April 1895.

Major Beli Ram, Imperial Service Troops.—Aide-de-Camp to the late General Baj Singh, Imperial Service Troops, who was killed in action on the 3rd March 1895 outside Chitral Fort. Very keen and did excellent work in the siege. He was indefatigable.

Subadar Badri Nar Singh, 4th Kashmir Rifles.—Recommended for the Order of Merit on 3rd March 1895. A most excellent, brave and reliable officer; far away the most capable officer I have met in the Kashmir Imperial Service Troops, and I have served with them since 1891. He should be promoted on the first opportunity. He has well-earned the Order of Merit twice during the siege, and I have frequently recommended him for promotion during the last two years. He should be promoted on the first opportunity.

Subadar Gandib Singh, 4th Kashmir Rifles, was in the capture of the mine on 17th April 1895; did good work during the siege.

Femadar Kalu Chand } 4th Kashmir Rifles.—I class these two together: both very
Femadar Fitman } reliable, good and steady officers. Kalu Chand is, perhaps, the best of the two; he is older. These two officers, Subadar Badri Nar Singh and Havildar-Major Durgah were the most reliable men in this regiment, far and away. They were always put on duty at the waterway outside the fort, the place where I thought we should be seriously attacked.

Havildar-Major Durgah, 4th Kashmir Rifles.—I must mention the name of this non-commissioned officer. He should be promoted on the first opportunity; he was

wounded on the 3rd March, but went on performing his duties just the same; an excellent man. He is fit to promote to Subadar straight off, if it could be done.

Finally, when many did so well it is hard to distinguish the sepoy who never murmured, took everything calmly—the overwork, the half ration of atta, the over-fatigues, practically getting no rest; they slept in accoutrements and on their alarm posts, throughout the siege. The spirit of the 14th Sikhs was our admiration: the longer the siege lasted the more eager they became to teach the enemy a lesson. There could not be finer soldiers than these men of the 14th Sikhs, and they were our sheet-anchor in the siege. The Panyalis and Gilgit men, under Rajah Sifat Bahadur, did excellent work in the fort with us. They were incorporated into levies; all the important demolitions as a rule were done by them. But the spirit of all was excellent; all non-combatants were used for some duty or other. The munshis volunteered for work and took their share of fatigue parties, etc., and the servants were put on the handmills grinding grain.

Official account of the siege of Chitral Fort by Captain C. V. F. TOWNSHEND, Central India Horse, Commanding the Escort to the British Agent and Commandant of Chitral Fort during the siege,—3rd March 1895 to night of 18th April 1895.

3rd March 1895.—About 4-30 P.M. the news of the approach of Sher Afzal and a force was brought in, and I was ordered to take out 200 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles by Captain Campbell, Central India Horse.

I threw out an advanced guard of one section under Subadar Badri Nar Singh and sent Captain Baird with them, and advanced in extended order. Captain Campbell ordered me to leave 50 men at the Serai, and so I left Subadar Harichand and 50 rifles at this place. Captain Campbell sent me orders to block the Ayun-Chitral road, and accordingly I occupied the eastern spur of the face on which the Political Officer's house stands, and which commands the road with a clear field of fire to the front up to over 1,000 yards; on reaching this spur I found that Captain Baird has been sent up on the high ground to the eastward among the trees, and had taken the section with him, and Captain Campbell soon ordered me to send another 25 men to Baird. This I did, sending Jemadar Shamu in command of it. After about half an hour Captain Campbell ordered me to advance on a house in which he said they had received news that Sher Afzal was to be found. He indicated the house on the plain, about a mile and a half to the south. I accordingly advanced in extended order, half company in firing line and half company in support. On reaching this house we found it empty, but I saw a hamlet about 500 yards further on, and I could see a lot of men moving about there among the trees and houses. I continued the advance. I could see our men (Baird's party) dotted up on the hill-side on the northern slopes of a *nala*, and some men on the opposite (southern) side of the *nala*, evidently Chitralis. Very soon I heard shots on these hill slopes, so concluded the men I could see in my front moving about in the village were the enemy, and I opened fire with a section volley. This fire was immediately returned by the enemy. I now advanced in the ordinary way, getting the men under cover as much as possible, and giving them steady volleys until I got to within 200 yards or so. The enemy now made most excellent shooting,—the Martini and Snider,—and men began to get hit, although I had got the men under a stone-revetted bank. I could see that the hamlet or village was full of men. I could see men in white clothes and standards, and they kept up a well-sustained fire from the walls and loop-holes and there was no more cover to my front.

I determined to hold on to this ground I had reached with my 100 men, until Baird should move along the hill slopes to the westward and so turn the village, and I could then rush it. However, time went on and I could see no signs of Baird, and small parties of the enemy of four and five began to overlap my left flank towards the river, and were enfilading us with their fire and in a similar way they began to move forward on my right. It was now 6-30 P.M., and it would soon be dark. Captain Campbell shortly after this arrived and said that the village must be rushed. I gave the order "to reinforce," but the support of men in rear did not come up. I kept on repeating the order, but no one came. Captain Campbell then went back to fetch the men himself, while I fixed bayonets preparatory to the charge, and kept up a heavy independent fire. The support was among some low walls 150 yards to the rear. Campbell managed to bring about a dozen men and fell shot through the knee as he rejoined me. I then sent Colonel Jagat Singh, who only got one or two men. It was no good waiting any more, so I went round among the men, telling them that we must take the houses, rushing straight in, and I sounded the charge. We were met by a most close and destructive fire as we scrambled over the bank

and rushed on. General Baj Singh was shot dead on one side of me and Major Bhikam Singh of the 4th Kashmir Rifles mortally wounded on the other side. After about 30 and 40 yards the men began to take cover, laying down behind stones, and the charge could not be carried home, though I tried all I could to get the men on.

Seeing that it was hopeless, that it was impossible to carry the village, I ordered the men to retire, and the men collected again under the bank whence we had charged from. It was getting rapidly dark and the enemy were overlapping us fast. I ordered a retirement, for I saw it would not do to be caught among the stone walls and hamlets between us and Chitral Fort in the dark. I told off some men to carry off Captain Campbell and Major Bhikam Singh, and sent them off. I then retired my party by alternate parties keeping up a heavy fire whilst the men dribbled off to the rear in twos and threes by word of command, remaining with the last party myself. The enemy's fire being too close to carry out the retirement in any other manner, I carried out the retirement in alternate parties in this way, the enemy following us up very closely and getting round our flanks. I rallied the men for a stand at a small house with a half walled enclosure, where I found the British Agent rallying the men. The British Agent then went to bring out the company of 14th Sikhs to support us. I begged him to get on his horse and told him that I would manage to get my party in all right; the enemy were now all round us and their swordsmen were getting bold. The British Agent was fired at on all sides as he rode across the polo-ground. I commenced the retirement again, the men now having very little ammunition left.

We were now fired into on all sides, front, flank and rear, from every hamlet and wall, and it was now quite dark and impossible at a short distance to distinguish friend from foe. Captain Campbell, who had been put on a pony, notwithstanding that he was severely wounded, helped me in keeping the men together. Crossing the polo ground the enemy kept up a fire on us from the houses and the orchards. On reaching the *sarai* I found 50 men of the 14th Sikhs under Lieutenant Harley, who had come out to cover our retreat. I directed him to cover our retirement into the fort, and, restoring order among the 4th Kashmir Rifles, retired into the fort; the Sikhs covered the retreat very steadily. I took command now at the fort as Campbell was severely wounded. Every man was sent to his station. I heard that Captain Baird had been desperately wounded away on our right flank, and that he and Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch had not come into the fort. He had been wounded in the early part of the action. About 8 P.M. Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch came in, bringing Captain Baird, who was mortally wounded. Thirteen of the 4th Kashmir Rifles had stuck by them,—Gurkhas and one or two Dogras under Subadar Badri Nar Singh. They had had a marvellous escape. They had to charge one or two walls or *sangars* where the enemy tried to stop them; several of the party were killed, Baird receiving another wound as he was being carried; they had to rush one *sangar* with the bayonet.

Casualties.

Killed.—British officer:—Captain Baird, 24th Punjab Infantry.

General Baj Singh Imperial Service Troops.

Major Bhikam Singh 4th Kashmir Rifles.

Hospital-Assistant Bhawani Dass, and 21 non-commissioned officers and sepoy, 4th Kashmir Rifles.

Wounded.—British officer:—Captain Campbell Central India Horse; Jemadar Rab-Nawaz Khan, 15th Bengal Lancers, and 28 non-commissioned officers and sepoy of the 4th Kashmir Rifles.

Total 23 killed and 33 wounded=56 killed and wounded out of 200 men, and 150 only actually engaged.

I recalled the picquet of 20 men at the bridge head at night, about half a mile off, and the Havildar managed to bring in the party without being attacked.

Number rounds expended in action on this day=15,935 rounds Snider. The men carried mostly 120 rounds a man in the pouches; much ammunition was lost by the men lying down with open pouches and cartridges would fall out on the ground. I ordered expense ammunition to be carried in a haversack by the men after this, so as to ensure easy feeding, and that cartridges would not be lost.

I should have mentioned that Lieutenant Gurdon accompanied the British Agent on this day, and was sent off to join Baird's party on the right.

4th March 1895.—Engaged in demolitions in the garden, east front of fort stables and walls. The enemy's rifle men fired into the fort all day from *sangars* thrown upon the hill-sides.

Poor Baird died this morning.

Ammunition expended on the 3rd March = 15,935 rounds Snider, *i.e.*, 106 rounds per man.

On this date we had over 300 rounds per man Martini ammunition, for the detachment of the 14th Sikhs, and 250 rounds per rifle, Snider for the 4th Kashmir Rifles.

Supplies for two months and a half, putting every one in the fort on half rations.

The number of people drawing rations in the fort were 543, of whom 406 were combatants. There were 52 Chitralis amongst us,—Mehter Shuja-ul-Mulk and Adamzadas and servants; 11 followers, 27 servants; 16 Punyalis; 12 munshis and chaprasis; 7 commissariat and transport, etc., etc., and 6 British officers:—

Surgeon-Major Robertson, C.S.I.	•	British Agent.
Captain C. V. F. Townshend	•	Central India Horse, Commanding British Agent's Escort and Commandant of the Fort.
Lieutenant Gurdon	•	Assistant to the British Agent.
„ H. K. Harley	•	14th Sikhs.
Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch	•	24th Punjab Infantry.
Captain Campbell	•	Central India Horse, badly wounded.

The detachment of the 14th Sikhs numbered 99 men, and the 4th Kashmir Rifles numbered 301 of all ranks.

We found the work of demolishing all the out-houses and walls around the fort, especially on the garden side (east side), a task of great labour and a deal of the work had to be done under fire.

The fort is commanded *on almost every side* at ranges varying from 700 yards. On the east and west faces are huge *chinar* trees in abundance, which we had not the time or materials to cut down; the south face towards the *bazar* and Fateh Ali Shah's house, about 600 yards, was encroached upon by walls and trees and summer-houses; on the east face is the fort garden full of fine *chinar* trees and the garden surrounded by a high wall; so the enemy had everything in their favour. We had made a covered way down to the water on the north front of the fort; here is a tower built to guard access to the water which we called the Water Tower, but a covered way was necessary from this tower down to the river bank, some 35 yards, for the enemy would be certain to build *sangars* on the opposite (left) bank of the river to prevent our people getting water.

Tuesday, 5th March 1895.—A flag of truce arrived from Sher Afzal, with a letter from Umra Khan to the British Agent. We expended 200 rounds to-day.

I had marksmen put in the towers to annoy the enemy, there being some very decent shots among the Sikhs.

6th March 1895.—Lieutenant Gurdon, Political Officer, was attached to the 4th Kashmir Rifles for duty.

Messengers were sent off with letters to try and get through the enemy to Mastuj on the nights of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th.

Umra Khan's Diwan arrived with a flag of truce to see the British Agent.

The following officers and men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles are to be recommended for the Order of Merit for their bravery in bringing in the late Captain Baird:—

Subadar Badri Nar Singh	•	Gurkha.
Lance-Naik Govind Singh	•	„
„ Lall Singh	•	„
Naik Nain Singh	•	„ severely wounded.
Sepoy Dall Bahadur	•	„
„ Lachman Ghalleh	•	„
„ Kapura	•	„
„ Bahadur Aleh	•	„
„ Johar	•	Dogra.
„ Asbir	•	Gurkha.
„ Balbir	•	„
„ Lalla	•	Dogra.
Havildar Danni	•	Gurkha, badly wounded.
Kahar Jungli	•	14th Sikhs.

Thursday, 7th March 1895.—Engaged in making volley loop-holes and log head-cover on parapets.

One sepoy of the 4th Kashmir Rifles wounded.

Friday, 8th March.—The enemy made a determined attempt on our waterway last night; they commenced a heavy and well-sustained fire from the trees on the north-west front of the fort, about one hour before dawn. As the men always slept on their alarm

posts, every one was quickly in his place. Independent fire was not allowed at night, only section volleys. During the enemies' fire one of their men actually managed to get into the passage under the Water Tower and lit a huge fire; one or two men also with him had carried up bundles of faggots in the darkness. I opened the water-gate and sent out *bhisties* with *massaks* to put the fire out, and this they did. Gave them Rs. 10 each afterwards.

Saturday, 9th March.—Nothing occurred in night, our tower sentries firing a few shots at men seen lurking about among the trees on the north-west front. The enemy had improved their *sangars* in the night. A kahar was shot dead to-day in the fort by the riflemen in the *sangars* at Danin village, across the river; a Martini. This man caused us much annoyance throughout the siege.

Sunday, 10th March.—Nothing happened in the night; engaged in demolishing the old hospital and commissariat houses just outside the main gate at 9 P.M. I used the Punyalis and Guta syces to do this work; splendid fellows to work. They do everything in a quarter of the time that the sepoys do. The enemy fired a few shots at us at this work, but no damage done. One driver wounded in the fort to-day, and also a hospital dresser; both men were going down to get water.

Five casualties in the past week.

We had now only 80 rifles of the 14th Sikhs fit for duty, and 240 rifles of the 4th Kashmir Rifles. The latter rather shaken by their losses on the 3rd of March. Taking into consideration the large number of guards, sentries and patrols we had to keep going in the fort, that the *morale* of the 4th Kashmir Rifles had suffered somewhat, that our siege was in all probability to be a very long one, I decided in my mind that the energy to be displayed in sorties must depend on circumstances; that the energies of the men must be husbanded as much as possible; that in always having to return after a sortie the men would soon be disheartened. Neither could we afford to lose a single man, and there were only three British officers, including myself doing duty with the garrison. I therefore decided that we should begin sallying as soon as we heard of a force from Gilgit approaching, unless a sortie became absolutely necessary from the close approach of the enemy's *sangars*.

I laid down the following measures to be carried out as regards the defence of the fort:—

1. Fort police were established on account of the small number of Chitralis in the fort.
2. An organised system for putting out fires: *bhisties* slept with filled *massaks*, and vessels were filled with water. Patrols went round at night, and also during the day, watching for accidents from fire. We feared fire greatly in the fort, as there is more wood almost than stones in it.
3. The sanitary arrangements were very bad but the best that could be done under the circumstances. The latrines of necessity had to be in a little confined space of ground at the north flank wall.
4. As many walls and buildings as possible to be levelled outside the fort.
5. The sepoys to be spared as much fatigue and working parties as possible, getting the work done by the non-combatants.
6. Internal communications.
7. Hand-mills were made for grinding the grain, and all extra servants and odd hands were put on to this.
8. A careful watch was kept over the Chitralis in the fort, and a guard placed over them at night.
9. Every kind of cover that could be devised was thrown up; traverses and paradoss were constructed out of beams taken from the buildings demolished wooden traverses erected on all the tower tops. Boxes filled with earth, commissariat bags filled with earth, carpets, doors taken off hinges; all were utilised for cover. Finally I took care to instil into the minds of all the men that a relieving force would soon come, and then we should sally out and have our turn.

Monday, 11th March.—Messengers and letters from the enemy.

Tuesday, 12th March.—Managed to get all the outer wall knocked down on the west and south-west fronts last night; using the Punyalis to do the work; and, as usual, the work was done excellently and marvellously quickly. The enemy fired pretty hotly from their *sangar* about 250 yards off on west front, and also they opened fire from the *basar* on hearing the crash of the walls coming down. No one hit.

I ordered 30 rounds a day to be fired at Sher Afzal's house at 1,100 yards range, to cause him annoyance. Our average was 40 to 50 rounds of Martini daily expended, and 20 to 30 rounds of Snider, *i.e.*, when we had a quiet night and there was no firing. We used the brass gun to-day in the fort, getting off two or three rounds at Sher Afzal's house from outside the garden gate (east face). One sepoy of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, one of the gun's crew, wounded in the arm by a Martini bullet.

Wednesday, 13th March.—I started watches for British officers, like on board ship as regards night work; this I found was the only way of ensuring a proper vigilance on the ramparts at night.

The rumour amongst the Chitralis in the fort is that Sher Afzal has sent a lot of men up the road towards Mastuj. We can get absolutely no information from outside. The enemy keep a close cordon round the fort at night to intercept messengers.

Thursday, 14th March.—The enemy made an attack last night on the east face in the garden; much shouting and tom-toms and a straggling fire. They sounded the advance on a bugle. We received them with a brisk fire, and they slunk off in the dark. During the time we were firing, a man was heard to shout to them repeatedly in Pashtu to come on and attack the water-way.

I loop-holed and occupied the stables outside the water-gate with one section to-night. This picquet always to mount in the evening at 8 P. M.; in the day-time the east end of the stables was held by a Cossack post of six men, the wall being loop-holed.

Friday, 15th March.—A few shots only were fired last night. The end of the covered way on the water's edge was enlarged a bit, loop-holes made, and occupied by a Cossack post of six Sikhs at night. A letter came from Sher Afzal to the British Agent to-day, saying that a party of our sepoys escorting an ammunition convoy had been surrounded and defeated at Reshun, and that a British officer who had come down from Mastuj had been taken prisoner also with this party. That he had written a letter to the British Agent which Sher Afzal would deliver if the British Agent would send some one to get it. We did not believe the story.

Saturday, 16th March.—A quiet night last night. Sher Afzal forwarded a letter to-day from Lieutenant Edwards dated Reshun, 13th March 1895. He said that he and Lieutenant Fowler, Royal Engineers, with a party of 20 sappers (Bengal Sappers and Miners) and 40 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, on the march from Mastuj to Chitral, had been attacked just this (Chitral) side of Reshun on the road. They had lost 6 men killed and 13 wounded. They had concluded a truce with the enemy after three days' hard fighting. The Pathans with the Chitralis had proposed the truce to Edwardes, saying that the British Agent had made peace with Sher Afzal at Chitral. They had had to sally out of the house they had entrenched themselves in whenever they wanted water. The ammunition (60 boxes of Snider and engineer stores in this convoy) and stores, Edwardes said, were quite safe. Edwardes added a postscript to say that they could not hold out any longer if they were again attacked. A large force was all around them.

A truce of three days has been agreed to on both sides. Negotiations going on with reference to Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler and party. We began digging out an old disused well in the fort which had been filled in for many years.

Sunday, 17th March.—I employed next two days in improving the traverses made of beams, boxes, etc., on the parapets, and the head-cover in the tower tops, making flanking loop-holes in lower story of flag tower (S. E.) and digging out the old well. Noticed that the enemy had shifted their quarters out of the bazar, which our marksmen had made fairly warm for them, and had moved south to Fateh Ali Shah's house and orchard walls.

Monday, 18th March.—Nothing worthy of note.

Tuesday, 19th March.—The look-out men on the towers reported that Chitralis had been seen arriving in batches from the direction of Mastuj at dusk yesterday evening. Considerable numbers of the enemy arrived during the day from Mastuj-way. Should say quite 400 men during the day. Seven corpses were carried along past the fort into Chitral. These must have been men of note brought in, who had been killed at Reshun by our people.

Abdul Majid Khan, Umra Khan's lieutenant, who has been, with 300 Jandolis, with Sher Afzal all the time, sent a letter to the British Agent this evening. Says they are very sorry, but although they had sent off messengers to Reshun to say that peace was being made, a "row" had taken place in the meantime; that they had made prisoners of nine Mahomedan sepoys; and that the two British officers would be here to-morrow. This looked as if there had been treachery, and so it proved afterwards. I increased the

picquet in the covered way to the water to-night to 20 rifles instead of 6, and arranged a picquet of 20 men to hold it by night and 20 by day. This made 70 men holding our water.

Thursday, 20th March.—The enemy reinforced their *sangars* in the day with a lot of men, and sent 28 men across the bridge, and in a short time afterwards 80 men arrived across the bridge from Mastuj-way. The two British officers were being escorted in, but I could not make them out with the glass. However, Munshi Amir Ali was allowed to go and see them from the fort this evening, and our doubts were put an end to, as Amir Ali was allowed to see them and to converse with them, but in Hindustani only.

They were being well treated, but had been looted of all their kit.

Friday, 21st March.—Constructed a semi-circular *fêche*, loop-holed, outside the water door.

Enemy trying to arrange that we should send a British officer up to Sher Afzal's house to see Fowler and Edwardes.

A note from Fowler, asking for medicine, said that the enemy had got all the stores, etc., so we suppose that they have got ammunition and all.

The British Agent told me that he has now heard the story of how Fowler and Edwardes were captured. During the truce they had with the enemy at Reshun, the Chitralis invited the British officers to look on at a game of polo on the Reshun polo ground. They went and were instantly thrown down and bound. What then happened to their men they do not know; they suppose that the 35 men remaining have been massacred with the wounded. We could hardly bring ourselves to believe the story, it was so astonishing.

Sunday, 22nd March.—We had now to commence eating horse flesh, and killed and salted ponies.

23rd March.—Poured with rain in the night.

Umra Khan's Diwan came to see the British Agent. The enemy announce that they will haul down the flag of truce this evening; this they did. We hauled down ours at the same time. Some desultory firing this night. It rained hard. We lit a fire outside the main gate to throw a light.

24th March.—The rain continues to pour in torrents. I hear that Lieutenant Edwardes and Fowler are to be taken down to Drosh to Umra Khan to-day. The enemy fired into the fort to-day from the hill *sangars*. A large piece of the parapet on the west front subsided, and we built it up with beams in the evening.

25th March.—Rained hard all night; evening quiet: 38 men in three parties observed to cross bridge from up road this evening. The surmise is that it is the captured 60 boxes of ammunition. I had a gun post made in the wall of the half-demolished building outside the main gate during the night, also an embrasure close by in the wall for our brass gun to bear on the enemy's *sangar* in front of our west front. Took the gun out 7 A.M. and opened fire on this *sangar*, but with no effect, as the gun has no sights, and we had to make a wooden one. The second shot hit the parapet of the *sangar* at the crest, but did it no damage. This *sangar* was made of fascines, and, as we found afterwards, excellently made, very strong, and rude earth casemates for their men to take cover in. All the *sangars* round opened fire on the fort. A Sikh was shot through the stomach and died in half an hour.—Martini bullet.

27th March.—Enemy fired from garden (east front) in the night, lighting a fire in the garden; supposed with object of drawing our fire, and thus wasting our ammunition.

During the night we put up a bullet-proof roof on the top of the water tower, and arranged screens of tents turned inside out to cover entrance into north tower, a favourite target for the riflemen in the Danis *Sangar*; also screens rigged up over the gangway leading up on to the south parapet, a very exposed place. A *bhisti* shot dead this afternoon; this makes 10 casualties since the 3rd March.

28th March.—The Eed festival. Put up beams in stables to protect men going out of water gate to the latrines and down to the covered waterway. This is where the *bhisti* was shot yesterday. Also further strengthened top of water tower, and pierced its lower story for loopholes.

Ordered a board to assemble to-day, of which I was President, recommending Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch for the Victoria Cross for his conduct on the 3rd of March. Handed in the proceedings to the British Agent.

Constructed Machicoulis galleries to hold beacon fires, one on each parapet of fort. These a great success; the fires lit on them give a capital light in front of the parapet, lighting up the darkness, and at the same time do not light up our own loopholes, as we

were behind the fire. Two Chitralis told off to each fireplace to feed the fires under the watch of one sepoy. Before this we used fireballs to throw out when lighted over the parapets, and they acted very well indeed, only were expensive in oil. These balls consisted of resinous wood-savings, tow, etc., compressed into a bag made of sacking tied up with stout string at the mouth, and kept handy on the parapets, with bottles of oil and matches close at hand. If the enemy attacked in the darkness, these were lit by a British officer, who soaked it with oil, applied the match, and hurled the ball out over the wall. They gave a clear light for about half an hour.

29th March.—Made and hoisted the Union Jack on the top of the highest tower (S. W.); called the Flag Tower. Improved head-cover on towers during night. The British Agent received a letter yesterday from Lieutenant Edwardes at Drosh, where he and Fowler were prisoners of Umra Khan. They were to start the next day for Jandol.

An attempt was made to send a messenger out to carry a letter to Mr. Udny, Asmarway. The man returned saying he had nearly been captured by the enemy in the garden. Quiet night.

30th March.—Ammunition in hand this date:—

Martini 29,224 rounds, *i.e.*, 356 rounds per rifle, for effective of 14th Sikhs.

The Sikhs had expended the following number of rounds since the 11th March:—

11th March 1895,—47 rounds in 24 hours.

12th	„	„	29	„	„
13th	„	„	251	„	„
14th	„	„	234	„	„
15th	„	„	24	„	„
23rd	„	„	2	„	„
24th	„	„	5	„	„
25th	„	„	93	„	„
26th	„	„	135	„	„
27th	„	„	25	„	„
28th	„	„	26	„	„

Total . 871

This is given to show the number of rounds usually expended a day. Every effort was made to husband the ammunition.

Snider.—68,587 rounds in hand for 261 rifles effective of the 4th Kashmir Rifles (5 men had recovered from wounds, but were not well enough to take their places at the alarm posts), *i.e.*, 202 rounds per rifle.

We had now 343 rifles fit for duty, *i.e.*,—

14th Sikhs	82
4th Kashmir Rifles	261
	<hr/>
	343

The following guards and picquets had to be furnished:—

Main gate	10
10 sentries on each,	
Parapet	40
Water picquet	20
Water tower	25
Stable picquet	20
Water gate guard	10
Guard over Amir-ul-Mulk, the ex-Mehtar	6 <i>i.e.</i> , 3 double sentries.
Guard over Chitralis at night	4
Guard on ammunition, 4th Kashmir Rifles	6
Guard on garden gate	6
Men in the 4th towers	24

171

343—171=172

Thus only 172 rifles were available to make a sortie should it become necessary. I had reduced the strength of guards to the lowest safe number; and of this number 172, five

were unfit to fight, men who had just recovered from wounds, and out of 172 I had to keep 35 at least for the inlying picquet.

We had supplies to the amount of 526 maunds 36 seers of grain, which would last the number of people present in the fort 74 days, or up to and for the 13th of June 1895, at 6 maunds 30 seers a day; but allowing for a wastage of 40 maunds in the grinding, we had only rations up to and for 11th June 1895.

We had only got 18 seers of *ghi* left, and that would only last for the sick and wounded in hospital, and for lights at guards in the fort for 12 days; and we knew that the already heavy sick list would be greatly increased among the sepoys as soon as the *ghi* gave out, being on half rations and getting absolutely no rest. The stanches in the stables where the latrines were, were awful, and there was a picquet of 25 men in this place every night. It was absolutely necessary to have the picquet there, being at the fort end of our waterway.

We still had some rum left and a little tea, and to stop the increasing sick list the Sikhs were given one dram of rum every four days, and the 4th Kashmir Rifles were given a tea ration every 3rd day.

31st March.—The enemy made a new *sangar* last night on the opposite bank of the river, about 175 yards from our water place; this *sangar* about 30 yards in advance of their old *sangar*. At this point, screens of tents put up during the night to conceal *bhisties* and men going down to the covered way to the water, between the stables and the water tower. The enemy never fired if they could not actually see a man. Also had beams put up as screens outside the water gate, as the riflemen up at Danin made things warm for people at this doorway.

Enemy also last night commenced a covered way to the water from their lower *sangar* on our north-west front near the river; they only managed to get up about eight yards of it as our men fired at the noise of the stones. This waterway was running parallel to ours at a distance of about 80 yards. This lower *sangar* was only about 80 yards from our covered way to the water.

1st April 1895.—Desultory firing in the night; loop-hole fire from the garden wall at our parapets. Sank a trench in the stables with a view to more protection for men going to the waterway. Made some volley loop-holes in the lower story of water tower.

We had now 37 men in hospital and 23 out-patients,—total 60 men.

3rd April 1895.—Nothing of importance since 1st April. Much rain on this date. The son of Mehtar Jan Bahadur Khan (who was in the fort along with us) was admitted to see his father. He had come from Mastuj, and said that 800 troops had arrived at Mastuj, and there were three British officers; included 150 to 200 Hunza, Nagar, and Punyali levies. However, I believe, his statements were most contradictory, and he had evidently been told what to say.

4th April 1895.—Only a few stray shots last night fired by our people at men moving about by the enemy's *sangar* on north-west face in the *chinar* trees.

We filled powder bags and made up powder-hose in linen sewn up in mackintosh sheets.

In hospital	.	.	.	36, <i>i. e.</i> , 7 Sikhs and 29 Kashmir Rifles.
Out-patients	.	.	.	39
				—
				75
				—

5th April 1895.—The enemy were at work in Nizam's summer-house in the garden at south-east angle of fort, about 50 yards from the gun tower. This place we had been unable to knock down owing to heavy fire on working parties. It was in reality a small servants' house, which had stood next door to the summer-house which had been levelled by us. The fire from the enemy got lively about 5 P. M. Bahadur Khan's son again came to see the British Agent, but late in the evening. He was not admitted into the fort, but told to come next morning.

6th April 1895.—Found in the morning that the enemy had been very active in the night. A large fascine *sangar* stood in front of the main gate at a distance of 40 yards only (west front).

A palisade-work *sangar* had also been made just under the *chabootra* (north-western face); also a *sangar* had been made in the middle of the garden (east face) about 40 yards from the garden gate. They fired with matchlocks in the night, mostly from the summer-house: this was no doubt to take off our attention.

I loop-holed the lower story of the east tower in the night to command the east end of the stables, which point in my opinion was a dangerous one. More loop-holes also made in stable buildings at west end.

I had occasion to find fault with the sentries of the 4th Kashmir Rifles in the gun tower this evening, and took steps to increase their vigilance.

They did not seem to like looking over the top of the tower owing to the enemy in the summer-house; who now made things warm for the sentries in the gun tower. Loop-holed the walls left outside the main gate; enemy from near *sangar* firing.

7th April 1895.—Last night I occupied the remaining walls standing outside the main gate, having loop-holed them, with 12 Sikhs and six Punyalis. About 5 A. M., whilst I was having a look from the top of the north tower, a large number of the enemy opened a heavy matchlock fire from the *chinar* trees in front of the north tower. It seemed to me that this meant an attack on the covered way to the water at last, and having directed the Sikhs in the north tower to fire volleys, I went down and turned out the inlying picquet, and sent round sending every one to their different alarm-posts. The enemy kept up a deal of shouting and yelling, our men in the water tower and the Sikhs on the west parapet giving them steady volleys, which the enemy could not face, but decamped towards the *bazar*. Some of their men crept up to within twelve yards or so of our walls outside the main gate, firing at them, one Sikh being shot through the thigh by a Snider bullet.

During the firing the enemy managed with great pluck to place huge faggots and logs of wood in a pile against the corner of the gun tower, and set light to it, and the tower was soon well on fire and blazing up. Things looked very bad; I sent up all the whole of the inlying picquet to run up with their great-coats full of earth, sent up sacks of earth and as much water as we could get hold of.

A strong wind was blowing at the time. At one time the fire was got under; it then blazed up again, the flames mounting up in the spaces between the beams in the tower. The Machicoulis galleries in the tower were the targets for a hail of Snider bullets from the summer house at 50 yards, the bullets smashing through the planks. The British Agent, who was in the tower superintending the putting out of the fire, was wounded at a hole in the wall, and a Sikh shot there the next minute. A sentry of the 4th Kashmir Rifles also shot. I now went into the towers, as all seemed quiet around the fort, and it was getting quite light. Their riflemen from the *sangars* opened fire at the gun tower from across the river and from high ground to the south-west, where they could hit our people going in and out of the tower with water and earth. My orderly was mortally wounded; altogether nine were wounded putting out the fire.

The fire was got under with great difficulty. We had to keep picking holes into the wall inside the tower as it mounted up, and pouring water down, and we got above the fire by means of ladders and by working *downwards* from the top story of the tower so as to meet the fire.

It was 10 A. M. before the fire was out, but water was kept pouring down inside the wall all day.

The enemy showed great courage and enterprise in firing our tower, and our sentries showed great slackness and want of vigilance.

I now changed the sentries of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, putting the men of the 14th Sikhs in their places. The Machicoulis were greatly improved and made very strong, and loop-holed with a large loop-hole to see a lot of ground at the foot of the tower. A sentry was always lying in each of these Machicoulis galleries.

Twelve corpses of the enemy were reported to have been seen by the look-out men in the towers.

During the after noon I had heaps of earth collected and sent up on the parapets, vessels and ammunition boxes filled with water also and earth in plenty, and water in every story in all the towers. The mackintosh sheets of the 14th Sikhs were utilised to hold water. All the servants, syces, etc., were formed into a fire-picquet under Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch. Also heaps of stones were placed in the tops of the towers for the sentries to throw down from time to time in the dark.

Rounds expended last night—

Martini	127
Snider of the 4th Kashmir Rifles	283

Subadar Badri Nar Singh, 4th Kashmir Rifles, has shown great bravery in the tower, going into the Machicoulis gallery when it was being ripped up with bullets; as did also

Sepoy Awi Singh, of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, who was badly wounded—Snider bullet through the thigh. (Throughout the fighting, during the siege, and in the action of the 3rd March, I think not more than one man was wounded by matchlocks; all Martini and Snider.) The British Agent asked me to recommend these two men for the Order of Merit, and also Sepoy Bhola Singh, of the 14th Sikhs, also wounded in the tower. He displayed bravery in putting out the fire under the enemy's rifle fire. Subadar Badri Nar Singh had previously been recommended for the Order of Merit for his work on the 3rd March.

8th April 1895.—The enemy made no attack last night. There was an alarm of fire in the gun tower at 9 P.M. last night. I proceeded to the gun tower, and on looking out of the Machicoulis gallery on the south face, could see some red-hot embers placed quite close to the tower, and a bundle of faggots lay close by. We soon got this out by means of the *bhistics* in the tower. The enemy must have done this from the Summer-house when the sentries were relieved in the evening; so I altered the time of reliefs from day to day.

Desultory firing in the night. Work done to-day as follows:—Decided to demolish the remaining walls and shell left of buildings in front of the main gate, doing it with the Punyalis at 12 noon; at the same time built a stone tambour loop-holed in front of the main gate before the walls outside were knocked down. This tambour held 10 men, and flanked capitally the whole of the west front with its two towers (north and flag towers).

The work was not finished till about 5 P.M. The outer walls were well prepared for knocking down, the uprights holding up the roof sawn through. Rajah Sipih Bahadur then suggested setting fire to them, and I allowed him to do so. The *sangar* 40 yards in front made it awkward for the working party; the fire burnt well, but only a part of the walls fell down; some remained the next morning, but the tambour made was a good piece of work. I left two perpendicular walls to the fort standing, knocking gaps through them.

During this work the Machicoulis in the gun tower were still more improved, and good loop-holes were made in the lower story, vertical to the ground at foot of tower; also a hole inside the tower dug in the floor to about four feet deep, and then a shutter-like loop-hole made which commanded the ground at the foot of the south face of the tower. Sentries placed in all these: 14 men now occupied this tower and I had an officer living in it.

9th April.—Quiet night; only a few shots from our men moving about.

Men in hospital—11 Sikhs.

19 4th Kashmir Rifles.

6 others.

—
36

49 out-patients.

—
85
—

We managed to knock the walls down clear outside the main gate to-day; no one hit doing it. I cannot speak too highly of the courage and skill of the Punyalis and Gilgit syces doing this work.

11th April 1895.—The enemy made an attack last night—supposed to be on our waterway. A tremendous din was suddenly raised. Yelling and tom-toms at 11-30 P.M. We went to our stations quietly. Section volleys from the east parapet, also from the west parapet, and a sharp fire at the gun tower corner. A large number of men came out of the *sangars* and were received by steady volleys from the water-tower. We heard afterwards that this attack was really intended on the waterway, and that the Lutko men in these *sangars* had received orders from Sher Afzal to assault our waterway. The volleys, however, soon caused them to deploy off towards the *basar*, and they received some volleys from the Sikhs on the west parapet as they cleared off to the *basar*. The firing lasted half an hour. One man was wounded on our side in the gun tower, one of the levies. The Punyalis in the fort had been formed into a levy and armed with Sniders and placed in the tower-tops, where they were of great use. Some old Enfield rifles found in the fort were also put to use in the tower-tops, loaded with slugs. The riflemen in the *sangars* across the river kept up a fire on us and also from the direction of the *basar*. Rounds expended,—335 Snider, 341 Martini.

12th April 1895.—The enemy now began playing tom-toms and Pathan pipes in the summer-house at night, and shouting abuse at intervals; also men were set to work to

sling stones into the fort, one man being wounded in the head by a stone. This, we found out at the end, was to drown the noise of their picks, as they had commenced a mine from the summer-house to undermine our gun-tower. The Pathans had guaranteed the taking of our gun-tower; they used to keep up a straggling matchlock fire from behind the trees in the garden. On the evening of the 11th 40 to 50 men were seen going up the *nala* to the south-west, where is a road leading up over the heights to the west of the fort going Drasan-way and to Mastuj. They never took the road leading to the bridge, as our Sikh marksmen in the north tower made this route too hot. At 11 A.M. on the morning of the 13th 100 men with flags and men on ponies seen going the same route up the *nala*, and we began to speculate on the approach of a force from Gilgit. In the afternoon a lance-naick of the 14th Sikhs was shot through the head at a loop-hole. This made 23 men killed and wounded since the 3rd March. Parties of two and three were seen going Drasan-way all day on the 13th, and 25 cooly-loads.

On the night of the 15th and the 16th the usual din of tom-tom and pipes playing at the summer-house, and desultory firing.

17th April 1895, Wednesday.—Jemadar Rab Nawaz Khan, of the 15th Bengal Cavalry, warned us that he thought the tom-toms and band at the summer-house might possibly be to drown the noise of their making a mine. I warned the sentries in the gun-tower to be on the alert and to listen intently; also the sentries in the tambour at the main gate. At midnight on the 16th one of the sentries in the lower story of the gun-tower reported the noise of knocking. I went up and listened for some time but could hear nothing.

About 11 A.M. on the morning of the 17th the native officer in the gun-tower reported to me he could hear the noise of knocking. I went up into the tower in the lower story, and there was no doubt that a mine was being made, and it had reached within twelve feet of the foot of the tower. The British Agent came up, and we both agreed that there was only one thing to do, and that was the summer-house must be rushed, and that soon, and the mine destroyed.

There was no time to countermine. I told off Lieutenant Harley and 40 men of the 14th Sikhs and Major Bhagwan Singh, Subadar Gandib Singh, and 60 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, and decided to let the party out of the garden-gate at 4 P.M. in the afternoon. They would only have to go fifty yards, and the enemy in all probability would be surprised, and 100 men would be ample to do the business. Men were told off to carry the powder-bags, powder-hose, matches and picks to destroy the mine. The shafts in all probability would be in the summer-house.

I gave the following instructions to Lieutenant Harley:—No firing, bayonet only; 40 rounds in pouch; take a prisoner or two if possible; take three powder-bags; 110 lbs. of powder, 40 feet powder-hose, picks and spades. To go straight for the gap in the wall of house, no dividing up the party; no support. Having rushed the place to hold the house on front towards Fateh Ali Shah's house, and with the remaining men destroy the mine by pulling down the uprights and wooden supports if any, or blow it in as he saw fit. No hurry. If the *sangar* in front of the garden-gate annoyed, he should send some men round it, first sounding the cease fire and let us know what he was going to do, and we would cease firing from the parapets on the *sangar* in question.

I had up all the officers going with him and explained the object of the *sortie* that they might explain it thoroughly to their non-commissioned officers and men, so that every man going should know the object of the *sortie*, as the stupidest man in the detachment might then be the means of carrying it out successfully.

All officers carried matches, and one officer was told off to bring up the rear and see no man hung back.

The gate was opened, and the party rushed out, a few hurried shots, and they were into the house, and had captured it, two men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles being shot dead as they got in. About 30 Pathans were in the house, and they bolted down the garden wall, but stopped at the far end of the garden and kept up a heavy fire into the house and sustained it throughout, Harley's men keeping up a heavy fire in return. The mine shaft was found just outside the house behind the garden wall, and 35 Chitralis were bayoneted in the mouth of the mine as they came out, all being armed with swords. Two Pathans were shot in the house; two prisoners were taken. In the meanwhile we had gone to our stations on the parapet and kept up a lively fire from the parapet; several of the enemy were killed running away across the open towards the *basar*. It was several times reported to me from the towers that a considerable number of the enemy were making their way down to the river-bank from Fateh Ali Shah's house and coming round behind the garden wall, round towards our waterway; and they lined the garden wall at

the east end of the garden, and opened fire on us with rifles. Two Gurkhas of the 4th Kashmir Regiment were shot dead in the garden, as they crept along the wall answering this fire. A considerable number of the enemy were seen gathering along the river-bank, and this made me anxious of a counter-attack on our waterway, so I occupied the stables with 20 men, withdrew the Sikhs from the west parapet, and put them in the north-east angle of the fort, to support and flank the waterway. I sent three different messages to Lieutenant Harley to hurry up in his work at destroying the mine, and warning him of the enemy gathering at the end of the garden. Soon after 5 P.M. I heard the explosion of powder, and the party came rushing back, to the garden gate, the enemy from the end of the garden keeping up a furious fusillade on them. The party lost 8 killed and 13 wounded, *viz.*, 3 Sikhs killed and 5 wounded, and 5 of the 4th Kashmir Regiment killed and 8 wounded; total 21 killed and wounded out of 100 men.

The effect of the powder-bag was excellent, although it exploded before they were ready and it was unramped. The whole mine was burst open right up to the foot of the gun tower and lay exposed like a trench. Two of the enemy were killed in the mine by the powder. We computed the loss of the enemy at about 60 men, taking into consideration the men shot from the parapets of the fort. The north and the flag towers accounted for 8 of the enemy. The two prisoners were brought in. Harley and his party had done their work well.

The following men are to be recommended for the Order of Merit for bravery in the affair—

- * No. 772, Naick Garja Singh, 14th Sikhs.
- No. 926, Havildar Santok Singh, 14th Sikhs.
- No. 1822, Sepoy Attar Singh, "
- No. 1508, " Karram Singh. "
- † No. 578, " Nikoo, 4th Kashmir Rifles.

The party round the mine were under fire from the end of the garden wall at 150 yards range.

Number of rounds expended=2,795 on this day (1,560 Martini-Henry and 1,435 Snider).

We started a couple of countermines this evening under the gun-tower, so that if the enemy mined again they must break into our gallery.

18th April, Thursday.—Enemy very quiet to-day. Working hard at our countermines, gangs relieving all day and working in three hours' reliefs.

The prisoners gave information that the enemy had intended to make another and determined attempt to fire the water-tower, but waited to see the effects of their mine, either by burning or by gunpowder. They had intended to blow up the tower to-morrow night. That no other mines were in contemplation. That some of our troops had arrived at Mastuj, and had attacked Muhammad Isa who was in position at Nisa Gol this side of Mastuj, but had had the worst at the skirmish, and had retired again to Mastuj. That Sher Afzal had sent to Umra Khan, asking him to assist him with 2,000 men.

19th April.—About 3 A.M. this morning Lieutenant Gurdon, who was on middle watch, reported that a man was outside calling out under the fort wall that he had important news to tell. All precautions were taken; he was admitted to the main gate, and he told us of the flight of Sher Afzal and the Jandol Chief about midnight, and of the near approach of Colonel Kelly's column from Mastuj. All the *sangars* were deserted. In the morning not a man was to be seen about Chitral. The siege which had lasted 46 days was at an end. A letter was received from Colonel Kelly this night, with news of his fighting on the road and of the Peshawar force advancing also. The Gilgit column accordingly arrived at 2 P.M., on the 20th, the 32nd Pioneers looking in very good trim and good condition.

Our losses throughout the siege, including the 3rd of March, amounted 104 killed and wounded of all ranks, out of 370 combatants forming the British Agent's escort.

* Jumped into the mine shaft first with Lieutenant Harley, and bayoneted the first Chitrali, being wounded in the hand with a *talwar* cut.

† Sepoy Nikoo, 4th Kashmir Rifles, also jumped into the mine shaft at the same time.

‡ All the gun-shot wounds caused by Martini and Snider bullets, except two.

List of Casualties in Chitral from March 3rd to April 20th, 1895.

Serial Numbers.	Companies.	Regimental Numbers.	RANKS AND NAMES.	Admitted.	Discharged.	Died.	Diseases.	REMARKS.	Serial Numbers.
<i>14th Sikhs wounded.</i>									
1	A	1633	Sepoy Thamman Singh.	7th March 1895	...	31st March 1895.	Gun-shot wound	Very severe.	37
2	A	1252	" Partap Singh	24th March 1895	24th March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Slight.	38
3	A	1501	" Bhola Singh	7th April 1895	Ditto . .	Very severe.	39
4	A	1510	" Harnam Singh	Ditto	Ditto . .	Do.	40
5	A	1932	" Attar Singh	9th April 1895	Ditto . .	Severe,	41
6	A	511	Havaldar Mal Singh	17th April 1895	Ditto . .	Do.	42
7	A	772	Sepoy Garja Singh	Ditto	Talwar wound .	Do.	43
8	A	1436	" Keher Singh	Ditto . .	17th April 1895	...	Gun-shot wound	Slight.	44
9	A	739	" Fauja Singh	Ditto . .	Ditto	Ditto . .	Do.	45
10	A	1540	" Harnam Singh	Ditto . .	Ditto	Ditto . .	Do.	46
11	A	1804	" Patap Singh	Ditto . .	Ditto	Talwar wound .	Do.	47
<i>Killed of 14th Sikhs.</i>									
12	A	1950	Sepoy Sawan Singh	16th March 1895	...	Killed . .	Gun-shot wound.	...	48
13	A	1442	Lance-Naick Bakhtawar Singh.	13th April 1895	...	Do. . .	Ditto.	...	49
14	A	1295	Sepoy Narain Singh	17th April 1895	...	Do. . .	Ditto.	...	50
15	A	829	Naick Mota Singh	Ditto	Do. . .	Ditto.	...	51
16	A	1666	Sepoy Jiwan Singh	Ditto	Do. . .	Ditto.	...	52
<i>Other British Indian Troops.</i>									
17	Jemadar Rab-Nawaz Khan (Khan Bahadur), 15th Bengal Lancers.	3rd March 1895	18th April 1895	...	Talwar wound .	Very severe.	55
18	Sowar Mahmud, Central India Horse.	7th April 1895	16th April 1895.	Gun-shot wound	Mortally wounded.	57
19	3rd Grade Hospital Assistant Bhawani Dass.	3rd March 1895	...	Killed . .	Ditto.	...	58
<i>4th Raghunath, wounded.</i>									
20	5	...	Sepoy Jagat Deo . .	3rd March 1895	17th April 1895	...	Gun-shot wound	Very severe.	61
21	6	...	" Kashi Nath	Ditto	27th March 1895.	Ditto.	...	62
22	" Jot Jaman . .	Ditto . .	8th March 1895	...	Talwar wound .	Slight.	63
23	6	...	" Dhani Ram	Ditto . .	25th March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Severe.	64
24	3	...	" Amar Singh	Ditto . .	Ditto	Gun-shot wound.	...	65
25	2	...	" Kirpa . .	Ditto	Ditto . .	Very severe.	66
26	1	...	" Arjan	Ditto . .	18th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Severe.	67
27	3	...	" Pyar Singh	Ditto . .	25th March 1895	...	Talwar wound .	Do.	68
28	" Santoo	Ditto . .	5th March 1895	...	Gun-shot wound	Slight.	69
29	3	...	Kot-Havaldar Gulaboo .	Ditto . .	27th March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Do.	70
30	4	...	Sepoy Sono . .	Ditto . .	14th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Very severe.	71
31	2	...	" Khushia . .	Ditto . .	17th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Severe.	72
32	6	...	" Raghbir . .	Ditto . .	5th March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Slight.	73
33	2	...	" Deedo . .	Ditto . .	7th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Severe.	74
34	5	...	Naick Nain Singh .	Ditto	Ditto . .	Very severe.	75
35	2	...	Sepoy Jita . .	Ditto	Talwar wound	...	76

List of Casualties in Chitral from March 3rd to April 20th, 1895—contd.

Companies.	Regimental Numbers.	RANKS AND NAMES.	Admitted.	Discharged.	Died.	Discases.	REMARKS.
		<i>4th Raghunath, wounded</i> —contd.					
5	...	Sepoy Chandarbir . .	3rd March 1895	4th April 1895	...	Gun-shot wound	Severe.
5	...	" Santbir . .	Ditto . .	7th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Do.
5	...	Havaldar Dhani . .	Ditto	Ditto . .	Very severe.
4	...	Sepoy Sant Ram . .	Ditto . .	25th March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Severe.
3	...	" Khyali . .	Ditto . .	5th March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Slight.
2	...	" Jamohar . .	Ditto . .	7th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Severe.
4	...	" Kalu Raj . .	Ditto . .	8th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Do.
6	RB	" Kakir . .	Ditto . .	5th March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Slight.
6	...	" Parti Man . .	Ditto . .	19th March 1895	...	Tulwar wound .	Do.
5	...	" Karkbir . .	Ditto . .	5th March 1895	...	Gun-shot wound	Do.
2	...	Lance-Naick Chanda Singh.	Ditto . .	31st March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Severe.
3	...	Sepoy Hiroo . .	Ditto . .	25th March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Do.
1	...	" Bhogmal . .	12th March 1895	14th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Do.
5	...	Lance-Naick Jitman . .	14th March 1895	Ditto	Ditto . .	Do.
6	RB	Sepoy Ilahi Baksh . .	15th March 1895	15th March 1895	...	Ditto . .	Slight.
3	...	" Abhad Singh . .	7th April 1895	Ditto . .	Severe.
5	...	" Prem Singh . .	Ditto . .	7th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Slight.
2	...	" Chait Singh . .	8th April 1895 . .	8th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Do.
2	...	Lance-Naick Sundur . .	13th April 1895 . .	15th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Do.
2	984	Sepoy Gobind Ram . .	18th April 1895	Ditto . .	Very severe.
6	...	" Beli Ram . .	Ditto	Ditto . .	Severe.
4	...	" Singbir . .	Ditto	Ditto . .	Do.
6	...	" Kharak Singh . .	Ditto	19th April 1895	Ditto . .	Mortally wounded.
6	...	" Raghbir . .	Ditto	Ditto . .	Severe.
4	...	" Surjan . .	Ditto	Ditto . .	Do.
3	...	" Hari Singh . .	Ditto . .	18th April 1895	...	Ditto . .	Slight.
		<i>Killed of the 4th Raghunath, Kashmir Light Infantry.</i>					
2	...	Sepoy Hushiara . .	3rd March 1895	Killed	Gun-shot wound.	
2	...	" Dewi . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
2	...	" Doolo . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
3	...	" Lachman . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
3	...	" Mian Singh . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
4	...	Naick Dhanbahadar . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
4	...	Sepoy Kaloo . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
4	...	" Jagbir . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
5	...	Lance-Naick Kishen Singh.	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
5	...	Lance-Naick Sri Man . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
5	...	Sepoy Madan Singh . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	
5	...	" Mukti Ram . .	Ditto . .	Do.	Ditto.	

List of Casualties in Chitral from March 3rd to April 20th, 1895—concl'd.

Serial Numbers.	Companies.	Regimental Numbers.	RANKS AND NAMES.	Admitted.	Discharged.	Died.	Diseases.	REMARKS.
<i>Killed of the 4th Raghunath, Kashmir Light Infantry—concl'd.</i>								
76	5	...	Sepoy Kesar Singh	3rd March 1895		Killed		Gun-shot wound.
77	5	...	" Ram Ratan	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
78	6	...	" Gopal Singh	Ditto		Do.		Gun-shot.
79	6	...	" Lachman	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
80	2	...	" Gurkoo	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
81	2	...	" Beli Ram	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
82	2	...	" Rubela	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
83	4	907	" Mool Singh	17th April 1895.		Do.		Ditto.
84	4	748	" Jebe	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
85	3	...	" Debi Singh	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
86	3	...	" Kakir	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
87	3	...	" Sundar	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
<i>Native Officers of Imperial Service Troops, killed.</i>								
88	General Baz Singh	3rd March 1895		Killed		Gun-shot.
89	Major Bhikam Singh	Ditto		Do.		Ditto.
<i>British Officers, killed and wounded.</i>								
90	Captain J. McD. Baird, 24th Punjab Infantry.	3rd March 1895	...	4th March 1895.		Gun-shot wound Mortally wounded.
91	Captain C. P. Campbell, Central India Horse.	Ditto		Ditto Very severe.
92	Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I.	8th April 1895		Ditto Severe.
<i>Gilgit and Hunsa Levies.</i>								
93	Sultan Shah	7th April 1895		Ditto Very severe.
94	Rajab	Ditto		Ditto Severe.
<i>Private servants.</i>								
95	Syce Habib-ullah	3rd March 1895		Killed		Ditto.
96	Sher (Pakali)	8th April 1895		Ditto Severe.
<i>Wounded followers.</i>								
97	Driver Gokal	15th March 1895		Gun-shot wound Severe.
98	Barber Labboo	11th April 1895.		Ditto Very severe.
99	Bhisti Ami Chand	17th April 1895.		Ditto Severe.
<i>Followers killed.</i>								
100	Kahar Dewi (14th Sikhs)	3rd March 1895		Killed		Gun-shot.
101	" Mohamdoe	11th March 1895		Do.		Ditto.
102	Bhisti Roda	27th March 1895		Do.		Ditto.
103	" Hukma Singh	7th April 1895		Do.		Ditto.
104	A Havildar, 4th Kashmir Rifles, in British Agent's escort, sent from Chitral to Koghazai with					

REWARDS.

No. 532.—In recognition of the gallant and successful defence of the Fort at Chitral from the 3rd March to the 19th April 1895, by Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I., British Agent, Gilgit, by Captain C. V. F. Townshend, Central India Horse, Commanding the troops, by the undermentioned officers, and by the detachments of the 14th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry, 4th Kashmir Rifles (Imperial Service Troops), and Punyal levies against the forces of Sher Afzal and Umra Khan of Jandol, the Governor-General in Council, with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, is pleased to announce the grant of six months' pay to all ranks of the garrison, including levies and followers.

2. The following commissioned officers, British and Native, took part in the defence of the Fort at Chitral:—

British Officers.

Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I. (severely wounded).
 Captain C. P. Campbell, Central India Horse (severely wounded and incapacitated thereby from taking command).
 Captain C. V. F. Townshend, Central India Horse.
 Captain J. McD. Baird, 24th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry (mortally wounded; died of wounds).
 Lieutenant B. E. M. Gurdon, Staff Corps.
 Lieutenant H. K. Harley, 14th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.
 Surgeon-Captain H. F. Whitchurch, Indian Medical Service.

Native Officers.

Subadar Gurmukh Singh, 14th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.
 Jemadar Atar Singh, 14th (Sikh) Bengal Infantry.
 Jemadar Rab-Nawaz Khan, *Khan Bahadur*, 15th Bengal Lancers, in Political employ (severely wounded).
 General Baj Singh, Kashmir Imperial Service Troops (killed).
 Major Bhikam Singh, Kashmir Imperial Service Troops (killed).
 Colonel Jagat Singh, 4th Kashmir Infantry.
 Major Bhagwan Singh, 4th Kashmir Infantry.
 Subadar Hari Chand, 4th Kashmir Infantry.
 Subadar Badri Nar Singh, 4th Kashmir Infantry.
 Subadar Gandib Singh, 4th Kashmir Infantry.
 Jemadar Kalu Chand, 4th Kashmir Infantry.
 Jemadar Jitman Singh, 4th Kashmir Infantry.
 Jemadar Gopala, 4th Kashmir Infantry.
 Jemadar Shamu, 4th Kashmir Infantry.
 Major Beli Ram, Kashmir Imperial Service Troops, Aide-de-Camp to General Baj Singh.
 Brigade-Major Soochan Singh, Kashmir Imperial Service Troops.
 Hospital Assistant Bhawani Das (killed).

Government General Order No. 558, dated Simla, the 31st May 1895.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

CHITRAL.

The Right Hon'ble the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council directs the publication for general information of the subjoined communication from the Adjutant-General in India, submitting, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India, a despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir E. C. Low, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force, on the operations of the troops under his command from the 2nd to the 29th April 1895:—

No. 758-G,—“*Field Operations*,”—dated Simla, the 21st May 1895.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL G. DE C. MORTON, C.B., Adjutant-General in India,
 To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit, for the information of the Government of India, and for publication as a despatch, the accompanying

letter from Lieutenant-General Sir R. C. Low, giving a *resumé* of the operations of the Chitral Relief Force from the date the troops crossed the frontier to the 29th April 1895.

2. Although some of the engagements mentioned in this letter have already been described in former despatches submitted with my marginally noted communication, new light is now thrown upon them, and the publication of the letter will, in Sir George White's opinion, give, when read with those already

published, a connected account of the operations of Sir Robert Low's force up to the end of April.

3. The Commander-in-Chief, in inviting the attention of Government to paragraph 18, considers that the critical condition in which the garrison of Chitral was reported to be on the 20th April, justified Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Low in assuming the responsibility of ordering Brigadier-General Gatacre to push on with a small column of 500 men over the Lowarai Pass to Chitral. As events turned out, the necessity for this course no longer existed; but he thinks credit is due to Brigadier-General Gatacre and to Major Deane, who apparently suggested it, and to Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Low, who sanctioned it.

4. I am to express His Excellency's concurrence with Sir Robert Low's remarks in paragraph 21, on the admirable spirit displayed by officers and men in this expedition. The rapidity with which the troops had to move in order to accomplish the primary object of the force, and the difficult nature of the country to be traversed, compelled the adoption of a lighter scale of equipment than has been usual in previous expeditions of this strength and at this particular period of the year.

5. The Commander-in-Chief cannot send forward Sir Robert Low's despatch without recording separately his admiration of the way in which the retirement of the Guides Infantry was carried out on the 13th April.

6. From Sir Robert Low's despatch it is evident that the Guides kept perfect formation throughout the movement; that they were attacked by 4,000 tribesmen emboldened by their retirement; that the Guides, supported towards the end of the operation by the fire from the left bank of the Panjkora, inflicted a loss of 500 on the enemy, probably one for every sepoy of the Guides engaged, while of their own number only three were killed and nine wounded.

7. His Excellency considers this a very remarkable instance of results that may be obtained under very trying circumstances by absolute steadiness combined with high training and perfect fire control, and believes that the Guides must have felt themselves conquerors though retiring before eight times their number of brave but undisciplined tribesmen. The impression left on the enemy may be gauged by the fact that they never afterwards made the faintest effort to stand against our troops.

8. Sir George White has not dwelt specially on the irreparable loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, as this brave officer fell after he had withdrawn his battalion with great skill and determination within the zone of comparative safety covered by the fire from the left bank.

No. 296-A., dated Camp Dir, the 1st May 1895.

From—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR R. C. LOW, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force,
To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honor to make the following report on the operations of the troops under my command since crossing the frontier on the 2nd April.

2. During this period of a month I have from time to time given brief accounts of each action as it took place, and of each further advance of this force; and now that the troops have arrived in Chitral territory, and the fort there is relieved, the British prisoners who were in Umra Khan's hands have been restored to freedom, and Umra Khan himself is a fugitive; now too that Sher Afzal, the Chitral usurper, is a prisoner in my hands, the time has arrived that I should make a more comprehensive report on the work done.

3. In my despatch dated the 5th April I gave a brief account of the assault and capture of the Malakand Pass. It must be remembered that this was written only two days after the action, and, being based on my own observation, was necessarily incomplete. Thus I have to make an important correction in this report regarding one battalion—namely the 4th Sikh Infantry, who did not remain stationary guarding the left flank of the advance, as I wrote, but joined throughout in the advance up to the highest peaks of the enemy's position, parallel with the Guides Infantry, having an equally arduous climb with

them, and meeting with and carrying many *sangars* full of the enemy. During this advance officers and men alike distinguished themselves. In my original report also the enemy at the Malakand Pass were estimated at 12,000 men, of whom 3,000 were said to be armed with fire-arms, but we afterwards ascertained that the number armed with fire-arms was much larger.

4. The following day, 4th April, the 1st Brigade was ordered to descend the Malakand Pass into the Swat Valley, its place on the pass being taken by the 2nd Brigade, while the 3rd brigade remained on the south side of the pass, pending the passage of the baggage and supplies of the rest of the force.

5. I may here allude to one of the most extraordinary coincidences within my experience. The height of the pass is about 1,000 feet from the valley below, and the track used by the hill people, is most precipitous and goes straight up the hill by short zig-zags, over boulders, and often under protruding crags; and when I saw it on the 3rd April it appeared to be impossible ever to make such a place fit for camels to carry loads over in any reasonable time. In the report of the Officer Commanding the King's Royal Rifle Corps on this day's action, he states that after going half way up the hill he came upon "an old pathway." On examination this turned out to be an old Buddhist road, disused for hundreds of years, but so well made originally that it took our engineers and sappers but two days to make it into a camel road from near Dargai, at the mouth of the pass, to the top. The discovery of this old and unknown road, on a good alignment and easily repaired, which came to our relief and enabled the force to advance in three days, when without it we should have been delayed many days, was certainly a remarkable stroke of good fortune.

6. On the 4th April the advance of the 1st Brigade down the pass towards the Swat Valley was opposed by the enemy. In this action the Guides Cavalry, under Captain Adams, made two brilliant charges, before which the enemy in largely superior numbers scattered and fled up the hills.

7. During the 5th and 6th April the 2nd Brigade marched down the pass and encamped opposite the crossing over the Swat river, north of the village of Aladand. Reconnaissances were made which shewed that the gatherings we had fought on the 3rd and 4th had retired up the Swat Valley without entirely dispersing.

8. On the 7th April the 2nd Brigade was opposed by the enemy at the passage of the Swat river. The action commenced by several bodies of the enemy being seen advancing down the Adinazai Valley from the direction of Uch, and the Sappers, then collected on the river, making a bridge, were fired at from the hills on the opposite side. I should mention that the previous evening the 11th Bengal Lancers, which had crossed the pass and joined the head-quarters camp with the 1st Brigade at Khar, had been ordered to march early on the morning of the 7th to the 2nd Brigade camp opposite the crossing over the Swat river, and from thence to ford the river and make a reconnaissance up the Adinazai Valley towards Uch, being supported by other arms from the 2nd Brigade, the Brigadier-General Commanding the 2nd Brigade being also directed to cross the river and destroy the fort of Ramora.

The 11th Bengal Lancers, conveying these orders, joined Brigadier-General Waterfield and his Brigade at 9 A. M., before which time the enemy had commenced the attack and the 4th Sikhs had been ordered down to the river bank to support the Sappers, as also the Maxim guns under Captain Peebles, Devonshire Regiment. On the arrival of the 11th Bengal Lancers, that regiment, with a squadron of the Guides Cavalry, the whole under Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, 11th Bengal Lancers, was directed to cross the river, under cover of the fire of No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, and part of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, and attack the enemy, while the remainder of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, supported by No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, crossed later opposite Ramora fort and took possession of it. As soon as the 11th Bengal Lancers began to cross the river the enemy were seen to begin retiring, but were too late, for the Lancers, led with great dash, pursued and overtook them, and are reported to have killed at least 100. The pursuit was continued after Umra Khan's horsemen up to the top of the Katgola Pass.

Our loss was trivial, while that of the enemy was considerable; and this was mainly due to the able manner in which Brigadier-General Waterfield handled his troops. In the original report on this action the enemy were estimated at 1,500, but I have since ascertained that there were quite three times that number opposed to us.

Two battalions occupied Chakdara and the adjoining villages on the right bank of the Swat river on the night of the 7th April.

9. The 3rd Brigade crossed the Malakand Pass and joined me at Khar on the 8th. To feed the troops on the north side of the pass, I had been obliged to utilize during the 4th, 5th and 6th all the mules of the force, as these were the only animals that could cross the pass by the zig-zag road already described, and consequently it was not till the 8th, when camels had been streaming across with supplies for two days, that it was possible to equip the 2nd and 3rd Brigades with transport for their baggage and for twenty days' supplies.

The 2nd Brigade were entirely across the river by the evening of the 8th.

10. On the 9th April head-quarters crossed the Swat river and joined the 2nd Brigade at Chakdara, the 3rd Brigade encamping on the opposite bank at Aladand.

On the 10th head-quarters and the 2nd Brigade marched to Gumbat, crossing the Katgola Pass. The 3rd Brigade crossed the Swat river to Chakdara, the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Kinloch, C.B., being left to guard the Swat Valley and the communications. On the 11th head-quarters and the 2nd Brigade reached the Panjkora river at Sado ferry. There are two routes to the ferry from Gumbat, one by the Shago Kas defile, the other by the Kamrani Pass. The former route was taken, as the pass route was reported unfit for camels, but the Shago Kas road in its original state was such an intricate one, and was so very bad, that all the labour of the force was afterwards put on to the other to make it fit for animals. Owing to the extreme difficulty of the defile the baggage did not get into camp till very late that night, being fired into several times *en route*.

11. Before I moved on from the Swat river, an advanced guard had been sent on ahead, consisting of the 11th Bengal Lancers, two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry, the Guides Infantry and the 4th Sikhs, which had arrived at Sado on the 10th. The cavalry forded the river and reconnoitred up the Bajaur Valley on the 10th, finding Umra Khan's forts held, and on that evening, owing to the river rising, they experienced considerable difficulty in recrossing to the left bank. On my arrival it was clear that nothing but a bridge could get the troops across, and this was at once commenced by Major Aylmer, V.C., Royal Engineers, with the 4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, under the direction of Colonel Leach, D.S.O., Commanding Royal Engineers with the force. The bridge was built on raft-piers constructed from the logs lying on the banks of the river. On the evening of the 12th, men on foot could cross, and there being every hope of my being able to cross the troops and their baggage the following day, the Guides Infantry were passed over to cover the bridge, and formed an entrenched post at the apex of a re-entering angle of the right bank, on which the end of the bridge rested. This post had a level space of some hundreds of yards in front, and, being with its surroundings thoroughly commanded at short range by the high ground on the left bank, was extremely strong.

12. On the morning of the 13th, between 3 and 5 A. M., an unexpected misfortune happened. The river rose suddenly and brought down large logs of timber which broke the bridge, and as the current increased at the same time to such an extent to make a raft-bridge useless, it was seen at once that the only resource was to make a suspension bridge. A suitable place, about two miles down stream from the site of the raft-bridge, was accordingly selected, and a design was adopted by which the cables of the bridge were to be made of many strands of telegraph wire. Work was commenced immediately, but the bridge could not be expected to be ready for three or four days. The site selected, being, as I have said, about two miles down stream, a new road was required along the hillside on the right bank back to the mouth of the Bajaur Valley, which road could only be commenced when men could be passed over the river.

Meanwhile, on the morning of the 13th, the Guides Infantry had received orders to march down the right bank of the Panjkora river, and punish certain villages on that side from which men had been persistently firing on the transport, which, till the completion of the Kamrani route, was forced to use the Shago Kas defile road. The whole of the route which should have been followed by the Guides Infantry was in full view of the left bank, and could easily be protected by Infantry posted thereon. By some mistake, which can never now be accounted for, Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, Commanding the Guides Infantry, led his battalion up the Usihri river into Bajaur. At noon he sent a message by heliograph that two large bodies of the enemy were advancing against him. His battalion could not be supported, as troops could not cross the river to do so.

It was therefore ordered to retire to its entrenched post, and the 2nd and 3rd Brigades at once lined the high banks overlooking the Panjkora river to cover its retirement. The battalion retired most deliberately, and this retirement was covered first by artillery fire from the left bank, and afterwards, as the enemy approached nearer, by fire of the infantry and Maxim guns. The enemy were in considerable strength, probably about 4,000 all told, and I do not doubt had heard of the broken bridge, and thought that our troops on their side of the river might be cut off. With the knowledge that troops could not be sent to his assistance, the visible strength of the advancing enemy, and the distance of his battalion from the covering fire of the troops on the left bank, it would undoubtedly have been wiser if the officer commanding had retired at once without waiting for orders. However, the disinclination to retire is a fault on the right side, and the retirement, as it was carried out, was a splendid performance. It is deeply to be deplored that when the battalion had reached the level ground, and was about to cross the Ushiri river to its entrenched post, Lieutenant-Colonel Battye was killed. In his death the Corps of Guides has lost an able commander, and the State a gallant and valuable officer. After the Guides reached their post, they were reinforced by a company of the 4th Sikhs, which crossed on rafts, and the enemy did not attack with any boldness, but contented themselves with long range firing, which they continued up to about 11 P.M. The loss on the enemy's side was reported by their own people afterwards to be over 500.

On this day, 13th April, Lieutenant Edwardes, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, who had been a prisoner, was sent in by Umra Khan to my camp.

13. On the 14th the gathering of the previous day gradually disappeared, but not before we had to lament the loss of another valuable officer, *vis.*, Captain Peebles, Devonshire Regiment, in charge of the Maxim guns, who was mortally wounded in the entrenchment whither he had crossed the previous evening with one of his guns, on a *massak*-raft.

14. During the 14th the remainder of the 4th Sikhs was crossed on *massak*-rafts, and joined the Guides Infantry, and a strong position on spurs on the other side of the river and to the north of the Ushiri stream was occupied by these two battalions. The crossing on the few small rafts at my disposal became every moment more difficult and slower, owing to the river continuing to rise. On the night of the 14th very bad weather set in, and rain continued all that night, and through the day and night of the 15th, much delaying work on the suspension bridge, and the rising water approached nearer and nearer to its piers.

On the morning of the 16th, with the Swat River in my rear, reported also to be steadily rising, and the bridge over it, on which I depended for supplies, hardly completed and of doubtful stability, with the Panjkora River in front of me rising into a tremendous torrent, and threatening the new suspension bridge, the two remaining rafts (one had been overturned and two damaged by bullets) unable longer to pass over supplies, the situation was one of grave anxiety.

The Guides Infantry and the 4th Sikhs with them, had the previous evening been ordered, as the only means of feeding them, to be ready to park their ammunition and baggage in the entrenched post of the Guides Infantry, and make their way to the suspension bridge, so that they might re-cross before the bridge was swept away, and things looked so serious on the morning of the 16th that they were ordered to commence this movement. When, however, I visited the bridge, early on the morning of the 16th, I was informed that no further rise had taken place in the last three or four hours; and, during the time that I was there, the water, if anything, fell, and the rain ceased. I therefore sent orders to the Guides Infantry and 4th Sikhs to stand fast. At noon it was clear that the water was falling, and that the danger was over for the time. But the necessity for a bridge above high flood-level was evidently urgent, and the Commandant, Royal Engineers, put it in hand at once; and I trust it may be ready before the river rises again.

Lieutenant Fowler, Royal Engineers, was on this day sent in by Umra Khan.

15. On the morning of the 17th the two brigades were ordered to advance. One squadron of the Guides Cavalry marched at an early hour to reconnoitre up the valley towards Miankila, under the orders of Brigadier-General Blood, C.B., and the 11th Bengal Lancers and the two infantry brigades followed across the river.

At 10 A.M., after the troops of the 3rd Brigade (which was leading) had crossed, I received a message from Brigadier-General Blood that the enemy were in sight near the village of Miankila, and were advancing from thence. The road on the right bank of the Panjkora river from the bridge up to the open valley was only a footpath fit for mules.

over which every man and animal had to go in single file, horses having to be led, and it was clear that both brigades could not hope to get across and move up to the scene of action during the day.

I therefore directed Brigadier-General Waterfield to pass over the baggage of the 3rd Brigade which could reach that brigade before night, and then only to cross the bridge with his own brigade and its transport, and to join me the first thing next morning.

Then pushing on myself, I reached Ghobani just as the 3rd Brigade were going into action. The enemy occupied the hills on the left or southern side of the valley, and held the villages of Gulderi and Andak to the west on some bluffs above the river and the hills to the south of the Ushiri. The 4th Gurkhas were directed up the southern hills and then to move along them to the west; the Seaforth Highlanders being on the slopes below them, and the 25th Panjab Infantry in support. Two companies of the Buffs occupied the hills to the north, with No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery in action on a knoll in the centre, and the remainder of the Buffs in reserve. While the infantry cleared the southern hills, the 11th Bengal Lancers advanced up the centre of the valley to a small village, Gosam, where their horses got protection from the enemy's fire, but the cavalry got no opportunity of charging, the ground in their front being too broken. The enemy on this occasion did not show the bold front of previous days, but retired as the infantry advanced, and though the guns were sent forward about 1,000 yards to hasten their retreat, the loss of the enemy was not great. Throughout the action the troops were well handled by Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O.

16. On the morning of the 18th, Brigadier-General Waterfield with the 2nd Brigade joined me, and the 2nd and 3rd Brigades advanced against Miankila and Mundah. The latter, a fort on the left bank of the Jandol river, is the home of Umra Khan, and it was expected that he would make a final stand at one of these places. Both were, however, deserted, and it was reported that Umra Khan had fled towards Asmar, and had asked for an asylum from the Amir of Kabul. I may add that he has been a fugitive ever since.

17. The same afternoon Brigadier-General Gatacre, with the Buffs, the 4th Gurkhas, half of No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, and the two Maxim guns of the Devonshire Regiment, pushed on to Barwa, *en route* for Dir and Chitral, with twenty days' supplies; and the remainder of the brigade, *viz.*, the Seaforth Highlanders and the 25th Punjab Infantry, were taken on by me on the morning of the 20th to Kambat (called Chashma at first) at the foot of the Janbatai Pass.

18. On the afternoon of the 20th April, Brigadier-General Gatacre sent a message back to me that Major Deane, Chief Political Officer (who accompanied him), had received news that the garrison of Chitral was reduced to great straits, and that the mines of the enemy had reached to within ten yards of the walls of the fort, and he suggested that he should advance rapidly with a small body of 500 men. To this I consented, as being the only way of passing quickly through the intricate country we were now traversing, and the only chance of rescuing the garrison. To support him while out of communication, I sent forward on the 21st the Seaforth Highlanders with all the supplies I could collect, and arranged to move on myself with the 25th Punjab Infantry when more supplies arrived. On the following day, 21st, reassuring news came regarding the garrison of Chitral Fort, *viz.*, that it was holding out on the 17th, and later that Sher Afzal had abandoned the siege and had absconded; this was confirmed on the following day, the 22nd.

At that time it was not known whether the relief of Chitral Fort had been effected by Colonel Kelly, or by the occupation of Kila Drosh by the Khan of Dir acting under my orders, or by the advance of my force and the defeat of Umra Khan. Probably it was the result of all three, but it is now known that Colonel Kelly was the first to arrive at Chitral, on the 20th April.

19. When this news was received, Brigadier-General Gatacre was directed not to advance hurriedly, but with due consideration for his troops. The Janbatai Pass (7,400 feet) was found to be a very difficult one, and the hills beyond it were very much more difficult to traverse than any that had yet been passed over, and it was only possible to move over this pass by single battalions at a time.

20. On my arrival at Dir on the 25th April, Brigadier-General Gatacre was crossing the Lowarai Pass, which was accomplished by the Buffs and half a battalion of the 4th Gurkhas on the 26th and 27th without any loss, though it was only done by all the troops following the example of Brigadier-General Gatacre himself, and exhibiting the most determined perseverance and energy. The troops above named, *viz.*, the Buffs and half a battalion of the 4th Gurkhas, are now at Ashreth in Chitral, where

they have been ordered to halt pending further orders, as, with the capture of Sher Afzal, who was brought into my camp a prisoner on the 27th, peace in the Chitral Valley is reestablished.

21. I would, before concluding, allude to the message sent to the troops of this force by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, published in Divisional Orders of the 21st April, as also those from the Her Most Gracious Majesty, the Queen Empress of India, and His Excellency the Viceroy, published in Divisional Orders of 29th April, which congratulated them on the success which had so far attended their efforts, and praised them for their endurance. These messages were much appreciated by the troops, and assuredly they were never better earned, as His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is aware. The troops of this force had unavoidably to start in lighter order than, I believe, any large body of troops have ever done before in India. They have been exposed to great hardships owing to the month being an unusually stormy one.

When not fighting or marching, every man has laboured with the greatest cheerfulness all day on road-making, and altogether the month has been one of continued exertion and cheerful self-denial and devotion, under circumstances of unusual difficulty and hardship.

I cannot speak too highly in this respect of the conduct of all ranks, both British and Native.

In a later communication I shall have the honor to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the names of the officers whose services in connection with the above detailed operations seem worthy of his special consideration.

Government General Order No. 998, dated Simla, the 27th September 1895.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

CHITRAL.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the subjoined letter from the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 20th August 1895, forwarding a despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir R. C. Low, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force, recapitulating the operations of the force under his command, and bringing to notice the services of officers and men who have been specially distinguished during the operations.

2. The Governor-General in Council takes the opportunity afforded by the return of the Relief Force to British India, to signify the cordial recognition of the Government of India of the distinguished manner in which the force has acquitted itself during the arduous and completely successful operations now brought to a close.

3. The troops were hastily called into the field in March last to undertake the relief of the fort of Chitral, where the British Agent in Gilgit and a small force, mainly composed of the Imperial Service troops of the Kashmir State, were beleaguered by a large body of tribesmen under the direction of Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, and of Sher Afzal, an aspirant to the Mehtarship of Chitral. His Excellency in Council observed with satisfaction the rapidity and ease with which the mobilisation of the force was carried out, and considers that this reflects credit both on the originators of the mobilisation scheme, and on those by whom it was worked out and carried into effect. The excellent work done by Colonel Boughey, Royal Engineer, Manager of the North-Western State Railway, and those under him, contributed very largely to the successful mobilisation of the force, and merits special acknowledgment.

4. The Governor-General in Council fully concurs with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the opinions he has expressed regarding the skilful dispositions made by Lieutenant-General Sir R. C. Low, the admirable conduct of the troops, and the excellent spirit displayed by all ranks, not only in their encounters with the enemy, but also in overcoming the exceptional difficulties which presented themselves in the nature of the country. His Excellency in Council desires to express the thanks of the Government of India to Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Low, to the officers Commanding the Brigades of the force under his orders, and to all the officers and men engaged in the operations, for their most valuable services, through which the intentions of the Government have been fully carried out.

5. His Excellency in Council notes with much satisfaction the efficient manner in which the onerous duties of the Commissariat and other departments of the army and

of the Telegraph and Postal Departments were performed. His Excellency has specially observed the excellent arrangements made by Major-General Stedman and his staff for the organisation of the line of communications after the cessation of active hostilities, and the success with which the difficult task of carrying out the supply of the force has been accomplished. The transport trains placed at the disposal of the Government of India by the Maharajahs of Gwalior and Jeypore proved to be of the greatest value, and their high state of efficiency reflects much credit on the British officers who superintended their training in quarters, and worked them in the field. The Governor-General in Council is specially pleased to notice the terms of praise in which Lieutenant-General Low has spoken of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of these transport trains.

6. The services of the officers of the Royal Engineers, of the companies of Sappers and Miners, and of the battalions of Pioneers, have been of special value in this campaign. The Governor-General in Council entirely agrees with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his high estimate of the work done by the officers of the Royal Engineers. But for the remarkable skill displayed by these officers in constructing and maintaining bridges over the Swat and Panjkora rivers, the operations would have been greatly retarded.

7. The officers of the Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster-General's Department, and of the Survey Department of the Government of India, have done work which will be of lasting value. The Governor-General in Council appreciates the ability and energy shown by these officers in carrying out their laborious duties.

8. His Excellency in Council deplors the loss of the officers and men who have bravely fallen in the performance of their duty, or have succumbed to disease brought on by the conditions under which the operations were conducted. A special tribute is due to the memory of Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye, by whose death, at the moment when he had, with great gallantry and skill, brought the battalion under his command out of a position of peculiar difficulty, the Indian service has lost one of its most admirable officers.

9. The mobilisation and advance of the Chitral Relief Force were the signal for very numerous offers of personal service, assistance, and co-operation from Native Chiefs throughout India, including especially those who maintain Imperial Service Troops, and from native noblemen and gentlemen of every station and degree. This widespread evidence of an earnest and vigilant loyalty has afforded the deepest gratification to the Governor-General in Council. Although the circumstances of the expedition did not afford to the British Government an opportunity which could be taken of employing the troops of India's loyal States, the Governor-General in Council none the less cordially tenders his acknowledgments to all who came forward ready to render service and prove their devotion.

No. 1086-G—"Field Operations,"—dated Simla, 20th August 1895.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL G. DEC. MORTON, C.B., Adjutant General in India,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 758-G, dated 21st May 1895, I have the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit,
* No. 1174-A, dated 27th July 1895. for the information of the Government of India,

the accompanying despatch* from Lieutenant-General Sir R. C. Low, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force.

2. As this is Sir Robert Low's final despatch on the operations of the Force, it will be desirable to briefly review the operations from the date the Force took the field.

3. Orders for its mobilization were issued on the 14th March 1895, and on the 1st April it had crossed the frontier, with two of its brigades at Jalala and one at Lundkhwar.

4. The actions of the Malakand Pass, Khar, Chakdara, Sado (or Panjkora) and Manugai followed in rapid succession, and the details of each action, together with those of the passage of the Swat and Panjkora rivers, have already been published in the previous despatches submitted to Government.

5. On the 20th April, a report, received through Brigadier-General Gatacre, of the great straits to which the garrison of Chitral was reduced, led to Sir Robert Low approving of a flying column of 500 men being pushed on in advance to effect the relief of the garrison at all hazards. The support to the Khan of Dir afforded by this small column, added to the prestige gained by the successes of the British arms, emboldened the Khan of Dir

to advance with his tribesmen into the Chitral Valley, and his arrival there had a material effect on the raising of the siege and the flight of Sher Afzal—a service of great importance, which is alluded to by Sir Robert Low in paragraph 4 of his present despatch.

6. In their advance from the Indian frontier, the troops under Sir Robert Low had to cross five mountain passes, three of which—the Malakand (2,900 feet), the Janbatai (7,400 feet) and the Lowarai (10,200 feet)—presented exceptional difficulties to the movement of troops, their baggage and supplies; they had to bridge two rivers which in rain became impassable torrents, and to fight five actions with the enemy, and, when not engaged in fighting or marching, they had to labour incessantly in road-making in order to make the mountain-tracks passable for the force. The admirable conduct of, and the spirit displayed by, the troops have already been favourably commented on by Sir George White, and it remains now for His Excellency to bring to the notice of Government the skilful dispositions of their gallant leader, Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Low, K.C.B., and the admirable manner in which the intentions and orders of Government have been carried out by this distinguished officer.

7. His Excellency also concurs in the favourable terms in which Sir Robert Low has spoken of Major-General E. Stedman, C.B., Brigadier-Generals W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O., H. G. Waterfield, A. G. Hammond, C.B., V.C., D.S.O., and Brigadier-General Blood, C.B., and the other officers mentioned by him in his despatch.

8. Sir George White has in a previous letter alluded to the loss sustained by the service in the premature death of the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye, Corps of Guides, and I am to add that the names of this officer and of the late Captain A. P. Peebles, Devonshire Regiment, would have been prominently brought forward for the favourable consideration of Government had they survived.

9. Although Major-General Stedman joined the Force after the conclusion of active hostilities, the success that has attended his efforts, and the skill he has displayed in the organization of the large transport train required for the provisioning and supply of the troops on so extended a line of communication, entitle him, in His Excellency's opinion, to special recognition by Government. In his important duties he has received material aid from his Staff, Colonel I. S. M. Hamilton, D.S.O., Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, and Captain G. V. Kembal, Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.

10. The physical difficulties of the country traversed have afforded special opportunities of distinction to the officers of Royal Engineers who were selected for appointments in that branch of the service with the Force; that these opportunities were taken the fullest advantage of is apparent on reference to paragraph 10 of Sir Robert Low's despatch, and the magnitude of the work accomplished can also be judged by the following descriptions of the six bridges thrown over the Swat and Panjkora rivers and of a few smaller ones over minor streams:

A.—At Chakāra on the Swat River—

- (1) A trestle bridge thrown over the Swat River by Major Barton, nearly 1,200 feet in total length, erected in the early part of April, which lasted till the end of June, when the suspension bridge was completed.
- (2) A pontoon bridge, with twelve pontoons which were brought over the Malakand Pass by Captain Heath, and with trestle landing stages, and a trestle bridge over the smaller arm of the Swat River, erected in May and still in use.
- (3) A suspension bridge, total length 948 feet, with two suspension spans of 250 and 110 feet over two main streams, erected by Captain Williams, and though only commenced in May, was completed on 26th June. Total suspended lengths, including back stays, are 500 feet and 220 feet.

B.—At Sado on the Panjkora River—

- (4) A bridge on rafts was first made by Major Aylmer on the 12th April, but was carried away by logs coming down the torrent of the swollen river.
- (5) A suspension bridge, telegraph wire being used for the cables, was then erected by Major Aylmer; main span 95 feet; finished on 16th April; only commenced on 13th April.
- (6) A third bridge was afterwards erected by Captain Serjeant and the 1st Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners; a suspension bridge, with main span of 200 feet at a higher level than the one erected by Major Aylmer.

C.—At Chutiātan on the Panjkora—

- (7) A suspension bridge was afterwards erected six miles south of Dir, when it was decided to open out the road on the left bank of the Panjkora. This also was

built by the 1st Company, Sappers and Miners, under Captain Serjeant. Total span about 78 feet.

D.—Minor Bridges—

Several smaller bridges, chiefly trestle or cantilever bridges, were erected, of which the most important are —

- (8) A trestle bridge erected by Captain Skey and the 6th Company, Bengal Sappers, at Darora over the Ushiri River.
- (9) A wooden girder bridge at Sakot between Jalala and the Malakand: two spans of 50 feet: built by Captain Nanton, Royal Engineers.

The Commander-in-Chief considers that the record of work done by Colonels Leach and Shone, Majors Ellis, Barton, Aylmer, v.c., and Abbott, Captains Tanner, Williams, and Serjeant, and other officers of the Royal Engineers, reflects the highest credit on those officers and on the corps to which they belong. In the same terms His Excellency would comment on the survey work done by that Department under Captain Bythell, Royal Engineers.

The services of the two Pioneer regiments under Lieutenant-Colonels Gordon and Wilson have also been of a most valuable character, while every regiment in the force has contributed, in the shape of working parties, its quota to the opening out of this mountainous and difficult country by the construction of practicable roads.

11. The administration of the Commissariat-Transport Department could not have been so successfully conducted as it was, had it not been for the careful supervision exercised over all details, both before and after the commencement of the campaign by the Commissary-General-in-Chief, Major-General Badcock, C.B., C.S.I., and the late Commissary-General, Punjab Command, Colonel R. Patch; and His Excellency desires me to bring the services of these officers, as well as of those of that Department named by the General Officer Commanding the Force, to the favourable notice of Government.

The transport trains maintained by the Maharajahs of Gwalior and Jeypore, respectively, as part of their quota of Imperial Service troops, have proved of the highest value. The efficiency manifested during a continuous strain could not, I am to observe, have been kept up without the closest attention to every detail in time of peace, and Sir George White cordially endorses the commendatory remarks made in paragraph 8 of the despatch on Captain H. R. Tate, 15th Bengal Lancers, Captain J. B. Edwards, Central India Horse, and the native subordinates who have done such admirable work under the supervision of those officers.

12. To the careful medical arrangements and to increased sanitary precautions must be ascribed, in Sir George White's opinion, the comparative immunity from disease and the general good health that the troops have enjoyed under very trying conditions. These results could not have been attained without the great forethought and administrative experience of the late Principal Medical Officer, Her Majesty's Forces in India, Surgeon-Major-General Bradshaw, C.B., and of the officer now filling that appointment, Surgeon-Major-General A. A. Gore: and their efforts have been well seconded by Surgeon-Colonel T. Maunsell, Principal Medical Officer with the Force, and the medical officers under his orders.

13. The Veterinary Department, under Veterinary-Lieutenant-Colonel Poyser, Army Veterinary Department, has not only contributed greatly to the efficiency of the transport animals, but has diminished in great measure the heavy mortality that was marked feature of former campaigns.

14. The Commander-in-Chief endorses the opinion expressed by Sir Robert Low in his paragraph 12 on the valuable services rendered by officers of the Intelligence Branch.

15. The efficiency of the Army Signalling Staff, under Captain T. E. O'Leary, Royal Irish Fusiliers, has been thoroughly tested during the campaign, and has again proved the great utility of heliograph and flag signalling in the rapid transmission of intelligence and of orders in the field.

16. The services rendered by Major H. A. Deane and his political assistants have no doubt been fully appreciated by the Government of India in the Foreign Department; but Sir George White cannot permit this despatch to go forward without expressing his opinion of the valuable work done by this body of officers, and endorsing the recommendations made by Sir Robert Low on behalf of the Chief Political Officer.

17. I am specially to bring to notice the excellent work done by Colonel Boughey, the Manager of the North-Western Railway, and the officer and the staff serving under him. Colonel Boughey has met all the demands of the military authorities to the Com-

mander-in-Chief's entire satisfaction. The concentration of the troops was carried out without a hitch, and the resources of the railway made possible the sudden and unexpected nature of the movement against the tribes.

18. In all the previous despatches that His Excellency has written to the Government of India on former campaigns, it has been an agreeable duty to him to dwell upon the admirable organization of, and the excellent services rendered, by the Telegraph Department. This expedition gives him yet another opportunity of commending the enterprise with which the telegraph line was so rapidly carried forward with the advance, in the face of all difficulties, under the able and indefatigable direction of Mr. F. E. Dempster, whose services merit the Commander-in-Chief's cordial acknowledgments, and are now brought to the favourable notice of Government. His Excellency here takes the opportunity of expressing his acknowledgments to Mr. C. H. Reynolds, Director-General of Telegraphs for the ready response he has always made to all military demands upon the Department, and especially in the matter of facilitating the establishment of direct communication between Army Head-Quarters and the General Officer Commanding in the field.

19. His Excellency also commends to the favourable notice of Government the good work done by the Postal Department under Mr. A. F. Ryan, Chief Postal Officer with the Force.

No. 1174-A—"Field Operations,"—dated Laram Pass, 27th July 1895.

From—LIBUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ROBERT C. LOW, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honor to submit the following report in continuation of my No. 296-A of the 1st May last.

1. After the capture of Sher Afzal the troops were halted, and it was a question as to whether it was desirable to move up to the Chitral Fort. The British Agent there advised that the troops should not advance, on the ground that the valley, already devastated by Umra Khan, could not give supplies.

The Government of India, however, decided that British troops should be shown at Chitral.

Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O., Commanding the 3rd Brigade, was ordered to move on the three marches from Ashreth to Chitral.

He found the track up the Kunar River quite as bad as, if not worse than, the defiles on each side of the Lowarai Pass, and, as before, the track had to be made passable by the skill of engineer officers and sappers and by the willing labor of the troops.

3. During the first week of May, I was detained at Dir. The Khan of Dir at this time wanted our constant support. He had, by capturing Sher Afzal and handing him over to me, done good service and simplified the political situation at Chitral, but the duty was a very unpleasant one for him, and he incurred a great deal of unpopularity amongst the people of his own country, in which he was not yet firmly established as ruler.

4. It is only right that I should here record the military services of the Khan of Dir during the advance of the Force, as it bears considerably on the main object of the expedition,—namely, the relief of Chitral Fort.

Muhammad Sharif Khan, the Khan of Dir, some years ago was dispossessed of the whole of his territory by Umra Khan, and at the time of the mobilization of the Chitral Relief Force he was a refugee in Upper Swat. On hearing that the Government of India intended to send a force against Umra Khan, he joined me at the front, avowedly with the object of regaining his lost territory and position, but offering his services, at the same time,—services which, as will be seen, were afterwards of great importance.

After the action of the 4th April, on the descent from the Malakand Pass to the Swat Valley, the Khan of Dir was sent on in advance across the Laram Pass into Dir territory, with orders to raise his tribes and recapture, if possible, all the forts in Dir territory, then held by detachments of Umra Khan's men, and then to push men across the Lowarai Pass to the assistance of the besieged garrison of Chitral.

The delay to the advance of the Force caused by the floods in the Panjkora River, the washing away of the first bridge, and the necessity of building a suspension bridge, have been duly reported in my despatch of which this is a continuation. At that time it was believed that the garrison of Chitral had food only till the 20th April, and after the defeat of Umra Khan on the 17th and his flight, it was clear that, using the utmost exer-

tions, the leading troops could hardly reach Chitral before the 25th, and that the action of the Khan of Dir might have an important effect on the fate of the besieged garrison.

The Khan carried out his instructions most loyally, not only in capturing the different forts in Dir territory, in doing which, it may be said, he acted as much for himself as for us, but also in pushing forward men into the Chitral Valley, which is outside his territory, and which was done entirely in our interests.

He captured the Fort of Dir from Umra Khan's troops on the 12th April, with the loss of sixty of his own men, and he pushed forward men under his brother, who took and occupied the fort of Kila Drosh, the most important fort in the Chitral Valley, on the 18th April. Kila Drosh is two marches south of Chitral Fort, and on the same date Colonel Kelly's troops were two marches north of Chitral Fort, while Brigadier-General Gatacre's brigade had reached Barwa, five marches south of Kila Drosh. The siege of Chitral was raised that night, the garrison finding themselves free on the morning of the 19th April.

It is due to the Khan of Dir that the active part he took should be recognized, since, if he did nothing more, he heralded our arrival in the Chitral Valley.

5. Leaving Dir on the 9th of May, I marched to Chitral and reached it on the 16th. The troops were drawn up to receive me, and in front of them I met the British Agent, Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I., and the provisional Mehtar, the boy Shujah-ul Mulk.

The parade was made as impressive as possible, for the Chitralis had never seen British soldiers, and as a matter of fact did not believe that we had any. A portion of the garrison that had defended the fort during the siege, *viz.*, one company of the 14th Sikhs, was in the centre, supported on the right by the Gilgit Field Force, consisting of the 32d Pioneers and two guns of the Kashmir Mountain Battery, the whole under Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Kelly, 32d Pioneers; on the left were the troops of the 3rd Brigade, *viz.*, the 1st Battalion of "The Buffs," No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, a detachment of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles, and my escort of one company of the Seaforth Highlanders; the whole parade being under the command of Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O. After inspecting the troops, I formed them into three sides of a square and, addressing them, pointed out that the parade was a very remarkable one, in that every man present had received the congratulations of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress; that the gallantry of the besieged garrison of Chitral was the pride and admiration of all their comrades in the army; as was also the determined march of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and his troops, who were the first to reach Chitral.

6. Prior to my departure from Chitral, the British Agent heard rumours of disturbances in Kohistan, and asked that the troops of this Force should hold the valley and relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's troops. This was sanctioned by Government, and Chitral was occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles, and the whole line from Chitral to our frontier in India has since been held by the troops of this Force.

7. During the operations of the month of April the troops of the Force under my command advanced from our Indian frontier into Chitral territory, crossing five mountain passes, three of which—the Malakand (2,900 feet), the Janbatai (7,400 feet), and the Lowarai (10,200 feet)—were of the most difficult character; and having also to throw bridges over two large rivers, the Swat and the Panjkora, besides innumerable smaller streams. The tracks across the mountains were so narrow and difficult that it is no exaggeration to say that the troops had to make them passable for baggage animals every yard of the way.

8. During the first advance of the Force the object was speed, and the labour of the troops was spent in making the mountain tracks passable. Since the 1st May the troops have been employed in improving these tracks into roads, over which the transport can work without exhaustion.

From the first the Gwalior and Jeypore transport rendered services which may honestly be described as invaluable at a time of great pressure, when sufficient transport had not yet been collected. They lifted a very large amount of commissariat stores from Nowshera to Dargai. After this, at the request of the General of Communications, they parked their carriages at Nowshera and brought their ponies up to Dir, where they undertook the daily convoy duties, working as pack transport. When no longer required at Dir they returned to the Nowshera-Dargai stage; and, finally, when the Chakdara suspension bridge was completed, they brought their carts over the Malakand pass and worked between Khar and Sarai. Probably they are the first wheeled transport ever employed on this route. Thus, wherever their services were most required, they have always been to the front and eager to meet all requirements. The greatest credit is due

to Captain Tate, of the Jeypore transport, and to Captain Edwards, of the Gwalior transport, for their thorough efficiency, and the native officers, non-commissioned officers and men deserve all that can be said in their praise, for their willingness and cheery good conduct.

9. The heat in the valleys has been intense during May and June, but posts have been found on or close to the line of communications for the British soldiers of the Force, namely, on the Laram, the Janbatai and Lowarai passes, where they have had a comparatively cool climate.

10. The operations of the Force being throughout in a country which has hitherto been closed to us, has afforded special opportunities for certain branches of the service to earn distinction. This is notably the case as regards the Sappers and Miners and Pioneers. The rapid way in which almost impassable foot-paths over mountain passes were converted into excellent mule and camel roads, testifies to the energy and zeal of the officers and the endurance and physique of the men of these branches of the service; while the hastily-constructed bridges over unfordable rivers and mountain torrents, with many of the gallery passages along bare cliffs, built out from sheer precipices with cantilevers of beams, doors, etc., from the nearest villages, were marvels of ingenuity and resource.

11. The survey party with the Force has done most valuable work, which has principally consisted in triangulation, traversing, and large-scale surveys of country, and plans of various places. The extent of this work may be judged when I say that the area embraced by the triangulation has been upwards of 1,500 square miles; 60 miles have been traversed, while the country mapped at two inches, one inch, half an inch, and quarter inch to a mile, scale has been respectively 40 square miles, 450 square miles, 100 square miles, and 1,200 square miles.

12. The Intelligence Branch also has lost no opportunity of adding to our knowledge of the country. Stage by stage as the Force advanced the officers of the Intelligence Department reconnoitred, sketched, and reported on the route to be followed by the troops in rear, the mileage of this alone being about 186 miles. In addition, 600 miles of branch roads were sketched and reconnoitred, as well as between 30 and 40 passes, and the whole country embraced by these reconnaissances was gazetted and much new information collected.

13. The different actions in which the troops of the Force have been engaged have already been reported, but I may now briefly refer to them with the view of bringing to His Excellency's notice the names of officers who have earned distinction.

At the storming of the Malakand Pass, the attack, as already reported, was made by seven battalions of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, two battalions, the 4th Sikhs and Guides Infantry, being sent up the highest peaks with orders to make a turning movement on reaching the crest, while the direct frontal attack on the enemy's main position was made by the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Gordon Highlanders, supported on the left by the King's Royal Rifle Corps, and on the right by the Bedfordshire Regiment and the 37th Dogras. The action commenced at 8-45 A.M., and the pass was captured at 2 P.M. I attach a casualty return, Appendix A, which shows the losses on our side. The enemy numbered about 12,000, and afterwards admitted a loss of over 300 killed.

I would bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the admirable manner in which the regiments above mentioned completed a very difficult task, and the able manner in which they were led. I would bring the following officers to His Excellency's notice in connection with this action:

Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Mathias, Commanding the Gordon Highlanders, who led the right of the frontal attack.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Dixon, King's Own Scottish Borderers, who led the left of the frontal attack.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. McCall, King's Royal Rifle Corps, who, by skilfully using his opportunities, brought his battalion to the main position of the enemy and joined the King's Own Scottish Borderers in the final rush and capture of the main position.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Paterson, Commanding the Bedfordshire Regiment, who conducted the pursuit of the enemy on the north side of the pass.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Dempster, Commanding the 4th Sikh Infantry, who led his regiment up the highest peak and conducted a difficult operation with great determination and skill.

Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye, Commanding the Queen's Own Corps of Guides (since killed), who advanced on a parallel spur, leading his regiment with great judgment and gallantry.

Major J. Dacres Cunningham, Royal Artillery, who commanded the three batteries (16 guns) most skilfully, and by accurate firing largely contributed to the success of the day.

Captain O. S. W. Nugent, King's Royal Rifle Corps, displayed gallantry and presence of mind in rescuing a wounded man of his battalion. Captain Nugent was directed with a party of the battalion to occupy an adjoining empty *sangar* and endeavour to silence the fire of the enemy in a position from whence they had been causing loss of men to the advance. On occupying the *sangar* he found that one of his men was lying wounded outside and exposed to the enemy's fire, when he at once sprang out, together with No. 2664, Corporal W. H. Race, of the Bedfordshire Regiment (who was attached as a signaller), and brought the wounded man into a place of safety.

Lieutenant and Adjutant F. W. Kerr, Gordon Highlanders, who, after Captain Burney of the same regiment was wounded, collected the company and led the final rush of the party on the village at the top of the pass.

Captain F. Campbell, of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides, was detached with two companies and ascended the hill on a spur between the Guides Infantry and the 4th Sikhs and rendered great service to the advance of both regiments by the skill with which he used his position and brought flanking fire from both sides on the enemy opposing the advance.

Lieutenant and Adjutant R. Harman, D.S.O., 4th Sikh Infantry, led a portion of the Dogra company of the regiment over some most difficult ground, and rendered great service to the advance until very severely wounded.

14. On the descent into the Swat Valley on the 4th April, the troops of the 1st Brigade were met by the advancing enemy. The troops held the eastern hills of the descent, while the baggage passed through the defile to the open in the Swat Valley. The brunt of the fighting fell on the 37th Dogras, supported by No. 4 Company of the Bengal Sappers and Miners, and by one company of the 15th Sikhs, who were ordered to hold a low hill which commanded the passage, and who repulsed repeated attacks of large bodies of the enemy; the final and most determined attempt being frustrated and enemy routed by a brilliant charge of the Guides Cavalry. I attach a statement (Appendix B) of our casualties on this occasion.

With reference to this action I would submit to His Excellency the names of the following officers:

Lieutenant-Colonel A. McL. Mills, Commanding 37th Dogras, who had the onerous duty of holding the position which was the main object of repeated attacks by the enemy in largely superior strength.

Major W. S. Marshall, 37th Dogras, who handled his men with great skill and coolness at a critical moment.

Major F. J. Aylmer, V.C., Royal Engineers, who covered the left flank of the 37th Dogras with his company (No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners).

Captain R. B. Adams, Commanding the Guides Cavalry, who contributed largely to the final withdrawal of the enemy by boldly charging very superior numbers.

Lieutenant G. M. Baldwin, Guides Cavalry, who was in immediate command of the squadron, and who was wounded.

Subadar Gurdatt Singh, 15th Sikhs, who commanded one company of his regiment which had marched with No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, as a covering party, and handled his men with skill and coolness on the left of the 37th Dogras.

15. On the 7th April the enemy disputed the passage of the Swat River, which was effected by the advance of the 11th Bengal Lancers and Guides Cavalry to the river bank under cover of artillery and infantry fire, the crossing of the river by those regiments, and their brilliant charge and pursuit of the enemy for many miles, while the infantry forded the river and seized the positions of the enemy and Umra Khan's fort of Ramora. I attach a statement of our losses on that occasion (Appendix C), and would bring to His Excellency's notice the services of the following officers:

Brigadier-General H. G. Waterfield, who by the able manner in which he directed the attack, secured the defeat of the enemy with heavy loss, together with the least possible loss to our troops.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. W. H. Scott, 11th Bengal Lancers, who led and directed the cavalry advance.

Major H. H. R. Heath, 11th Bengal Lancers, who led the right of the advancing attack of cavalry, which caught the enemy before they could reach the hills, committing great slaughter amongst them and pursuing as far as Uch.

Captain H. Wright, 11th Bengal Lancers, who commanded the squadron on the left which, routing the footmen and riding through them, continued the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry up to the top of the Katgola Pass.

Jemadar Khushal Singh, 11th Bengal Lancers, who led the leading troop across the river under a heavy fire, and himself captured a standard from the enemy, killing many with his own hand.

16. The next action was that of the Guides Infantry at the Sado ferry on the Panjkora River on the 13th April, which has already been described in detail, at the conclusion of which the regiment lost their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye. The attack of the enemy continued during the night of the 13th and till the morning of the 14th. I attach a casualty return (Appendix D) of our losses on the occasion, and would bring to His Excellency's notice the services of the following officers:

Captain F. Campbell, who took command when Lieutenant-Colonel Battye fell, and who skilfully conducted the further retirement of the regiment.

Lieutenant F. A. Maxwell, Royal Sussex Regiment, a probationer for the Staff Corps attached to the Queen's Own Corps of Guides, for the gallantry he displayed in the removal of Lieutenant-Colonel Battye's body under fire.

Surgeon-Lieutenant D. W. Sutherland, Indian Medical Service, for the promptitude and coolness he displayed in attending on the wounded under short-range fire.

17. The three days following the above action, while full of anxiety regarding the rising of the Panjkora River in front and the Swat River in rear, were notable for the arrival in camp of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, who had been prisoners in Umra Khan's hands: their safe arrival to camp being a great relief, as I had constant fears as to what their fate would be on my advancing into Umra Khan's territory.

18. I may record here an instance of the promptitude of Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O., and the gallantry of Major Aylmer, V.C., Royal Engineers, which occurred on the 15th April. On that day I had only three rafts left, and in the last attempt to cross the Panjkora River one of these three rafts was overturned, having on it at the time two British soldiers, Private Hall and Private Ellwood of the Maxim gun detachment of the Devonshire Regiment, one sepoy and one boatman. When the raft was overturned Brigadier-General Gatacre was standing on the bank, and seeing that one of the British soldiers (Private Hall) and the sepoy and boatman had regained the raft, which was being carried down the stream bottom upwards, and knowing that the stream took a considerable bend before it came to the point where the suspension bridge was being built, he galloped down to that point and informed Major Aylmer, who was superintending the construction of the bridge, of the accident. At that time there was no superstructure to the bridge—merely the standards and wire suspension ropes. Major Aylmer ordered a rope to be passed across to the right bank, but the slack was caught by the current, and the rope was carried away. At this moment the raft appeared in sight about 200 yards off, and Major Aylmer, seeing the urgency of the case, got into a sling cradle and was pulled to the centre of the stream. The raft immediately after passed under him, and he grasped Private Hall who left his hold on the raft, whereupon his extra weight immersed the cradle in the water, so that officer and man were in great danger of being swept away. However, Major Aylmer held on manfully, and with the assistance of No. 3189, Lance-Naick Sham Singh of No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, who got down into the cradle to help Major Aylmer, the whole party were landed, though with much difficulty and danger.

19. The last action in which the force has been engaged was that of the 17th of April. In this fight the enemy did not make any stand, possibly owing to the able manner in which the attack was directed by Brigadier-General Gatacre; for the positions of the enemy were taken in flank from east to west, and they were abandoned one after the other as the troops advanced. I append (Appendix E) a casualty return of our losses on this occasion.

20. I cannot conclude this portion of my report without bringing to His Excellency's notice the passage of the Lowarai Pass by the troops of the 3rd Brigade under the direction of Brigadier General W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O.; at the time there was about three miles of ascent to be made over snow, and the same extent of snow on the descent. The pass was crossed in very bad weather, which added to the difficulties and to the time taken in crossing the mules and supplies. The time of year (early spring) necessitated the passage being, if possible, done in the very early morning while it was yet freezing and the snow was as sound as possible. The start, therefore, was made from Gujar at the foot of the snow at 1-30 A.M., by torch-light. A strong working party led the advance armed with

improvised snow-ploughs to cut through drifts when necessary, but their main duty was to steadily tramp down a track all the way which in this manner hardened sufficiently to bear the weight of the mules, while men with torches were left at turns and dangerous places; for if once a mule left the track, it at once sank into the adjoining snow and had to be unladen and lifted again on to the beaten path. In this way the top of the pass was reached in the middle of heavy rain and sleet at 7 A.M. The descent on the north side is very steep, never less than 1 : 4 and often 1 : 3, and the track had to be tramped down in zigzags. The laden mules found it almost impossible to control their movements, especially as the rain, freezing on the snow, had made the top layer into a sheet of ice, and large numbers of them were constantly slipping off and, so to speak, "tobogganing" straight down the mountain. General Gatacre, in his report, says he saw as many as twenty at a time solemnly sliding down on their haunches for distances varying from 100 to 200 feet or more, when they turned complete somersaults into the snow, whence they could not move till dug out; and as it was impossible to load them again there, the bags or boxes carried by them were sent sliding down the mountain, guided by ropes from party to party of men stationed on the descent, while the animals, replaced without loads on the path, found their way down the beaten track.

The column reached Ziarat, on the north side of the pass, below the snow-line, by nightfall. I may add that the pass became more and more dangerous from this time till the snow melted sufficiently to admit of a summer road being made above the snow-covered torrent by the Pioneers. The only passage, until the snow melted sufficiently to admit of this being done, was up and down the centre of the snow-covered torrent, and for about ten days in the spring this becomes very dangerous, owing to the liability to sink through into the water beneath and from the avalanches of snow from the adjoining cliffs. Probably the best time to cross this and other passes of this nature is on a fine day at the latter end of winter when the snow is hard.

21. In conclusion, I have the honour to submit the following list of names of the officers whose services I would wish to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India for his favourable consideration.

Major-General E. Stedman, C.B., joined the force in April as Second-in-Command and General of Communications. He was given immediate command of the troops in rear of the advance, from the base to Dir, where the advanced depot was situated; and had charge of all the supply, transport, ordnance, and medical arrangements by which the troops under him, and those of the advance force beyond Dir, were maintained. Up to this time I had had to deal directly with the Brigadiers behind me, and with the various heads of departments—a matter of extreme difficulty, as the telegraph line was often some distance in rear and was sometimes interrupted; so that the relief obtained when Major-General Stedman took up his duties was immediately apparent.

Major-General Stedman is an officer of wide experience and knowledge of field requirements; he possesses great powers of organization, and his forethought for the wants of the Force has been a marked feature of his administration of the departments on which the Force depended. His services have been conspicuous, and I confidently recommend him to the notice of His Excellency as an officer of exceptional ability and worthy of advancement.

Brigadier-General W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O., has commanded the 3rd Brigade, and is an officer of exceptional and inexhaustible energy. He conducted in a very able manner the action of the 17th April, and his advance from Miankilai across the Janbatai and Lowarai passes was an example of what troops can do when inspired by a leader ready to accept responsibility and devoted to his duty.

I commend Brigadier-General Gatacre to His Excellency's notice as an officer of great ability and exceptional power of inspiring troops under him with energy and devotion.

Brigadier-General H. G. Waterfield commanded the 2nd Brigade during the forcing of the Malakand Pass and in the action of the 7th April at the passage of the Swat River. On both occasions he exhibited a quick grasp of the situation, followed by determined action, which shew him to be a commander of promise. He has sound judgment, and I found him a very valuable assistant in more than one difficult situation.

Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., had charge of the line of communications up to the arrival of Major-General Stedman, C.B., and did good work under considerable difficulties. Afterwards he was appointed to command the 4th Brigade, and has exercised his command with ability and success.

Of the divisional staff I have first to bring to His Excellency's notice Brigadier-General B. Blood, C.B., my chief staff officer. I am deeply indebted to Brigadier-

General Blood, who is an officer of exceptional ability, ever ready for active work in the field or for the larger questions of strategical importance. He has also been of invaluable assistance from his large former war experience and engineering knowledge. In conducting his arduous duties as Chief Staff Officer, he has exhibited tact, firmness, and courtesy to all, and I would especially bring him to His Excellency's notice as an officer whose advancement would be a benefit to the public service.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. S. Craigie, Assistant Adjutant-General, is an excellent staff officer. He possesses marked ability, together with a complete knowledge of both staff and regimental duties; he is active, a good rider, very hardworking, and always ready for anything that may be required of him; and his tact, patience, and temper are remarkable.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. C. Dyce, Assistant Quarter Master General, is also an excellent staff officer; most able, energetic, and reliable. He is very active, a good rider, with great tact, and always cheerful and good-tempered. He is remarkably quick and accurate in his work.

Captain J. E. Nixon, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch, is a very promising officer, with great energy and marked ability. He is of very active habits, takes great interest in his work as Intelligence Officer, and has done very good service in obtaining information about the country in advance of the Force.

Lieutenant W. R. Robertson, 3rd Dragoon Guards, Field Intelligence Officer, is a very active and intelligent officer of exceptional promise.

Colonel W. W. Murdoch, Colonel on the Staff, Commanding Royal Artillery, is an officer of large experience and knowledge of artillery matters. He carried out his duties to my entire satisfaction.

The campaign has been remarkable for an exceptional amount of engineering work, and in carrying it out the services of Colonel H. P. Leach, D.S.O., have been of very great value. He is an officer of conspicuous ability, of wide experience, of great readiness of resource and of remarkable activity and energy; and I consider that his presence with the expedition contributed materially to its success.

Major C. C. Ellis, Royal Engineers, is a most hard-working and able officer, and has done valuable service.

Captain J. A. Tanner, D.S.O., Adjutant, Royal Engineers, is an excellent officer and his services have been of great value.

Major S. C. H. Monro, D.S.O., Seaforth Highlanders, was Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General of the Lines of Communications during the first phase of the campaign and was afterwards a Road Commandant. He carried out his duties most satisfactorily.

No body of officers or men in the Force had more exposure or more arduous duties to perform than the signallers, and great credit is due to Captain T. E. O'Leary, Royal Irish Fusiliers, Superintendent of Army Signalling, for the efficient way in which signalling was maintained throughout the operations.

Captain W. F. Shakespear, 6th Bengal Cavalry, has carried on the duties of Provost-Marshal in a thoroughly satisfactory manner.

Major W. St. J. Richardson, Indian Staff Corps, Field Paymaster, has carried out his duties to my satisfaction.

Surgeon-Colonel T. Maunsell, Army Medical Staff, Principal Medical Officer with the Force, is an officer of ability and experience, and his management of the medical and sanitary arrangements connected with the Force have been most successful.

Captain W. J. Bythell, Royal Engineers, is an officer of marked ability and energy; he pushed on his survey operations with remarkable rapidity.

I would specially bring the services of Major H. A. Deane, Indian Staff Corps, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and Chief Political Officer with the Force, to His Excellency's notice. He possesses an intimate knowledge of the frontier tribes, and their language, together with a remarkable power of eliciting the truth from conflicting reports, and he has supplied me throughout the operations with much valuable information. It was largely due to his personal influence with the Khan of Dir that the Khan pushed forward his men and captured Kila Drosh, thereby alarming the besiegers of Chitral for the safety of their retreat. Again, it was mainly due to Major Deane's influence that Sher Afzal and other important prisoners were captured. I commend Major Deane specially to His Excellency's notice.

I have also to bring to His Excellency's notice the services of my personal staff:

Lieutenant R. B. Low, 9th Bengal Lancers, my Aide-de-Camp, is an officer of much promise; he is impervious to fatigue, an excellent rider, and a keen soldier who has seen much previous service, and has been invaluable to me.

Lieutenant A. A. Irvine, 3rd Bengal Infantry, my Orderly Officer, has been eager doing his duty, very active, and of much assistance.

Ressaldar Nadir Khan, 9th Bengal Lancers, acted as my Native Aide-de-Camp, and was very useful.

I would further invite His Excellency's attention to the very valuable services of the late Captain A. L. Peebles, Devonshire Regiment. This talented and energetic officer command the Maxim detachment of his regiment, which was specially attached to the Force, and which he had brought to a state of admirable efficiency. He was mortally wounded on the 14th April by a chance shot, and died next day.

Besides the officers already named who came more especially under my personal notice, the following are very favourably mentioned by General Officers commanding brigades as having shown zeal and ability in carrying out their duties, and I accordingly recommend them to His Excellency's notice :

First Brigade—

Major G. D. M. Nisbett, Bedfordshire Regiment.

Major G. G. Grimwood, King's Royal Rifle Corps.

Major R. C. Hadow, 15th Sikhs.

Captain W. E. Bunbury, 25th Punjab Infantry, Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.

Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., Royal Artillery, Brigade-Major.

Captain J. G. Turner, Body-Guard, Orderly Officer, and afterwards Intelligence Officer.

Second Brigade—

Major J. W. Godfray, King's Own Scottish Borderers.

Major G. T. F. Downman, Gordon Highlanders.

Captain W. G. Hamilton, East Lancashire Regiment, Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.

Captain A. C. Batten, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant P. E. Ricketts, 18th Bengal Lancers, Orderly Officer.

Third Brigade—

Lieutenant-Colonel G. E. Harley, The Buffs.

Major J. W. Hughes-Hallet, Seaforth Highlanders.

Colonel E. W. Smyth, 25th Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir C. H. Leslie, *Bart.*, 2-4th Gurkha Rifles.

Captain L. Herbert, Central India Horse, Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.

Captain G. C. I. Stockwell, Highland Light Infantry, Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant R. G. Brooke, 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars, Orderly Officer.

Fourth Brigade—

Captain G. J. Younghusband, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, Brigade-Major, who also served throughout the first phase of the campaign as Brigade-Major Divisional Troops, showing himself to be a most smart, energetic, and promising staff officer.

Lieutenant E. B. C. Boddam, 2nd Sikh Infantry, Orderly Officer.

The General of Communications brings the following officers to notice, and I fully concur in the opinions of them which he expresses, and recommend them to His Excellency's consideration :

Colonel I. S. M. Hamilton, D.S.O., Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, Line of Communications, has had long staff experience, and possesses much skill in organization. His services have been most valuable.

Captain G. V. Kembell, Royal Artillery, Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, Line of Communications, had immediate charge of the railway arrangements for the first concentration of the Force. His services throughout the campaign have been of great value.

Surgeon-Colonel G. Thomson, M.B., Indian Medical Service, Principal Medical Officer, Line of Communications, an officer of judgment and experience, administered his department in a very satisfactory manner.

Major A. F. Barrow, C.M.G., 12th Bengal Infantry, as Base Commandant at Nowshera, has had very important duties to perform, especially at the beginning of the campaign. In their discharge he has shown great tact and organizing ability.

Major F. S. Gwatkin, 13th Bengal Lancers, has been in charge of the first section as Road Commandant since the beginning of the campaign. His energy and tact have been conspicuous and his services most valuable.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Shone, D.S.O., the Commanding Royal Engineers of the Line of Communications, displayed unfailing energy and confidence, while directing the difficult operations entrusted to his charge. The great ability of this officer is well-known, and he has shown it conspicuously during this campaign.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Yaldwyn, Indian Staff Corps, Divisional Commissariat Officer, and Major C. M. FitzGerald, Indian Staff Corps, Divisional Transport Officer, both officers of experience, have administered their respective charges satisfactorily.

Major K. S. Dunsterville, Royal Artillery, Senior Ordnance Officer, an officer of exceptional qualifications in his own department, carried on his duties very satisfactorily.

Veterinary-Lieutenant-Colonel R. Poyser, Army Veterinary Department, Inspecting Veterinary Officer, who was ably seconded by Veterinary-Major G. J. R. Rayment and the other officers of his department with the Force, has done work of the greatest value.

Lieutenant H. W. F. Cooke, 24th Punjab Infantry, rendered excellent service in his capacity of Aide-de-Camp.

The good work performed by the Telegraph Department during the campaign, and the rapidity with which the wire was pushed on to Chitral, in spite of all difficulties, are sufficient evidences of the ability of Mr. F. E. Dempster, the Chief Telegraph Officer, and of the zeal and energy of his staff.

The postal arrangements were successfully carried out under the direction of Mr. A. F. Ryan, the Chief Postal Officer with the Force.

The Commanding Officers of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers and the several heads of Departments with the Force have submitted the names of a large number of officers who have done exceptionally good work. From these lists I have selected the following officers, whom I strongly recommend for favourable consideration, in addition to those whose names have already been mentioned in this despatch, namely:

Royal Artillery—

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, Commanding Royal Artillery, Divisional Troops, and now Commanding Royal Artillery with the Force.

Major J. D. Cunningham, Commanding No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

Major J. C. Shirres, Commanding No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

Captain J. L. Parker, Commanding No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.

Royal Engineers—

Major M. C. Barton, in charge of the Field Park, Royal Engineers.

Major H. E. S. Abbott, Field Engineer.

Major F. J. Aylmer, V.C., Commanding No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

Captain G. Williams, Field Engineer.

Captain J. R. B. Serjeant, Commanding No. 1 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

Pioneer Battalions—

Lieutenant-Colonel S. V. Gordon, 23rd Pioneers.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Wilson, 34th Pioneers.

Medical Staff—

Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. Donovan, Army Medical Staff.

Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel P. F. O'Connor, Indian Medical Service.

Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Simonds, Indian Medical Service.

Surgeon-Major G. Coutts, M.B., Army Medical Staff.

Commissariat and Transport Department—

Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. E. Radcliffe, Indian Staff Corps.

Brevet-Major W. J. H. Bond, Indian Staff Corps.

Major R. H. F. Lambe, Norfolk Regiment, Assistant to the Divisional Transport Officer.

Captain J. W. G. Tulloch, 24th Bombay Infantry.

APPENDIX B.

Return of Casualties in action near Khar on 4th April 1895.

SUMMARY.

Officers	{	Killed	Nil	}	2
		Wounded	2		
		Missing	Nil		
Non commissioned officers and men.	{	Killed	2	}	18
		Wounded	16		
		Missing	Nil		

Nominal Return of Officers wounded.

Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe or slight.	Nature of wound.
Lieutenant	G. M. Baldwin, Guides Cavalry	Slight	Sword-cut back of hand.
Ditto	F. J. H. Winch, 37th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry.	Do.	Gun-shot wound, right arm.

APPENDIX C.

Return of Casualties in action at the Swat River on 7th April 1895.

SUMMARY.

Officers	{	Killed	Nil	}	Nil
		Wounded	Nil		
		Missing	Nil		
Non-commissioned officers and men.	{	Killed	3	}	12
		Wounded	9		
		Missing	Nil		

APPENDIX D.

Return of Casualties in action at Panjkora River (Sado) on 13th and 14th April 1895.*

SUMMARY.

Officers	{	Killed	2	}	3
		Wounded	1		
		Missing	Nil		
Non-commissioned officers and men.	{	Killed	3	}	18
		Wounded	15		
		Missing	Nil		
Followers	{	Killed	Nil	}	5
		Wounded	5		
		Missing	Nil		

* Fighting being kept up during the night, it is impossible to separate the days.

Nominal Return of Officers killed.

Rank.	Name.	Nature of wound.
Lieutenant-Colonel	F. D. Battye, Queen's Own Corps of Guides.	Gun-shot wound, abdomen.
Captain	A. L. Peebles, Devonshire Regiment	Do. (wounded 14th, died of wounds 15th).

Nominal Return of Officers wounded.

Rank.	Name.	Description of wound—dangerous, severe, or slight.	Nature of wound.
Captain	T. E. O'Leary, Royal Irish Fusiliers	Slight	Gun-shot wound, chest.

APPENDIX E.

Return of Casualties in action at Manugai on 17th April 1895.

SUMMARY.

Officers	{	Killed	Nil	} Nil.
		Wounded	Nil	
		Missing	Nil	
Non-commissioned officers and men.	{	Killed	Nil	} 8
		Wounded	8	
		Missing	Nil	

In acknowledging the receipt of the above Government General Orders relating to the expedition, the Secretary of State for India in his despatch of the 30th January 1896 said:—

I am glad to have this opportunity of conveying to your Lordship my cordial concurrence in the terms in which you have alluded to the brilliant defence of Chitral, and to the valuable services and admirable conduct of Lieutenant-General Sir R. C. Low and Colonel J. G. Kelly, and the troops under their command, including troops of the Kashmir State and a small body of levies of Cherkila, Hunza, Nagar, and Sai.

An extract Sir Robert Low's despatch and a copy of Government General Order No. 998 were forwarded to the War Office for the information of the Secretary of State for War and of the Commander-in-Chief, and were acknowledged as follows:—

War Office, PALL MALL, S.W.

9th January 1896.

Sir,—I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 6th November last and the 18th ultimo, and to acquaint you in reply that the Marquis of Lansdowne and the Commander-in-Chief concur with the Government of India in their appreciation of the conduct of the troops who took part in the Chitral Relief expedition, and the excellent manner in which the operations were carried out, which reflects credit upon all concerned.

The Under-Secretary of State for India.

I have, etc.,
ARTHUR L. HALIBURTON.

APPENDIX XVII.

Summary of casualties in the Chitral Relief Force in the actions of 3rd, 4th, 7th, 13th, 14th and 17th April 1895.

Action.	Date.	BRITISH AND NATIVE OFFICERS.		WARRANT AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN OF ALL CORPS.		FOLLOWERS.		REMARKS.
		Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	
Malakand	April 3rd	...	10	11	40	
Khar	" 4th	...	2	2	16	
Swat river	" 7th	3	9	
Panjkora river	{ " 13th	2	1	3	15	...	5	Fighting being kept up during the night, it is impossible to separate the casualties.
	" 14th							
Manugai	" 17th	8	
TOTAL		2	13	19	88	...	5	

APPENDIX XVIII.
CHITRAL RELIEF FORCE.
Register of Captured Ordnance.

DESCRIPTION.			CARRIAGE.	NATURE.	CONDITION OF		SENTENCE.	RECEIVED FROM
WEIGHT.	LENGTH.	GAUGE.			VENT.	BORE.		
Approximate. Cwt. qrs. lb	Ft. in.	Inches.						
5 0 0	4 6 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{8}$	Wood fit for firewood only.	S. B. Bronze	Bad	Bad	Unserviceable	Brigade-Major, 2nd Brigade.
10 0 0	5 2 $\frac{3}{8}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nil	Ditto	Do.	Do.	Ditto	Ditto.
18 0 0	6 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{8}$	Nil	Ditto	Do.	Do.	Ditto	Ditto.
10 0 0	5 8	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nil	Ditto	Do.	Do.	Ditto	Ditto.
15 0 0	5 11 $\frac{1}{4}$	4 $\frac{3}{8}$	Wood fit for firewood only.	Ditto	Do.	Do.	Ditto	Ditto.

Forwarded in accordance with Assistant Adjutant-General's No. 1100-A., dated 14th July 1895.
 C. L. WILSON, Captain, R.A.,
Ordnance Officer, Munda.
 B. BLOOD, Brigadier-General,
Chief Staff Officer, Chitral Relief Force.

FIELD PARK OFFICE,
 CHITRAL RELIEF FORCE;
Munda, the 22nd May 1895.

APPENDIX XIX.

Report by the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication, Chitral Relief Force.

No. 2081-L., dated Janbatai Kotal, the 11th July 1895.

From—Major-General E. STEDMAN, C.B., Commanding Lines of Communication, Chitral Relief Force.

To—The Chief Staff Officer, Chitral Relief Force.

As desired, I have the honour to submit the following despatch upon the working of the communications of the Chitral Relief Force from the 28th April, when I assumed my duties, up to the present date.

2. No active military operations have taken place during the period aforesaid. Troops have been harassed by night firing into camps, and a few casualties have resulted from attacks upon individuals and small parties. Punishments for these offences are meted out in communication with the Political Agency, there being great difficulty in attaching blame to any tribal section or to any particular village. Under these circumstances I have not considered it necessary to call upon Brigadiers for any special reports in connection with the line of communications. I would, however, take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the cheerful manner in which the troops under my command have carried out their heavy and trying duties, and of the excellent work performed by the infantry, both British and Native, in the improvement and maintenance of the roads.

3. I beg to offer the following remarks upon the working of the several departments under my orders:—

Commissariat and Transport.—Prior to the date on which I took up the command of the Line of Communications the rapid movements of troops to the front, the fighting, and the difficult and unknown nature of the roads and rivers had prevented the establishment of a definite system of supply, although the work of the Commissariat and Transport was heavier than it has been since.

By the time, however, that the news of the relief of Chitral was confirmed, all opposition had been broken down, and the worst natural difficulties of the country had been surmounted. From that period, therefore, it became possible to introduce a more regular system, and steady progress has since been made in improving the organisation of our supply arrangements.

In the original scheme only 3 advanced depôts were provided for, but eventually it was found necessary to have no less than 5. These are now established at the following places:—Dargai, Chakdara, Munda, Dir, and Kala Drosh. The advanced depôts, besides maintaining 20 days reserve for the troops on their own section, and 1 day's supply for all troops in front, have met the daily wants of the force along nearly 200 miles of road, the last 63 miles of which presented exceptional difficulties owing to the almost entire absence of local supplies of fodder.

During the earlier part of the campaign the *khasil* available in all the larger valleys had afforded the greatest relief to the supply arrangements, but when the *khasil* began to fail, before the fresh *khusa* supplies were available, the difficulty in this connection became almost as pressing on the lower sections of the road as in the more mountainous and barren districts to the north.

It is no exaggeration to say that, had it not been for the enormous quantities of compressed fodder brought up from India, the maintenance in the field of this force with its thousands of transport animals would have been practically impossible for any length of time. No force operating on this frontier has hitherto, so far as I am aware, been dependent upon India for its fodder, and I think that every credit should be given to the Commissariat authorities, both in the field and within our border, for the way in which these heavy and abnormal demands have been met. At the same time I am bound to draw attention to the fact that the very convenience afforded by an apparently unlimited supply of fodder in a portable and handy form for issue has certainly tended towards extravagance. Continual orders have been necessary to check the issue of compressed fodder, when, by the exercise of a little trouble, local substitutes might have been made available. It must, however, be admitted that the extent to which local resources could be utilised has been limited by other considerations. When a large army with a horde of transport and followers enters a sparsely inhabited district, too great zeal in collecting

the supplies actually available on the spot may entail hardships on the country and possibly provoke hostility.

As regards transport, the introduction of a regular staging system was no doubt impracticable during the earlier stages of the campaign, but a start had already been made on the lower sections of the line when I arrived in the field at the end of April. Since that date the staging system has been introduced throughout, and it is working very well at the present time.

I would venture here to express my opinion from personal observation that regularity and method are only obtainable by means of the staging system. Through convoys may be inevitable at first, but they should be discontinued at the earliest possible opportunity.

There are three ways of working the staging system, and these have all been given a trial on the present expedition:—

1st.—Transport moving from one stage to the next loaded one day, and returning unloaded the next.

2nd.—Transport moving half way to the next stage; handing over loads to the transport sent back to meet it, and returning to its original station the same day.

3rd.—Transport proceeding laden to the next stage and returning unladen the same day.

All these methods have their merits under varying circumstances into which I need not enter here, but I may mention that, provided the roads are broad enough to admit of laden and unladen animals passing each other, the first system has, in the majority of instances, been found to work the best.

The amount of transport employed with the expedition has been unusually large. This is principally owing to the difficulty of the road, which only permitted the use of carts to a very limited extent, while the mountainous nature of the country in the northern section greatly restricted the employment of camels. The roads are now so improved, however, that were it necessary carts might be used even as far as Serai.

The total number of transport animals in the field has at times exceeded 40,000, exclusive of contract carriage. At present it amounts to about 39,000, made up approximately as follows:—

9,300	Camels.
13,300	Mules.
4,200	Ponies.
4,500	Donkeys.
7,400	Bullocks.

These animals are mainly distributed and worked as stated below:—

Between Nowshera and Dargai—Draught bullocks and draught ponies.

From Dargai over the Malakand pass to Khar—The Government pack mules of the Reserve Brigade and Quetta District supplemented by camels. The mules employed on this section of the road were not allowed to cross the Swat river.

From Khar to the crossing of the Swat river at Chakdara—Pack bullocks.

From Chakdara to Kanbat at the head of the Jandol valley—Camels.

From Kanbat across the Janbatai pass to Bandai in the Baraul valley—Hired pack mules and ponies.

From Bandai to Dir—Donkeys.

From Dir onwards to Chitral—Government pack mules.

The ponies not included in the above detail were those attached to Field Hospitals for the transport of the wounded and sick.

This distribution was not arrived at until experience had shown the best way of working, feeding, and administering this large and varied mass of transport. It has resulted in different classes and kinds of transport, *vis.*, hired and Government; pack and draught; 2-maund and 5-maund animals, being kept as separate and distinct as possible.

The lifting power arrived at by these arrangements averaged 3,000 maunds daily from Dargai to Khar over the Malakand pass; 2,500 to 3,000 maunds between Khar and Mundah; 2,000 maunds from Mundah to Dir over the Janbatai pass, and about 1,000 maunds daily from Dir onwards over the Laorai pass, at first covered with snow. Arrangements were occasionally made to carry considerably more than the amounts aforesaid to meet special demands.

As regards the quality of the animals supplied, I think I am justified in saying that, taking things all round, no force has ever left our frontier better equipped with transport. This is due, in my opinion, to the arrangements made beforehand for the collection of

animals on mobilisation, and to the care and judgment exercised by the purchasing and collecting officers in their selections. Pack ponies, it is true, have not proved a success in this mountainous country. They do not stand exposure and privation as well as mules, and are more liable to sore backs. They are also inclined to rush at difficult places, a habit which is liable to lead to casualties. The Jeypore and Gwalior transport, however, has, under Captains Tate and Edwards, done good work with their carts on the Nowshera Dargai road.

In spite, however, of hard work and occasional scarcity of food, the transport has, as a whole, kept in wonderfully good condition, whilst the mortality also has, so far, not exceeded reasonable limits.

I attribute these good results, in a great measure, to the zeal and energy of the large number of regimental officers and non-commissioned officers attached to the Transport Department during this campaign. The work of the regimental officers has been extremely hard and responsible, and they have as a body distinguished themselves by their unremitting devotion to their duties. At the same time I would remark that the services of some of these officers would have been more valuable at the commencement of operations (at which time both transport animals and followers demand the closest attention) had they previously received a longer training in transport duties, and had a knowledge of native languages been made a necessary qualification for employment.

Lieutenant-Colonel Yaldwyn, the Chief Commissariat Officer, and Major FitzGerald, Divisional Transport Officer, both officers of experience, have, whilst under my orders, administered their respective charges to my satisfaction. The work has been on a large scale than usually falls to the lot of administrative officers on frontier expeditions.

Lieutenant-Colonel Yaldwyn brings to my notice the good services performed by the following officers on the Line of Communications :—

Lieutenant-Colonel Radcliffe, Base Commissariat Officer,
Major Wingate, Special Forage Officer.
Captain Wickham, Base Transport Officer.
Captain Mackintosh, Commissariat Officer, 3rd Advanced Depôt.
Captain Allen, Transport Officer.
Captain Nicholson, Commissariat Officer, 4th Advanced Depôt.

Out of 60 regimental officers :—

Major Lombe, Norfolk Regiment, Assistant to Divisional Transport Officer.
Captain Tulloch, 24th Bombay Infantry, Assistant Divisional Transport Officer.
Captain Stewart, 14th B. L., Assistant to the Chief Commissariat Officer.
Captain Ranken, 24th P. I.
Captain Cowper, 10th B. L.
Captain Creagh, 5th P. I.
Lieutenant Baynes, 12th B. C.
Lieutenant Ballard, Norfolk Regiment.

In addition to these names I would mention that of Major Bond, who has had charge of the 1st Advanced Depôt, where he has had heavy work in a trying climate.

I would also specially express my personal appreciation of the services rendered by Captain Tulloch, in charge of the hired transport. He has performed his responsible and important duties in the most able manner.

Engineer operations.—Before my arrival, the advancing troops had already made the existing paths and roads passable for mules. Subsequently these had to be widened and re-aligned, as far as Dir, under the superintendence of the Commanding Royal Engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Shone.

Full details regarding these important works will be submitted in the report on Engineering operations which will be rendered at the close of the campaign.

Meanwhile the following works constructed under the orders of the Commanding Royal Engineer, Line of Communications, seem to me to deserve special mention :—

- (1) The construction of excellent graded roads surmounting the difficult passes of the Malakand and Janbatai.
- (2) The spanning of the swift and dangerous Swat river by a suspension bridge of a size and solidity probably never before attempted in a mountainous and uncivilised country. It is seldom indeed in any country that the Engineers of an army in the field have been called upon to construct a work of this magnitude in so short a time. The bridge is 948 feet long, 700 feet of this being hung from suspension cables of two spans of 250 feet and 100 in the clear. Lieutenant-Colonel Shone reports that the bridge is strong enough to carry field guns, and I consider that the results achieved reflect the greatest credit on Captain Williams and the officers working under his orders.

I would specially desire to bring to notice the work done by the following corps:—

No. 1 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, constructed a trestle bridge over the Swat river and a suspension bridge over the Panjkora river of 197 feet span in eleven days. These bridges were constructed under the orders of the Commanding Royal Engineer, Chitral Relief Force, since when, however, the same Company has thrown another fine suspension bridge over the Panjkora river at Chutiatan.

No. 6 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, under Captain Skey, constructed trestle bridges over the Swat and Jandol rivers.

No. 6 Company, "Queen's Own," Madras Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant Ainslie, did excellent work on the suspension bridge over the Swat river previously mentioned.

The pontoon section, under Captain Heath, Royal Engineers, succeeded in bringing 26 pontoons over a difficult pass to the banks of the Swat river, where they established and maintained a bridge in a current of eight miles an hour—a current believed to be far swifter than any previously crossed by this method.

The 23rd Pioneers have only recently come under my orders, and for this reason it scarcely falls within my province to note upon the work they have accomplished.

The 34th Pioneers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, have done exceptionally good work throughout. They were employed principally upon the Malakand and Janbatai passes.

To the Commanding Royal Engineer, Line of Communications, Lieutenant-Colonel Shone, my best thanks are due for the unfailing energy and confidence he has displayed whilst directing these difficult operations. The great ability of this officer is well known and he has displayed it conspicuously during the course of the present campaign. He has brought to my notice the name of Major Barton, who superintended the works on the Swat river, and more lately those on the Panjkora river. Also that of Major Abbott, who was in charge of all the roads over the Malakand pass.

Medical.—The Field Hospitals detailed for the transfer of sick and wounded to the base, together with certain Field Hospitals put into the field with the Divisional Troops, were distributed by the Principal Medical Officer, Line of Communications, as staging hospitals along the line from Nowshera to Dir.

In nearly every case one section of a British and one section of a Native hospital were placed at each post on the Line of Communications. By these means the sick were regularly transferred to the base stage by stage, in ambulance tongas between Dargai and Nowshera, and by means of riding ponies and dandies along the rest of the line.

Five E. P. tents were pitched at each staging hospital between Mundah and Mardan (where the Guides hospital was available), and *chappars* were erected over the ordinary hospital tents at all stations south of Khar. Arrangements were also made for ice, aerated water, etc., so that the sick have been moved to the Base with the greatest amount of comfort possible under the circumstances.

These staging hospitals have also been most useful for the treatment of sick at posts where no Field Hospitals belonging to brigades were stationed. They were also used to shelter details, both British and Native, moving from the Base to rejoin their regiments. Such men being without tents or cooking pots would otherwise have had to suffer considerable discomfort, and the arrangements made by the Medical Department for their accommodation and rations have been most acceptable.

Wherever a Native Field Hospital has been stationed advice and treatment have been proffered gratis to the inhabitants of the country. The privilege has been highly appreciated, and large numbers of the tribesmen have availed themselves of the medical facilities afforded them, with, I am convinced, excellent results both from their point of view and from ours.

I would particularly wish to mention the valuable services rendered by the Senior Medical Officers of Posts, who, as the sanitary advisers of the Post Commandants, have done much to prevent disease by careful daily attention to the purity of the water-supply and other sanitary precautions.

In conclusion, I would add that I have been struck by the excellence and completeness of the medical organisation and equipments, and by the smoothness with which it has worked. My best thanks are due to Surgeon-Colonel Thomson, Principal Medical Officer, Line of Communications, to whose judgment and experience I am much indebted. He has specially brought to my notice the names of the following officers:—

Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Williams.
Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Simmonds.
Surgeon-Major Esmonde White.

Ordnance.—An Ordnance Field Park was mobilised to accompany the force, and advanced depôts were subsequently established at Khar and Mundah. Not only have all the demands of the troops been satisfactorily met, but also the periodical condemnations of equipment by Commanding Officers have been promptly replaced. The good work performed by this Department is, in my opinion, largely due to the exceptional qualifications of the Senior Ordnance Officer, Major Dunsterville, Royal Artillery, whilst the two depôts are reported as having been very well conducted under the superintendence of Captain Wilson, Royal Artillery, and Captain and Deputy-Commissary T. Smith.

Postal.—Owing to the length of the line between Peshawar and Chitral (197 miles) and to the manner in which the troops have been distributed, the number of post offices employed with this force has been largely in excess of the ordinary requirements of a Division of all arms.

The strain thus thrown on the Punjab Postal Circle has, however, been successfully met, and at the present time 21 Field Post Offices, 3 second class Offices, and 1 Base Post Office are supplying the wants of the force.

The mail service has been carried on by tonga as far as Dargai. From thence to Chitral I came to the conclusion, after a full consideration of various alternatives, that the service would best be maintained by native runners supplied by the Political Department. These runners are disposed in stages and have been found to work more satisfactorily than sowars, owing to their being able to pass convoys on narrow mountain roads and also from their being able to travel at night and without escort. Considering that the mails are now carried from Nowshera to Chitral, on fixed time tables, in less than 77 hours, with satisfactory regularity, I think that high praise is due to the Postal Department for the care they have bestowed upon the training and supervision of the ignorant tribesmen from whom their postal runners were perforce recruited.

The parcel service, which is carried on mules under military escorts, covers two or three stages per diem, reaching Chitral in about one week from the date of leaving Nowshera. This also is, I think, a result upon which the Postal Department may fairly be congratulated.

I would further bring to your notice the several postal concessions and privileges extended to the field force, many of them, I believe, for the first time, by Mr. A. F. Ryan, the Chief Postal Officer with the Force.

Amongst these are the following :—

Carriage of light parcels with the letter mails.

The delivery to addressees of unpaid or insufficiently paid letters, etc.

The delivery of value-payable parcels and registered letters.

The sale of British and Foreign postal money orders and certain newspapers.

For these concessions the force is indebted to the initiative of Mr. Ryan, who also brings to notice the service rendered by the following officers :—

Rai Salig Ram, Bahadur.

Mr. C. J. Stowell.

Mr. A. D. Appleby.

Telegraphs.—On mobilisation being ordered, 200 miles of field material and 20 offices were sent to the Base. The work of construction commenced at Hoti Mardan on the 26th March, and by the time I took over command of the communications the line had reached Dir. It was subsequently extended to Chitral, and an office was opened there on the 17th May. The work of construction beyond the Janbatai pass was exceptionally difficult owing, in the Baraul and Dir valleys, to the dense brushwood which impeded operations, and in Chitral to the precipitous cliffs across which posts and wires had to be dragged. Transport also was not always available on account of the more pressing requirements of the troops.

The system of telegraphs now consists of 3 wires and permanent posts from Mardan to Khar; 2 wires from Khar to Janbatai Kotal; 1 wire from Janbatai Kotal to Chitral; and a branch line from Dir to Mirga. Altogether 26 field offices have been opened, of which 8 have been closed and 18 are now open. Two hundred and twenty-one miles of posts and 403 miles of wire have been erected, of which 38 miles of posts and 76 miles of wire have been dismantled. There are now 183 miles of posts and 327 miles of wire in working order. The erecting party at the front averaged 5 miles of line daily for 37 working days.

The amount of messages disposed of on the system has been very heavy. In April a total of 21,433 messages were sent, an average of 714 a day. In May the total number of messages sent was 44,589, an average of 1,438 a day. The average number of words per message was 50, or double the length of the average Indian message.

In the large offices of Nowshera, Khar, Mundah, Dir, and latterly Janbatai Kotal, the work has been continuous for the 24 hours. During April constant interruptions were caused by transport animals breaking the light field posts. In May wire cutting commenced, principally between Mundah and Kanbat, causing interruptions amounting to no less than 155 hours in that month alone, whilst in June the interruptions from the same cause lasted 62 hours.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the work performed by the Telegraph Department, and the rapidity with which the wire was pushed on to the front, are sufficient evidences of the excellent arrangements made by the Chief Telegraph Officer of the Force, Mr. Dempster, and of the zeal and energy of his staff.

Mr. Dempster, whose name I would specially desire to bring forward, has brought to my notice the good services rendered by Mr. Coode, Assistant Superintendent in charge of the advanced party; by Mr. Meredith, Assistant Superintendent in charge of the second party, and by Sergeant Wells and his staff at Mundah. The Mundah Office has been harder and more continuously worked than any other on the system, whilst it has been frequently fired into at night, several casualties having taken place in the immediate vicinity.

Veterinary.—The work thrown on this Department during the campaign has been exceptionally heavy owing to the very large number of transport animals engaged (over 40,000), and to the serious outbreaks of foot and mouth disease, and rinderpest amongst the transport bullocks and slaughter cattle. The careful measures of inspection and isolation instituted by Veterinary Lieutenant-Colonel Poyser, the Inspecting Veterinary Officer of the force, and the thorough and zealous manner in which those measures have been carried out by the Veterinary Officers and subordinates under his command, have undoubtedly done much to check the spread of these contagious diseases, to the benefit of the efficiency of the whole transport service.

I am glad of this opportunity of expressing my obligations as General of Communications to Veterinary Lieutenant-Colonel Poyser and his officers for their good work rendered often under difficult conditions in a very trying climate, to the results of which, I regret to say, one young Officer, Veterinary Lieutenant Freeman, recently fell a victim.

The Inspecting Veterinary Officer has specially brought to my notice the services rendered by Veterinary Major Rayment in his responsible position as Veterinary Inspector, and by Veterinary Captain Forsdyke at the Base.

I must not omit to mention and very cordially to thank the following officers of my staff:—

Major Gwatkin has been in charge of the 1st Section as Road Commandant since the beginning of the campaign. His energy and tact have been conspicuous, and the services he has rendered most valuable.

Major Watson, Suffolk Regiment, took over charge of the 2nd Section early in May. He has attended to his duties most assiduously and with marked success.

Major Barrow, 12th B. I., as Base Commandant at Nowshera, has had very important duties to perform, especially at the beginning of the campaign. In their discharge he has shewn great tact and aptitude for organisation. His report on the operations at the Base will be furnished at the close of the campaign.

I would desire to bring to special notice the services of Colonel Hamilton, D. S. O., and Captain Kemball, the Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General, and Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General of the Lines of Communication.

The first of these officers has had long staff experience and possesses much skill in organisation, and his services have been to me invaluable.

Captain Kemball has exceptional acquaintance with the authorised plans of mobilisation, and has given me the fullest assistance in carrying them out.

Finally, my thanks are due to the political officers with whom I have been associated I propose to refer to their services more fully on a future occasion.

Dated Simla, the 23rd October 1895.

From—Major-General E. STEDMAN, C. B., late General of Communications, Chitral Relief Force,

To—The Chief Staff Officer, Chitral Relief Force.

I have the honour to submit the following despatch on the working of the communications of the Chitral Relief Force from the 14th July, the date of my former despatch, to the 6th October, the date on which I quitted Nowshera.

2. No active military operations took place between those dates, but a few casualties continued to occur from time to time owing to the fanatical attacks of individuals.

3. I have but little to add on the general working of the several departments under my orders, having already dealt fully with these matters in my former despatch.

4. The evacuation of the Baraul and Jandol valleys and the adoption of the Panj-kora river route from Sado to Chutiatan were difficult operations, requiring much forethought and careful arrangement, coming as they did at a time when over 40,000 maunds of stores had to be pushed up rapidly to Chitral territory from India. Their accomplishment without delay or abandonment of stores was very largely due to the excellent work done by the departmental and regimental officers of the Commissariat-Transport Department, and by Major Watson, the Road Commandant.

5. About the middle of August the intimation of the Government policy with regard to Chitral and the Swat valley, and the consequent prospect of the early return of the force to India rendered it possible to take steps to reduce the transport in the field.

With a view to economy, hired animals were as far as possible first discharged, the Government transport being retained to the end for the return of the troops.

6. Owing to the previous existence of rinderpest, foot and mouth, and other contagious diseases, special precautions had to be taken on the return of such large masses of transport and the inevitable accumulation of animals at the Base pending discharge. The measures taken by Veterinary-Lieutenant-Colonel Poyser were, however, most satisfactory in their result. Veterinary Officers were stationed by him at various camps along the line to inspect all transport passing through, while no animal was allowed to cross the bridge over the Kabul river at Nowshera without final inspection by a Veterinary subordinate.

7. A Standing Transport Committee, which had been formed under the presidency of Colonel Lynch of the 12th B. C., examined all Government transport returning from the front and eliminated from the transport, retained for the peace establishment, all unfit and inferior animals. The subsequent disposal of rejected animals was carried out by the Commissariat Department under instructions from the Commissary-General, Punjab Command. Before leaving Nowshera, I arranged for the assembly of a 2nd Transport Committee with Lieutenant-Colonel Radcliffe, Base Commissariat Officer, as President, in order to relieve Colonel Lynch's Committee, which had been on duty for over two months. When I left Nowshera, the dispersion of the transport was proceeding rapidly and satisfactorily under these arrangements, nearly a thousand animals being despatched daily by road and rail.

8. About the middle of August two regiments of British Infantry, one regiment of Native Infantry, and one company of Sappers commenced their march to India; the 4th Brigade was broken up, and a redistribution of commands took place.

Shortly after, the Reserve Brigade at Mardan was broken up, the troops returning to their stations, and the garrison detailed for Chitral began to move up the line. At the beginning of September, another regiment of British Infantry, a British Mountain Battery, and the Imperial Service Transport Corps were ordered back to India; they were followed ten days later by another regiment, the Buffs.

On the 17th September orders were received from Divisional Head-Quarters detailing the movements of the rest of the force to the Base. I thereon issued a detailed programme with the necessary subsidiary orders (a copy of which is attached *) for all movements within my Command, *viz.*, from Serai downwards.

The withdrawal of the troops was carried out strictly in accordance with these orders without a hitch of any sort.

9. Considering the large number of men and transport animals that had to be fed during this movement, I think Colonel Yaldwyn and the officers of the Commissariat Department deserve much credit for not only having met every requirement, but also at the same time having so arranged that no stores were abandoned at any of the posts vacated.

10. The whole of the railway movements from the Base were arranged by Lieutenant-Colonel A. F. Barrow, C.M.G., Base Commandant, in communication with the various railways concerned. From two to four troop trains ran daily in addition to the ordinary traffic, and the trains containing transport animals, and I understand that the railway arrangements left nothing to be desired. I may here mention that under orders from the Quarter Master General in India, the British troops proceeding by rail were

* See Appendix XX.

accommodated up to the 1st October at 4 instead of 6 men per compartment, to avoid as far as possible ill effects from the heat. With the same object 1 lb. of ice was, in accordance with Quarter Master General's orders, issued to each British soldier at every camp after crossing the Malakand until arrival at final destination.

11. Colonel Barrow, to whom my best thanks are due, has brought to my notice the good services rendered by his Staff Officer, Captain Somerset, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General at the Base. That Officer supervised the arrival and despatch by rail of all troops from the beginning of the concentration until the last unit had left.

12. Considering the well-known unhealthiness during the autumn months of the rice valleys in which most of the native troops were quartered, and through which the British troops had to pass during the withdrawal, the sickness in the force was remarkably slight. Although all sick and weakly men had been sent down in July, in anticipation of an earlier withdrawal of the force, I cannot but attribute the satisfactory health of the troops in a considerable measure to the issue of prophylactics which was made on the recommendation of Surgeon-Colonel Thompson, P.M.O., Line of Communications. Two useful circulars on sanitary precautions, drawn up by that officer, were also distributed to Officers Commanding corps.

13. With regard to the Telegraph Department, I must add that the withdrawal of the troops necessitated the dismantlement of the telegraph line between Kala Drosh and Chak-dara. This operation was carried out as the last troops withdrew without causing the least delay to the latter, and in a manner that reflects much credit on Mr. Dempsters' arrangements.

14. I would take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to Mr. C. S. Hastings, who joined me in the month of June as Political Officer for the Line of Communications. Mr. Hastings' wide experience of frontier tribes and sound judgment rendered his services of great value, and I am much indebted to him.

15. I would also specially bring to your notice the services of Major G. H. W. O'Sullivan, R.E., who succeeded Major Gwatkin, as Road Commandant, 1st Section, in June. Major O'Sullivan performed heavy and important duties during the return of the troops in a trying climate, and the satisfactory arrangements were largely due to his exertions.

16. In conclusion, I would add that before crossing the frontier I halted some days on the Malakand and made arrangements to complete the requirements in tentage, transport, ammunition, etc., of the Malakand Brigade, in accordance with the instructions furnished by Army Head-Quarters. Before I left Nowshera, on the 6th October, the whole of the transport required by Brigadier-General Waterfield was on its way to the Malakand, and the full complement of heavy tents for his brigade had been completed by handing over to him the E. P. and S. S. tents that had been in use on the Line of Communications with Field Hospitals and Rest Camps; while the reserves of ammunition had been made up by dropping those of corps returning to India at the Malakand as the corps in question marched through.

APPENDIX XX.

Orders issued by the G. O. C. Lines of Communication, relative to the withdrawal of the Relief Force.

All corps and hospitals in the Line of Communications command will leave their present stations on the date shown for their first march.*

No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery and the 4th Sikh Infantry will leave Nowshera on the 1st October, and march to Kohat under arrangements which will be made by the Punjab Command.

All Field and Veterinary Hospitals will be demobilised at Nowshera, on completion of which the Base Commandant will despatch the establishments to their respective stations in India.

No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery and the 37th Dogras will remain at Khar, and 30th Punjab Infantry at Dargai and Jalala, until further orders.

The Base Commandant will arrange the necessary railway transport and the through timings to destinations, communicating the same to the Deputy Adjutants General, Punjab and Bengal Commands, and the General Officers Commanding Districts concerned.

Officers Commanding Corps will at once telegraph to the Base Commandant their strength in officers, rank and file, followers, chargers, ponies and mules, weight of baggage, camp equipage and ammunition, for which railway transport will be required.

Officers Commanding British Corps will also at once telegraph to the Chief Commissariat Officer, Chitral Relief Force, Chakdara, their marching strength in Europeans.


Rations will be drawn at each stage, the Base Commissariat arranging to send out the supplies required at Rushaki daily. From and including Mardan rations will only be supplied to Native troops and all followers on payment, but there is no objection to Officers Commanding making their own arrangements for rations at Mardan and onwards. Should they wish to do so, they must at once inform the Base Commissariat Officer, Nowshera, accordingly.

Arrangements for carriage will be made by the Divisional Transport Officer, but obligatory mules only will accompany corps beyond Dargai, any mules in excess being handed over to the Commissariat Transport Department at that place. Corps moving by rail will hand over their obligatory mules to the Base Transport Officer, Nowshera, as these mules will not be conveyed in the same trains as the troops.

Corps moving by road from Nowshera will be supplied with the necessary transport on the field service scale.

Field Hospitals equipped with E. P. tents will take them on to Nowshera, and there make them over to the Ordnance Depot.

* See table of dates attached.



APPENDIX XXI.

Extract from the Report by Brigadier-General W. F. GATACRE, D. S. O., on the passage of the Laorai Pass, April 1895.

The main points to be attended to in any similar operation of this kind, appear to be :—

A careful reconnaissance of the ground with working parties previous to any attempt at crossing, to ensure dangerous snow bridges and streams being avoided, bad places marked, gradients zig-zagged, where rock or earth crops out, snow cut away if not too deep, culverts made and roughly lined with stones or branches to direct or divert falling water from the track, channels cut above the track and below snowdrifts or avalanches where they lie across line of route.

Advance-guard to be liberally supplied with tools (heavy pattern), carried by hand, as mules cannot keep up in unbeaten snow, strong working and escort parties to assist laden animals and carry loads over dangerous or very steep places.

Where night marches are made, to secure advantage from frozen snow, hand torches, lanterns, and bonfires should be employed freely, and guides left at all turns of the track to prevent men or animals going astray.

As a rule nothing should move before daybreak.

Men should precede animals to ensure the track being consolidated.

Animals to be driven, not led, and under no circumstances should they be linked together.

Loads should be evenly divided on either side of the animal, preferably to a single load on the top of the saddle.

I think the experience gained in the passage of the Laorai pass (I have now crossed it nine times in connection with our advance) shows us that a column accompanied by pack animals can, if reasonable time is available, go anywhere and surmount what at first sight appear to be difficulties, but which, when carefully gone into, are found to be nothing more than what can be easily accomplished with perseverance and careful consideration.

In some cases, especially with small detachments, where time is an object, the coolie transport of the country is convenient, inasmuch as it saves the time occupied in cutting out roads for pack animals, and avoids the extra train of supplies obligatory for animals—grain and rations for drivers. Coolies, however, are unsatisfactory to deal with; they are easily frightened, very independent, have to be fed, foul the camping-grounds, and are difficult to control, as so few officers are thoroughly acquainted with their language or customs. Besides which, it appears to me to be of the highest importance to maintain the principle that a force properly equipped should be self-containing and can move in any country without being dependent on local aid, which may fail at any moment.

In forwarding the above report to the Quarter-Master-General, Sir Robert Low remarked :—

“The report shows the difficulties that had to be surmounted by the example and indomitable energy of Brigadier-General Gatacre, and the strength and endurance of the troops under his control; the passing of troops, stores and animals over the pass in the state in which it then was reflects the greatest credit on the 3rd Brigade.”

APPENDIX XXII.

Extract from a Report by the Commissary General-in-Chief to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 5878, dated Simla, the 3rd August 1896.

119. *Summary.*—The experience gained during the Chitral Relief Operations shows :—

- (a) The necessity for having an organization and a worked-out scheme for collection of transport on mobilisation.
- (b) The necessity for trained and more experienced officers at the Base and at Stages and Depôts, as well as an increase generally to the establishments authorised for these posts to commence work with.
- (c) The desirability of placing specially qualified officers in charge of hired transport.
- (d) The necessity for some scheme for a reserve of qualified attendants.
- (e) The desirability of placing in regimental charge the ordnance and line gear for the grass mules, which corps maintain for mobilisation purposes.
- (f) The comparative suitability of the several classes of the animals for transport work, *viz.*:—

Mules are the best transport animals for work, in difficult parts of mountainous districts, as well as for employment with troops.

Camels.—Next to mules, camels are the best transport animals for convoy work, as also for employment with troops, they fare better however in the former case in that they are not kept under their loads for such long periods, and get better opportunities for grazing.

Ponies are not so suitable for pack as for draught work, they do well as riding animals.

Donkeys, though owing to their slow pace ill suited for employment with troops, are excellent animals for stage convoy work and on comparatively level ground; local breeds, however, require improving to render them equal to carrying a 160 lb load.

Pack Bullocks, like the donkeys, owing to slowness of pace, are not well suited for employment with troops, but do well on stage convoy work.

- (g) The practicability of transporting camels by rail, and the desirability of detrain-
ing them *en route*, in cases of long journeys, in view to their being fed and watered, whenever possible.
- (h) The unsuitability of barley, crushed or whole, as a grain ration for camels on service, which should consist of gram only.
- (i) The unsuitability of our donkey gear.
- (f) The unsuitability of our camel *palan*.

APPENDIX XXIII.

Extracts from the "Report of the working of the Intelligence Branch, Chitral Relief Force," by CAPTAIN F. NIXON, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General for Intelligence, 10th September 1895.

The Intelligence Branch has worked smoothly, but I submit the following points for consideration :—

2. Field Service Departmental Code, "Intelligence and Survey," para. 12, Section III., does not distinctly lay down that the lithographers and photographers are under the orders and at the disposal of the Intelligence Branch, which it is presumed is intended; undoubtedly they should be, as the reproduction of sketches is to be expected from them. On this campaign they have been under the orders of the Commanding Royal Engineer.

The Hektograph or the Acme duplicator, the latter of which was supplied on this occasion to the Intelligence Branch, cannot compare with the ferrotype process, but for the latter process frames of various different sizes should be supplied, varying from 18" x 9" to two feet square. As a method of reproduction of writings and sketches the process by the "Acme," which requires the matter to be rewritten with a special ink, is very hard to work in a dry and dusty climate, and then gives a poor result, comparing very unfavourably with the process by the Trypograph or the Cyclostyle.

* * * * *

I would very strongly recommend that a pentagraph (English pattern) be added to the Intelligence Office equipment, and, in support of this proposal, would note that on many occasions during this campaign I have been desirous of having details from large scale sketches worked into smaller scale maps to send out with individual officers, etc.; to do so it has been necessary to resort to the tedious process of square reduction, introducing the new matter by freehand copying.

* * * * *

3. One clerk cannot do the *whole* work satisfactorily, however much the Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General takes upon his own shoulders to do, and hence something suffers, either dissemination of information or the ordinary work, and hence my recommendation for the addition of the draftsman to the absolutely necessary clerk.

APPENDIX XXIV.

Extracts from the "Report on Signalling Operations with the Chitral Relief Force, 1895," by CAPTAIN T. E. O'LEARY, Superintendent, Army Signalling, 14th September 1895.

* * * * *

Time did not admit of the signallers being worked together for a few days, previous to brigades being separated. It would have been a great advantage as thorough uniformity in all details would have been ensured. This, I believe, has been frequently advocated by Superintendents of Signalling in former expeditions, but owing to want of time it has not been found practicable.

Separate parties of Signallers.—Three parties of signallers (24 men) separate from those with regiments, joined the force. These three parties of 8 men each were equipped by me and attached to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades respectively. These parties have been invaluable. With the long line of communications, the number of signallers with regiments would have been quite inadequate; moreover, these separate parties were of great use when a station had to be occupied away from where regiments were stationed.

Communication.—An almost uninterrupted line of visual signalling was maintained in advance of the telegraph from Jalala to Chitral, so by this means messages could be sent from the very furthest portion of the force to the terminal telegraph office, *i.e.*, the last telegraph office established.

Engagements.—During the engagements, arrangements were so made that messages could be sent from the General Officer Commanding Chitral Relief Force and Brigadiers to any portion of the force engaged. This was very satisfactorily performed, more especially during the action at the Malakand Pass. These actions have clearly shown that it is absolutely necessary in hill warfare that there should always be with every corps a good supply of well-trained and intelligent signallers.

Numbers of Signallers.—In all, 141 British and 129 Native signallars were employed during the expedition. I cannot speak too highly of the manner in which they have worked. British and Native Signallers worked together, and I found it answered well, more especially where a Native understood English.

Message Form.—Difficulty has been felt on former expeditions regarding the message form used, as it was different to that used by the Telegraph Department; but as they have been now assimilated matters worked smoothly, messages being taken by visual signallers and forwarded on by telegraph, and *vice versa*.

Message Book.—The Army Signalling Message Book, India Army Form 369, might with advantage be increased in size so as to contain 300 forms instead as of 150 as at present, and pieces of carbon be increased to 6 instead of 2. The paper on which it is printed might be of a thinner texture so as to readily admit of the carbon copy being taken.

Flag poles.—I experienced great difficulty at times in always having a sufficient quantity of poles ready for use. On enquiry as to where they were, the answer invariably given was that they were lost or broken, more especially the 5 feet 6 inch pole used with the large flag. To obviate the recurrence of this I desire to recommend a jointed pole for use with the large flag.

Rockets.—Some description of rocket, easy to carry so as to be able to attract attention at night, would be of very great use to signalling parties.

Hatchets.—Many instances have occurred showing the necessity for some description of hatchet being issued to signallers. They would be extremely useful to clear away obstructions, such as bushes, etc., as well as for cooking purposes.

Tents and cooking pots.—Great inconvenience was experienced on many occasions when a party of signallers (British) were detached from their regiments, regarding tents and cooking pots. On field service the signallers of a corps are always liable to be sent off in two or even more parties. By the present arrangement of having only one tent for them and their feeding with their companies, this becomes impossible.

Messages.—55,590 messages were sent, received and transmitted up to 14th September 1895.

APPENDIX XXV.

Extract from a "Report by F. E. DEMPSTER, Esq., Chief Telegraph Officer, Chitral Relief Force, on the Telegraph Operations carried out."

Mobilisation was ordered on the 20th March 1895, and the place of assembly chosen

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1 Chief Telegraph Officer. | was Rawal Pindi. From the Rawal Pindi |
| 2 Royal Engineers and 2 Civil Assistant Superintendents. | reserve store depôt 200 miles of the "semi-permanent" system with equipment for 20 |
| 4 Sub-Assistant Superintendents. | offices, and 36 miles of field cable were sent to |
| 18 Unattached List Telegraph Masters. | the Base, Hoti Mardan. |
| 17 Civil Signallers. | * * * * * |
| 51 Military Signallers. | |
| 6 Native Sub-Inspectors. | |
| 20 Native Linemen. | |

The strength of the party selected is shown marginally. By the 25th March all who were required to start work with, had arrived at Hoti Mardan.

- 1 European N.-C. O., R. E.
- 5 Sapper Sub-Inspectors.
- 15 Sapper Linemen.
- 150 Workmen.

- 1 Base Store-keeper.
- 1 Sub-Assistant Superintendent for charge of Departmental Junction Office.

12. The advanced construction party commenced work on the 26th March and finished into Chitral on the 17th May, in which period they erected 170 miles of line in 37 working days. This is a by no means high average rate. On only three occasions were the party unable to complete either to the nearest post, or to finish the stores they had. Had it been possible to provide more transport and to allow the party always to proceed, the average rate of progress would have been much higher. Except in the most difficult country, such as the section between Dir and Gujar, the party could always do 10 to 12 miles a day if there was sufficient transport.

20. On the 14th July orders were received to erect a line along the Panjkora river from Panjkora post to Dir. * * * * Work on the Panjkora route was started on the 16th July and was completed on the 23rd July. This section was about 40 miles of posts and 45 miles of wire.

27. The amount of work done by the party during the campaign has been :—

Miles of wire erected	454
Miles of posts	279
Miles of wire dismantled	315
Miles of posts dismantled	212
Offices opened	19

The average rate of construction was about five miles a day, 12 miles being the maximum. The average rate of dismantlement was about 12 miles a day, maximum being 9 miles of posts and 22 miles of wire.

* * * * *

Traffic.

3. The offices were divided into two classes, and the whole system divided into four sections. The objects kept in view were to afford the utmost facilities for the through traffic and to keep it moving continuously, second, to afford full facilities for convoy working, and, lastly, to utilise the wires as much as possible for general work.

4. The system was divided as follows:—

- No. 1 Section.—Nowshera to Khar with intermediate offices at Mardan, Jalala, Dargai, and Malakand.
- No. 2 Section.—Khar to Mundah with intermediate offices at Chakdara, Serai and Panjkora.
- No. 3 Section.—Mundah to Dir with intermediate offices at Kanbat, Janbatai and Bandai.
- No. 4 Section.—Dir to Chitral with offices at Gujar, Ziarat, Ashreth, Drosh and Gairat.

* * * * *

*Extract from Director General of Telegraphs, No. 126-T. dated Calcutta, 11th
February 1896.*

7. The message traffic was very heavy throughout the campaign. The Superintendent of the Check Office reports that between March and October inclusive, State messages were carried in connection with the Chitral Relief Force between India and the Field Telegraph system of the value of ₹1,23,745, and that, in addition, service messages, which were transmitted *free*, of the estimated value of ₹5,15,005* traversed the field lines only. The interchange of messages between the telegraph offices and Helio stations is reported to have worked satisfactorily and without any friction. Press messages at the early part of the campaign were considerably delayed owing to the block of State messages on the lines, as the rules require that State messages of any class must have precedence of all private and press messages. It has been suggested for the consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief whether the rules should not provide for the General Officer Commanding being authorised, when necessary, to permit a limited amount of press matter, classed urgent, to have precedence over State messages classed ordinary or deferred.

* Calculated at the tariff for messages of the ordinary class.

8. The lines were well maintained—91 interruptions only occurred during the six months ending September, aggregating 610 hours in duration, but 46 of these, of a duration in all of 371 hours, were due to the enemy cutting the wires at night.

9. Questions in connection with the packing and transport of telegraph stores, the best form of battery cell and other technical details of the equipment are receiving attention. The use on field service of so-called dry cells, which are portable, always ready for immediate use and work with a minimum of attention is, however, a matter of some importance, and we have under trial in the Indian climate all the newest patterns of these articles. Several kinds were used in Chitral, and though they worked satisfactorily they are not perfect.

General.

The Department was able to be of some service to the Royal Engineers by supplying them with wire for bridging, and like purposes. Altogether 34 miles of 600lb wire (which was specially sent up from India), 62 miles of 300 lb wire and 5 miles of 150 lb wire were handed over. Numerous petty issues were also made at various times for wire entanglements, hutting purposes, and such like. Field posts were also found to make most excellent water-pipes and were used to some extent for that.

2. At Mundah wire fences with electric alarms on them were run up as an experiment to keep off rifle thieves. The arrangement consists of a lever which is clamped to a wire, and so arranged that if anybody comes against the wire a small weighted lever drops causing a bell to ring. The trial was not conclusive: the only thing was that no rifle thefts occurred at Mundah after the alarms were fitted, whether *propter hoc* or *post hoc* is not so easy to decide. In any opinion such arrangements should be given an exhaustive trial in camps-of-exercise, so as to familiarise men with their use. All such automatic arrangements also possess the inherent defect of going off if hit against by an animal. This of course turns the guard out unnecessarily. Where there is heavy jungle though, I am convinced of their utility.

3. At Kanbat moveable bells were put up for the out-pickets. Lines were run from the quarter guard to the outer line of defence, to points whence the pickets usually went out. From the outer lines a drum of cable on a barrow was carried out by the pickets laying the cable as they went. Fixed on the drum was a signalling key. In the quarter guard was a telephone indicator, and each picket was joined through this to a bell. When each picket reached its position, it rang once, the indicator number in the quarter guard fell, thus informing the officer in charge that the picket had taken up its position. In case of need ringing the bell would call out assistance, the indicator number showing the picket that was calling. This plan also had not a sufficiently lengthened trial to prove conclusively its usefulness. It would probably be very useful in heavy cover, and I think should be tried in camps-of-exercise.

APPENDIX XXVI.

Extracts from report by SURGEON-CAPTAIN LUARD, I.M.S., Senior Medical Officer of the Gilgit Column.

When the Gilgit column marched in March, it was accompanied by an extemporised field hospital, and marched to Mastuj in two detachments, which the Medical Officer, 32nd Pioneers, and myself respectively accompanied. Transport was short, so for several marches all the field hospital kit and equipment was carried by the Balti kahars, in addition to empty doolies. The crossing of the pass resulted in a good many casualties from frostbite and snow ophthalmia, but except for this and for casualties in action, a good state of health was maintained by officers, men and followers throughout the march. The Medical Officer, 32nd Pioneers, was with the advanced party, and attended them through the first fight at Chakalwat.

Mastuj being relieved, the sick, wounded and field hospital were located there. At the second (and last) fight, which occurred at Nisa Gol, one march beyond Mastuj, both Medical Officers, three Hospital Assistants and as many doolies as possible from Mastuj were present. That night the wounded, who were promptly attended during the action, bivouacked with the force at Sanoghar. Next day they were brought back to Mastuj on charpoys obtained from a village near, carried by Balti coolies and prisoners.

The sick and wounded remained a few weeks at Mastuj, and when convalescent were sent down, together with the invalids received from Chitral, to Gilgit in successive convoys, mostly on ponies. I tried to arrange for the sick and wounded to be sent down to India by the Dir route. It was shorter by three or four hundred miles than the Gilgit route, and would have saved them a good many weary marches over hill paths, precipices and passes. I had no opportunity of personally visiting Chitral, and the suggestion addressed to the Senior Medical Officer there was not acted on, as the road was considered too difficult.

26. *Casualties in action and their character.*—The casualties in action were as follows:—

	BRITISH OFFICERS.		NATIVE OFFICERS.		MEN.		FOLLOWERS.		TOTAL.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Siege of Chitral	3	3	1	21	53	5	6	30	66
Captain Ross' party . . .	1	1	1	...	45	9	6	...	53	10
Lieutenant Edwards' party.	...	1	1	...	54	...	2	...	57	1
Siege of Mastuj	1	1	1	1
Relief force	2	6	17	6	19
TOTAL . . .	1	5	5	3	127	80	13	6	156	97

Nine of the wounded subsequently died, viz. :—

- 4 From wounds of abdomen.
- 2 " " " lung and chest.
- 1 " " " spinal cord.
- 2 " " " complicated by dysentery and asthma.

Casualties from disease; their character and prevention.—Frostbite and snow blindness caused 7 and 35 admissions respectively (exclusive of many slight cases treated out of hospital, and of cases that occurred prior to March 1st). Owing to the urgency of the marches, not permitting of choosing days and seasons, and to deficiency in spectacles and suitable foot-gear, some casualties from these causes were unavoidable.

Some patients lost the tips of their fingers or toes, but all recovered without permanent disablement. No lives were lost. The force marched over the pass on the 1st April and succeeding days after several days' heavy snowfall. The soft deep snow necessitated frequent halts for the baggage, all of which was carried on coolies, pony transport being unable to pass. The men thus got cold and numb, and arrived very tired on a shelterless camping ground of melting snow, in some cases long after dark. It froze hard all night, and before dawn the march began again. Altogether it was not surprising that a few men were frostbitten. The sepoys marched in ammunition boots and one pair of socks, grass shoes not being available. The followers were given double

socks made out of torn up blankets, and though most of them had no other foot covering, none of them were seriously frostbitten.

Extra rum, tea, *gur*, *ghi* and meat were recommended and issued on both sides of the pass when available.

In my opinion, however well prepared men are in clothing and foot covering, frostbite can hardly be avoided if forced marches are made with baggage on these passes, extending far into the night, when the snow is soft and recent, so that the men arrive cold and numb, and cannot or do not take proper precautions in the darkness.

I think a supply of grass shoes (3 per man), socks for same (2 per man) and snow-glasses (1 per man), sufficient for 1,000 men, should be kept in reserve stock at Gilgit for emergencies like this; grass shoes and socks are the best wear, as they keep the foot warm without cramping toes.

The cases were treated as usual by friction, and when the hands were affected, by swinging the arms: warm drinks were given, warm puttis applied. The necrosed parts were removed gradually after the line of demarkation developed, with a free use of anti-septics. Some severe cases which occurred in Chitral earlier in the year were treated by partial amputation of the feet at an early stage, which gives a sounder scar, but has the disadvantage of greatly shortening the foot and so crippling a man's walking powers. Natural separation, aided by the scissors, leaves much more of the length of the foot, and the stump skins over slowly but surely, leaving a serviceable foot.

Snow ophthalmia took the form of an acute watery conjunctivitis with much injection, pain, intolerance of light, and sluggish semi-dilated pupils. Most cases rapidly recovered in a few days by the use of warm boric lotions, and a dark room. In a few cases some purulent discharge with swelling of the lids and corneal ulceration occurred, requiring the use of atropine, fomentations, and silver nitrate applications. These cases resembled, and probably were, cases of old corneal ulcers re-aroused.

The snow blindness seemed to be caused as much by the wind and cold as by the glare: in the Europeans, *i.e.*, men with fair skins, the same elements took effect also upon their noses and lips which swelled and peeled till they were raw: eyes and face were affected by the same cause. In the absence of cold and wind, for instance, in mild spring or early summer, one may cross snow passes without any trouble from snow ophthalmia.

Of other diseases, ague was the most frequent, owing to cold and exposure in constitutions liable to this disease. Some severe cases of remittent fever occurred at Mastuj fort, which is built upon the edge of a marsh, and is not a healthy location for troops.

Dysentery, diarrhoea, rheumatism, dyspepsia, and contusions, caused a good many admissions. Pneumonia, in spite of the exposure, was rare, only seventeen cases occurring over the whole force from Gilgit to Chitral in four months, and none fatal. Pneumonia is singularly rare in these parts and never epidemic, the air being clear and dry, though cold.

There were a few cases of scurvy in out-lying posts, but little or none in the marching force.

Several of the 14th Sikhs, both during the winter at Gilgit and on their return from Chitral, suffered from a severe form of malarial anæmia, with cardiac failure, and intermittent attacks of diarrhoea. Three died from this cause. The 14th Sikh detachment had some men of weak constitution, several of whom died, who should perhaps never have come up to Gilgit.

The general health of the troops was good. The 32nd Pioneers did not suffer from scurvy during the winter though exposed to precisely the same conditions as the regiment they relieved. Both the Medical Officer of the 32nd Pioneers and myself attribute their freedom from scurvy in no small measure to the extra ration of $\frac{1}{2}$ lb ata recommended by us (to prevent scurvy) and sanctioned this winter. This enabled the regiment to maintain its health and come up for field service in the excellent condition and spirit they did.

The Kashmir troops showed their usual hardiness and fitness throughout.

The followers, including about 2,000 Baltis and 1,000 to 1,500 local coolies, were well treated and fed on the whole, and had little sickness; they were mostly discharged when the hot weather, which is their sickly season up here, began.

The relief force marched without tents, using waterproof sheets or durries as shelters; in the higher altitudes they got shelter in houses, except in the camp near the top of the Shandur pass.

APPENDIX XXVII.

Extracts from a letter from the Principal Medical Officer, Her Majesty's Forces in India, to the Adjutant General in India, No. 2724, dated Simla, 16th November 1896.

	Average strength.	No. of admissions.	Ratio of admissions to strength.
British troops	2,787	4,268	151 ³
Native troops	4,581	3,119	68 ²
Followers	7,118	5,837	54 ⁶

2. The amount of sickness which occurred with the force is shown in the margin, from which it will be observed that British troops suffered more than twice as much as Native troops.

3. The principal diseases amongst British troops were malarial fevers, diarrhœa, dysentery, enteric fever, and venereal, and amongst Natives, malarial fevers, diarrhœa, dysentery, and debility.

4. Malarial diseases occurred chiefly amongst the troops located in the valleys and amongst men so predisposed who contracted chills, while diarrhœa and dysentery were attributed to chills and the indigestible character of the rations.

5. Enteric fever made its appearance principally in the Bedfordshire Regiment and King's Royal Rifles at Khar and Laram Kotal. The first case occurred on the 29th April 1895, and is supposed to have been imported from India, while the spread of the disease is attributable to the fouling of the ground (which is inevitable in standing camps); the lack of conservancy establishment; the contamination of food through the agency of dust and flies, and the necessary crowding, dirt, and intimate contact in which the men lived.

6. Venereal diseases amongst British troops were prevalent only in the early phase of the campaign, and were chiefly contracted at Nowshera and Hoti Mardan *en route* to the front.

7. Debility amongst Native troops was the result of hardship and unsuitable food and probably a malarial taint amongst the men attacked.

8. The casualties in action consisted of 1 officer and 16 men killed, while 12 British officers and 69 Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men were wounded, of whom 1 officer and 4 men died. Out of a total of 43 admissions amongst British troops for wounds, 4 died and 39 recovered, and amongst Native troops there were 34 admissions, all of whom, with one exception, were ultimately discharged to duty.

9. Three British officers died from diseases contracted on service (2 enteric fever and 1 abscess of liver), and there were 128 deaths amongst British soldiers (94 enteric fever, 20 dysentery and 14 other diseases). Amongst Native troops there were 45 deaths mostly from remittent fever, dysentery, diarrhœa, bronchitis and pneumonia. The number of deaths amongst followers were 125, the principal causes being dysentery, remittent fever, diarrhœa and wounds.

APPENDIX XXVIII.

Extracts from the Report of the Inspecting Veterinary Officer, Chitral Relief Force, No. 1000-L., dated Laram, 13th September 1895.

3. The General Veterinary Hospital was, unfortunately, not permitted to leave Umballa until after the concentration of all the troops.

5. The General Veterinary Hospital, complete, should be at the base before the troops arrive, and being a small unit, might readily be moved up by passenger train. The services of its Veterinary Officers and establishment, and its general utility, were absolutely lost at the most important period, *viz.*, during concentration.

6. The despatch of the Base Veterinary Store Depôt, with the stationery depôt attached, might be delayed until after concentration, but its Veterinary Officer might precede it for duty at the base.

7. The junior Veterinary Officers of Field Veterinary Hospitals might also be made available for duty there before concentration, and some *salutries* might report themselves early enough to the Veterinary Officer in charge of the General Veterinary Hospital to be utilized in detraining and at other inspections, also in the sick lines and in dressing minor cases in the transport lines, and in a variety of ways.

9. In this instance three brigades had actually marched out from the base, each with 2,500 animals and one pair of Brigade Transport Veterinary Field Chests, and there was only one Veterinary Officer available, whereas three were required.

10. Field Veterinary Hospitals cannot arrive at the base too early, as it may be advisable to push them forward to some advanced post, or with brigades.

MULES.

52. The Government mules commenced the campaign in every excellent order and condition, their appearance and equipments being practically perfect in every respect; nothing could be finer, but there is considerable room for improvement in the "*Draby*," or muleteer.

53. The "grass mules" drawn from Native Cavalry regiments, never maintained as good condition as the Commissariat Transport mules; they started with less, and are an inferior class.

56. The hired mules are mostly of a still inferior order, but very excellent transport under the common country *soondka* and pads when not over-weighted. As a rule, they receive a small ration of grain on service, but may have to pick up all or part of their grass ration either during or after convoy duty; this, however, is not always practical or satisfactory to the animal, the owner or the service; it answers as long as the green cereals or other crops are obtainable for the cutting or grazing.

57. Animals hired for what is called "maundage" are expected to be loaded up to what they can carry in comparative comfort. So far the system is sound, but owners frequently overtax their animals to get the most out of the arrangement; and both the owners and the animals are difficult to manage and control when contagious and infectious diseases attack the latter.

PONIES.

58. The Imperial Service Transport ponies sent up by the Jeypore State arrived in good working condition, and were turned out in a thoroughly careful and workmanlike manner in gear, clothing and equipment generally. The same may be said of their useful tonga-rigged carts, as well as of their drivers, one per pair of ponies.

59. The only thing against these ponies was their being entire.

60. The Gwalior Transport ponies (geldings) arrived in poor condition, and, though not having the fire and dash of the Jeypore animals, gave no trouble, a very desirable point everywhere. Their tonga carts, gear and equipments, though differing somewhat in detail, were equally as good and workmanlike as Jeypore's.

64. Glanders-farcy was discovered in the Gwalior ponies at the end of April and a troop was isolated at Jalala. Eleven cases were destroyed, the last 3 cases between 15th and 21st June. Before these valuable transport corps are again sent on service, a Veterinary Officer should be ordered to personally examine every animal in their own States.

ASSES.

68. The Government donkeys were a good lot and well able to carry 2 maunds on the level, but this they cannot easily do over zigzag rock and boulder roads that require climbing up and scrambling down, because, for one reason, the loads are not sufficiently fixed on the saddle devised, and it is not always put on to the best advantage, the breasting and breechings being too loose and have their attachments too low on the pads.

69. The lining of the *soonda* and the pad to which it is attached is too smooth, hence the tendency for load and saddle to slip round for want of grip where the girthing is slack.

70. If a saddle of the present Ordnance pattern—than which no better is likely to be devised—could be made and adopted to the size of the ass, and suitable for the support of its couple of maunds, donkey transport might become extensively and satisfactorily adopted.

CAMELS.

75. Under well directed selection and with subsequent correct treatment and feeding were, as always, satisfactory transport, even over hill roads at fair slopes; and as regards the Government animals, this ought never to be otherwise, but it is recorded that many of the purchases were young and immature, and too old, and physically unfit for work.

76. As regards hired ones, it was explained that "owners would not let their good ones go unless their young and weak ones were taken as well"—a sufficient reason why I have no more to say on the subject of hiring.

77. During part of May and June, camels between Khar and Kumbat were much affected by diarrhoea, which, in the Field Veterinary Hospital of Serai, was not fatal, whilst, in the Mundah one, the deaths were numerous.

BULLOCKS.

80. A few siege-train bullocks were utilized from Campbellpore to take pontoons over the Malakand to Khar or rather Chukdara; they returned almost at once, but a few were temporarily detained with foot and mouth disease at Dargai. Later they took the pontoon carriages to Sado over the Kamrani pass.

81. Army Transport bullocks were utilized as staging animals up to Durgai with wheeled ambulance and also in the Army Transport cart; they, too, contracted foot and mouth disease at all posts, and rinderpest at Jalala.

82. Hired pack bullocks worked chiefly from Khar to Mundah, later over a smaller extent of line. It was very good transport where well selected, but always possessed the dual disadvantages of being liable to contract foot and mouth disease, which cripples them, and rinderpest, which generally kills them.

SLAUGHTER CATTLE—SHEEP AND GOATS.

85. The slaughter animals, as a rule, were in poor condition, and continuance of marching under a hot sun, without grazing time, considerably reduced it from day to day and induced a liability to incept diseases; and they gave us the first trouble in this respect on the line of communications.

86. If possible they should never march two days in succession, nor should the weakly be selected for marching, as they cannot keep up with the strong. On arrival they should always be reported to the Veterinary Officer, or to a *salutri*, for inspectional purposes, as one of the best means of checking the spread of epizootic diseases to which I have especially referred under another heading.

FORAGE.

116. Under reduced diet, and with constant pack work over the passes and hill and river bed roads, the pony transport absolutely failed, and, partly on my recommendation, the ponies were sent down towards India about the end of June, and many were sold by auction at Nowshera and other places, whilst more were distributed to various districts for feeding purposes before being offered for sale. Those unable to travel were destroyed. The mules on the contrary, many exceptions of course, withstood the hard work and scanty forage admirably well; those belonging to the Commissariat Transport Department much better than the native cavalry grass mules.

117. Cereal-*bhusa*, compressed or otherwise, is, without doubt, a very suitable campaigning diet, and may be considered most reliable for equines and bovines, so long as it is

kept dry and free from mould; and also for camels, especially the "*missa*" *bhoosa*, provided they can get a certain amount of suitable browsing or grazing. Hay-*bhoosa* in compression was very much relished, and when sound is a most excellent ration-stuff.

GRAIN.

118. Gram is doubtless the best for all animals, especially when well crushed, but I never saw this sufficiently well done.

121. Watermills might have been more extensively utilized for crushing from Khar to Chitral. When the crushing of grain is going on, some one who understands what crushed grain means should superintend the process. The ribbed roller mills—sent into the field—are not lasting: the smooth-wheeled roller mills by Messrs. Turner & Co., Ipswich, are far superior, especially the larger ones.

FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE.

130. Foot and mouth disease did not exist in *Government* cattle when the troops left Nowshera, but as soon as pack cattle were being collected there, by thousands, it was evident that diseased cattle had to be hired.

136. On the 9th April the slaughter cattle of the 3rd Brigade became affected at Khar, and those of the 1st—then halted there—on the 12th, and it appeared amongst the hired pack cattle on the 14th April. By the 16th April these latter were working up to Panjkora river, and on marching from Khar on the 18th, I inspected large numbers returning, and sent a crowd of these into isolation there. Two hundred inspected between Chakdara and Uch were also isolated at Chakdara.

137. On the 19th April, thirty were isolated out of a batch proceeding to 3rd Brigade at Mundah; and Veterinary-Lieutenant Williams shot 28 cows, 1 goat, and 1 sheep—all slaughter animals—at Gumbat.

139. It was now evident we were in for a wide-spread epizootic of foot and mouth disease, and, as had already been done in the rear posts, I established isolation depôts at all posts to receive the affected, which, on the 15th May, at Khar, contained 1,200 heads of hired pack (chiefly) and slaughter cattle, and where large numbers died or were destroyed and buried—burning not being practical.

142. By the 31st May there remained 708 cases, the majority at Khar, where 198 had been "relieved" to be readmitted for rinderpest, from which all died or were destroyed, and on the 30th June only 29 cases of foot and mouth disease remained at Khar, whilst at Jalala, where rinderpest had been rife, no cases there of that or foot and mouth disease were left in quarantine on 31st May.

143. No post escaped foot and mouth disease between Nowshera and Bandai (in imported slaughter cattle in this last), north of which no cases were imported, in this (imported) class. But there were no cattle, except a few slaughter animals, which had, evidently, escaped infection or not been noticed or reported, and the local cattle had not been affected as far as I could make out, excepting two cases at Ashreth in the second week of July.

146. The disease was neither virulent nor fatal in cattle in good condition, and such readily recovered in 10 or 14 days, but death frequently resulted from exhaustion induced by debility and exposure, rather than from foot and mouth disease, which, even under campaign difficulties, is not hard to cure.

154. Up to the 31st August from 1st April 3,675 cases of foot and mouth disease were admitted, 2,783 cured, 639 were relieved to be readmitted for rinderpest, 151 died, 95 were destroyed and 7 "remained" at Nowshera out of a batch of 8 admitted from some slaughter cattle taken from the Malakand or Dargai by the East Lancashire Regiment.

RINDERPEST.

155. Rinderpest made its first appearance in Jalala on 2nd May 1895 in two slaughter cattle affected with foot and mouth disease.

157. At Khar, on the 9th May, I observed the first of rinderpest in animals affected with, or recovering from, foot and mouth disease in the isolation depôts.

158. How rinderpest was here introduced I cannot say, but between the 9th May and the 21st August, after which no fresh cases occurred, out of 6,363 hired pack bullocks, 1,795 cases were admitted, 505 were cured, 1,290 died or were destroyed.

159. The disease was virulent at first, numbers were shot as hopeless. Many, when attacked, were affected with foot and mouth disease on recovering, and so low in condition as to make no stand against the attack. Burial was resorted to, burning not being practical. But little opportunity for treatment was afforded. Towards the middle of June the disease became less virulent and admissions less numerous, and a small percentage recovered.

166. Up to the end of July rinderpest prevailed in Dir, Goojar, Ashreth and Drosh in both country (chiefly) and Indian cattle; and it was heard of up to and beyond Chitral towards Mastuj. The Political Officer at Drosh (28th July) says that it was known there and thereabout and was then prevalent, that the natives cut the animals' throats and threw what they could not eat, and the carcasses of those that died, into the Chitral river or any tributary.

GLANDERS-FARCY.

169. In order to prevent or check the introduction of glanders-farcy into the equines of the Chitral Relief Force, I, at the outset, instituted a system of careful inspection by Veterinary Officers—real close examinations—in all equines in and plying between Nowshera and Dargai, and they included ekka, cart, postal and private equines: each owner received a small ticket of his animals' identity and freedom from disease, and which he had to produce at every subsequent examination for redating and reinitialling.

170. This entailed very great labour to my officers, but it was absolutely necessary and eminently satisfactory. Not a single animal of the 45,000 left Nowshera or returned unexamined by Veterinary Officers or their subordinates, as the in and out boat-bridges were constantly guarded by them.

171. When inspecting the Gwalior transport ponies at Jalala on the 29th April, I discovered the first case of glanders-farcy.

172. Several ponies were specially isolated and the affected troop put off the working line for two months, and up to the 4th August, 11 cases were destroyed; also 11 Government, 2 hired, and 2 ekka ponies, at and between Khar and Nowshera.

173. No cases occurred in Government or hired mules and donkeys until the 10th September, when one hired mule was destroyed for glanders at Serai: till then only ponies were affected. One case in a pony is believed to have occurred at Chitral, two at Chakdara and one at Biram, but none were verified by Veterinary Officers.

GENERAL REMARKS.

Veterinary Medicines for Field Service.

216. The adoption of medicines in the tabloid or other concentrated form for hypodermic or intratracheal or other similar administration is worthy of the most earnest consideration in order to save carriage and at the same time increase supplies. Solid medicines and antiseptic applications soluble in water are most desirable.

217. Some solid preparation, soluble in water, certain to destroy the (scabies) mange insect in animals is much wanted, to save the transport of large quantities of *tara meru* oil, oil of tar and oils of sorts. A sure insect destroyer soluble in water, which shall be safe for the animal, would be a distinct gain.